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Abstract 
 
The BRICS, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, accounts for 40 
percent of global population and is predicted to be the largest economic group by 2050.  
Outward foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the BRICS has grown rapidly, from around 
US$7 billion in 2000 to US$126 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013).  The European Union 
(EU) is traditionally a major beneficiary of FDI.  However, there is few studies on the 
BRICS outward FDI, and there is relatively little evidence on how BRICS FDI differs in 
its characteristics between the BRICS countries and its location at a European level.  The 
purpose of the thesis is to explore BRICS FDI location in the EU countries over the period 
1997-2010.  The thesis analyses data on over 35,000 FDI projects from the European 
Investment Monitor.  The period covers the early stages of BRICS FDI and its growth, 
and the fifth EU enlargement to include the Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC).  
Conditional Logit, Multinomial Logit and count data methods are used, where the first 
two consider the dummy for a location as the dependent variable and the last one is used 
to control for the large number of zeros in the data. 
 The thesis makes three main contributions.  First, it describes BRICS FDI location 
in the EU countries (i.e. members in 2010), cross-tabulating this according to 
characteristics such as industry and function.  Second, it finds many host country 
characteristics have an effect on global FDI location, but only a few of these are significant 
for the BRICS, of which the main factors are the GDP growth rate, higher education (i.e. 
tertiary education) rate, wage rate, exchange rate and political risk.  Furthermore, 
Multinomial Logit model allows the project characteristics and sources to vary, such as 
the industry, function, investment type and global source region.  The results reveal 
significant differences in BRICS FDI location between the old and new Member States, 
except the three main destination countries (i.e. France, Germany and the UK).  Russian 
FDI tends to go to Central and Eastern Europe, Brazil FDI to Spain and Portugal, while 
there are differences in Chinese and Indian FDI location, both of which have grown 
strongly. 
 The third contribution of the thesis is to examine the “follow-the-leader” behaviour, 
whereby FDI location in a country follows FDI from the same source in the preceding 
xiv 
 
year.  This is explored using both the Conditional Logit and count data models. Statistical 
analysis shows that there is persistence in the country location whether it is considered 
over a one or two-year time horizon.  The logit analysis shows that at the level of the 
BRICS group, BRICS FDI prefers the location of FDI from the same BRICS country but 
it tends to avoid the location of other BRICS FDI as a whole.  At the individual BRICS 
level, China and India are the investment leaders of the five BRICS countries.  The results 
are less clear for the count data methods. The exact reason for the ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour is not known (e.g. it could be agglomeration economies, linkages or some 
unobserved heterogeneity, such as cultural factors), but it is worthy of further exploration.  
Overall, the thesis finds that outward FDI from the BRICS should not be treated as 
homogeneous.  While there is evidence that BRICS FDI spreads out to other countries as 
it grows, and differences in BRICS FDI location at the European country level are likely 
to persistent over time. 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
This thesis explores the location choice of BRICS Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
25 European Union (EU) countries from 1997 to 2010. The BRICS is the group of five 
emerging and industrializing countries that comprise Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa, while the EU is traditionally a major beneficiary of FDI.  There are few 
studies that have examined the outward FDI from BRICS, and there is relatively little 
evidence on how this FDI differs in its characteristics between the BRICS countries and 
its location at a European level.   A particular focus for this thesis is on whether BRICS 
investment tends to agglomerate, which is examined by exploring whether there is 
‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in FDI location (i.e. if BRICS FDI tends to locate in the 
same countries as previous FDI from the same BRICS country or the BRICS as a whole), 
or whether it ‘avoids’ previous FDI from other BRICS countries, so that there is 
distinctiveness in its nature.  The period 1997-2010 covers the early stages of BRICS FDI 
and considers the negative effect of financial crisis on the FDI flows.  It also includes the 
fifth EU enlargement, which admitted countries from Central and Eastern Europe.  
 The term ‘BRIC’ was first coined in 2003 by Jim O’Neill, the Head Economist at 
Goldman Sachs.  It originally included the four largest and fastest growing emerging 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), but in 2010 South Africa was added to this 
group.  There is a common feature for these countries as each has a large population, 
territory and economic size, such that BRICS countries have 40 per cent of the world 
population and produce 25 per cent of global GDP.  However, they have low levels of 
income, but fast economic growth.  Of course, the study period actually precedes the 
inclusion of South Africa, but overall it can be viewed as representing the early-stage 
investment of these countries as they invested abroad.  UNCTAD defines FDI as an 
investment that is controlled by an enterprise resident in one economy of an enterprise 
resident in another economy, which involves a long-term relationship and represents a 
lasting benefit in the host economy (see Ranjan and Agrawal, 2011).  It is an important 
sign of economic globalization, which means that it has become one of the main pillars of 
internationalization for firms and it is treated as the main channel of international 
2 
 
competition from the perspective of the micro-economy.  The level of global FDI flows 
is much lower than that of trade flows, but FDI may be a more effective channel by which 
to promote the diffusion of technology, the transfer of capital, knowledge and other skills 
(Driffield and Taylor, 2000). 
The BRICS are of interest as the emerging economies are playing an increasingly 
important role in the world economy and are attracting closer attention (e.g. India is now 
the third highest investor in the UK).  Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012) indicate that most 
previous research in international business concentrates on the motives and forms of 
outward FDI from developed countries.  More recently, there has been a change in the 
patterns of FDI, with more companies from emerging markets investing abroad, and 
BRICS are expected to be the richest countries in the world and largest economic group 
by 2050.  Therefore, they are likely to have an increasing effect on the global economy.  
The EU is the largest host region for the global FDI inflows, as the summary in Milelli et 
al. (2010) makes clear.  In 2007, FDI in the EU occupied 44% of the total global inflows 
(more than 800 billion US dollars), while EU is a significant trade partner with many other 
countries.  Further, outward FDI from the BRICS has traditionally sought raw materials, 
such as Chinese FDI in Africa and Australia, but BRICS investment in the EU can be 
treated as the first step of internationalisation for the BRICS countries (Holtbrügge and 
Kreppel, 2012).  Overall, it is therefore of great interest to concentrate on the EU as the 
host recipient of BRICS FDI outflows. 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
FDI has increased considerably since the beginning of the 1980s, which is no doubt 
because it has advantages compared to trade.  In general, FDI allows firms in the source 
country to get access to a foreign market, while for the host country it provides an 
opportunity to stimulate economic integration and growth.  Figure 1.1 shows that both 
global and EU FDI inflows have trended upwards over the period from 1997 to 2010, 
albeit with some fluctuation.  It reached a peak in 2007, which is when Bulgaria and 
Romania acceded as part of the fifth enlargement of the European Union. 
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Figure 1.1: Global and EU FDI Inflows, Billion US Dollars, 1997-2010 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2003, 2005 
and 2011). 
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In general, Figure 1.1 shows that global FDI inflows have a relatively lower level with a 
slight decrease before year 2003, after that there is a sharp increase in the global FDI 
inflows and it reaches the peak at 1970.9 billion US dollars in 2007.  However, a sharp 
decrease occurs in 2008 and 2009 as the onset of the global financial crisis, where the 
inflows drop by 40%.  In 2010, global FDI inflows recover slightly, rising to $1243.7 
billion.  The EU shows a similar pattern over the study period.  It can be seen that EU FDI 
inflows occupy nearly 50% of all global inflows in most years, but excluding the period 
of the financial crisis.  EU FDI inflows also increased considerably during the period of 
enlargement (2004-07), reaching $850.5 billion in 2007 (i.e. 43.2% of global inflows).  
The figure suggests a delay between the global and EU inflows, as the former decreases 
up to 2003 and then increases, but EU inflows fall until 2004 due to the decrease in the 
total flows to the EU-15 countries by 40% from the level of 2003.  This is because EU-15 
has the relative lower level of economic growth and there are “large scale repayments of 
intra-firm credits by foreign affiliates to their parent firms abroad in some major host 
countries” (UNCTAD, 2005).  At the end of this period, the global inflows are rising, but 
EU inflows still decline and account for just 24.5% of global FDI inflows. 
Inward FDI has a significant effect on the development of host economies, which 
can be treated as a catalyst for economic growth.  According to de Mello (1999), there are 
both direct and indirect effects of FDI on economic growth.  The direct effects relate to 
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factors that link the source and host countries, such as the exchange rate or import 
substitution. The indirect effect occurs in the host country, and improves the efficiency of 
firms through spillovers.  These spillovers mean that domestic firms improve their 
competitiveness in international markets by assimilating the advanced technology and 
knowledge.  FDI could also promote economic development through the innovation and 
imitation.  In addition, there may be changes in the employment and labour costs.  It 
creates employment by building new facilities or by stimulating high technology sectors, 
but equally it causes the closure of domestic competitor firms, perhaps through higher 
wages (Moosa, 2002).  FDI could also lead to wage inequality and to the use of more 
highly-skilled labour (Driffield and Taylor 2000). 
 This thesis focuses on FDI originating from emerging and industrializing countries 
in the developed economies, so that the reverse spillovers of the inward FDI cannot be 
ignored.  It indicates that the desire of foreign firms investing in developed countries is to 
acquire the technology from these host countries, rather than spread their own advantages.  
Driffield and Love (2002) believe that there is the growth in the productivity of foreign 
firms through the investment in domestic sectors, but this growth is limited to R&D-
intensive sectors and the effect of reverse spillovers will be greater at those industries 
where spatial concentration is greater.  Overall, both the host and source countries can 
benefit from the FDI flows, which means that it is necessary to understand FDI flows 
more deeply. 
The EU is a main destination of global FDI flows, and indeed the growth rate of 
outward FDI from emerging markets to the EU has exceeded that of developed markets. 
This trend is likely to continue into the future.  Figure 1.2 compares the difference in the 
number of FDI projects in the EU between the BRICS and other sources, whether arising 
from the EU or from non-BRICS and non-EU countries.  It shows that BRICS FDI 
increases, but it is not a main source of FDI projects located in the EU.  At its height, the 
number of projects from the BRICS accounts for only 7% of FDI projects received by the 
EU in 2010.   
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Figure 1.2: FDI in the EU from Different Sources, 1997-2010 
 
Source: European Investment Monitor (EIM) database.   
Note: EU members at 2010 are included, excluding Cyprus and Malta. 
2 
Havlik et al. (2009) explain the possible reasons for the low level of investment activities 
of BRICS are that all BRICS countries are still in the process of international expansion 
during these years, which means that they are not international enough currently.  In 
particular, the targets of FDI from China and India are Asia and Africa, and the activities 
of Brazil are still limited. Overall, these low level activities can explain that the main 
activities of BRICS firms in the EU are still exports rather than FDI.  
Figure 1.3 shows the tendency of BRICS FDI projects in the EU to increase over 
the study period from 1997 to 2010.  It can be seen that there are very few BRICS projects 
at the start of the period, but the number increases sharply from about the year 2000, so 
that there are nearly 250 investment projects from the BRICS per annum by the end of the 
study period. 
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Figure 1.3: Number of projects from BRICS in the EU, 1997-2010 
 
Source: European Investment Monitor (EIM) database.   
Notes: EU members at 2010 are included, excluding Cyprus and Malta. Figure 1.3 is the 
same to Figure 1.2 for the BRICS. 
3 
In total, there are 1,415 projects from the BRICS over this period, which means that there 
is a sufficient number of observations to explore BRICS investment.  Figure 1.4 below 
plots the number of projects from each BRICS country over time, while Table 1.1 shows 
the number of projects from each BRICS country by sub-period.  These show that each 
BRICS country has experienced an increasing trend for FDI in the EU over time, so that 
they are each in the process of international expansion over the study period.   
 
Figure 1.4: The Number of FDI Projects from Each BRICS Country in the EU, 1997-2010 
 
Source: European Investment Monitor (EIM) database.   
Note: EU members at 2010 are included, excluding Cyprus and Malta. 
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Table 1.1: BRICS FDI in the EU: Number of Projects, 1997 to 2010 
Source 1997 - 2000 2001 - 2005 2006 - 2010 Total 
Brazil 2 19 49 70 
Russia 10 58 97 165 
India 27 130 385 542 
China 16 121 406 543 
South Africa 29 28 38 95 
BRICS 84 356 975 1,415 
Source: European Investment Monitor (EIM) database.   
Note: EU members at 2010 are included, excluding Cyprus and Malta. 
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Overall, the number of projects from each of the five BRICS countries is very low prior 
to the year 2000, at under 20 projects a year, but since then the number of projects from 
China and India starts to increase significantly and reaches a high level in 2010.  Table 
1.1 shows that in the last sub-period, the projects from China and India have increased by 
25.4 and 14.3 times respectively compared to the first sub-period, and that together they 
account for more than half of all BRICS projects in the EU countries.  In total, China and 
India reach a similar number of projects, with 543 and 542 projects respectively.  For the 
other three countries, their FDI increase is much slower.  According to Ranjan and 
Agrawal (2011), China and India will be the main global supplier of manufactured goods 
over the coming decades, and Brazil, Russia and South Africa will be the dominant 
suppliers of raw materials. 
FDI flows measured by value from UNCTAD is described in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5 discusses this issue based on the number of FDI projects from EIM database.  
The former measures the value of FDI in net terms and also includes Merger and 
Acquisitions. The advantages of EIM database include showing the FDI flows in gross 
terms and identifying the location choice of FDI based on the discrete projects.  
 
1.2. Aims of the Thesis 
 
Europe is both an important source and host for FDI, but currently most research focuses 
on outward FDI from the developed economies.  It means that there is a gap in our 
knowledge and understanding of the determinants for the location choice of FDI from 
both emerging and industrializing economies.  The main purpose of this thesis is to 
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explore the determinants for the BRICS FDI location choice in the EU countries.  Our 
dataset is the European Investment Monitor, which is compiled by Ernst and Young, 
comprising more than 35,000 investment projects in Europe over the period 1997-2010, 
of which 1,415 originate from the BRICS.  These are 25 EU countries at 2010, but 
excluding Cyprus and Malta, for which data were not collected prior to their EU accession 
in 2004.  These are small island economies that receive little FDI.  The database covers 
the fifteen Member States prior to 2004 and the ten countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs) that joined in 2004 or 2007.  In total, I refer to these as the EU-25 
countries, and the data for these were presented in the above tables and figures. 
There are three aims, which correspond to the contributions of this thesis, as 
follows: 
 
AIM I: To reveal the characteristics of early-stage BRICS FDI in the EU-25 countries by 
implementing a descriptive statistics analysis over the period 1997-2010. 
 
AIM II: To investigate the locational determinants of BRICS FDI in the EU-25 compared 
to other global regions, and to examine the probability of FDI location. 
 
AIM III: To analyse the persistence in the location choice of FDI from each BRICS 
country, and to examine their ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour. 
 
The thesis analyses the European Investment Monitor (EIM) database.  The first aim gives 
an overview on the nature of BRICS FDI in the EU-25 over the study period, including 
the spatial distribution of this FDI and how it has changed over time.  The second aim 
seeks to confirm the locational determinants for the FDI in the EU-25 countries using a 
Conditional Logit model.   It focuses on the determinants for BRICS FDI location, which 
are compared to the general determinants for FDI from elsewhere.  To examine 
heterogeneity of projects, it allows the project characteristics and sources to vary and 
discusses the relative probabilities of location.  Finally, the third aim uses a ‘goodness-of-
fit’ test to examine whether FDI from each BRICS country ‘follows’ the previous FDI 
from the same country.  Then, the regression analysis (i.e. logit and count data models) 
further explores the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS FDI and whether it ‘avoids’ 
the FDI of other BRICS countries. 
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Overall, these three aims enable me to consider the nature of early-stage BRICS FDI in 
the EU countries and its location determinants.  It allows me to consider whether this FDI 
has built-up in some countries, such as through the presence of some agglomeration 
economy of some kind, or whether BRICS FDI from different countries is distinct, so that 
it is driven by different location factors and tends to ‘avoid’ the FDI arising from other 
BRICS countries.  If so, it suggests BRICS FDI is distinct and should be considered as 
heterogeneous. 
 To the best of my knowledge, the existing literature concentrates on the FDI 
outflows from developed economies to developing or emerging economies, so that there 
is little known about the generation of FDI from developing countries (see Gammeltoft, 
2008).  Therefore, this thesis fills the gap on the location of foreign investment from the 
developing economies.  UNCTAD (2014) indicates that outward FDI from developing 
economies has been increasing considerably recently, representing nearly 40% of global 
FDI outflows, compared to just 12% at the beginning of the 2000s.  The rapid growth of 
BRICS outward FDI makes an important contribution to this currently accounting for 
about a third of developing economies’ FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2013). 
 Turning to the methodology, the investment characteristics of BRICS countries 
(AIM I) are analysed using descriptive statistics.  First of all, the temporal pattern of FDI 
flows from the world, developed and developing economies are compared to show that 
outward FDI from developing economies is playing an increasingly important role in the 
global FDI outflows.  This is because their FDI increases and it now account for a 
considerable share of global FDI outflows.  Meanwhile, the outward FDI from developed 
economies suffers a sharp decline from 2007 to 2009.  Second, the FDI trends of the five 
global regions that contain the five BRICS countries are explored.  This analysis includes 
South America, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), South Asia, East Asia 
and Southern Africa.  Finally, the FDI flows of the BRICS and each country within the 
BRICS are investigated to show their main location choice, tendency over time and other 
investment characteristics.  It gives us a good understanding of the location choice of 
BRICS FDI in the EU-25 and it is a good first step towards analysing its locational 
determinants. 
 Econometric analysis is implemented for examining the determinants of the 
location choice of FDI from different sources in the EU-25, especially for BRICS FDI 
location (AIM II).  For this aim, a Conditional Logit model is used to capture the discrete 
location choice of FDI between alternative locations.  It is perhaps the main econometric 
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technique for discrete choice, although it is based on the assumption of the Independent 
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).  First, the overall effects of different determinants on the 
global FDI location is explored to confirm which determinants have a significant effect 
generally.  Second, FDI from different source regions (i.e. Europe, North America, BRICS 
and Other) are considered to compare the different locational determinants that attract FDI 
from different source regions.  Finally, I explore the locational determinants of BRICS 
FDI in the EU-25 countries. 
 The Multinomial Logit model is also used to determine the relative probability of 
FDI location in each EU-25 country (AIM II).  This model enables both the project and 
source characteristics to be explored together, and it calculates the probabilities relative 
to a base country (i.e. the UK).  The characteristics of the projects from different sources 
are examined and it is explored how this influences the location choice across EU-25 
countries.  The project characteristics considered are the project industrial sector (i.e. 
manufacturing and other), the project function (headquarters / R&D and other) and the 
project investment mode (start-up or other).  First I allow only the project characteristics 
to vary; then I allow only the FDI sources to vary (i.e. each BRICS country and all other 
global regions); and finally I allow both of these variations simultaneously.  The effect of 
each country variable (i.e. location characteristics) can be examined through this model, 
for which the same set of variables is considered throughout.    The UK is chosen as the 
base country as it receives the greatest number of projects across all of the EU-25 countries. 
 To explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of each BRICS country (AIM III), I first 
use a simple ‘goodness-of-fit’ test to compare the observed FDI location data by country 
with that which is ‘expected’ based on the previous location of FDI from the same BRICS 
country.  The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no significant difference between 
the observed and expected data.  I examine the persistence in FDI location over a one-
year and two-year time horizon.  An issue for BRICS FDI is how to deal with the small 
number of projects in earlier years, including a large number of zero observations.  For 
this purpose the study period is classified into three sub-periods (1997-2000, 2001-05 and 
2006-10) to increase the number of observations and to investigate the persistence in FDI 
location. 
This issue is also explored using the Conditional Logit (CL) and count data models.  
In both these cases, the lagged BRICS term (i.e. number of projects from the whole BRICS 
locating in each country in the preceding year) is used to capture this effect.  In the CL 
model it is first disaggregated into the five constituent countries to examine whether 
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BRICS FDI as a whole follows the previous FDI of any individual BRICS country. Further, 
to explore this for each BRICS country and maintain a sufficiently large number of 
observations, the projects for each BRICS country are matched with those projects from 
the same BRICS country in the same host country in the preceding year (i.e. ‘Same BRICS 
Country’).  In addition, the difference in the number of projects between the whole BRICS 
and ‘Same BRICS Country’ is also introduced (i.e. ‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS 
Country’).  They are used to examine whether BRICS FDI ‘follows’ the location of 
previous FDI from the same country, but also whether it ‘avoids’ the location of FDI from 
the other four BRICS countries, if so that they are distinct. 
To further explore these issues, the FDI projects are analysed as count data using 
both a log-linear model and other count data models such as the Poisson and Negative 
Binomial models.  To facilitate the comparison of the results the explanatory variables are 
basically the same as those considered in the CL model.  As before, the lagged FDI terms 
capture whether FDI ‘follows’ that from the same BRICS country in the following period, 
and also whether it ‘avoids’ the FDI from other BRICS countries.  OLS estimation of the 
log-linear model is used as the benchmark, where the FDI dependent variable and lagged 
FDI terms are measured by the log of original number of projects plus one. This solves 
the problem caused by the zero observations and reduces the volatility of absolute changes 
in the number of projects to improve the nature of the regression results.  The Poisson and 
Negative Binomial (NB) models that are in principle more suitable for analysing discrete 
count data are also used, where the latter allows for over-dispersion in the count data.  
Several more advanced models are also considered that allow for the large number of zero 
observations in the count data including the Hurdle, Zero-Inflated and Zero-Truncated 
models.  Results from these models are compared with those of the CL model to examine 
‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of the BRICS countries. 
 
1.3. The FDI Data 
 
The FDI data analysed in this thesis are from the European Investment Monitor (EIM), 
which provides information on cross-border investment in Europe for each year since 
1997.1  The EIM is compiled by Ernst and Young, which is the leader for providing online 
information and tracking inward investment across Europe.  The sources used to construct 
                                                            
1 Further details of the EIM database are available at: http://www.eyeim.com/ 
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the EIM are national investment agencies, financial information providers and media 
outlets (Defever, 2012). Ernst and Young (2012) claim to monitor 20,000 information 
sources to identify the projects, and to contact the vast majority of firms to validate the 
data.  It captures investment that adds to the gross capacity of a country only, so that it 
excludes mergers and acquisitions, as well as license agreements and portfolio 
investments, which are not usually considered as FDI.  It classifies investment into three 
modes or types: new (‘greenfield’) investment, co-location and expansion (‘brownfield’) 
investment. Detailed information on the projects is also supplied, including the host 
country, ultimate country of origin, industry sector and project function. 
The EIM database gives information for 35,105 projects in the 25 EU countries 
over the study period, where new investments are the main type of project, comprising 
two-thirds of all projects.  Projects originating from the EU-25 make-up nearly half of all 
projects and the US accounts for around 32% of all projects.  The top three destinations 
are the UK, France and Germany, which combined account for about half of all 
investments.  The industry sectors are classified according to nine industries comprising 
agriculture, construction, education and health, energy, finance and business services, 
manufacturing, recreation, retail and hospitality, and transport and communications, with 
manufacturing accounting for 58% of all projects.  Ten project functions are identified, of 
which the main ones are production (34.7%) and sales and marketing (34.5%).  The 
investment scale is known for 31% of projects, but the number of gross jobs associated 
with a project (i.e. new jobs) is known for 62% of projects.  
The data on the explanatory variables used in this thesis was gathered from 
Eurostat, which provides economic statistics for the countries of the EU on a harmonized 
basis.  Some countries joined the EU over the study period, but the data for these countries 
were collected from 1997.  The determinants for FDI location are classified according to 
previous studies (e.g. Sun et al., 2002).  These are organized in my thesis in terms of 
theories such as the New Economic Geography (NEG) and New Growth Theory (NGT), 
where the categories includes variables for demand, the labour market, costs, education, 
trade and EU policy.  This thesis focuses on the characteristics of host country for the 
location choice of FDI.  This is the conditional logit model, and differences in the 
characteristics of source countries are allowed to separately regress for the different 
BRICS countries based on the multinomial logit model.  All variables are at the country 
level and the previous investment of different global regions is introduced as explanatory 
variables.  Some variables are constructed by the author, so that, for example, a variable 
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is included for EU membership.  Finally, the relevant data are in the real terms using the 
EU country deflator and are in Euros at 2005 prices. 
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Overall, including this Introduction, the thesis is divided into nine chapters.  The structure, 
in relation to the Aims of the thesis, is as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the literature on FDI 
location determinants, including both theoretical and empirical studies.  The beginning of 
this chapter defines FDI formally and emphasizes its importance in the international 
economy.  After that, Chapter 2 introduces the early theories of FDI, mainly concentrating 
on the international business literature.  The ‘eclectic paradigm’ is discussed to reveal a 
more specific locational dimension to this theory.  The chapter then turns to more specific 
location theories to further understand FDI location, including Marshallian agglomeration 
economies, the New Economic Geography (NEG) and New Growth Theory (NGT). These 
form the basis for the empirical analysis of the thesis.  After discussing the theory, the 
chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the FDI location choice by discussing the 
traditional factors and the role of agglomeration economies, including production linkages 
and knowledge spillovers. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the location of BRICS FDI, focusing on locations in Europe.  
It examines the main locations and the special locational determinants for the BRICS FDI 
using published data from UNCTAD (AIM I).  There are several aspects to this.  First, 
the chapter describes global FDI flows distinguishing between the developed and 
developing economies.  After this, the location choices and trends in FDI across different 
global regions are explored.  Second, FDI flows for all BRICS countries are explored and 
compared, providing a general framework and understanding for the empirical analysis 
on ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour (AIM III).  Third, ‘OLI paradigm’ in Chapter 2 indicates 
that the location choice of FDI is determined by the host country characteristics, so that 
Chapter 3 examines the general locational determinants and special ones for individual 
BRICS FDI, including the country, industry and firm level factors. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used for exploring the location choice of FDI 
in the EU-25 at a country level.  These include the discrete choice models such as the 
Multinomial Logit and Conditional Logit models that analyse the location choice of FDI 
among a set of alternative locations.  This chapter also discusses the models appropriate 
for count data analysis to capture the number of FDI projects locating in a given country.  
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Specifically, this chapter describes the models of binary choice to provide a basic 
understanding of the Conditional Logit and Multinomial Logit models.  The former is 
used to examine the location choice of FDI projects in the EU-25 (AIM II), including the 
‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS countries’ FDI (AIM III), and the latter explores 
the relative probability of FDI location in a country (AIM II).  After this, count data 
models (Poisson and Negative Binomial models) are described.  Finally, this chapter 
discusses several more advanced count data models, such as the Hurdle, Zero-Inflated and 
Zero-Truncated models, which are more appropriate for BRICS FDI count data, which 
contain many zero observations. 
 Chapter 5 describes the nature of EIM FDI data and other variables that form the 
independent variables in the analysis.  This chapter gives information on the EIM database, 
including the nature of the FDI projects that are covered by this database.  The 
characteristics of these FDI projects is then explored in great detail in terms of a range of 
factors, such as the temporal trend, the destination and source countries, the industry sector 
and the functional activity.  This is followed by a more-detailed analysis of the data 
through the cross-tabulating various characteristics.  The last part of the chapter describes 
the explanatory variable.  This includes the motivation for these terms based on Chapter 
2, their measurement and the data source.  Summary statistics and correlation matrices for 
each explanatory variable are presented to check that the variables are not correlated 
strongly. 
In Chapter 6 the importance of BRICS FDI to the EU-25 countries is investigated 
using the EIM database.  This analysis compares BRICS and non-BRICS countries’ FDI 
and also explores the investment by each BRICS country.  The comparison between 
BRICS and non-BRICS FDI makes a distinction between the EU-15 and CEEC-10, given 
that most FDI projects tend to favour the former.  The characteristics of the BRICS 
investment is explored according to the industry sector, functional activity and project 
type (i.e. ‘greenfield’ start-up or ‘brownfield’ expansion), which contributes towards the 
first aim (AIM I).  The persistence in the BRICS FDI location choice over time (i.e. a 
tendency to locate in the same countries over time) is examined using a ‘goodness-of-fit’ 
test (AIM III). 
Chapter 7 uses regression analysis to explore the determinants for the BRICS FDI 
location choice (AIM II) and also to examine how BRICS investment locates in relation 
to earlier investment, which is known as the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour (AIM III).  
First, this chapter analyses the effect of the country variables and FDI lagged terms on 
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global FDI location based on the Conditional Logit model.  This confirms that different 
characteristics of the host countries are attractive to FDI from different sources.  Second, 
this chapter explores the same issue for BRICS FDI only, focusing on ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour.  Two new variables are introduced that capture the number of projects from 
the same BRICS country and from the other four BRICS countries.  Finally, the 
probability of BRICS FDI locating in each country is examined relative to the UK base 
case.  This uses the Multinomial Logit model, which allows the characteristics of FDI to 
vary (AIM II).  These comprise the project characteristics (i.e. industry sector, functional 
activity and project type) and the investment source (i.e. BRICS countries, Europe and 
North America). 
Different empirical models are used in Chapter 8 to investigate BRICS FDI 
location using project counts.  These models are based on the data on the number of 
projects in a country in a year.  The analysis concentrates on whether there is evidence for 
supporting the conclusion of Chapter 7 on the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS 
FDI (AIM III), and the results are compared to those obtained by logit analysis in Chapter 
7.  This chapter examines whether FDI from one BRICS country ‘avoids’ the location of 
FDI from the other BRICS under the hypothesis that this FDI is interested in different 
locational determinants. For these purposes, the OLS estimation of a log-linear model 
gives the benchmark results, which are compared with those from the Poisson and 
Negative Binomial (NB) models, which are more suitable for discrete count data.  In order 
to deal with the issue of excessive zero observations, two-stage models are used, including 
the Hurdle, Zero-Inflated and Zero-Truncated models. 
Finally, Chapter 9, summarises the main results of the thesis and draws 
conclusions in relation to the research questions of the thesis.  In addition to the main 
findings, the policy implications are considered, referring to the investment strategy for 
BRICS countries in the EU and their policy orientation for the development of their 
economy.  Finally, this chapter summarises the advantages and limitations of this thesis, 
for which it also provides ideas and suggestion for further study. 
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Chapter 2. A Review of FDI Location Determinants 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is seen as a channel for promoting economic growth and 
assisting the development of economies that are either under-developed or in transition.  
FDI is also a mechanism used to link national economies and promote an outward-looking 
international economy that fosters the increased globalization of an economy.  In 
particular, FDI is a tool that can enable lagging countries to overcome their organizational 
gaps and realise their objectives by introducing new production techniques (Barrell and 
Holland, 2000), with the most important channel for the transfer of modern technology 
being spillovers from FDI (Blomstrom, 1989).  According to Kok and Ersoy (2009) FDI 
affects income, production, prices, employment and the economic growth of a host 
country, while Ho and Rashid (2011) suggest that FDI also improves capital stocks and 
employment levels by generating new production capacity and promoting the transfer of 
intangible assets.  Overall, the implications of the positive benefits that FDI brings into an 
economy are that countries will try to create a favourable environment to attract even 
greater levels of inward FDI (Bhavan et al. 2011).   
This chapter aims to review the previous theoretical and empirical research on the 
determinants of FDI location.  According to van Aarle and Skuratowicz (2000), the 
theories related to FDI location can be classified into several types, which are based on 
the one hand on the international business literature and on the other hand on the 
economics literature that includes the New Economic Geography and New Growth 
Theory.  The international business literature, mainly in the form of Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm, shows that firm-specific characteristics are the main driver behind the decision 
of a firm to locate abroad.  However, these characteristics are not sufficient to enable FDI, 
but instead there must also be incentives to physically undertake the investment rather 
than to export or to license the product.  This leads to the importance of specific locational 
determinants of FDI, such as the size of the host market and the cost of factors of 
17 
 
production in the host economy.  The theories of New Economic Geography and New 
Growth Theory also highlight a number of determinants for FDI location, but their focus 
on the importance of agglomeration economies, such as inter-firm linkages and 
knowledge spillovers between firms, rather than the traditional location factors of the 
international business literature.  
Using the above theoretical framework, this chapter then reviews the empirical 
literature on FDI location.  It focuses on both the traditional and agglomeration variables 
and finds support for a large number of these location determinants.  Specifically, the 
importance of market size and labour costs is found amongst the traditional determinants, 
while for the agglomeration economies there is evidence to suggest that foreign firms 
decide to locate near the presence of other foreign firms, providing benefits from inter-
firm linkages and knowledge spillovers.  In particular, FDI is found to locate in areas 
where there is a presence of other foreign firms from the investors’ same home country, 
so that there may be a build-up of FDI from particular countries in a given area. 
 The structure of the literature review is as follows.  The next section introduces 
the early theories of FDI, which are centred on the international business literature.  
Section 2.3 then covers in detail the main theory of FDI, specifically the OLI paradigm.  
Section 2.4 discusses the importance of agglomeration economies and Section 2.5 reviews 
the empirical evidence for FDI location.  Section 2.6 concentrates on the issue of ‘follow-
the-leader’ behaviour.  Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2. Early Theories of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Dunning (1981) suggests that FDI is more than the transfer of capital within a firm, 
because it includes the transfer of technology, organisational and management skills, so 
that FDI also involves the transfer of a broad range of resources within the firm.  There 
are a number of theories explaining why FDI occurs and these emphasise certain aspects 
of multinational corporations.  These theories include Hymer’s (1960) international 
production, the product life cycle theory of Vernon (1966), horizontal and vertical theories 
of Caves (1971) and the internalisation theory of Buckley and Casson (1976).  These 
theories form a key part of Dunning’s eclectic theory (Dunning, 1977) that has 
subsequently become the main framework explaining FDI, so an understanding of these 
early theories is also important for understanding the eclectic paradigm. 
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2.2.1. The Theory of the International Operations of Firms 
 
According to Hymer (1960), in order to explain FDI, it is necessary to distinguish it from 
portfolio investment.  The key difference is that FDI gives the firm a level of control over 
its investment.  In particular, FDI is used by investors to control the activities of foreign 
firms, and this is the main basis of Hymer’s theory (Dunning and Rugman, 1985).  If a 
firm sets up production abroad, there are barriers to entry in the form of uncertainty and 
host country risk, such as nationalism and exchange rate risk.  Therefore, why does a firm 
engage in FDI given these barriers to international production?  Hymer suggests that by 
taking over or merging with firms in other countries the firm can reduce competition.  
However, this is not sufficient to explain why a firm may engage in FDI.  The necessary 
pre-condition is that the firm must access the foreign market to fully appropriate the profits, 
while FDI may also be important if there are problems in licensing the product. 
 
2.2.2. Product Life-Cycle Theory 
 
Vernon (1966) argues that the decision to produce in a foreign country is not based on the 
standard factor-cost analysis, but rather on a more complicated process. According to 
Vernon, the life cycle of a product has three main stages (where only in the second and 
third stages of a maturing or standardised product is FDI worthwhile): 
 
Stage One: Product development phase. The requirement in the product 
development phase is certainty, which means that communication between 
producers, suppliers and customers is important. These give rise to a location 
decision which means a product is situated close to its market. 
 
Stage Two: Maturing product phase. Increases in the demand for the product lead 
to a greater degree of standardisation, which decreases the dependence on the market.  
This can promote the development of economies of scale.  If the firm seeks to 
establish a plant abroad and the level of labour costs is lower, it will result in the 
foreign plant becoming a more cost-efficient location.  It may lead the foreign plant 
to export back to the home country.  As rivals of the firm will try to avoid the loss 
of their market share, it may lead to further FDI into the country from other firms. 
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Stage Three: Standardised product phase. In this stage, the standardisation of the 
product arrives at its peak, and now the international market is determined more by 
price competition. The low level of labour cost in less-developed countries offers an 
incentive for firms to establish plants in these areas.  Besides, since there is no large 
industrial environment in less-developed countries, the product can take on a high 
level of standardisation.  This means the inputs can be easily specified. 
 
Overall, the product life cycle theory focuses on the dynamics of FDI.  It is the first theory 
that genuinely integrates a location dimension into the process of foreign investment. 
 
2.2.3. Horizontal and Vertical Theories 
 
According to Caves (1971), horizontal FDI occurs when a firm gets access to a product 
market in a foreign country, whereas vertical FDI takes place when a firm goes into the 
product market at a different stage of production, i.e. as a supplier or customer.  These can 
be discussed as follows: 
 
Horizontal FDI.  If a firm has a unique set of assets that other firms do not have, or 
there are trade barriers on exports, such as tariffs, then a firm engages in horizontal 
FDI.  Both of these reasons could lead to FDI occurring in market structures that are 
characterised by oligopoly or product differentiation. Overall, it predicts that a 
feature of oligopolistic markets or where products are differentiated is the existence 
of horizontal FDI. 
 
Vertical FDI.  If a firm seeks to reduce strategic uncertainty or create entry barriers 
that prevent foreign firms gaining access to the market then it may engage in FDI at 
a different stage of the production chain.  If profits in the foreign market depend 
mainly on contracts, then vertical FDI is also more likely to be large in scale in order 
to avoid negotiating and other costs associated with contracts.  However, if there is 
no technological complementarity between different stages of production and the 
market is competitive then vertical FDI may not take place at all. 
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2.2.4. Internalisation Theory 
 
Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm highlights the importance of the internalisation of firms’ 
activities, and it was used and developed in the 1970s by a number of authors to explain 
the role played by transaction costs in forming multinational organisations and hence to 
explain international production and FDI.  One of the leading proponents of the 
internalisation theory, Buckley and Casson (1976) argue that the multi-national enterprise 
(MNEs) is essentially an extension of the multi-plant firm.  According to Buckley and 
Casson, the activities of firms are interdependent and connected by intermediate products, 
especially in the case of large firms.  If the market for intermediate products is imperfect, 
then an incentive may arise for firms to internalise intermediate goods.  When this 
internalisation takes place across national boundaries then a MNE emerges and FDI occurs.  
An important intermediate product in the internalisation theory of FDI is knowledge, 
which not only can give rise to internalisation but also internationalisation.  Overall, it 
suggests that MNEs tend to emerge in industries where knowledge is an important 
intermediate product.  The internalisation theory has played an important and popular role 
in the development of theories of FDI since the 1970s. 
 
2.3. The ‘Eclectic Paradigm’ 
 
The ‘eclectic paradigm’ of Dunning (1977) brings together a number of different theories 
of FDI discussed above into a general framework.  However, while these theories have 
explored questions mainly about why FDI occurs, the eclectic paradigm introduces a more 
specific location dimension to the theory of FDI, so it attempts to explain where FDI 
locates.   
 
2.3.1. The ‘OLI’ Framework 
 
The location choice of foreign investment may be determined by many factors, which are 
partly external and partly internal to the firm.  The best general framework to consider all 
of these factors together is the so-called ‘OLI paradigm’ developed by Dunning in 1977.  
The eclectic paradigm provides the basic outline for FDI theory (Resmini, 2000).  Prior 
to the paradigm there were many competing theories of FDI, so that the main advantage 
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of this approach is that it places these theories in a common framework to generate a single 
theory or paradigm (Jones and Wren, 2006).  The central premise of the eclectic paradigm 
is that it combines Hymer’s ‘ownership advantages’ theory with the ‘internalisation’ 
theory of FDI, while at the same time introducing a ‘location’ dimension to the FDI 
decision process.  In addition, the theory considers the effects of a range of factors, such 
as the characteristics of countries or industries on the ownership (O), location (L) and 
internalisation (I) advantages of FDI, i.e. the OLI framework.  Therefore, the eclectic 
paradigm can be seen as an all-encompassing and comprehensive explanation of FDI 
(Dunning, 2000). 
According to the eclectic paradigm, if a firm seeks to invest directly in a foreign 
country it must fulfil three necessary conditions.  The first condition is that it must have 
ownership-specific assets that are exclusive to it, so that the firm has an advantage over 
other firms.  This reflects the ownership advantages theory developed by Hymer (1960).  
Second, reflecting the internalisation theories of FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1976), the 
firm will internalise these assets within its firm structure rather than through contracting 
or licensing as long as these other methods have higher transaction costs (Mina, 2007).  
Finally, the firm must have an advantage in setting-up its production in a particular foreign 
country rather than exporting, so that there is also a specific location dimension to the 
paradigm.  Therefore, FDI is determined, first, by the extent of net ownership advantages 
that a firm possesses; second, by the internalisation advantages; and thirdly, by the 
profitability of locating its production at home or in foreign country (Pelegrín and Bolancé, 
2008).  Respectively, these are the Ownership, Internalisation and Location advantages, 
i.e. the ‘OLI’ framework of the eclectic paradigm, and these advantages are now explored 
in further details. 
 
2.3.2. The Ownership and Internalisation Advantages 
 
The ownership advantages are treated as particular assets, including both tangible and 
intangible assets, which are specific to the firm and provide the potential for the firm to 
earn greater profits in the future (Bevan and Estrin, 2004).  The ownership advantages 
include a range of factors such as the size of the firm, the level or quality of its 
management and its technological capabilities.  These ownership advantages may also 
strengthen themselves over time, for example due to economies of joint supply or through 
the possession of greater knowledge and information.  Therefore, a multinational 
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enterprise could acquire and develop a number of ownership-specific advantages over 
time. 
The internalisation advantages are ways by which a firm can maximise its gain 
from the ownership advantages in order to avoid imperfections of the market.  According 
to Jones and Wren (2006), the reasons for internalisation include “the avoidance of 
transaction costs, the protection of goods, avoidance of tariffs and the ability to capture 
economies of scale from production, marketing and finance” (p. 37).  Internalisation-
specific advantages can therefore give rise to a production process becoming internal to 
the firm.  For example, under the theory of internalisation, in order to better adjust existing 
products to local needs, R&D expenditure by foreign subsidiaries could help a firm adapt 
technologies that are created at home to the conditions of the host country (Pelegrín and 
Bolancé, 2008). 
According to Mina (2007) both the ownership and internalisation advantages are 
firm-specific (and home-country specific) as they arise within the firm from the home 
country, whereas the final set of advantages in the paradigm, the location advantages, tend 
to reflect the characteristics of the host-country (and are therefore host-country specific 
advantages). Caves (1996) notes that on the one hand OLI advantages rely on 
characteristics of the home country that permit a firm to develop its ownership advantages 
and to become a multinational, but on the other hand they depend on the characteristics of 
the host country that permit foreign firms that already possess ownership advantages to 
locate their economic activities there.  These location advantages are of interest to this 
thesis and they are now explored. 
 
2.3.3. The Location Advantages 
 
The location-specific advantages, the ‘L’ in the OLI paradigm, represent those factors that 
attract FDI into a particular market (Oxelheim et al., 2001).  As noted by Rugman and 
Gestrin (1993), location advantages (host-country specific advantages) are often a 
country’s national factor endowments in its aggregate production function. They can 
however also include the resources, networks, institutions and other facets that are specific 
to a given country (McCann and Mudambi, 2004).  Dunning (1998) notes the importance 
of locational advantages in the eclectic paradigm because it is a key determinant of the 
foreign production of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  Thus, if there are immobile 
factors that are natural or created endowments and a firm needs to use these with their 
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ownership-specific advantages, then this may affect its preference for a foreign rather than 
a domestic location. 
Location advantages include traditional factors such as input prices, transport and 
communication costs and government incentives, in addition to the other assets that a 
country possesses, such as natural and skilled resources. However, Dunning (1998) notes 
that there are many potential country-specific advantages including input cost advantages, 
labour productivity, access to knowledge-intensive assets such as higher education 
institutions, market size, transport costs and the (psychic) distance from key markets to 
the home country of the MNEs, in addition to tariff barriers, taxation, and market 
competition.  Overall, these factors make production in the country more attractive relative 
to the other means of international operations such as exporting. 
Overall, the OLI conditions for FDI are not evenly distributed across countries, 
which means that location is also determined by the specific factors of the source countries, 
as well as the host in which FDI locates.  In the case of ownership advantages, for instance, 
the size of the firm is affected by the market size of the source country since larger markets 
enable the firm to obtain ownership-specific advantages in the form of economies of scale.  
The degree to which firms can internalise their advantage may also be influenced by 
country-specific factors, such as institutional arrangements or by the competitive 
environment.  Finally, in the case of the location-specific factors, labour costs vary 
between developed and developing countries, and transport costs are partly determined by 
the distance between the source and host countries.  Therefore, the location characteristics 
are central to the OLI framework for explaining not only the underlying motives of why 
firms become foreign investors but also determining where the investors decide to locate.  
 
2.4. Economic Theories of Location 
 
The theories of FDI discussed above span both the economics and international business 
literatures and with the eclectic paradigm provide a general framework for explaining the 
rationale for being a multinational enterprise and engaging in FDI.  The location 
dimension of the eclectic paradigm is however still a relatively neglected element 
(Dunning, 1998), so that to further understand the location of FDI attention is now turned 
to more specific location theories from the economics literature.  Specifically, these 
theories comprise traditional neoclassical location factors, Marshallian agglomeration 
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economies and the modern expression of these in the New Economic Geography and New 
Growth Theory. 
 
2.4.1. Profit Function: Traditional Factors 
 
The traditional neoclassical location factors are those characteristics of host countries that 
affect a firm’s profits, but that are not directly related to the location of other firms, either 
in the same or different industries.  He (2002) indicates that these traditional determinants 
of FDI include market size (or potential), labour and capital costs, transport costs, and 
government policies such as financial incentives for FDI.  They also include the operating 
environment of a country, such as its openness to trade, the exchange rate, economic 
stability and country risk.  Reviewing the previous literature, the important traditional 
factors in the profit function (i.e. characteristics of the host country) mainly refer to the 
level of market demand (internal and external demand), labour market costs, education 
level, trade and host country policies.  These are included in our regression analysis in 
Chapters 7 and 8 to explore their effect on investment location.   
The internal market demand can be measured by GDP and GDP per capita, which 
are indicators for the scale of the economy and the benefits received by the citizens 
respectively.  The GDP growth rate reflects the position that an economy is in (e.g. 
recession, recovery or prosperity), and the population density represents the size of the 
consumer market.  In addition to these, it is necessary to consider the external market 
demand of the host country that could reflect market access to the host country.  Indicators 
for the labour market are unemployment and wage rates.  The former reflects the 
development of economy and society of the host country, but when it reflects the 
availability or quality of the labour force, there may be opposite effects on the location of 
investment.  For wage rate, the profit function shows that profits are lower with a higher 
wage rate as it increases the level of costs. 
Turning to the costs of investing in the host country, the profit function shows that 
the corporate income tax rate is an important factor as it could affect the firms’ net profit 
after-tax directly.  Based on the assumption of maximising profits, the corporate income 
tax rate has a negative effect on the investment location.  Better motorway density, 
reflecting a good road infrastructure could reduce the transport cost and save time, and so 
improve the level of profits.  In addition to these, the profit function also shows that it is 
necessary to consider the country risk that reflects the economic and social stability and 
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predictability of the host country based on the assumption of risk-aversion of investors.  
Education level represents the level of labour skills that further affects the wage level 
considered in the profit function.  In this sense, a labour force with a higher level of 
education normally requires a higher wage (i.e. increase in the cost), which causes a 
decrease in profits.  However, it also represents a higher level of technology, which could 
attract more investment inflows to the host country.   
Trade factors include the host country openness to trade and the exchange rate, 
where the former reflects the relative level of export and import of the host country.  The 
effect of this on location depends on the relationship with FDI (i.e. whether their 
relationship is complementary and substitution).  The exchange rate reflects the costs of 
labour and production that are considered in the profit function.  In particular, if the 
domestic currency appreciates there will be an increase in the costs of investing firms.  
Assuming risk-aversion, exchange rate volatility may also adversely affect FDI location. 
Finally, certain policies of the host country are considered as they can reduce the costs of 
investing firms, e.g. if the policy seeks to attract foreign investment. 
 
2.4.2. Agglomeration Economies 
 
Agglomeration economies are location-specific economies of scale (McCann, 2001).  
They can be classified into three categories: internal returns to scale, localization 
economies and urbanization economies, where the last two types are external to the 
investor (Parr, 2002).  Internal returns arise from economies of scale in production due to 
size and are treated as internal to the firm, while external economies provide advantages 
to firms in a given area but are generated from outside of the firm so that firms’ costs 
decrease when they enter into the location (Rasciute, 2008).  Localization economies are 
industry-specific external economies that cause firms in the same industry to locate in the 
same area, i.e. economies of scale that are external to the firm but are internal to an 
industry in an area.  Urbanization economies are city-specific economies of agglomeration, 
that again are external to the firm but differ from localization economies in that they flow 
across industries, where over larger spatial scales urbanization economies are known as 
Jacobs economies (Jacobs, 1969).  It is the localization economies, associated with 
Marshall (1920) that have received the greatest attention in the literature and given their 
importance in modern theories they will be discussed further. 
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The discussion of agglomeration economies derives mainly from the localization theory 
of Marshall (1920).  Marshall found that when an industry selects a locality, it tends to 
stay there for a long time.  This was because location brought advantages that encouraged 
other activity in the same industry to locate in the locality and this became mutually 
reinforcing.  In general, localization economies refer to firms in the same industry that are 
located together.  Overall, three sources of agglomeration economies are identified: local 
skilled-labour pool, non-traded local inputs and information spillovers (see McCann, 
2001).  They allow firms to experience localized external economies and are as follows: 
 
Local Skilled-labour Pool:  A specialized labour pool that can reduce the cost of 
labour, of which there are two aspects.  First, firms often need sufficient quantities 
of labour in a local area to respond to market conditions, so that they can expand 
their labour force quickly if market demand conditions improve rapidly, which 
increases their flexibility.  Second, firms also want to ensure that employees carry 
out tasks correctly and in many sectors the cost of training labour and the acquisition 
of skills are very high; however, if a firm is located in an area that has a large local 
labour pool with specialist skills that are required by the particular industry, the costs 
for the firm expanding its workforce are likely to be low.  According to Overman 
and Puga (2010), if plants in a sector experience shocks then they have the potential 
to benefit from labour pooling by drawing from other plants in the same industry 
that use similar workers.  Using establishment-level data from the UK Census of 
Production, and controlling for a range of factors, Overman and Puga (2010) show 
that these sectors tend to be spatially concentrated. 
 
Non-traded Local Inputs:  When some firms from an industry are in the same 
location, there may be specialist inputs that are provided in this location in a more 
efficient manner than in the case when firms are dispersed.  To distinguish these 
from consumed inputs, these inputs are ‘non-traded’. Firms providing specialist 
services, such as legal or software firms, tend to be located in certain areas and 
provide their services to certain market sectors.  The provision of specialist services 
is expensive, but if there are many firms located in the same place, the average cost 
of providing these services becomes lower.  Another type of non-traded local input 
is the specialist local infrastructure, where the market benefits from the local 
infrastructure and the cost is spread across all of the beneficiaries.  Therefore, non-
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traded local input costs will decrease for each firm in this location when there are 
more firms that have access to this location. 
 
Information Spillovers:  If firms from the same industry are located in the same 
location, they have contact with each other through business and other informal 
meetings, such as lunch meetings, sports activities and other occasions.  The 
exchange of information or knowledge permits each firm to establish a more 
coherent picture of the market, improving its ability to compete.  The advantage of 
spatial clustering is the mutual accessibility of all firms and therefore the increased 
availability of information and the greater likelihood of knowledge spillovers.  The 
firms in the location will have an information advantage relative to other firms, and 
the extent of this will depend on the number of agglomerated firms in the same 
location. 
 
Agglomeration is important within innovative industries (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001), 
where the innovative ability of multinationals strengthens the distribution of technological 
specification in the local area.  Overall, agglomerative sources include access to non-
traded inputs, such as infrastructure and local public goods; access to specific labour 
markets, i.e. labour market pooling; and the presence of knowledge spillovers. 
Turning to urbanization economies, they are another type of agglomeration 
economies that occur to firms among different sectors.  In addition to the above sources 
for agglomeration economies, there are some sources of urbanization economies that 
operate through the mechanisms of sharing, matching and learning (Puga, 2010), as 
follows: 
 
Sharing:  This mechanism includes sharing facilities, suppliers and labour pool.  
First, in the case of facilities, if there is a large fixed cost associated with the facilities 
that are being shared, the cost per user will decline when the size of the population 
that is sharing the facilities increases, encouraging agglomeration.  Scotchmer (2002) 
indicates that the growth of the user base will be restricted by the potential crowding 
of these facilities.  Second, sharing can apply to suppliers; if firms in a sector cluster 
to share intermediate suppliers, they can make large purchases and these 
intermediates can achieve economies of scale.  Finally, for labour pooling, if some 
firms have substantial variations in their employment relative to other firms that 
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have workers with similar skills, there may be an advantage for these firms to locate 
in places that contain many workers with these skills.  It means that an 
agglomeration may occur, as the concentration of employment can eliminate 
idiosyncratic shocks and can be conducive to the transfer of labour from low- to 
high-productivity firms. Ellison et al. (2010) find that across sectors, industries that 
have labour with similar skills also have an agglomeration pattern. 
 
Matching:  A larger market is conducive to better matching between employers and 
employees or consumers and suppliers.  For example, the skill-space can be better 
covered by firms in a large city that can reduce the average cost of mismatches.  It 
improves the opportunity for a suitable match, a match of good quality or a 
combination of these.  Berliant et al. (2006) find there is a higher probability of 
matching taking place in a larger market, which permits firms and workers to 
become more fastidious.  Further, when the average quality of matches increases, 
the higher probability of matching decreases.  For example, by studying the 
academic recruitment for new PhDs in Economics, Gan and Li (2004) find support 
that there will be a higher probability of matching if a specialization field has more 
candidates and vacancies. 
 
Learning:  In general, learning as one of the main sources for agglomeration 
economies has attracted less attention in the New Economic Geography compared 
to sharing and matching.  Glaeser (1999) uses a model to show that young workers 
prefer to migrate to large cities to interact with experienced workers who may help 
them obtain valuable skills, and to share the rents of this learning process with 
experienced workers who stay in these cities.  Duranton and Puga (2001) find that 
younger firms locate in an urban area to get information from experienced firms, 
such as hiring labour and controlling costs.  When these younger firms become 
mature, they may relocate to other specialized places.  In addition to the above 
transmission of advanced knowledge, large cities encourage the creation of new 
knowledge and arbitrary flows of information (Puga, 2010).  Furthermore, there is 
a complementary relationship between skills and agglomeration (Glaeser and 
Resseger, 2010).  It means skills can increase the benefits from agglomeration and 
agglomeration promotes the accumulation of skills.  Hence, there is a cumulative 
process, which leads to an agglomeration of activities. 
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Overall, all of above sources allow a firm to benefit from locating in the given area or 
industry where these economies arise.  This may lead to a spatial agglomeration of firms 
or clustering, and in turn can increase the possibility of the transfer of information, the 
provision of specialist services and the likelihood that the appropriately-skilled labour is 
available relative to dispersed locations, which increase the likelihood of further spatial 
agglomeration.  Agglomeration economies and the agglomeration of economic activities 
therefore become a self-reinforcing process. However, it only arises if agglomeration 
economies are stronger than the opposing forces of competition in the product or labour 
market that reduce the output price or push up input prices, causing firms to disperse in 
their location.  This is the central premise of the New Economic Geography and is now 
discussed in greater details. 
 
2.4.3. The New Economic Geography 
 
A modern interpretation of the Marshallian localization advantages helps underpin recent 
theories of spatial agglomeration.  This is the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature 
of industrial location, e.g. Krugman (1991) and Venables (1996). The NEG is a 
decentralised model of the economy and resulted partly as a response to dissatisfaction 
with earlier models of industrial location that were not based on microeconomic 
foundations.  It includes the fundamental trade-off between the agglomeration and 
dispersion forces in an equilibrium framework.  NEG focuses on the importance of market 
size, trade costs and external economies of scale in location and it is rooted in mainstream 
economics (Guimaraes et al., 2000).  Ultimately, it shows that an uneven location of 
economic activity can occur, i.e. spatial agglomeration, as an equilibrium process from 
the above sources of agglomeration economies rather than the standard neoclassical 
factors.  
The NEG emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for which Krugman (1991) 
indicates that market access or the ‘Home Market Effect’ (HME) was an early and 
important result of the NEG.  It states that an area that has the greatest home demand 
relative to endowments leads to greater levels of production of the good.  This is because 
inputs are costly to transport, but the goods produced and sold to the home market are not, 
and so firms locate in the larger markets and export to smaller ones.  Market size and 
transport costs are therefore key variables in the NEG theory that lead to an agglomeration 
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of economic activity.  In addition, there are other agglomeration sources that can produce 
an agglomeration of economic activity.  For example, the NEG presents an approach in 
which the forward and backward linkages (see Hirschman (1958) for a broader discussion 
on these) are a centripetal source that generates a process of agglomeration whereby 
producers locate close to their suppliers and customers to reduce transport costs.  
Therefore, the presence of a variety of intermediate inputs available for final goods, as 
well as reducing the average transaction costs (Venables, 1996), leads to a greater number 
of firms in the upstream / downstream markets and in turn leads to a further agglomeration 
of activity.  
Kinoshita and Campos (2003) find that the generation process of agglomeration 
economies and their role in attracting economic activity (e.g. foreign investments) 
eventually becomes self-reinforcing process and leads to a process of cumulative 
causation between agglomeration economies and the agglomeration of activity.  In the 
case of FDI, when host countries receive their first mass investments, the existence of 
agglomeration economies can make the stock of FDI attract further levels of FDI into the 
host country and therefore existing FDI can predict future levels of FDI.  Overall, the NEG 
theory of agglomeration of economic activity emphasises the importance of market size, 
labour markets, inter-firm linkages and knowledge as the main sources of agglomeration 
economy.  The importance of knowledge spillovers for location is also emphasised by the 
New Growth Theory (NGT) theory as follows. 
 
2.4.4. The New Growth Theory 
 
The New Growth Theory (NGT) indicates that international transfers of technology and 
knowledge through FDI can affect the performance of host countries and be a reason for 
FDI location.  The transmission mechanism for the NEG mainly depends on pecuniary 
external effects (i.e. market-based), but for NGT it relies on technological effects (i.e. 
externalities) in the form of knowledge spillovers.  The NGT originates from a labour-
augmented production function 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖 𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖), where 𝑌𝑖 represents output of firm i, F is 
a production function, 𝐾𝑖  and 𝐿𝑖  represent capital and labour respectively, and 𝐴𝑖  is an 
index of knowledge available in firm i.  Since knowledge is non-rival, 𝐴𝑖 is determined 
by the gross level of capital 𝐾, so that 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐾.  If this function has constant returns to 
scale, the theory reconciles endogenous growth with competitive markets, whereby 
constant returns occur at the firm level with respect to 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖. 
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According to Griliches (1992), there are two main points emphasized by the NGT.  First, 
changes in technology come from investment that arises from decisions made by 
economic agents.  Second, economic growth cannot proceed at a constant and 
undiminished rate if there are no significant externalities, spillovers or other sources of 
increasing social returns.  As Grossman and Helpman (1991) note, growth theories 
concentrate on international linkages through trade and FDI that could influence the 
productivity and economic growth of national economies.  Overall, the transmission 
mechanism of NGT is non-pecuniary and it downplays the importance of classical location 
factors, so it is sometimes considered as a social network (McCann and Sheppard, 2003).  
It may give rise to an agglomeration of activity at a different level to that of the NEG.  
This is because technological externalities that arise from personal interactions may lead 
to small-scale agglomerations, but pecuniary external effects that occur over large areas 
will lead to large-scale agglomerations.  Martin and Ottaviano (1999) argue that 
technological externalities in factor accumulation may well strengthen the incentive for 
agglomeration that comes from local pecuniary externalities. 
The NGT model emphasizes the importance of own-industry knowledge spillovers 
(Romer, 1986), where according to Driffield and Munday (2000) knowledge is an 
important ownership advantage of FDI that may flow to other firms.  In recognition of the 
earlier work of Marshall (1920) and Arrow (1962) these are known as MAR externalities.  
These occur at the industry level and arise as know-how and technology are more likely 
to be transferred between firms if they located in a small area owing to direct contact.  As 
discussed above, in a small area Marshall (1920) refers to these own-industry effects as a 
localization economy.  If knowledge is transferred across industries related to the size of 
a city it is an urbanisation economy, but, as noted above, over larger areas it is a Jacobs 
externality whereby firms in an industry may benefit from advanced technology in other 
industries, so that the variety of industries in an area can create an agglomeration of 
activity (Jacobs, 1969). 
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2.5. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section which is divided into two parts reviews the existing empirical evidence for 
FDI location determinants.  First, it discusses the traditional factors, comprising factors 
such market size, the cost and quality of labour, the role of knowledge, macroeconomic 
and institutional factors (Sun et al., 2002).  Second, it considers the empirical evidence 
for the role of agglomeration economies that are integral to the NEG and NGT models, 
including linkages and knowledge spillovers.  As discussed above, the traditional factors 
add to a firm’s profits in a location but are unrelated to the location of other activity, 
whereas agglomeration economies arise from a location in proximity to other firms either 
in the same industry or in other industries. 
 
2.5.1. Traditional Locational Factors 
 
The studies from which this section draws upon are summarized in Table 2.1 below.  It 
shows the characteristics of the some of the main studies and briefly summarizes the main 
results.  These studies are now discussed according to the different location factors as 
follows. 
 
Market Size (Demand) 
Market size tends to be measured by the gross domestic product of a country or region 
(GDP). As it measures market potential, it is expected to have a positive effect on FDI 
location.  Janicki et al. (2004) finds that market size is statistically significant, so that FDI 
flows are greater in larger economies.  Furthermore, other studies measure the size of the 
market by GDP per capita, which is important, as some countries such as China have a 
very large GDP but a GDP per capita that is much smaller.  GDP per capita is an indicator 
for the average benefits that the citizens receive from the increased output in their 
countries, and it is expected to have a positive effect on investment location as higher 
GDP per capita indicates an economy with well-off citizens and higher demand.  
Shamsuddin (1994) finds that market size, measured using GDP per capita, is the most 
important FDI determinant, followed (in order of importance) by the wage cost, per capita 
debt, per capita inflows of public aid and the volatility of price.   
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Table 2.1: The Characteristics and Results of Empirical FDI Location Studies 
Study and 
Date 
Characteristics of Study Summary of Main Results 
Bagchi-Sen 
and Wheeler 
(1989) 
Metropolitan areas of the 
United States over 1974-78 
and 1979-83. 
The level and growth rate of population are important 
determinants of FDI. 
Bevan and 
Estrin (2000) 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Countries from 1994 to 1998. 
A negative relationship between labour costs and FDI. 
Bevan and 
Estrin (2004) 
Bilateral data on European 
Union and Central and Eastern 
Europe Countries from 1994 to 
2000. 
FDI is negatively related to the distance between countries 
and unit labour costs, but positively related to GDP in the 
source and host countries. 
Coughlin et 
al. (1991) 
Manufacturing facilities in the 
United States from 1981 to 
1983. 
Higher per capita income, unemployment and 
manufacturing activities attract more FDI inflows, but 
higher wage levels could obstruct FDI. 
Deichman 
(2001) 
FDI in Central and Eastern 
Europe countries over 1993-
97. 
Trade volume is the most important determinant, followed 
by the host environment for investment and transportation 
infrastructure. 
Du et al. 
(2008a) 
US multinationals in Chinese 
regions over 1993-2001. 
Higher FDI in regions with lower government role in 
business operations, lower corruption and better 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
Friedman et 
al. (1996) 
Manufacturing branch plants in 
the United States over 1977-
86. 
Skilled labour as well as market potential and the 
expenditure on attracting FDI have a positive effect on the 
location choice of foreign subsidiaries in the US. 
Jadhav (2012) BRICS countries over 2000-09 
The effect of openness on FDI is determined by whether 
the investment is market-seeking or export-oriented. 
Janicki and 
Wunnava 
(2004) 
European Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe Countries 
in transition in 1997. 
Market size measured by GDP is statistically significant 
and FDI flows are larger in larger economies.  Country 
risk, labour costs and trade openness are also important 
determinants for FDI flows. 
Klein and 
Rosenger 
(1994) 
FDI flows to the United States 
from seven industrial countries 
over 1979-91. 
When the currency of a country starts to devalue, it leads 
to a decline in production cost, which is measured by 
foreign currency. It means that there is an increase in FDI 
flows and in the wealth of foreign investors. 
Kok and 
Ersoy (2009) 
24 developing countries from 
1983 to 2005 and 1976 to 
2005. 
GDP has a positive effect on FDI, along with trade 
openness and gross capital formation. 
Mina (2007) 
Six Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) over1980-
2002. 
A positive relationship between FDI and institutional 
quality, trade openness and infrastructure, but human 
capital discourages FDI flows. 
Resmini 
(2000) 
Manufacturing sectors of the 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Countries from 1990 to 1995. 
The formation of a market economy has a significant 
effect on FDI, especially in more capital and knowledge-
intensive sectors. 
Shamsuddin 
(1994) 
36 less-developed countries in 
1983. 
Market size is the most important FDI determinant, but 
only when measured by GDP per capita. 
Wang and 
Swain (1995) 
FDI to China and Hungary 
over 1978-92. 
For both of these two countries, the size of the host 
country, the cost of capital and the stability of the political 
environment have significant effects on FDI location.  For 
China, FDI is also determined by the exchange rates and 
labour costs.  For Hungary, averaged real growth rates of 
OECD countries are an important determinant for FDI 
inflows. 
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The GDP growth rate reflects whether an economy is in recession or growing.  Resmini 
(2000) argues that there is a non-linear relationship between the growth rate of GDP and 
investment. This is because less-developed economies have lower levels of GDP per 
capita, but a rapid economic growth rate.  Kok and Ersoy (2009) find that GDP growth 
has a positive effect on FDI, along with trade openness and gross capital formation.  Other 
studies measure market size using population.  Bagchi-Sen and Wheeler (1989) find that 
the level and growth of population are important determinants of FDI.  Population size is 
likely to be correlated with GDP, although in larger economies population grows at a 
slower rate.  Population density is the number of residents per land area, and it is a more 
accurate indicator of the extent of urbanisation than total population.  A greater population 
density indicates a larger consumer market, which could attract more market-seeking 
investment, but it could also have a negative effect from the perspective of congestion. 
 
Labour Market 
For the labour market, there are a number of factors that may affect FDI location.  Some 
studies focus on the cost of labour, which is expected to affect FDI location negatively 
(see Coughlin et al., 1991).  Bevan and Estrin (2000) explore FDI flows between European 
Union countries and transition economies, and find that there is a negative relationship 
between labour costs and FDI.  Shamsuddin (1994) find that the higher wage costs, a 
poorer investment climate and economic instability in the host country reduce FDI inflows.  
Based on a study of Chinese inward FDI, the second largest global host country for FDI 
from 1994, Wang and Swain (1995) find a positive relationship between the wage level 
and FDI.  This could be because wages indicate greater per capita income and hence 
demand.  
Other studies pay attention to the quality of labour, which can be measured in 
several ways.  One popular measure is the level of education, such as the number of people 
with degrees or the proportion of the relevant population in secondary education (Gao, 
2005), or alternatively the proportion of scientists in the labour force.  These are expected 
to have a positive effect on FDI as the foreign investors seek a skilled labour force.  
Friedman et al. (1996) find that skilled labour has a significant and positive effect on the 
location choice of foreign subsidiaries in the US, as well as market potential and 
expenditure on attracting FDI.  A potential difficulty with these proxies is that they capture 
other effects, such as the level of knowledge and hence agglomeration economies.  
Unemployment refers to the availability or quality of labour but it is an important indicator 
35 
 
for the development of economy and society, so that there is uncertainty about the sign of 
its effect on FDI location.  
 
Knowledge 
Knowledge is also an important factor in production.  Sometimes it is measured by the 
level of scientific research, as measured by the number of patents or by expenditure on 
research and development (R&D).  In general, these capture the level of human capital or 
the level of development, where higher levels of scientific research should attract greater 
levels of FDI.  According to Chung and Alcácer (2002), studies that focus on the location 
of R&D facilities in research-intensive sectors support the knowledge-seeking motive for 
FDI.  However, by studying FDI location in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Mina 
(2007) finds that human capital significantly discourages FDI flows.  This might be 
because higher education indicates higher production costs, and some industries may be 
more interested in a lower-quality workforce for simple routine functions.  Finally, 
although knowledge is seen as a traditional location determinant it may also capture the 
impact of agglomeration economies, so that there is some degree of overlap across these 
different variables. 
 
Trade Factors 
The degree of openness of an economy has a priori mixed effects on FDI location because 
it could lead to increased product-market competition.  Many studies find that there is a 
positive relationship between FDI and trade openness, with Deichman (2001) stating that 
international trade is the most important determinant of FDI, followed by the investment 
climate that is measured by the risk rating (see below).  Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) 
also find that an important determinant of FDI location of Swedish firms is exports.  In 
general the effect of openness on FDI is determined by whether the investment is primarily 
market-seeking or export-oriented (Jadhav, 2012).  There is also expected to be a positive 
relationship between exchange rates and FDI, where as stated by Klein and Rosenger 
(1994) when the currency of a country starts to devalue, it leads to the decline in 
production costs measured in foreign currency.  According to Goleberg (2009), the 
positive relationship exists because devaluation decreases the wage cost of a country 
compared to that of another country. 
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Other Factors 
Du et al. (2008a) explore the effect of economic institutions on the location choice of FDI 
from the US to China.  Their empirical results illustrate that US MNCs would be likely to 
invest in those regions in China with better protection of intellectual property rights, lower 
extent of government intervention in business operations and lower levels of government 
corruption.  It means that regions with stronger economic institutions are more likely to 
attract US firms to set up business operations in these regions.  Other studies focus on the 
political risk of a country using risk rankings from the Political Risk Services published 
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which also publishes a measure for the 
composite risk (Erb et al., 1996 and Diamonte et al., 1996).  These risks include the 
stability of the economy (e.g. inflation rate), political stability (e.g. no war), government 
efficiency, regulatory quality and control of corruption (Jadhav, 2012).  Li (2008) supports 
the negative relationship between FDI flows and military conflict.  Janicki et al. (2004) 
find that lower political risk leads to higher FDI inflows, using the credit rating as a proxy 
for risk and assuming a country with a good economic and political environment is 
characterised by the stability of financial markets. 
 
2.5.2. Agglomeration Economies 
 
Aside from the traditional factors discussed above, Guimaraes et al. (2000) argue that 
agglomeration economies are a decisive, if not principal, location determinant of 
investment.  As we have seen, an agglomeration economy is external to the firm, but 
internal to a small area, and comprises specialized labour markets, supplier networks and 
knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1920).  Overall, Bobonis and Shatz (2007) find that 
agglomeration economies are an economically significant externality that can attract new 
foreign investors, while Pelegrín and Bolancé (2008) find that agglomeration economies 
are the strongest driving factors of FDI location.  Porter (1990), Wheeler and Mody (1992), 
and Dunning (1998) respectively indicate that the role of agglomeration economies in 
improving the attractiveness of an area to foreign investment increases with the quality of 
infrastructure, the availability of specialized service suppliers and skilled workers, and the 
development of industrial clusters, all of which are used as proxies for agglomeration 
economies.  Further evidence is found by Head and Ries (1996) who use a Conditional 
Logit regression to analyse 931 joint ventures in 54 cities in China from 1984 to 1991.  
They show that those cities with good infrastructure, an established base for industries and 
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the presence of FDI are likely to be attractive to foreign investors.  However, not all firms 
are attracted by the same factors, so that the nature and importance of the agglomeration 
economies varies with the location and industry.    
One of the important sources of agglomeration economies is inter-firm linkages 
i.e. backward and forward linkages (Shaver et al. 1997; Dunning 1998).  Milner et al. 
(2006) explore the effect of industrial linkages between Japanese firms in Thailand on the 
inter-industry pattern of FDI.  The input-output linkages are the interdependencies 
between firms that are related to their sales and purchases of intermediate products that 
can be classified into intra-industry and inter-industry linkages. They find that firms in an 
industry with stronger input-output linkages follow each other, so that there is a positive 
relationship between the amount of FDI of Japanese firms in Thailand and the intensity of 
input-output linkages between these firms in Japan.  As summarised by Pelegrín and 
Bolancé (2008), forward and backward linkages can generate a process of agglomeration 
in that producers locate close to their suppliers and customers.  In addition, by studying 
the agglomeration economies and government institutions on FDI location in China, Du 
et al. (2008b) find that the provinces with a higher level of vertical agglomeration attract 
more FDI. 
Knowledge spillovers are also an important source for generating agglomeration 
economies, even in competitive markets (Mina, 2007).  One way of measuring these is 
research and development (R&D) expenditure, as discussed above.  In general, there are 
two types of R&D activities of firms (Criscuolo et al., 2005).  The first type is asset-
exploiting, including modification of products and processes, where firms develop the use 
of their technological assets in a foreign location.  The second one is asset-augmenting, 
where firms improve, obtain or create new technological assets.  In this case, the location-
specific advantages that are not available in the home country.  However, Chung and 
Alcácer (2002) find that R&D intensity is not attractive for FDI inflows, because most 
FDI is found in industries with lower levels of technology and in countries with lower 
R&D intensity, so that these firms are not interested in the technical capabilities of a 
country.  Likewise, Martin (1999) finds that knowledge is generally not a significant 
determinant of FDI location, although firms in research-intensive industries are more 
likely to locate in countries with high R&D intensity. 
 A common way of measuring agglomeration economies that does not specifically 
distinguish between the different sources of agglomeration economies, such as inter-firm 
linkages and knowledge spillovers, is through the number of previous foreign investments 
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locating in an area.  For example, using count data on the location of Japanese 
manufacturing firms in the US over 1980-92, Head et al. (1995, 1999) find that 
agglomeration economies affect the location of multinational affiliates within the US 
significantly.  Overall, using this measure for agglomeration economies there is a wide-
level of support for agglomeration economies being a significant determinant of FDI 
location. 
In addition, not only the presence of foreign firms but the presence of foreign firms 
from the same host country may lead to stronger agglomeration economies, which may 
arise since national similarity promotes closer linkages between customers and suppliers 
and in general stronger business relationships (Smith and Florida, 1994).  Foreign 
investors may gain information from the location decisions of previous foreign firms, so 
that the presence of FDI lowers the costs for the foreign investors and so foreign investors 
imitate previous FDI (Mariotti et al., 2010).  Given this, and the cumulative causation that 
is associated with agglomeration economies, we may well expect to see locations with 
high levels of FDI from particular countries also having greater levels of FDI from these 
countries in the future. 
Of course, the presence of foreign firms in a location may not be the only indicator 
that agglomeration economies are present, but rather an agglomeration of domestic 
activity could signal agglomeration economies.  Evidence to support that domestic activity 
attracts FDI is found by Crozet et al. (2004), where the domestic firms may hold location-
specific advantages that, if accessed or spillovers into foreign firms will allow these firms 
to overcome any disadvantages to locating in the host country (Guimaraes et al., 2000).  
Du et al. (2008b), also finds that vertical agglomeration gives rise to a concentration of 
domestic firms that have backward and forward linkages to foreign firms. 
In general, access to information and a variety of agglomeration economies 
available in some areas can reduce the disadvantages that are encountered by foreign 
investors, such as information asymmetries and internal and external uncertainties (He, 
2002). This may arise from the presence of domestic firms, foreign firms or foreign firms 
from the same home country of the investor.  As a final point however, agglomeration of 
activity can create negative externalities, in the form of congestion costs.  Chang and Park 
(2005) argue that when there is a concentration of firms, the advanced knowledge and 
technologies of a firm can be transferred to others, giving rise to a loss of technological 
advantage and therefore foreign firms may wish to locate away from other firms, be it 
other foreign firms or domestic firms.  In addition, the presence of foreign investors can 
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also lead to intensified competition in product and factor markets and hence may act as a 
disincentive for future FDI location. 
 
2.6. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour 
 
Agglomeration economies are an important motive for the FDI location choice in addition 
to the traditional determinants, where the purpose of the investor is to choose a location 
that maximizes its profit.  Chung and Song (2004) find that there is a tendency for firms 
to choose the same host country over time by investing several times, and that they often 
agglomerate with other investors when investing abroad.  In this sense, a question arises 
as to whether the firms prefer to follow the location of their own previous investment and 
possibly that of other investors.  This potential for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in FDI 
location is of great interest as it has implications for the location of this investment and 
for the economic development of the host economies.  In particular, if early-stage BRICS 
investment locates in some countries then it means that it will build-up in these countries 
over time.  Further, if FDI from different BRICS locates in the same countries or in 
different countries then it will indicate whether this investment is similar in its 
characteristics or distinctive in nature.  Of course, there may be many reasons why FDI 
may ‘follow’ previous investment, so I now consider this. 
 
2.6.1. Explanation for ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour 
 
Head et al., (1995) argue that if many foreign firms exist in a country or region then this 
will have positive effect on the attraction of new foreign firms.  Early studies of ‘follow-
the leader’ behaviour emphasize the loose oligopolistic nature of industry, whereby if 
some firms invest abroad then their competitors will imitate their actions and follow their 
location choice to maintain the balance of competition and minimize the risks of investing 
in a foreign market (Knickerbocker, 1973; Graham, 1974).   Thus, according to this 
argument, investment by foreign investors stimulates the actions of rivals and this may 
cause ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in the location choice of the investment.  According 
to the studies of Lieberman and Asaba (2006), Banerjee (1992) and Baum and Haveman 
(1997), ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour that could achieve economies of scale is promoted 
by the increase in profits and decrease in uncertainty in a location, superior information 
of some investors and the purpose of increasing competitiveness or limiting the rivalry.  
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Because of this behaviour, the following investments have a chance to share the physical 
infrastructure, advanced technology and the local knowledge in the location (Chung and 
Song, 2004). 
A reason for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour could arise from the economic 
geography literature (Krugman and Venables, 1994).  The location choice of an 
investment is a trade-off between ‘dispersion’ factors, such as firm competition or higher 
labour costs, and agglomeration factors like the production linkages that may be either 
backwards to other suppliers or forwards to customers.  If the latter dominate then it will 
be profitable for a firm to choose the same location of the previous investment, leading to 
an agglomeration of activity.  This will be more important if there are a large number of 
previous investments in a location (Altomonte and Pennings, 2008). 
There are other important reasons for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour, some of 
which I have already briefly mentioned above.  The first and most important one is 
information.  If some investors have superior information they may be perceived as 
‘leaders’ (Bikhchandani et al., 1998).  The location of the first investment may be based 
on the private information of the leader, but this information is revealed to ‘followers’ 
through the actions of the leader.  Along with the accumulation of this revealed 
information, the leader may solve many uncertainties and the followers gradually ignore 
their own information and follow the decision of the leader.  In this case, ‘follow-the-
leader’ behaviour results in similar actions, which helps decrease uncertainty and the 
possibility that one firm may obtain or lose profits relative to the others.  It can also be 
conducive to maintain the current status of all competitors that follow each other in a 
location, even if they are strong rivals (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006).  Altomonte and 
Pennings (2008) believe that the imitation of the leader helps the followers match the 
production costs of the leader and avoids mispricing. 
Second, in addition to the superior information, there is the higher probability for 
investors that have a larger size or better profitability to be followed (Haunschild and 
Miner, 1997), especially in the case of major innovations where there is a high degree of 
uncertainty (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006).  These authors further find that when the 
uncertainty is high, the information-based factors will play a major role in ‘follow-the-
leader’ behaviour, but rivalry factors will dominate under the condition of low uncertainty.  
Uncertainty about the revenue is also a motive for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour as the 
followers could reduce their risks by choosing the same location for investment. 
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Finally, investors prefer to choose the same location when they are attracted by the similar 
characteristics of the host country, such as lower costs or greater spillovers (Chung and 
Song, 2004).  Important among these factors may be a similar language and culture, and 
indeed I find below that Brazil and Russia among the BRICS are good examples.  The 
investment of Brazil is significantly more likely to enter Portugal and Spain in addition to 
the main host countries of all BRICS countries’ investment.  This is because these two 
countries have the similar culture to that of Brazil.  For Russia, its investment prefers to 
be located in Germany and Italy only within the EU-15, but there is a much greater 
probability of it entering several CEEC-10 countries, which were part of the former Soviet 
Union (see Chapter 7).   
 
2.6.2. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour of BRICS FDI 
 
In general, more experienced investors might tend to ‘follow’ the location of their own 
previous investment.  In the case of the BRICS there is still the question whether they 
‘follow’ their own previous investment, or agglomerate, or avoid other BRICS countries’ 
investment.  On the one hand, the BRICS countries that are a source for relatively few 
foreign investments may prefer to follow other countries including other BRICS, as they 
may not have enough experience and information about where best to invest.  On the other 
hand, the BRICS countries may be distinct and seek locations different to that of other 
BRICS countries. 
In the case of the BRICS, there are characteristics of this investment that suggest 
that some countries will show a significant tendency to follow the location of their own 
previous investment (i.e. ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour), but possibly avoid that of the 
other BRICS.  In particular, it is argued that Brazilian foreign investment is mainly aimed 
at acquiring raw materials, natural resources and other resource-related products (Sauvant, 
2005), whereas for Russia the unstable economic environment of the domestic market 
might promote firms to invest abroad, but they may also want to acquire advanced 
technology (Elenkov, 1995).  In addition, as I have noted, historical and political reasons 
might encourage Russian FDI to locate in Eastern Europe.  In the case of Indian 
investment, it is argued that the main motive is to increase the competitiveness of firms, 
with Pradhan (2003) describing the relaxation of the restrictions to invest abroad after 
2003. Knowledge-seeking, greater market potential and the acquisition of advanced 
technology are likely to be key factors for Chinese FDI outflows.  Policy liberalisation, 
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such as the 1979 Reform and Opening up policy, is another important motive for outward 
FDI (Naughton, 1996).  For South Africa, Gammeltoft (2008) suggests that availability of 
natural resources in the host countries is a main attraction for its outward FDI. 
Generally, for the BRICS as a whole I find that there is the significant ‘follow-the-
leader’ behaviour in the location choice (i.e. FDI from the BRICS follows the location of 
FDI from the same BRICS country), but this can be insignificant for individual BRICS 
countries.  A possible reason for this is that the ‘dispersion’ factors are more important.  
Alegría (2006) finds that some dispersion determinants, such as the wage level and 
country risk, rather than agglomeration economies play a key role in FDI location choice.  
It means that these factors could offset the positive effects of agglomeration economies 
and discourage the FDI from the same source country.  As further evidence for these kinds 
of effect, Crozet et al., (2004) study the location choice of foreign investors in France 
based on a sample with 4,000 investments over ten years, and find that investments from 
Italy and Netherlands are less likely to be clustered as they are more sensitive to the wage 
rate.  Likewise, for Japanese FDI in the US at the industry level, Hennart and Park (1994) 
find that the effect of variable that is used to measure ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour is 
insignificant.   
Finally, while I find that BRICS FDI ‘follows’ the location of previous FDI from 
the same BRICS country, I also find that it tends to ‘avoid’ the FDI of other BRICS 
countries as a whole.  This suggests that BRICS FDI from different countries is distinct.  
However, when disaggregated for individual countries, not all BRICS countries’ FDI 
always ‘avoids’ the FDI location of other countries.  The main reason for this is that some 
economies (i.e. China and India) are able to attract the FDI from other BRICS countries, 
causing it to ‘follow’.  This is probably because these countries have a combination of 
beneficial factors, including large size, rapid economic growth, superior information and 
greater profitability. 
 
2.6.3. The Way Forward 
 
To explore the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS countries’ investment, in this 
thesis I first discuss the persistence in FDI location of each BRICS country through a 
‘goodness-of-fit’ test based on the raw data.  After this, I use regression analysis to explore 
this behaviour by introducing several lagged FDI terms to measure the ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour.  The goodness-of-fit tests show that there is a tendency for FDI from all BRICS 
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countries to follow the same location over a one-year period, but there are some changes 
in the location choice for China and India over a two-year period.  This is because the 
longer lag gives FDI sufficient time to respond to earlier FDI flows.  The regression 
analysis shows similar results to that of the ‘goodness-of-fit’ test, but some of them are 
insignificant as the dispersion factors are considered in the regression analysis.  Further, 
the regression analysis not only explores the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS FDI, 
but also can examine whether BRICS FDI ‘avoids’ the location of FDI from other 
countries through the lagged FDI terms. 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to review the determinants of FDI location covering 
both the theoretical and empirical literature.  The OLI paradigm provides a general 
theoretical framework for the determinants of FDI location, where the location-specific 
advantages of a host country determine where a foreign investor will locate their overseas 
facilities.  Examples of these advantages include a country’s national factor endowments 
such as labour costs, productivity and access to knowledge.  Indeed, a number of location 
advantages have been identified in the empirical literature and these include input prices, 
transport costs, communication costs and government incentives as well the other natural 
assets that a country possesses such as access to natural resources.   
In addition to the above traditional location factors, agglomeration economies are 
also considered an important factor in the location of FDI.  These agglomeration 
economies differ from the traditional locational factors in that they are external economies 
of scale that arise from the proximity of other firms in a similar industry or location and 
their importance have been identified in recent theories of New Economic Geography 
(NEG) and New Growth Theory (NGT).  An implication of agglomeration economies as 
a location factor is that they can lead to an ever-increasing agglomeration of activity, and 
thus greater levels of FDI since agglomeration and agglomeration economies are linked 
in a process of cumulative causation. 
A number of mechanisms that lead to agglomeration economies have been 
identified in the literature.  These include the build-up of inter-firm linkages, the 
importance of market size and locating near final demand as well as the importance of 
knowledge.  In general, the main proxy for agglomeration economies has been the number 
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of previous foreign direct investors in a location as this will pick-up potential firm linkages 
and knowledge spillovers, given that foreign investors often possess greater levels of 
skilled labour than their domestic counterparts.  Firm linkages may also be stronger, and 
so FDI may be more likely to occur if there is a presence of foreign firms from the same 
home country of the foreign investor.  Overall, there is a range of support in the literature 
for FDI being attracted by agglomeration economies, and in particular by agglomeration 
economies arising from previous foreign firms locating in an area, and especially those 
from the same home country as the investor. 
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Chapter 3. Location of BRICS Investment 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In recent years there have been significant increases in FDI outflows from developing 
countries, such that these countries now account for nearly 40 percent of global FDI 
outflows, compared to 12 percent at the beginning of the 2000s (UNCTAD, 2014).  
BRICS countries have been an important part of this increase with BRICS outward FDI 
growing rapidly and now accounting for one-third of developing countries outflows 
(UNCTAD, 2013).  Despite this increase, the main focus of the empirical FDI literature 
on developing (and BRICS) countries has been on inward rather than outward FDI 
(Gammeltoft, 2008).  There are relatively few studies on the generation of FDI amongst 
these developing countries, apart from the early research of Wells (1983) and Agarwal 
(1985).2  In terms of the locational pattern of outward FDI, Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012) 
find that firms from the BRICS countries invest in a range of countries that include their 
neighbouring developing countries as well as a number of developed countries.  Possible 
reasons for these location patterns include the need to take advantage of growth 
opportunities outside of their national market and to gain access to knowledge and skills 
from developed economies in order to improve their competitiveness (Sauvant, 2005). 
This chapter aims to explore the trends and main locations of BRICS FDI and to 
compare these to the general global pattern of FDI.  The chapter also attempts to explain 
the determinants behind the location patterns of BRICS investment by drawing upon the 
theoretical discussion of Chapter 2.  The analysis focuses on the study-period of the thesis, 
1997-2010, during which there is a dramatic increase in BRICS outward FDI.  This 
analysis uses the published UNCTAD data, and this is indicated in the notes to the 
following tables and figures.  While as I mentioned in the Introduction, the UNCTAD data 
based on a broader definition on FDI provide published data in net terms and includes data 
on mergers and acquisitions, whereas the EIM data are for the location decision.  It is 
                                                            
2 Theoretical discussions on developing countries’ FDI highlight that these countries need to attract FDI 
because they face foreign exchange shortages and capital restrictions (Gammeltoft, 2008). 
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apparent in Chapter 5 below that the EIM data give a very similar investment pattern.  
This chapter has two main purposes. First, it seeks to explore the trends of BRICS FDI 
location by using the published UNCTAD data for FDI outflows.  Second, it reviews the 
literature about the determinants for the FDI location choice to examine whether BRICS 
FDI location is consistent with the literature review.  Therefore, the structure of the chapter 
is as follows.  The next section discusses the trends in global FDI flows. Section 3.3 then 
examines these trends for each of the BRICS countries. The possible reasons and 
determinants behind the pattern of this investment are then examined in Section 3.4 which 
also reveal the dates for Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between each BRICS and 
each EU country.  Conclusions are presented in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. Global FDI Flows 
 
This section explores global trends in FDI flows, analysing both FDI inflows and outflows. 
It distinguishes between developed and developing countries, before subsequently 
examining the main trends and location of FDI across the five global regions that 
encompass each of the BRICS countries: South America for Brazil, Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) for Russia, South Asia for India, East Asia for China and 
Southern Africa for South Africa.3 In order to explore the investment between EU-25 and 
BRICS, their bilateral investment agreements are discussed in section 3.4.4. 
 
3.2.1. Global Trends in FDI 
 
The pattern of FDI outflows during the 2000s, broken down by developed and developing 
economies, is shown in Figure 3.1.  The developed countries are included as they provide 
the major source of FDI and provide a useful comparison with that arising from 
developing countries, and the BRICS in particular.  Overall, global FDI flows reached 
$1.3 trillion dollars by the end of the period and increased by 59% over the decade.  
However, the breakdown by developed and developing countries in Figure 3.1 shows 
differing patterns emerging for each of these groups.  Following the decline in FDI 
outflows from developed countries at the turn of the century, FDI generated by developed 
countries experienced a large boom during the middle part of the 2000s. This increase was 
                                                            
3 These global regions are used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) in 
the yearly World Investment Report analysis of global FDI trends.  
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however short-lived as the financial crisis led to a sharp decrease in FDI outflows in 2007 
returning FDI to pre-boom levels by the end of the decade. By comparison, developing 
economies experienced less dramatic fluctuations in FDI outflows over the period, so the 
large increases in global FDI outflows were driven mainly by the developed economies. 
 
Figure 3.1: Value of FDI Outflows by Developed and Developing Economies 
 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2003, 2005 and 2011). The UNCTAD World 
Investment Reports of 2003, 2005 and 2011 gives the data for 1997-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2010 
respectively. 
Note: FDI is measured in billions of US dollars (current prices and current exchange rates).  Constant 
prices give similar pattern owing to low inflation. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the rise in FDI outflows from developing economies is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, with outflows increasing from $47.8 billion at the start of the period 
to $327.6 billion by 2010 (current prices and current exchange rates in billions). The figure 
also shows that the developing countries have increased their share as well as their levels 
of global FDI outflows over the period, and they now account for 25% of global outflows 
compared to just 7% at the beginning of the decade. This increase in FDI outflows for the 
developing economies reflects the changing nature of FDI for these economies as 
traditionally they have been associated mainly with inflows of foreign direct investment, 
but now they have started their process of internalization.   
The financial crisis causes several shocks. First, the bursting of the housing bubble 
leads to a relocation of capital and reduction in the wealth and consumption of households.  
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Second, the sharp increase in the equity risk premium results in the increase of capital cost, 
decline in the private investment and collapse of demand for durable goods.  Third, 
financial crisis also causes a reappraisal of risk by household, which makes them to 
discount their future income, increase savings and reduce their consumption (McKibbin 
and Stoeckel, 2010).  UNCTAD (2012) indicates several reasons for the boom in FDI 
during the period. The main factors are the increase in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the European Union (EU), driven by the creation of the Single Market, and 
the large amounts of reinvested earnings from US multinationals enterprises. The 
continuous appreciation of the Japanese yen over this period increased the purchasing 
power of Japanese multinationals and was also a factor behind the rise in developed 
countries outward FDI.   
A comparison between FDI inflows and outflows can be made using Tables 3.1 
and 3.2, which show FDI inflows and outflows respectively over the study period. The 
tables also give a breakdown of these FDI flows into different global regions (developed, 
developing and transition economies) and within these, the regions that contain the BRICS 
countries.  Table 3.1 gives the breakdown of FDI inflows over the 2000s and shows that 
world inflows are primarily related to the developed countries. Within the developed 
countries the location of FDI tends to be heavily concentrated in the European Union (EU) 
and the US. However, compared to the pattern of world outflows in Table 3.2 and Figure 
3.1, the difference between developed and developing countries is less pronounced for 
FDI inflows, with developing countries accounting for 34% of global inflows on average 
over the period, rising to 46% of total inflows by the end of the period.  The increase in 
FDI inflows to the developing economies is driven mostly by the Asian countries, which 
after the financial crisis of 1997 have absorbed around 60% of developing countries’ 
inflows of FDI. Latin America and the Caribbean provide another third of inflows, while 
by comparison Africa and the CIS absorb negligible amounts with FDI inflows at 
relatively low levels over the period. 
 
 
 4
9
 
Table 3.1: FDI Inflows by Global Region, 1997-2010 (billions of US dollars) 
Global Region 
1997-2001 
(Average) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World total: 892.8 716.1 632.6 648.1 982.6 1,461.9 1,970.9 1,744.1 1,185.0 1,243.7 
Developed Economies: 655.3 547.8 442.2 380.0 619.1 977.9 1,306.8 965.1 602.8 601.9 
EU 385.3 420.4 338.7 216.4 496.1 581.7 850.5 488.0 346.5 304.7 
US 203.8 71.3 56.8 95.9 104.8 237.1 216.0 306.4 152.9 228.2 
Developing Economies: 213.9 155.5 166.3 233.2 332.3 429.5 573.0 658.0 510.6 573.6 
Asia 113.3 92.0 101.3 147.5 215.8 283.5 339.3 375.7 307.5 357.8 
(East Asia) (-)* (67.3) (72.1) (105.0) (116.2) (131.8) (151.0) (185.3) (161.1) (188.3) 
(South Asia) (-)* (4.5) (5.3) (7.0) (14.4) (27.8) (34.3) (51.9) (42.5) (32.0) 
Africa 11.8 13.0 18.0 18.1 38.2 46.3 63.1 73.4 60.2 55.0 
(Southern Africa) (-)* (1.5) (1.3) (1.0) (14.7) (10.5) (18.8) (28.6) (20.0) (15.1) 
Latin and Caribbean 88.5 50.5 46.9 67.5 78.1 98.5 169.5 206.7 141.0 159.2 
(South America) (53.6) (28.5) (24.4) (37.9) (44.3) (43.9) (71.5) (92.1) (55.3) (86.5) 
SE Europe and CIS: -* 12.8 24.1 34.9 31.2 54.5 91.1 121.0 71.6 68.2 
CIS -* 9.0 15.7 24.1 26.2 44.6 78.3 108.4 63.8 64.1 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2003, 2005 and 2011). The UNCTAD World Investment Reports of 2003, 2005 and 2011 gives the data for 1997-
2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2010 respectively. 
Notes: Main host countries shown only, so that columns do not sum exactly.  * No breakdown available. 
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Table 3.2: FDI Outflows by Global Region, 1997-2010 (billions of US dollars) 
Global Region 
1997-2001 
(Average) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
World total: 833.8 652.2 616.9 730.3 882.1 1,405.4 2,174.8 1,910.5 1,170.5 1,323.3 
Developed Economies: 761.3 599.9 577.3 637.4 745.7 1,155.0 1,829.0 1,541.2 851.0 935.2 
EU 527.7 384.5 372.4 279.8 606.5 690.0 1,199.3 906.2 370.0 407.3 
US 136.5 134.9 119.4 229.3 15.4 224.2 393.5 308.3 282.7 328.9 
Developing Economies: 69.1 47.8 29.0 83.2 122.1 226.7 294.2 308.9 270.8 327.5 
Asia 48.7 36.0 17.2 69.4 86.1 151.6 221.7 218.4 219.5 244.6 
(East Asia) (-)* (27.6) (14.4) (53.5) (51.9) (85.4) (114.4) (133.2) (142.9) (174.3) 
(South Asia) (-)* (1.1) (1.0) (2.3) (3.5) (14.8) (17.7) (19.9) (16.4) (15.1) 
Africa 1.4 0.4 1.2 2.8 2.0 6.9 10.7 9.8 5.6 6.6 
(Southern Africa) (-)* (-0.4) (0.8) (1.9) (1.2) (6.3) (4.0) (-0.6) (1.4) (1.9) 
Latin and Caribbean 19.0 11.4 10.6 10.9 34.0 68.1 61.7 80.6 45.5 76.3 
(South America) (5.9) (4.1) (5.2) (10.6) (11.9) (35.4) (12.2) (34.2) (4.1) (30.3) 
SE Europe and CIS: -* 4.5 10.6 9.7 14.3 23.7 51.6 60.4 48.7 60.6 
CIS (-)* (3.9) (10.4) (9.5) (14.0) (23.3) (50.1) (58.5) (47.4) (60.5) 
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2003, 2005 and 2011). The UNCTAD World Investment Reports of 2003, 2005 and 2011 gives the data for 1997-
2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2010 respectively. 
Notes: Main origin countries shown only, so that columns do not sum exactly.  * No breakdown available. 
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Turning to the pattern of FDI outflows over the period, Table 3.2 shows that it is the 
European Union (EU) and US that contribute the majority of developed countries’ 
outflows and in turn also the bulk of global outflows over the period.  On average, the EU 
and the US account for approximately 80% of FDI outflows from developed countries in 
each year.  This suggests that there is a concentrated pattern of FDI in both the generation 
and location of investment in these countries.  By the end of the period, the contribution 
of the developed countries is nearly three times as large as that of the developing countries 
for FDI outflows, but this share is much lower compared to the start of the decade.  This 
shift emphasises the changing nature of FDI for developing countries, as they are now not 
just major recipients of FDI but also engaging in increasing amounts of outward foreign 
direct investment. 
The majority of FDI outflows from the developing economies originate from Asia, 
which generates more than 60% of all outflows from the developing economies in each 
year apart from 2003, with most of these outflows coming from East Asia rather than 
South Asia.  Outside of Asia, the Latin American and Caribbean countries provide about 
a quarter of developing countries’ outward FDI, although there is a considerable degree 
of volatility for this group of countries over the period, especially amongst the South 
American countries.  In contrast, African countries contribute negligible amounts of 
outward FDI from the developing economies.  Finally, the transition economies, of which 
the CIS is the largest generator of investment, have experienced notable increases in 
outward FDI over the period, in fact reaching similar levels of investment to the Latin 
American countries. 
 
3.2.2. Global Regional Trends in FDI 
 
Before exploring the FDI flows of the BRICS countries, this section discusses the FDI 
trends of the five global regions that include each of the BRICS countries. These are South 
America (for Brazil), the CIS (for Russia), South Asia (for India), East Asia (for China) 
and Southern Africa (for South Africa). The aim is to provide a general understanding of 
FDI from these areas and hence some context to the location of BRICS countries’ FDI. 
 
South America 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that both inflows and outflows of FDI have increased over the 
period, but South America remains a net receiver of FDI.  Table 3.1 shows that South 
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America has on average received more than half of all FDI going to Latin America and 
the Caribbean over the period.  However, there is evidence that its importance as a main 
host of FDI inflows is declining, from 61% of Latin American and Caribbean inflows in 
1997-2001 to 54% in 2010. UNCTAD (2012) suggests that the growth of FDI inflows to 
South America is due to the high economic growth rate, rapid development of its 
consumer market and endowments of natural resources. The high ratio of investment 
return in South America has also been identified as an additional incentive for FDI inflows 
to the region.   
Outward FDI from this region, as shown in Table 3.2, has undergone a different 
pattern compared to inflows during the period with outflows showing a relatively high 
degree of volatility.  For example, the peak of FDI outflows in 2006 is nearly nine times 
as large as outflows in the years at the beginning and end of the period i.e. 2002 and 2009.  
The main feature of outward FDI from South America is that more FDI outflows are less 
relevant to the production activities abroad, which is reflected by the higher percentage of 
FDI in offshore financial centres to total FDI outflows from South America (UNCTAD, 
2012). 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Table 3.1 shows a continuous increase in FDI flows to the group of CIS countries until 
the financial crisis. This suggests that the increasing FDI inflows to this group of transition 
economies reflect the continuing development of these countries and the resulting 
investment-friendly environment.  After the crisis, there is a decline in FDI inflows to the 
CIS followed by a slight recovery in 2010.  Greenfield investment (i.e. new start-ups) is 
the most common form of entry into the region (UNCTAD, 2012), although the post-crisis 
recovery is driven mainly by cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions.  Despite the rise in 
FDI inflows into this region, the overall value of FDI inflows is still at a relatively low 
level with less than 5% of global FDI inflows per year. 
Similar to the pattern of inflows, Table 3.2 shows that FDI outflows from the CIS 
have increased until the financial crisis.  It is however worthy to note that these outflows 
decline only slightly after the start of the crisis and by 2010 they exceed the pre-crisis 
level. Throughout the period of analysis inflows of FDI are higher than outflows but after 
the crisis the levels converge to similar values in 2010. UNCTAD (2012) suggests that the 
considerable increase in outward FDI from transition economies is due to the recovery of 
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commodity prices in the domestic market, the development of the home economy and the 
increased number of outward investors from the transition economies. 
 
South Asia 
Table 3.1 shows that FDI inflows to South Asia increase over the period. However, the 
largest share of global FDI inflows to the region in any given year is only 3.6%, which 
occurs in 2009, so South Asia is not a major location for foreign investment. UNCTAD 
(2012) indicates that FDI projects to this region are mainly mergers and acquisitions, and 
these are driven by a series of large acquisitions in extractive industries from the EU and 
other developing Asian countries.  Table 3.2 shows that FDI outflows from South Asia 
have a similar trend to the inflows, as they increase before the financial crisis and fall 
continuously after that time. The reduction is partly due to the reduced activities of Indian 
multinationals acquiring assets abroad, for which UNCTAD (2012) shows that the value 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (i.e. net purchases) has declined by 77% after 
the crisis in 2011.4  In general, South Asia generates the relatively little outward FDI, 
which is much lower than inward FDI. 
 
East Asia 
Compared to South Asia, the East Asia region has significantly greater amounts of both 
inward and outward FDI. Table 3.1 shows that FDI inflows to this region increase over 
the period and reach a record amount of $188.3 billion in 2010, which is 15.1% of global 
inflows. The growth rate of inward FDI into East Asia is however lower than that of South 
Asia, which starts the period of analysis with much lower levels of FDI. After the financial 
crisis, FDI inflows to East Asia have increased, but UNCTAD (2012) illustrates that there 
is a mixed picture for the performance of FDI inflows for the different economies within 
the region. FDI inflows to South Korea and Taiwan have fallen sharply, while China, as 
the main economy in the region, has experienced a continuing increase after the financial 
crisis.5 
 Table 3.2 shows that FDI outflows from East Asia fluctuate before 2006, but they 
increase continuously thereafter, until 2010. This is a notable trend, which is different 
from that of other regions during the financial crisis.  UNCTAD (2012) explains that the 
considerable growth in the value of FDI outflows from East Asia is driven by the boom 
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which rise sharply from $13 billion to $50 
                                                            
4 See Annex Table 1.3 in World Investment Report, 2012, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
5 See Annex Table 1.1 in World Investment Report, 2012, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
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billion over 2005-11.6  Outward FDI from East Asia now accounts for over 50% of 
developing countries’ outflows and 13% of global outflows, so that it is one of the major 
global generators of FDI. 
 
Southern Africa 
Of all the regions discussed above, Southern Africa has the lowest amounts of both FDI 
inflows and outflows. Table 3.1 shows that FDI inflows to Southern Africa fluctuate 
during the period, although inflows increase from 1% of developing countries inward FDI 
at the beginning of the period to 3% by the end of the period. However, the value of FDI 
inflows is always relatively low and never rises above $30 billion during the period. This 
suggests that the region is not a main location choice of global FDI. Inflows continue to 
decrease after the financial crisis, with UNCTAD (2012) suggesting that this is caused by 
political unrest and decreased cross-border mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors.  
However, UNCTAD (2012) predicts better prospects for FDI inflows to Africa, due to the 
considerable economic growth, continuous economic reform and high commodity prices 
encouraging investment from abroad. 
Finally, looking at FDI outflows, Table 3.2 shows that FDI from Southern Africa, 
as well as Africa in general, is at a low level over the period.  Outward FDI fluctuates 
strongly during the period and turns negative in 2002 and 2008.  This highlights the region 
as the least likely of all the regions discussed to engage in outward FDI and instead shows 
that it continues to rely on inward FDI, which reflects its current stage of economic 
development. 
 
3.3. BRICS FDI Flows 
 
This section aims to explore the location and trend of BRICS countries’ FDI.  In general, 
China and India dominate the BRICS FDI flows. This is discussed in Chapter 5 associated 
with Appendix Table 5.1.  Figure 3.2 reveals the trends of inward and outward BRICS 
FDI over the study period.  In order to further explore the most recent trends after the 
crisis, data on 2011 are also included in the figure.  It can be seen that FDI inflows and 
outflows are relatively stable before 2003, after which they increase until the financial 
crisis, and decrease sharply post-crisis.  By 2011 the flows of FDI recover to exceed their 
pre-crisis levels of $281 billion and $144 billion respectively. 
  
                                                            
6 See Annex Table 1.3 in World Investment Report, 2012, UNCTAD, Geneva. 
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Figure 3.2: Value of BRICS FDI Inflows and Outflows, 1997-2011 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2000, 2003, 2005, 2011 and 2012). 
Note: FDI flows are measured in billions of US dollars (current prices and current exchange 
rates). Constant prices give similar pattern owing to low inflation. 
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Figure 3.2 also shows that the value of BRICS FDI inflows is always greater than the 
value of outflows. However, although the gap between these flows is relatively stable, by 
the end of the period the BRICS countries become an important generator of FDI, with 
the share of BRICS outward FDI to global FDI outflows reaching 11% in 2010.  This 
reflects the general pattern for developing countries discussed above, which tend to absorb 
large amounts of FDI from developed countries, but they are also emerging as a source of 
FDI in their own right (see Utter, 2011, for a further discussion of the recent trends of 
developing economies’ FDI). The high growth rate and increasing share of global FDI 
outflows reflects the rapid economic development of the BRICS economies, which are 
predicted to have an increasingly important role in future global FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 
2010).  Finally, outward FDI from the BRICS tends to prefer developing countries, with 
UNCTAD (2012) finding that more than half of BRICS FDI outflows went to developing 
and transition economies before the financial crisis. 
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3.3.1. FDI Flows for Individual BRICS Countries 
 
Investments from different sources normally have different location preferences. For 
example, most investments from developing economies normally access the economies 
that are close to their home country and enter familiar markets based on trade and cultural 
ties (Gammeltoft, 2008).  Battat and Aykut (2005) find that investments from Asia prefer 
to locate in Africa.  However, multinationals from China and India have recently diverged 
from this pattern and invest high value assets in the US and EU.  This section aims to 
further our understanding of FDI inflows and outflows for each BRICS country. 
Throughout the discussion it uses Table 3.3, which shows BRICS FDI inflows and 
outflows by country from 1997 to 2010. 
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Table 3.3: BRICS FDI Inflows and Outflows by Country, 1997 to 2011 (billons of US dollars, current price) 
FDI Inflows 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Brazil 19.0 28.9 28.6 32.8 22.5 16.6 10.1 18.2 15.1 18.8 34.6 45.1 25.9 48.4 
Russia 4.9 2.8 3.3 2.7 2.5 3.5 8.0 11.7 12.9 29.7 55.1 75.0 36.5 41.2 
India 3.6 2.6 2.2 2.3 3.4 3.4 4.3 5.3 7.6 20.3 25.4 42.5 35.6 24.6 
China7 44.2 43.8 40.3 40.8 46.8 52.7 53.5 60.6 72.4 72.7 83.5 108.3 95.0 105.7 
South Africa 3.8 0.6 1.5 0.9 6.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 6.6 -0.5 5.7 9.0 5.4 1.6 
BRICS 75.5 78.6 75.9 79.5 82.0 77.0 76.6 96.4 114.6 141.0 204.2 279.9 198.5 221.6 
FDI Outflows 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Brazil 1.1 2.9 1.7 2.3 -2.3 2.5 0.2 9.5 2.5 28.2 7.1 20.5 -10.1 11.5 
Russia 3.2 1.3 2.2 3.2 2.5 3.5 9.7 9.6 12.8 23.2 45.9 55.6 43.7 51.7 
India 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.9 2.2 3.0 14.3 17.2 19.4 15.9 14.6 
China 2.6 2.6 1.8 0.9 6.9 2.5 -0.2 1.8 12.3 21.2 22.5 52.2 56.5 68.0 
South Africa 2.4 1.8 1.6 0.3 -3.2 -0.4 0.6 1.6 0.9 6.1 3.0 -3.1 1.2 0.5 
BRICS 9.3 8.6 7.3 7.0 4.7 9.2 11.3 24.7 31.5 92.9 95.7 144.5 107.2 146.3 
Source: UNCTAD (2003, 2005 and 2011), World Investment Reports, based on Annex Tables. 
Note: FDI flows with a negative sign indicate that at least one of three components of FDI (equity, reinvested earnings or intra-company loans) is negative and 
not offset by positive amount of other components. These are instances of reverse investment or disinvestment. 
5 
 
                                                            
7 The data on China excludes Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
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Brazil 
Table 3.3 shows that FDI inflows to Brazil are subject to a great deal of volatility. It is 
however the second largest BRICS country after China in terms of attracting FDI inflows 
throughout the period. Notably, inflows have more than doubled since 2005 despite the 
financial crisis.  In the case of FDI outflows, there is no particular trend over the period 
and indeed they are volatile after 2003. Brazil lags far behind China and in most years it 
generates less than Russia. According to Gammeltoft (2008), the main host countries of 
FDI outflows from Brazil include other countries from Latin America (such as Chile and 
Venezuela).  In addition, the Bahamas, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands also attract 
considerable FDI from Brazil.  It means that most Brazilian outward FDI prefers to be 
located in the neighbour countries, but UNCTAD (2004) indicates that the destination 
countries of market-seeking FDI from Brazil are Western European countries, the US and 
Mexico.  In order to further explore the main host countries of Brazilian outward FDI, 
Table 3.4 shows the main destinations of Brazilian FDI outflows over 2006-10.  A notable 
feature of Table 3.4 is the rise in the importance of the EU as a main destination for 
Brazilian FDI. However, Table 3.4 also shows that FDI from Brazil can vary dramatically 
from one year to another. For example, there is volatility in FDI flows to the US as well 
as the Caribbean countries, with a sharp decrease in FDI flows to the US in 2010.  
 
Table 3.4: Value of Brazilian FDI Outflows by Host Country (millions of US dollars) 
Host 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU 983 711 1,985 2,002 6,594 
US 999 3,548 4,217 1,094 -5,784 
Bahamas 1,418 995 522 207 -103 
Bermuda 24 362 13 -9 754 
British Virgin Islands 990 954 327 270 -601 
Chile 41 689 547 55 895 
Mexico 10 258 54 84 72 
Venezuela - 73 183 1 - 
Data Source: Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014, UNCTAD.8 
Note: Data not available prior to 2006. FDI is measured in current prices and current exchange rates. 
6 
Russia 
Table 3.3 shows that the value of FDI inflows to Russia increases rapidly over the latter 
part of the period, and Russia overtakes Brazil to become the second largest destination 
for FDI within the BRICS group, after China between 2006 and 2009.  The main reasons 
given why Russia is able to attract more FDI are the continuous and considerable 
                                                            
8 Source: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx last accessed: 
12th April 2016. 
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development of the home market, cheaper labour costs and high returns on energy and 
other projects related to natural resources (UNCTAD, 2012).  For FDI outflows, the trend 
is similar to that of inflows, i.e. stable at the beginning of the period followed by a steep 
increase after 2002.  Russia is the main generator of FDI amongst the BRICS countries 
over the period, but EIM dataset shows that the number of projects from Russia is not 
dominant BRICS outward FDI, and Russian outward FDI is not energy based because 
table 6.12 in Chapter 6 shows that only 10% of projects in EU-25 from Russia are energy 
related.  According to Kalotay (2003), in addition to the traditional neighbouring countries 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the EU, an increasing amount of 
Russian FDI is likely to enter a range of countries, including Australia, Africa and the US.  
Table 3.5 shows the main locations of Russian outward FDI, supporting the findings of 
Kalotay (2003). The table also shows the extent to which Russian FDI primarily enters 
the European Union. 
 
Table 3.5: Value of Russian FDI Outflows by Host Country (millions of US dollars) 
Host 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU 32,301 32,264 26,852 36,107 
US 973 7,264 1,634 1,060 
Australia 42 47 14 36 
Bermuda 2,734 1,305 854 1,056 
Africa 75 63 70 118 
Belarus 813 1,032 1,370 934 
Kazakhstan 107 326 1,029 -225 
Ukraine 1,667 146 678 485 
Data Source: Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014, UNCTAD. 
Note: Data not available prior to 2007. FDI is measured in current prices and current exchange rates. 
7 
India 
India is one of the largest economies in the BRICS, but Table 3.3 shows that it is not a 
major destination country for FDI inflows; in fact the value of FDI inflows to India is less 
than that of Brazil, Russia and China.  Similar to inflows, Indian FDI outflows account 
for only a small share of BRICS outward FDI, but in the EIM dataset, India is one of the 
main contributors to the FDI projects in the EU-25. The difference means that each project 
from India is associated with lower value.  The value of Indian FDI outflows is at a low 
level at the beginning of the period and only starts to grow after 2005. Finally in 2010, the 
value of FDI outflows exceeds that of Brazil, but it is still considerably smaller than either 
Russia or China.  Overall, UNCTAD data show that Russia and China are main generators 
of outward FDI, but EIM data support that China and India are dominant BRICS outward 
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FDI.  This is because each project from different BRICS countries is associated with 
different project scales.  The main host countries of Indian FDI change dramatically over 
time.  During the period from 1975 to 1990, geography, language and history were 
important factors for the Indian outward FDI location choice, with Thailand, Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia accounting for the largest share. In the 1990s, Pradhan (2005) finds that 
Indian FDI is focused much more on industrialized countries, such as the US, which was 
the most important host country of Indian FDI between 1996 and 2003. UNCTAD (2014) 
finds that the US still maintains the position of main location choice of Indian FDI, with 
the Netherlands and the UK the other two major host countries within the EU. However, 
the British Virgin Islands and Sri Lanka also continue to attract considerable FDI from 
India.9 
 
China 
Table 3.3 shows that China is the main destination for FDI inflows in the group of BRICS 
countries, and the value of inflows to China increases from $41 billion in 2000 to over 
$100 billion by the end of the period.  UNCTAD (2012) predicts that it will continue to 
be the leading destination of FDI inflows among all Asian countries.  Along with Russia, 
China is the main generator of outward FDI among the BRICS.  Indeed, by the end of the 
period China becomes the main source of outward FDI from the BRICS. UNCTAD (2005) 
analyses the location of Chinese FDI and finds that the main destination countries are the 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  Hirt and Orr (2006) suggest that 
Chinese firms wish to gain access to Western markets in order to engage in knowledge-
seeking FDI.  These firms will therefore increasingly locate in economies that have rich 
endowments of advanced technology. From the perspective of the source, Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are strongly supported by the government (Buckley et al., 
2008). This means that they have advantages and priorities to invest abroad.  Table 3.6 
summarises the main host countries of Chinese FDI outflows from 2005 to 2010.  It shows 
that most Chinese FDI enters Asian countries or regions, predominately locating in Hong 
Kong. However, less FDI outflows go to traditional host countries like the UK and US.  
There are also considerable FDI inflows to Australia, Caribbean, Luxembourg and 
Sweden.  Especially for the Caribbean, FDI flows to this region are for the market growth 
rather than advanced technology. 
                                                            
9 The same source for Tables 3.4 and 3.5 shows Indian FDI outflows in 2010, 2011 and 2012 only.  For 
these three years, there is the same conclusion to that of UNCTAD (2014).  Therefore, no table is shown for 
India here. 
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Table 3.6: Chinese FDI Outflows by Host Country (millions of US dollars) 
Host 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU: 190 129 1,045 467 2,967 5,963 
(UK) (25) (35) (567) (17) (192) (330) 
(Sweden) (1) (5) (68) (11) (8) (1,367) 
(Luxembourg)* (-) (-) (4) (42) (2,270) (3,207) 
Asia: 4,351 7,541 16,174 42,834 39,978 43,962 
Hong Kong (3,420) (6,931) (13,732) (38,640) (35,601) (38,505) 
Singapore (20) (132) (398) (1,551) (1,414) (1,119) 
Thailand (5) (16) (76) (45) (50) (700) 
Africa: 392 520 1,574 5,491 1,439 2,112 
South Africa (47) (41) (454) (4,808) (42) (411) 
Caribbean: 6,416 8,409 4,530 3,591 6,984 9,609 
British Virgin Islands (1,226) (538) (1,876) (2,104) (1,612) (6,120) 
Cayman Islands (5,163) (7,833) (2,602) (1,524) (5,366) (3,496) 
Australia: 193 88 532 1,892 2,436 1,702 
US: 232 198 196 462 909 1,308 
Source: Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014, UNCTAD. 
Note: Luxembourg FDI grows strongly due to Special Purpose Entities for tax reasons (OECD, 2014).  
The FDI data for Hong Kong are counted separately by UNCTAD because it is a Special Administrative 
Region of China. FDI is measured in current prices and current exchange rates. 
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South Africa 
Table 3.3 shows that both South African FDI inflows and outflows are at consistently low 
levels throughout the period.  FDI inflows reach their peak at $9 billion in 2008, but this 
is followed by a continuous decrease to $1.6 billion in 2010, which accounts for just 0.7% 
of total BRICS FDI inflows.  FDI outflows show a decreasing trend over the period with 
only $0.5 billion of outflows in 2010. It shows that South Africa plays a relatively 
insignificant role in the development of BRICS FDI. This may be partly due to the lower 
development of the economy, compared with the other four BRICS countries.  Most FDI 
outflows from South Africa are directly located in neighbouring countries, in addition to 
the main destinations of world investment such as the UK and US (UNCTAD, 2014), 
which again emphasises that South African firms are at the early stage of their 
international operations.  Table 3.7 shows the main locations of South African outward 
FDI.  It shows that neighbouring countries attract a large amount of FDI (e.g. Mozambique, 
Namibia and Uganda), compared with the US. 
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Table 3.7: South African FDI Outflows by Host Country (millions of US dollars) 
Host 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mozambique 12 37 176 160 41 129 
Namibia 308 309 586 673 - - 
Uganda 8 13 67 51 90 17 
US -226 131 -325 438 -217 127 
Source: Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014, UNCTAD. 
Note: Net FDI flows. FDI is measured in current prices and current exchange rates. 
9 
  
3.4. Determinants of BRICS FDI 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the location of FDI outflows is determined by many different 
factors, both external and internal to firms.  The ‘OLI paradigm’ provides a framework to 
consider all these factors together and indicates three necessary conditions for firms to 
invest directly in foreign countries: firms must have ownership-specific assets that are 
exclusive to them, they must establish subsidiaries for production in particular foreign 
countries instead of exporting, and they must internalise these assets within their firm 
structure rather than by contracting or licensing.  These are ownership, location and 
internalisation (OLI) advantages.  They are affected by the conditions in the home country 
of the foreign direct investor and the industry the investor operates in (Battat and Aykut, 
2005; Gammeltoft, 2008). In addition, the location of FDI depends on the characteristics 
of the host economies and underlying motives for engaging in FDI.  Overall, this suggests 
that in addition to firm-specific factors, the FDI location determinants can be classified 
into country and industry level factors.  
 
3.4.1. Location Determinants for General FDI 
 
This section briefly reviews the main determinants for the location choice of FDI.  These 
were discussed at length in Chapter 2, and at the country level they include market size, 
labour and knowledge.  Market size is expected to have a positive effect on FDI location 
(Janicki et al., 2004) as it captures market potential.  Labour factors refer to both the cost 
and quality of labour. Labour costs are part of overall investment costs and are therefore 
expected to have a negative FDI effect (Bevan and Estrin, 2000), but labour quality, which 
is usually measured by the level of education (Gao, 2005), may attract knowledge-seeking 
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FDI.  Knowledge factors in the host countries that may attract FDI include the level of 
technology, human capital and the scientific research base of the country.  
 Other country-level determinants are the macroeconomic and institutional factors.  
Macroeconomic factors include the level of trade openness, which affects export-oriented 
FDI (Jadhav, 2012), and the exchange rate (in domestic per foreign currency units), which 
should be negatively correlated with FDI inflows as the depreciation of the host country 
currency reduces relative wages and other production costs measured in foreign currency 
(Goleberg, 2007).  Institutional factors refer to the protection of intellectual property rights, 
the extent of government intervention in business operations and government corruption. 
Protection of intellectual property rights has a positive effect on FDI inflows, while the 
other two institutional factors have a negative relationship with FDI inflows.  Political 
risk, including political stability, government efficiency and regulatory quality, is also 
considered among the institutional factors.  Most studies support the idea that a country 
with a stable economic and political environment should attract greater FDI inflows. 
 At the industry level, agglomeration economies are considered an important factor 
explaining FDI location.  As I explained in Chapter 2, these are external economies that 
occur across firms in an area.  According to Dunning (1998), knowledge spillovers and 
linkages (i.e. both forward and backward) may stimulate a process of agglomeration. 
Knowledge spillovers persuade firms to agglomerate around those firms with advanced 
knowledge and technology, while forward and backward linkages could encourage 
producers to locate close to suppliers or customers.  It generates clustering or 
agglomeration economies, which in turn can attract more FDI to locate in these economies.  
Based on previous studies (Pelegrín and Bolancé, 2008; Head et al., 1999 and Bobonis 
and Shatz, 2007), agglomeration economies have been found to be strong drivers for FDI 
location.  In addition, these externalities can reduce the extent of information asymmetries 
and external uncertainties faced by foreign investors and hence provide an attractive 
location for FDI. 
 
3.4.2. Location determinants for BRICS FDI  
 
This sub-section discusses the determinants for the location of outward FDI of the BRICS.  
It is based around the country and industry level determinants, as well as the firm-specific 
factors identified above.  It differs from that of the empirical review in Chapter 2 as it 
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relates more directly to the BRICS countries, and it draws on the international business 
literature. 
 
Country-Level Determinants 
At the country level, the three main determinants of outward FDI from the BRICS are the 
size of the host market, the potential for forward integration and the level of knowledge 
and technology in the host market (Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012).  The size of the host 
market is seen to be important as firms from the BRICS are thought to be expanding their 
international markets to obtain more growth opportunities outside their domestic markets 
(Holtbrugge and Kreppel, 2012).  This is especially the case for BRICS countries as the 
home market of each BRICS country is limited by the relatively low levels of GDP per 
capita.  Therefore, market seeking motives are seen to be the most important factors 
behind FDI from BRICS countries (Jadhav, 2010).  BRICS firms are very active in 
neighbouring countries and other developing countries, but they are also interested in 
developed countries in Europe and North America given the large market size and 
potential of these economies (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
The type of forward integration undertaken by firms can vary according to whether 
the destination of FDI is a developed or developing country.  On the one hand, firms from 
emerging markets that have location advantages in their own country normally prefer to 
establish foreign subsidiaries in developed host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007).  On the 
other hand, firms in developed countries that have competitive advantages are more likely 
to depend on their particular products or well-known brands (Lopez-Claros et al., 2006).  
In this case, BRICS countries normally invest in developed countries through forward 
integration, i.e. engage with upstream activities in their home markets, such as producing 
goods, logistics and operations and downstream activities in developed host countries, 
such as sales and services.  By contrast, developed countries invest in the BRICS and other 
emerging economies through backward integration.  Overall, outward FDI from BRICS 
countries aims to expand into the international market and increase management skills, 
rather than seeking cost advantages that can be easily obtained in their own countries. 
Most firms from the BRICS (or other emerging economies) have advantages like 
low labour and resource costs, but are weaker in terms of technology and management 
skills.  In order to solve this problem, one choice is to cooperate with firms in developed 
countries.  In this sense, another important driver for outward FDI from the BRICS is to 
obtain advanced knowledge in developed host countries and use this to improve the level 
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of technology and innovation ability of the parent firms in emerging economies (Deng, 
2009).  Based on the knowledge-seeking literature, previous studies indicate that countries 
with lower technology are more likely to invest in countries that have more advanced 
technology (Kuemmerle, 1999; Serapio and Dalton, 1999).  Further, Szulanski (1996) and 
Tsai (2001) argue that in order to transfer knowledge from the subsidiaries in the host 
country, the parent firms in the emerging economies normally increase FDI in the R&D 
sector, which could further strengthen the technological capability of parent firms. 
 Overall, the motivation based on knowledge seeking for outward FDI is to gain 
access to knowledge abroad to reduce the competitive weakness on the international 
markets (Mathews and Zander, 2007).  However, the extent of reducing the competitive 
weakness may depend on whether spillovers exist in the industry, and if so the extent of 
the spillovers. This in turn depends on the technology gap between subsidiaries and local 
firms, where a large gap provides more potential for knowledge spillovers (Findlay, 1978), 
but also implies lower levels of absorptive capacity.   
 
Industry-Level Determinants 
At the industry level, outward FDI from the BRICS countries mainly depends on two 
factors: the strategic position of an industry for the home country and competitive 
pressures in the home market.  For the former, the development of industries in BRICS 
countries is promoted by economic and political motives.  Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012) 
indicate that there is preferential treatment by BRICS governments for strategic industries.  
For example, the natural resource industry in Brazil and the pharmaceutical industry in 
India have tax breaks, while only certain Chinese state-owned manufacturing firms have 
the right to enter the Chinese financial sector (Liu and Li, 2002).  In line with the 
international and government-driven development of these strategic industries, outward 
FDI from BRICS firms is more likely to occur in those industries that are treated as 
important by the BRICS governments. 
 The second determinant for BRICS outward FDI at the industry level is the 
competitive pressure in the home markets.  Along with the internationalization process of 
the BRICS countries, closed industries gradually become open to foreign investors, and 
thereby more and more foreign firms get access to the home markets.  This in turn should 
lead to a decline in the market share of domestic firms, an increase in competition from 
foreign firms, lower demand and a fall in prices (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012).  This 
prompts domestic firms to start seeking growth opportunities abroad.  Overall, stronger 
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competitive pressures in the home market can stimulate the development of outward FDI 
from BRICS countries. 
 
Firm-Level Determinants 
According to Bertoni et al. (2008), the firm level determinants for outward FDI can be 
divided into three categories: ‘push’, ‘pull’ and management factors.  First, the push 
factors include the increasing costs on the domestic market, internationalization policies 
for domestic firms and the stronger competition among customers and suppliers on the 
domestic market.  Second, pull factors towards the host countries are growth and 
investment opportunities, the availability of natural resources and encouragement from 
host governments.  Finally, the management factors are the availability of skills and 
knowledge to be internationalized. 
The most important driver for outward FDI at the firm level is the extent of specific 
resources owned by the domestic firm (i.e. firm-specific resources), which includes 
different kinds of assets, specific knowledge, the form of organisation etc.  The firm-
specific resources can generate a strong competitive advantage for these firms in the home 
market, which means that they develop rapidly and become leaders in their home markets 
gradually.  The dominant position further facilitates these firms in obtaining skilled 
employees, achieving scale economies and obtaining priority entry to certain industries in 
the home market.  Therefore, they are available to compete with foreign firms and enter 
the global markets.  It is necessary to note that the firm-specific resources from BRICS 
countries are different from those from developed countries. In particular, firms in BRICS 
countries have an advantage in terms of natural resources and raw materials, while those 
in developed countries mainly rely on advanced technology and management skills.  
Investors at all levels will invest abroad when they can earn greater returns than at home.10 
 
3.4.3. Location Determinants for FDI of each BRICS country 
 
In addition to the above determinants of outward FDI from the group of BRICS countries, 
there are also specific country-level motives for outward FDI for each BRICS country.  
These generally encompass economic and political determinants, for example a distinctive 
feature of outward FDI from Russia, India and China is the strong political support from 
                                                            
10 The mechanisms for benefiting from outward FDI have been discussed in Sections 2.4 to 2.6 in Chapter 
2 and Section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
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the home government (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012).  This sub-section discusses the 
determinants of FDI outflows in relation to each BRICS country. 
 
Brazil 
In general, access to raw materials, resources and markets is an important driver of 
outward FDI from Brazil.  Sauvant (2005) indicates that most outward FDI from Brazil is 
dominated by natural resources such as food and beverages and other resource-related 
products, while manufacturing FDI is minimal.  The author also suggests that the sharing 
of experience and the development of education and knowledge, which can be achieved 
through training, are important for Brazilian firms completing the process of 
transnationalization.  In addition to this, the Brazilian government supports outward FDI.  
President Lula in 2003 encouraged the Brazilian merchants to become true multinational 
merchants, and the Minister also expected that there would be ten transnational companies 
in Brazil by the end of President Lula’s term of office (Sauvant, 2005).  This may mean 
that the government may facilitate the outward FDI of Brazilian firms.  However, there 
are no specific policy measures promoting outward FDI from Brazil like those operating 
in China and discussed below. 
 
Russia 
Specific factors that encourage outward FDI from Russia include both firm-specific pull 
and push factors, and these factors have changed over time.  Kalotay (2008) shows that 
the pull factors are related to the elimination of monopoly power in the developed host 
countries.  Push factors refer to the unstable domestic market and business environment 
in Russia, which could motivate Russian firms to invest abroad.  Elenkov (1995) indicates 
that searching for advanced technology (for example, aerospace technology) has a strong 
impact on outward FDI from Russia.  During the 1990s, Russian firms such as bank, 
energy and metal companies that are given priority access to national resources were 
supported by the government, so that the control of national resources was another 
important determinant for Russian outward FDI (Liuhto and Jumpponen, 2002). This is 
because these firms have more advantages over other firms.  Thus, they prefer to invest 
abroad to seek advanced technology or for markets or sources.  
 
India 
An increasing number of Indian firms are involved in FDI because of their growing 
competitiveness and the increase in their profitability and financial strength (Sauvant, 
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2005).  First, factors related to market seeking are the dominant determinants for the 
location choice of Indian outward FDI.  For example, Milelli et al. (2010) and Rasiah et 
al. (2010) indicate that the entry to foreign developed markets is the key driver for outward 
FDI from emerging countries in Asia, such as China and India.  Second, Sauvant (2005) 
indicates that protecting natural resources is a key incentive for Indian firms to invest 
directly in other countries that are abundant in relevant resources, such as Australia, 
Russia and Western and Central Asia.  However, Nunnenkamp et al. (2012) argue that 
raw materials or advanced technologies do not attract Indian FDI outflows significantly.  
The authors find instead that Indian outward FDI is more likely to follow previous 
investment.  The paper finds a positive relationship between FDI outflows and the 
previous FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP in the host country.  The authors also find 
that geographical distance has a negative effect on Indian outward FDI.  While evidence 
on the effect of political stability of host countries is still inconclusive (for example, 
Andrés et al. (2012) find evidence that investors from emerging economies are more risk 
averse than other investors), Nunnenkamp et al. (2012) find that investors from India 
prefer to invest in the countries with weak institutions, an unstable economy or political 
uncertainty. This is because weak institutions, unstable economies and political 
uncertainty mean the lower level of costs and more opportunities for FDI. 
There is also evidence that the government attitude towards FDI outflows from 
India is important.  The government has specific policies for outward FDI, which have 
changed significantly over time.  According to Pradhan (2003), during the period from 
1974 to 1991, the government was trying to discourage Indian outward FDI, by 
obstructing FDI outflows from Indian firms.  This is because the scarcity of resources was 
a problem for India.  Outward FDI was obstructed by restricting the cash remittances 
abroad, as a way to promote exports.  During the 1990s, an automatic approval system 
was established by the Indian government to increase the limit of permissible investment 
and decrease the regulatory constraints, which aimed to encourage Indian direct 
investment overseas.  After 2003, the Indian government has also relaxed its restrictions 
to investment in the agriculture sector of other countries directly or through overseas 
branches. 
 
China 
In general, firms from emerging economies prefer to invest in industrialised countries to 
take advantage of advanced technology and learning (Deng 2003), but during the 1990s 
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Chinese outward FDI mainly sought natural resources when investing in industrialised 
countries (Buckley et al., 2008).  However, knowledge-seeking FDI has become an 
important motive for Chinese outward FDI in recent years.  Overall, Buckley et al. (2008) 
argue that the key motives for Chinese outward FDI in developed countries are to generate 
global brands, obtain advanced technology, protect natural resources and expand markets 
abroad. 
Chinese firms have established R&D centres abroad to enhance their technological 
assets, for example, the Chinese firm Haier set up a research centre in India (Sauvant, 
2005).  Similar to Indian firms, Chinese firms also invest in resource rich countries in 
order to protect natural resources at home.  Fierce competition is an important factor that 
motivates Chinese firms to invest abroad.  In the case of asset-seeking FDI, Dunning (2006) 
suggests that Chinese firms tend to invest in economies rich in human and intellectual 
capital, which helps these firms improve their competitiveness on the international market.  
Because of cultural proximity, Buckley et al. (2007) suggest that FDI from Chinese firms 
prefers to locate in countries that have large ethnic Chinese minorities.  It suggests 
networks play an important role in attracting Chinese investors because they reduce 
transaction costs.  It could explain why Chinese FDI locates in Asian countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
 Policy liberalisation can also stimulate FDI outflows.  Similar to India, the Chinese 
government supports outward FDI from domestic firms and promotes the international 
competitiveness of multinationals through specific policies.  Most beneficiaries are the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have received strong support from the Chinese 
government in various ways, such as financial assistance, trade agreements with 
developed countries and bilateral investment negotiation (Buckley et al., 2008).  It means 
that SOEs have priorities to use national resources and enter the international markets. 
Thus, they have advantages over other firms to earn returns and occupy the market share 
in the domestic market, which could push them to invest abroad.  This support started in 
1979 and has continued since then.  In particular, many measures have been adopted by 
the government to simplify the approval procedures and reduce restrictions on foreign 
exchange.  For example, since October 2004, approval for outward FDI applications can 
be obtained from the official website of the Ministry of Commerce and there is no 
requirement for firms to submit their investment proposals.  In addition, the Chinese 
government also requires the Export-Import Bank and commercial banks to supply loans 
with low interest rates to firms that invest abroad.  At the same time, fiscal incentives are 
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used to favour these firms.  Finally, an online system was created by the government for 
firms to avoid FDI barriers and discrimination in host countries through bilateral 
consultations (see Sauvant, 2005).   
 
South Africa 
There are few studies of South African outward FDI, but they suggest that the 
determinants for outward FDI from South Africa are the same as for the other four BRICS 
countries.  They include knowledge-seeking, protection of natural resources and increased 
competitiveness of domestic firms.  South Africa is the largest single source of outward 
FDI from Africa.  Its FDI outflows are mainly motivated by the availability of resources 
in the host countries and the investment opportunities in neighbouring countries 
(Gammeltoft, 2008).  As a result, most South African investment is concentrated in Africa.  
Henley et al. (2008) show that most investors from South Africa still prefer to invest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) directly, even though there is poor infrastructure and low levels 
of development of the home markets. 
 
3.4.4. Bilateral Investment Treaties between the BRICS and EU-25 
 
The earlier discussions have found that the BRICS economies are playing an ever more 
important role in FDI flows and hence the general process of globalisation.  They have 
also highlighted the general determinants that affect the locational pattern of this 
investment.  A recurrent theme for each of the BRICS countries is that outward FDI takes 
place in specific industries, possibly helped by strategic government policies, and also in 
specific host countries.  These location patterns may arise because of geographical 
proximity or due to other motives such as market and knowledge-seeking FDI or 
agglomeration economies.  Therefore, this section mainly focuses on the location choice 
of investment from the BRICS in the EU based on their Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs).  A BIT is an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection 
of investments made by investors from countries in each other’s territory.  UNCATD 
provides the data on the signature date that cover 2963 treaties among different countries. 
This can be used as the extra evidence for the pattern of BRICS investments that is 
reported in the above sections and to examine whether the locations indeed have the 
characteristics that attract the investments of BRICS countries.  Hence, Table 3.8 shows 
the signature date for the BITs between each BRICS and each of the EU-25 countries. 
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Table 3.8: Signature Date for Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU-25 Countries 
Partners Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Austria - Feb. 1990 Nov. 1999 Sept. 1985 Nov. 1996 
Belgium Jan. 1999 Feb. 1989 Oct. 1997 Jun. 2005 Aug. 1998 
Bulgaria  - Jun. 1993 Oct. 1998 Jun. 2007 - 
Czech Republic - Apr. 1994 Jul. 2010 Dec. 2005 Dec. 1998 
Denmark May. 1995 Nov. 1993 Sept. 1995 Apr. 1985 Feb. 1996 
Estonia - - - Sept. 1993 - 
Finland Mar. 1995 Feb. 1989 Nov. 2002 Nov. 2004 Sept. 1998 
France Mar. 1995 Jul. 1989 Sept. 1997 Nov. 2007 Oct. 1995 
Germany Sept. 1995 Jun. 1989 Jul. 1995 Dec. 2003 Sept. 1995 
Greece - Jun. 1993 Apr. 2007 Jun. 1992 Nov. 1998 
Hungary - Mar. 1995 Nov. 2003 May. 1991 - 
Ireland - - - - - 
Italy Apr. 1995 Dec. 2002 Nov. 1995 Jan. 1985 Jun. 1997 
Latvia - - Feb. 2010 Apr. 2004 - 
Lithuania - Jun. 1999 Mar. 2011 Nov. 1993 - 
Luxembourg Jan. 1999 Feb. 1989 Oct. 1997 Jun. 2005 Aug. 1998 
Netherlands Nov. 1998 Oct. 1989 Nov. 1995 Nov. 2001 May. 1995 
Poland - Oct. 1992 Oct. 1996 Jun. 1988 - 
Portugal Feb. 1994 Jul. 1994 Jun. 2000 Dec. 2005 - 
Romania - Sept. 1993 Feb. 2009 Apr. 2007 - 
Slovakia - Nov. 1993 Sept. 2006 Dec. 2005 - 
Slovenia - Apr. 2000 Jun. 2011 Sept. 1993 - 
Spain - Oct. 1990 Sept. 1997 Nov. 2005 Sept. 1998 
Sweden - Apr. 1995 Jul. 2000 Sept. 2004 May. 1998 
UK Jul. 1994 Apr. 1989 Mar. 1994 May. 1986 Sept. 1994 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD.11 
10 
 
Table 3.8 shows that most dates of signature are concentrated in the 1990s and that they 
occur earlier in time if the partner countries are more developed and relatively open to 
trade.  That is, most signature dates between the BRICS countries and Western European 
countries are earlier than those with the Eastern European countries.  The opening of 
relations between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and the BRICS 
occurs after 1989, which is the year when Communism collapsed.  All agreements with 
the CEECs, with one exception, are signed after 1989.  
Section 3.2 shows that Russia and China are the two main investors among the 
five BRICS countries.  Table 3.8 shows that many of the treaties between Russia and the 
                                                            
11 Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/175 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195  last accessed: 12th April 2016. 
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EU are in 1989 and that none of them are dated before 1989 because these were also 
affected by the collapse of Communism.  In addition, Russia’s treaties with the East are 
earlier than those with the West owing to geographical and political factors.  It also can 
be seen that the treaty dates between China and the EU countries are concentrated in the 
1990s and the beginning of the new century, which is similar to India.  However, their 
agreement dates with specific EU countries can vary greatly.  For example, India signed 
the treaty with Germany in 1995, but the treaty date for China is 2003.  By contrast, China 
signed the treaty with Italy earlier than India did.  For Brazil and South Africa Table 3.8 
shows that all of the dates for their treaties with the EU countries occurred in the 1990s, 
although the missing dates indicate that there are still no bilateral investment treaties with 
many of these.  Overall, this table shows that the date of the bilateral investment treaty is 
not only determined by the economic development of the EU country, but also by the 
extent of openness of the BRICS countries themselves owing in part to political and 
geographical considerations. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has sought to review the overall pattern of BRICS outward FDI and the global 
regions that are the main recipients of this investment for individual BRICS countries.  It 
also discusses the reasons and determinants of this outward FDI including the special 
reasons underlying the FDI from individual BRICS countries, which aims to explore 
whether the location choice of FDI keep consistent with the literature review. The chapter 
considers the Bilateral Investment Treaties that are signed between each BRICS and EU 
country to see what these reveal about the location preference of each BRICS in relation 
to the European Union. 
 First of all, to examine whether the patterns of BRICS FDI have the similar 
tendency to those of global FDI, these global inflows and outflows are discussed, 
distinguishing between the developed and developing countries.  There is no doubt that 
the developed economies are both the main location of FDI inflows and main source of 
FDI outflows, particularly the EU and US.  In relation to FDI outflows, the developed 
economies showed a sharp decrease during the Financial Crisis, although over the study 
period they still increased their amount of FDI and share of global FDI outflow.  With 
regard to global regional trends, FDI flows from East and South Asia and from the CIS 
are more similar to those of the developing economies, compared with South America and 
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Southern Africa, which are a net receiver of FDI.  Outward FDI from these latter two 
regions is at a relatively low level and shows a high degree of volatility compared with 
their FDI inflows.   
 Second, FDI flows of BRICS is discussed. Both inflows and outflows are 
increasing over time, but with some slight fluctuations, while the amount of FDI inflows 
is still greater than that of the FDI outflows.  It means that the BRICS countries are at the 
early stage of internationalisation.  At the country level, China and India are the main 
contributors to the FDI flows of the BRICS and they alternate as the top one over time, 
but finally reach a similar level by 2010.  Compared with China and India, FDI outflows 
from Brazil, Russia and South Africa maintain a relatively low level and fluctuate 
considerably, where most Russian outward FDI prefers to be located in the East of EU, 
which is no doubt due to political and geographical considerations.  In addition to the 
general determinants of BRICS FDI location, there are special motives for outward FDI 
of each BRICS country including the policies of encouragement by the central government. 
Finally, this chapter considers the signature date of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
between the BRICS and EU countries, to examine which countries are more open to 
BRICS FDI.  An earlier signature date suggests that BRICS FDI is more interested in this 
country and that the BRICS country starts its international process earlier.  Inspection 
shows that the signature dates between China or India and EU countries are concentrated 
in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, but the dates with different EU countries 
vary, so that these two countries have different international processes, although starting 
around the same time.  The treaty dates for Russia are around 1989 and follow the collapse 
of Communism, and Russia is interested in the Central and Eastern European countries.  
For Brazil and South Africa, all signature dates are in 1990s, but there are still no treaties 
between them and some EU countries.  Thus, while these two countries started their 
international process early in relation to Europe at a slower pace, which may be due to 
their development. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In general, there are three levels of choice that a multinational firm faces when it engages 
in the international activities. As indicated by Rasciute (2008), the first choice is whether 
it produces in the home country and exports abroad, or alternatively produces both in the 
home and overseas country.  When a firm decides to locate its production abroad, the 
second choice it faces is a decision concerning where to locate their production facility 
between a number of alternative locations.  The final choice facing the firm is the scale of 
the investment.  These decisions are to some extent mutually dependent, so that the 
decision to invest in part depends on the scale of the investment and the nature of the 
preferred host country.  In this thesis I focus on the second choice, and following the 
relevant literature I generally regard these choices as independent.   
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology used to examine 
empirically the location of BRICS FDI in the EU countries in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis.  The EIM database provides data on the number of FDI projects (count data) 
and also shows the location choice of these projects in the EU associated with other 
information. These will be discussed in Chapter 5. The applied work involves a number 
of different frameworks that adopt a range of econometric models used in the empirical 
literature on FDI location.  In particular, these frameworks include a logit specification, 
such as Multinomial Logit and Conditional Logit models, which capture the discrete 
location choice of FDI between alternative locations (e.g. Becker et al., 2005; Crozet et 
al., 2004; Head and Mayer, 2004).  They also include the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
models that capture the discrete counts of FDI projects that occur in different locations 
(e.g. Wu, 1999; Roberto, 2004). 
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.2 discusses the 
model of binary choice that is the basis for the logit models of discrete choice.  The 
Multinomial Logit and Conditional Logit models that are used for analysing the location 
choice are then explored in Section 4.3.  Section 4.4 looks in detail at the count data 
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models that encompass the Poisson and Negative Binomial models.  This section also 
includes some more advanced methods such as the Hurdle, Zero-Inflated and Zero-
Truncated models that are appropriate if there are a large number of zero observations in 
the count data, which is the case for our data.  In this section, the model selection among 
standard Poisson, Negative Binomial (NB) and Zero-inflated models is discussed at the 
end of Section 4.4.5.12  Section 4.5 sets out the specification of the regression equations 
for the logit and count data analysis that is used in the following chapters.  Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2. Binary Choice Models 
 
Many economic outcomes can be considered as a discrete choice among a finite number 
of alternatives, such as the location decision of firms across a number of alternative 
locations.  A common feature of discrete data is that the conventional regression analysis 
of these leads to inconsistent or inefficient estimates, so that alternative estimating 
techniques should be used.  In most cases, these alternative regression methods are based 
on the interpretation of the probability of the discrete event occurring.  The models are 
constructed to relate this probability to a number of explanatory factors that determine 
or affect the event occurring.  Therefore, the general framework for these probability 
models can be specified as: 
 
Pr(𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒) = Pr(𝑌 = 𝑗) = 𝐹 (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠),       (4.1) 
 
where event j represents a particular choice among a finite set of discrete alternatives and 
F is a function of the relevant explanatory variables that affect this choice.  In specifying 
this function, this section looks at the simplest class of discrete choice models, which 
analyse choice between two events.  These are known as binary choice models. 
 
4.2.1. Specification of the Binary Choice Model 
 
The binary model, which is a basis for the logit analysis, is used to explain a binary 
dependent variable, which offers two choices.  For example, in the case of FDI the binary 
model can be used to explore whether an investor chooses to locate abroad or not.  If the 
                                                            
12 Hurdle and Zero-truncated models cannot be run for Brazil. Thus, these two models will not be used for 
discussing FDI location of each BRICS country. Details are shown in the Introduction of Section 8.5 in 
Chapter 8. 
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investor does invest then 𝑌 = 1, but otherwise 𝑌 = 0.  There are therefore only two 
possible scenarios (𝑌 = 1 or 𝑌 = 0).  These in turn may be affected by many factors, at 
the firm, industry and country level.  The variables for these factors can be expressed 
together in a vector 𝑋, so that the probability of the choice can be written as: 
 
{
Pr(𝑌 = 1) = 𝐹(𝑋,   𝛽)
      Pr(𝑌 = 0) = 1 −𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽),
                                       (4.2) 
 
where 𝛽 are the respective coefficients on the explanatory variables 𝑋 that affect the 
probability of the event (i.e. the foreign investment) occurring.  It is necessary to specify 
a suitable model for the right-hand side of equation (4.2), and if a linear regression is 
used, then 𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽) = 𝑋′𝛽.  As 𝐸(𝑌) = 𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽) the regression model can therefore be 
expressed as (Greene, 2002): 
 
𝑌 = 𝐸(𝑌) + [𝑌 − 𝐸(𝑌)] = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝜀 ,                                  (4.3) 
 
where 𝜀 is a random error term.  This is the linear probability model.  However, because 
𝑌 equals either 0 or 1, then ε equals -𝑋′𝛽 or 1 − 𝑋′𝛽 with probabilities of 1 − 𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽) 
and 𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽) respectively. Greene (2002) discusses the estimation of the binary choice 
using the method of maximum likelihood.  The discussion of this procedure is considered 
in Appendix 4.1. 
 
4.2.2. Model Selection 
 
As an alternative of the linear model, the normal distribution is widely adopted, which 
leads to the probit model: 
 
 Pr(𝑌 = 1) = Φ(𝑋′𝛽),                                             (4.4) 
 
where the function Φ(𝑋′𝛽)  is the standard normal distribution function.  Another 
commonly-used distribution is the logistic distribution, which leads to the logit model.  
The logit model is widely used owing to its mathematical convenience: 
 
Pr(𝑌 = 1) =
𝑒𝑋
′𝛽
1+𝑒𝑋
′𝛽
= Λ(𝑋′𝛽)                                        (4.5) 
 
where the function Λ(𝑋′𝛽) gives the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
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The probit and logit models each have a symmetric bell-shaped distribution, but in 
addition there are other models that do not assume symmetry. 
The natural question to ask is which of these distributions should be preferred.  
The logistic distribution is similar to the normal distribution, although its tails are much 
thicker, so that these two distributions give similar predictions of the probabilities for 
intermediate values of 𝑋′𝛽.  However, there tends to be larger probabilities for 𝑌 = 0 
when the value of 𝑋′𝛽 is very small in the logistic function compared to the normal 
distribution. Amemiya (1981) explores this, but he comes to no definitive conclusion.  
Overall, from a theoretical perspective, there is not any general basis in the literature for 
selecting one distribution over another, but researchers may have their own reasons to 
prefer one distribution, which is perhaps for its mathematical convenience.  Nevertheless, 
the probit and logit models tend to be the most widely used models in econometric 
applications using count data. 
A further issue when looking at the logit and probit models is in the interpretation 
of the parameters of these models, as in general they do not relate to the marginal effects 
that are associated with the standard OLS regression.  Marginal effects can be estimated 
at the means of regressors.  In the probit and logit models: 
 
𝐸(𝑌) = 1[𝐹(𝑋′𝛽)] + 0[1 − 𝐹(𝑋′𝛽)] = 𝐹(𝑋′𝛽),                     (4.6) 
 
so that in general, the first derivative of 𝑋 can be shown to be (Greene, 2002): 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑋
= {
𝑑𝐹(𝑋′𝛽)
𝑑(𝑋′𝛽)
} 𝛽 = 𝑓(𝑋′𝛽)𝛽,                                 (4.7) 
 
where 𝑓(𝑋′𝛽) represents the density function of the cumulative distribution function 
𝐹(𝑋′𝛽).  For the normal distribution, equation (4.7) can be written as: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑋
= ϕ (𝑋′𝛽)𝛽                                                (4.8) 
 
where ϕ(𝑋′𝛽) is the standard normal density function.  For the logistic distribution it is: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑋
= Λ(𝑋′𝛽)[1 − Λ(𝑋′𝛽)]𝛽                                     (4.9) 
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It can therefore be seen that these values depend on the values of 𝑋, so that to obtain the 
marginal estimated effects they are often calculated at the sample means (i.e. the means 
of the regressors). This could be given through econometrics packages such as Stata. 
 
4.3. Multiple Location Choice Models 
 
The above section has explored models for binary choices in the discrete choice 
framework, but in practice there may be a greater number of choices that need to be 
modelled.  These can be classified into ordered and unordered sets of alternatives.  For 
example, the location choice of a foreign direct investor may well encompass a number 
of different unordered alternatives that cannot be modelled in a simple binary framework.  
Therefore, this section discusses models of multiple unordered choice models. 
Again, Greene (2002) sets up a random utility model for unordered choices.  It is 
assumed that there is a choice between a set of 𝐽 unordered alternatives for firm 𝑖, so that 
the utility function of choice 𝑗 for firm 𝑖 is: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝐴𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  ,                                             (4.10) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑗
′  is composed of characteristics that relate to both the alternatives and the firms.  
If 𝑈𝑖𝑗 is the maximum utility that firm 𝑖 makes from choosing 𝑗 in the set of alternatives 
𝐽 then it must follow that the probability of choosing alternative j satisfies: 
 
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑗) > Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑘) , 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗                                       (4.11) 
 
where 𝑘 denotes all other alternatives in 𝐽.  McFadden (1974) shows that the probability 
of firm 𝑖 choosing location 𝑗 is: 
 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒
𝐴𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽
∑ 𝑒
𝐴𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝐽
𝑗=1
  .                                       (4.12) 
 
Equation (4.10) shows that utility depends on 𝐴𝑖𝑗, where 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = [𝑋𝑖𝑗 ,𝑊𝑖] distinguishes 
between the attributes of the alternatives like the countries (𝑋𝑖𝑗) and the characteristics 
of firms (𝑊𝑖).  In practice, these are often modelled separately, which is partly because 
data on the determinants for both of these are often too costly to collect, so that 
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researchers just focus on the attributes of one of these alternatives.  This means that two 
types of model are analysed and these are now considered in turn as follows.  
 
4.3.1. Multinomial Logit Model 
 
The Multinomial Logit model applies to circumstances in which the data includes only 
the characteristics of the agent making the choice, which in our case is the foreign 
investor.  Hence, only the characteristics 𝑊𝑖 appear in 𝐴𝑖𝑗 in equation (4.12).  Schmidt 
and Strauss (1975) show that in general there are 𝐽 + 1 choices in a set of 𝐽 alternatives, 
as the choice starts from 0 to 𝐽, rather than from 1 to 𝐽.  Therefore, the Multinomial Logit 
model is: 
 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑊𝑖) =
𝑒
𝛽𝑗
′𝑊𝑖
∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝑗
′𝑊𝑖𝐽
𝑗=0
                                          (4.13) 
 
where 𝑗 = 0, 1, … , 𝐽.  This model shows that there are 𝐽 + 1 choices for the decision 
maker who has characteristics 𝑊𝑖.  If 𝐽 = 1 (i.e. 𝑗 = 0, 1), then clearly equation (4.13) 
represents the binary choice model that has previously been discussed.  It is normal to 
let 𝛽0 = 0  as the sum of all probabilities equals unity, which means that 𝐽 + 1 
probabilities are determined by 𝐽 alternatives in the set.  Therefore, equation (4.13) can 
be re-written as: 
 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒
𝛽𝑗
′𝑊𝑖
1+∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝑗
′𝑊𝑖𝐽
𝑗=1
,            𝛽0 = 0                              (4.14) 
 
As indicated above, if 𝐽 = 1, equation (4.14) is the binomial model.   
 
4.3.2. Conditional Logit Model 
 
Compared with the Multinomial Logit model, the Conditional Logit model is used for 
data that include only the attributes of the alternatives, rather than the characteristics of 
the agent making the choice, i.e. the inward investor.  Thus, only the attributes of the 
alternatives 𝑋𝑖𝑗 appear in 𝐴𝑖𝑗 in equation (4.12), and the model is: 
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Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑖𝑗) =
𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
 .                                       (4.15) 
 
In order to be consistent with the convention of the previous literature, 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 
for all 𝐽 alternatives in the set.  In the Conditional Logit model, Greene (2002) 
emphasizes that there is no direct relationship between the coefficients and the marginal 
effects.  However, the latter could be calculated by differentiating equation (4.15) with 
respect to 𝑋: 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑗
𝜕𝑋𝑘
= {𝑃𝑗[𝟏(𝑗 = 𝑘) − 𝑃𝑘]}𝛽,  for  𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽.                        (4.16) 
 
It can be seen that the attributes of the alternatives 𝑋𝑗 affect the probabilities through 
both 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑃𝑘.  Furthermore, the effect of choice 𝑘 on 𝑃𝑗 with attribute 𝑚 can be shown 
to be: 
 
𝜕 log𝑃𝑗
𝜕 log𝑋𝑘𝑚
= 𝑋𝑘𝑚[𝟏(𝑗 = 𝑘) − 𝑃𝑘]𝛽𝑚                                  (4.17) 
 
Hensher (1986) indicates that it is better to show the elasticity of probabilities, but 
Greene (2002) argues that this is a personal choice to report the derivative or elasticity 
of probability “since there is no ambiguity about the scale of the probability itself” (p. 
723).  Therefore, if marginal effects are preferred to be shown, they can be estimated at 
the means of regressors. In this thesis, marginal effects are estimated for tables 7.8 and 
8.11 as they show the main regression results. 
 According to equation (4.12), 𝑋𝑖𝑗 varies between the alternatives and the agents 
to some extent, but 𝑊𝑖  varies only between the agents, but it is constant across all 
alternatives.  It is potentially possible to incorporate both the alternative attributes and 
agent characteristics into the model, in which case the probability of firm i choosing 
location j in equation (4.12) becomes: 
 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗+𝛼
′𝑊𝑖
∑ 𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗+𝛼
′𝑊𝑖𝐽
𝑗=1
=
𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑒𝛼𝑖
′𝑊𝑖
∑ 𝑒
𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑒𝛼𝑖
′𝑊𝑖𝐽
𝑗=1
                            (4.18) 
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Both the Multinomial Logit and Conditional Logit models are based on the assumption 
of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).  This imposes the constraint in the 
model that the ratio of the probabilities between any two alternatives is independent of 
the presence of a third alternative, where this third alternative may differ from one of the 
other two only in ways that are irrelevant to the decision being taken.  For example, in 
the case of the well-known travel-to-work transport mode if the choice is between rail 
and bus travel, but a new bus is introduced that is painted a different colour (it is blue 
whereas existing buses are red), then the new alternative (of a blue-painted bus) will not 
affect the estimated odds-ratio (i.e. the ratio of probabilities) between the rail and existing 
red-painted buses, even though it is reasonable that some commuters will now use the 
blue-painted bus.  This IIA restriction will mean that the probability of using a bus is 
likely to be over-predicted by the logit model, and that of use the train will be under-
predicted.   The testing for IIA assumption is considered in Section 7.4.3 of Chapter 7, 
which shows the main regression results.  Details of IIA assumption and the estimation 
problem caused by the IIA assumption are considered further in Appendix 4.2. 
 
4.4. Count Data Models 
 
In addition to modelling the FDI location as a choice between countries, which is captured 
by a dependent variable that takes a value of either 0 or 1, it is also of interest to discuss 
the approach that uses count data to examine FDI location, e.g. where the dependent 
variable is the count of the number of FDI projects.  In principle, multiple linear regression 
models can be used to examine count data, but as Greene (2002) notes given the discrete 
nature of the dependent variable it is possible to improve upon the performance of 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation.  In addition, if there is a large number of zero counts 
within the data then certain methods should be used to take into consideration these 
particular characteristics.  
This section briefly discusses the multiple linear regression techniques that are 
used to estimate count data and the specification of the Poisson model is then considered.  
The Poisson framework may however be problematic if the data is characterised by over-
dispersion in the data, such as a large number of zero counts.  Therefore, two further 
models are discussed that take into account this problem, comprising the Negative 
Binomial and Hurdle Poisson models, where the latter explicitly takes into account the 
effects of excess counts of zeros. 
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4.4.1. Log-linear Regression Model 
 
In general, the multiple linear regression model aims to explore the relationship between 
the dependent variable and several explanatory variables.  The linearity assumption refers 
to the way that explanatory variables and the disturbance term enter the equation, rather 
than the relationship between variables.  In this sense, when there is a linear relationship 
between the logs of x and y, the log-linear regression model arises as follows: 
 
ln 𝑦 =𝛽1 ln 𝑥1 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝐾 ln 𝑥𝐾 + 𝜀,                           (4.19) 
 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable measured by the number of FDI projects, 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝐾 are 
explanatory variables and 𝜀 is a disturbance term that is used to capture the effects of 
unobserved factors. 
This is referred to as the constant elasticity form, since as the elasticity of 𝑦 with 
respect to 𝑥𝐾 (𝜕 ln 𝑦/𝜕 ln 𝑥𝑘 = 𝛽𝑘) is constant.  The log-linear regression function allows 
a non-linear relationship to be estimated in a linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
framework, and also allows the transformation of variables that may be relatively skewed 
as may be the case when investigating FDI counts, e.g. some locations receive a large 
number of FDI projects relative to other locations.  Estimates of the 𝛽 can be obtained 
through either OLS or maximum likelihood estimation, where details are given in 
Appendix 4.3. 
 
4.4.2. Poisson Regression Model 
 
The log-linear transformation above may not be the most effective way of accounting for 
the skewed nature of the data, nor does it explicitly take into account the discrete nature 
of counts of FDI.13  In practice, the Poisson regression is the most popular technique to 
model this data.  According to Greene (2002), if Y is a count variable, it describes how 
each 𝑦𝑖 is selected from a Poisson distribution that is related to the explanatory variables 
𝑋𝑖 as follows, where 𝜆𝑖 is the Poisson parameter: 
 
                                                            
13 It is usually assumed that the linear regression has a normal distribution, which is reasonable if the 
dependent variable is continuous, because continuous variables can take all values in a large range.  
However, count data take a relatively limited number of values, so its distribution is Poisson, rather than the 
normal. 
83 
 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) =
𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
,    𝑦𝑖 = 0,1,2, … ,             (4.20) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖! is the factorial of 𝑦𝑖.  Greene (2002) also indicates that the common formulation 
for the Poisson parameter 𝜆𝑖 is through a log-linear model, so that ln 𝜆𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷.  It can 
then be shown that the expected number of event occurrences in each period is: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊) = 𝜆𝑖 = 𝑒
𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 .                              (4.21) 
 
Wooldridge (2014) supports the use of the exponential function to model the expected 
values as they will always be positive, so that the predicted values for the dependent 
variable 𝑦 will also be positive.  Thus, the first derivative with respected to 𝒙𝒊 is: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊)
𝜕𝑿𝒊
= 𝜆𝑖𝜷.                                                (4.22) 
  
The main problem with the Poisson model is that it constrains the variance of the number 
of event occurrences to be equal to the mean, as shown above in equation (4.21).  This 
restriction is often violated as it is common to observe that the variance exceeds the mean 
in many count data distributions, and this is called over-dispersion.  If the Poisson model 
ignores the over-dispersion then it under-estimates the standard errors.14  Kennedy (2008) 
argues that there are two reasons for the occurrence of over-dispersion.  The first is due to 
heterogeneity across the observations, for which the coefficient estimates cannot be 
identified for all individuals in the sample.  Second, over-dispersion happens when there 
are ‘redundant’ zeros in the data, which means that there are “more zeros in the data than 
would be expected if the data were actually following a Poisson” (Kennedy, 2008; p. 244).  
The next section looks at the way of modelling data over-dispersion. 
 
4.4.3. Negative Binomial Model 
 
The main weakness of the Poisson regression model is the equality of the conditional 
mean and variance.  However, there are alternatives to this model (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998), of which the most popular is the Negative Binomial model.  This relaxes the 
equality of the conditional mean and variance by introducing an individual and 
                                                            
14 Wooldridge (2014) believes that the Poisson distribution has a good robustness property in that estimates 
will be consistent and asymptotically normal estimators for 𝛽. 
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unobserved effect: 
 
ln 𝜇𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖 = ln 𝜆𝑖 + ln 𝑢𝑖,                                     (4.23) 
 
where 𝜆𝑖is the variance of the Poisson distribution and the variance of NB is 𝜇𝑖 which 
exceeds its conditional mean.  𝒙𝒊 = (1, 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘 ) is a (𝑘 + 1) ∗ 1 covariate vector and 
𝜷 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘) is the corresponding parameter vector. 
The assumption of the Poisson model is that the conditional mean 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = 𝜆𝑖 
is equal to the conditional variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = 𝜆𝑖 . The disturbance 𝑢𝑖  (i.e. 𝜀𝑖 ) in 
equation (4.23) is the specification error in the classical regression model.  In this sense, 
the distribution of 𝑦𝑖 still maintains the Poisson distribution and the density function is 
expressed as the following form based on 𝒙𝒊 and the disturbance 𝑢𝑖 (see Greene, 2002): 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊, 𝑢𝑖) =
𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖(𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖)
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
 .                                       (4.24) 
 
The unconditional distribution 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊) is expressed as the expected value of the above 
conditional distribution over 𝑢𝑖 as follows: 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝒙) = ∫
𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖(𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖)
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
+∞
0
𝑔(𝑢𝑖)𝑑𝑢𝑖.                                (4.25) 
 
It can be seen that the unconditional distribution is defined by a density choice of 𝑢𝑖.  
Greene (2002) indicates that 𝑔(𝑢𝑖)  in equation (4.25) can be defined as the follow 
according to the normalization: 
 
𝑔(𝑢𝑖) =
𝜃𝜃
Γ(θ)
𝑒−𝜃𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖
𝜃−1.                                           (4.26) 
 
Because of the unobserved heterogeneity, the Poisson model is not adequate any more. 
The probability function of Negative Binomial model as an alternative is shown as (Cruyff 
and van der Heijden, 2008): 
 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) =
Γ(𝑦𝑖+𝛼
−1)
Γ(𝛼−1)𝑦𝑖!
 (
𝛼−1
𝛼−1+𝜆𝑖
)𝛼
−1
 (
𝜆𝑖
𝛼−1+𝜆𝑖
)𝑦𝑖                        (4.27) 
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where Γ(. ) represents a gamma function and 𝛼 is a dispersion parameter that is greater 
than zero.  When 𝛼  approaches zero, the Negative Binomial model is similar to the 
Poisson model.  However, the key difference is that the conditional variance is now 
greater than the mean:15 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖
2 > 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = 𝜆𝑖                                  (4.28) 
 
The likelihood-ratio test can be used to select the Poisson or NB model. The null 
hypothesis is Poisson model should be selected (𝛼 approaches zero). In this sense, if the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it means that Poisson model should be selected. This 
will be discussed in details in Section 4.4.5. 
 
4.4.4. Hurdle Poisson and Negative Binomial Models 
 
Over-dispersion in the count data can arise due to the large number of zero counts in the 
data (Kennedy, 2008).  If a simple count data model is used when there is an excess of 
zeros then there will be a misspecification of the counts and biased estimates (Kennedy, 
2008).  Mullahy (1986), Lambert (1992) and Johnson and Kotz (1993) suggest that the 
zero outcomes can be derived from one of two regimes.  In one regime, the outcomes are 
always zero, but in the other regime there are both zero and positive outcomes.  The 
Hurdle models are based on the notion that during the process of data generation the zero 
outcomes (from both regimes 1 and 2) are qualitatively different from the positive 
outcomes (Mullahy, 1986).  Therefore, a binary probability model, as discussed in Section 
4.2, is first used to determine whether there is a zero or a non-zero outcome, and a 
truncated Poisson or negative binomial model (truncated at zero to rule out the zero counts 
already determined by the probability model) is then used to describe the positive 
outcomes. It is shown as (Greene, 2002): 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑿𝒊) = Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 1) + Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑿𝒊, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 2) Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 2), 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑿𝒊) = Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑿𝒊, 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 2) Pr(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 2) , 𝑗 = 1,2, … 
 
 
                                                            
15 Marginal effects are estimated for the main results in Tables 7.8 and 8.11, rather than all regression results. 
This is because Greene (2002) argues that this is a personal choice to report the derivative or elasticity of 
probability. 
86 
 
Hurdle Poisson Model 
Greene (2002) shows the Hurdle Poisson model as: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝒙𝒊) = 𝜔,    𝑗 = 0 
and                                                                                                                              (4.29) 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) =
(1−𝜔)𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝜆𝑖
𝑗
(1−𝑒−𝜆𝑖)𝑗!
,     𝑗 = 1,2,… , 
 
where Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝒙𝒊)  determines the probability of a zero outcome and 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) gives the probability of a positive outcome.  The  (1 − 𝜔)  term in the 
numerator of (4.34) is the probability of crossing the zero Hurdle and it is multiplied by 
the truncated Poisson to ensure the sum of the probabilities is equal to one (see 
Farbmacher, 2011).   
 
Hurdle Negative Binomial Model 
If the truncated negative binomial model is used to rule out the zeros, Saffari et al. (2012) 
consider the hurdle negative binomial model as: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝒙𝒊) = 𝜔,    𝑗 = 0 
and                                                                                                                              (4.30) 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) = (1 − 𝜔)
Γ(𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼
−1)
Γ(𝑦𝑖 + 1)Γ(𝛼−1)
(1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖)
−𝛼−1−𝑦𝑖𝛼𝑦𝑖𝜆𝑖
𝑦𝑖
1 − (1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖)−𝛼
−1 ,     𝑗 = 1,2, … 
 
where ω could have different parameterisation and Greene (2002) defines 𝜔 = 𝑒−𝜃 .  
Bilgic and Florkowski (2007) show their conditional mean as: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝑖) = ∑ 𝑦𝑖
+∞
𝑦𝑖=1
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) , 𝑗 = 1,2,…                            (4.31) 
 
Overall, the logit model explores the occurrence of zero observations at the first stage, 
and then truncated Poisson or NB model considers the positive observations. With zero-
inflated models, dependent variable is modelled by the standard Poisson or NB 
distribution, which means that all non-negative observations are considered in the second 
stage. In addition, different explanatory variables can be considered in the first and second 
stage of zero-inflated models. Details will be discussed in the next section. 
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4.4.5. Zero-Inflated Poisson and Negative Binomial Models 
 
An extension of the Hurdle models is the Zero-inflated models that is explored by Minami 
et al. (2007).  These are frequently mixture distributions of unaggregated count data and 
extra zero observations, for which the principle is to consider the extra zero observations 
(zeros from regime 1) separately from the events.  It means that only zeros from regime 
1 are considered in the first stage, and all observations from regime 2 are modelled in the 
second stage.  This modelling of the zeros is known as the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) or 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) model, where Zero-Inflated means the incidence 
of zero observations exceeds that expected (Garay et al., 2011). 
 Therefore, a Zero-inflated distribution for count data consists of two parts: a 
distribution that considers zero observations only that is called the ‘perfect state’, and a 
second distribution that considers the non-negative counts that therefore includes the zero 
observations, which is called the ‘imperfect state’.  The mixture distribution will be the 
ZIP or ZINB, when the corresponding distribution for the imperfect state is the Poisson 
or Negative Binomial distribution respectively.  Therefore, if the mixture distribution is 
ZINB, the distribution function for both perfect and imperfect states is (Minami et al., 
2007): 
 
𝑓(𝑦|𝛼, 𝛽) =
Γ(𝛽+𝑦)
Γ(a)Γ(y+1)
(
𝛽
𝛽+𝛼
)𝛽(
𝛼
𝛽+𝛼
)𝑦, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 = 0, 1, 2, … ,                    (4.32) 
 
where α and β are the mean and size of parameters respectively, and Γ(. ) represents a 
gamma function.  As β approaches +∞ or 𝛼  approaches 0, the Negative Binomial 
distribution tends towards the Poisson distribution, and thus the ZINB model can be 
treated as a flexible extension of the ZIP model.  If the probability of a perfect state is p, 
then the probability for imperfect state is 1 – p, Minami et al. (2007) indicated that the 
mean and variance of ZINB (or ZIP when β approaches +∞) can be written as: 
 
𝐸(𝑌) = (1 − 𝑝)𝛼 ≡ 𝛼∗ 
and                                                                                                                               (4.33)  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌) = (1 − 𝑝)𝛼 + (1 − 𝑝) (𝑝 +
1
𝛽
)𝛼2 = 𝛼∗ +
𝑝 + (1/𝛽)𝛼∗2
1 − 𝑝
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Zero-Inflated Poisson Model 
For the ZIP model, Lord et al. (2005) defined the Poisson distribution (known as Poisson 
with extra zeros) as: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝒙𝒊) = 𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑒
−𝜆, 𝑗 = 0 
and                                                                                                                              (4.34) 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) = (1 − 𝑝)
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑗
𝑗!
, 𝑗 = 0,1,2,… 
 
The Hurdle Poisson and ZIP models in equations (4.29) and (4.34) change the 
specification of the Poisson model, as the equality of the mean and variance no longer 
holds.  There may a problem of identification when the data are over-dispersed as it is not 
easy to confirm whether the over-dispersion arises from heterogeneity or from the regime 
splitting mechanism.  A test is available to choose between the simple count data models 
and extra zero models due to Vuong (1989).  This is based on testing for extra zeros in a 
simple count data model accounting for the over-dispersion. 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model 
The above models are based on the Poisson model, but there is may still be over-dispersion 
in the count data relative to the Poisson distribution (Moghimbeigi et al., 2008).  This will 
mean that the parameter estimates of the ZIP model are biased, so that another distribution 
like the ZINB model is preferred.  Minami et al. (2007) also believe that the ZINB model 
gives a better fit to count data when over-dispersion exists compared to other models.  It 
operates under a framework like the ZIP model (Garay et al., 2011).  The ZINB regression 
model is based on the ZIP regression model, in which p refers to the covariates of a logistic 
regression model (Lambert, 1992).  Lambert also indicates that the Poisson mean is related 
to the covariates in the imperfect state by using a log-linear model.  The NB distribution 
instead of the Poisson distribution could be used for the imperfect state of count data 
because count data are “are highly skewed with a heavy right tail” (Minami et al., 2007, 
p. 213).  Hence, the probability function of the ZINB model is: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖|𝐵𝑖 , 𝐺𝑖 , 𝜌, 𝛾, 𝛽) = {
𝑝𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝑖) 𝑓(0|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽)    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑖 = 0
(1 − 𝑝𝑖)  𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑖 = 1, 2, …
 ,                 (4.35) 
 
where the distribution functions of the imperfect and perfect states 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽) are defined 
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in equation (4.32). The covariates 𝐵𝑖  refer to the mean of the imperfect state (α) in 
equation (4.35).  The probability of the prefect state (p) and 𝛼 are related to covariates by 
the ZINB regression model.  Therefore, both of these can be expressed as: 
 
log(𝛼𝑖) = 𝐵𝑖0 + 𝐵𝑖1𝜌1 + ⋯+ 𝐵𝑖𝑘𝜌𝜌𝑘𝜌 = 𝐵𝑖𝜌 
and                                                                                                                               (4.36) 
logit(𝑝𝑖) = log
𝑝𝑖
1−𝑝𝑖
= 𝐺𝑖0 + 𝐺𝑖1𝛾1 + ⋯+ 𝐺𝑖𝑘𝛾𝛾𝑘𝛾 = 𝐺𝑖𝛾,     (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛), 
 
where Bi and Gi are row vectors for the values of the covariates for observation i.   𝜌 and 
𝛾 are the corresponding vectors of regression coefficients.  The log-likelihood function 
with respect to 𝜌, 𝛾 and 𝛽 comes from plugging in equation (4.35) and the dependence of 
parameters on the covariates is obtained from equation (4.36). The log-likelihood is 
𝐿( 𝜌, 𝛾, 𝛽|𝒚,𝑩, 𝑮) = ∑ log 𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝐵𝑖 , 𝐺𝑖, 𝜌, 𝛾, 𝛽)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , which can be maximized with respect 
to parameters 𝜌, 𝛾 and 𝛽 to obtain their estimates (see Mwalili et al., 2008, p. 125). 
 The remaining issue is how to choose between the ZIP and ZINB regression 
models.  Broadly, the first stage of these is the same, so that the likelihood-ratio test for 
comparing the standard Poisson and NB models is available for testing the ZIP and ZINB 
models.  Since the ZINB distribution tends to the ZIP distribution as 𝛼 approaches zero, 
the hypotheses are H0: 𝛼 = 0 (ZIP / Poisson model) and H1: 𝛼 ≠ 0 (ZINB / NB model).  
The Vuong (1989) test involves comparing the ZIP and standard Poisson models.  If the 
ZIP is appropriate based on the Vuong test, then a likelihood-ratio test can be used to 
select one of the ZIP and ZINB models.  Both tests are available in standard econometrics 
packages such as Stata. 
 
4.4.6. Zero-Truncated Models 
 
Another approach to estimating models using count data in which there are zeros is to use 
a truncated model, in which the zero observations are excluded from the regression.  In 
this section, the Zero-Truncated Poisson (ZTP) and Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial 
(ZTNB) models are briefly considered.  In these two models, the data including zero 
observations are assumed to satisfy the same distribution of the Poisson and NB models.  
(Zuur et al., 2009) indicate that when zero observations of the dependent variable are 
dropped by hand and the standard Poisson and NB models are used, there will be the 
biased estimates for the parameters and standard errors if the mean of dependent variable 
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is too small.  In this sense, the ZTP and ZTNB models offer a solution as they exclude the 
zero observations automatically but through a different regression path.  If the mean is 
relatively large, then the standard Poisson and NB models are less likely to give rise to 
this problem, which means that the results of them are similar to those of ZTP and ZTNB 
models. Zero-truncated models rule out zeros and only consider the positive observations. 
 
Zero-Truncated Poisson Model 
Cruyff and van der Heijden (2008) note that the ZTP model assumes that each observation 
on the dependent variable has identical Poisson parameters.  According to Section 4.4.2, 
which considers the Poisson regression model, the Zero-Truncated Poisson model can be 
written as follows when the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity is made: 
 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0, 𝜆𝑖) =
Pr(𝑌=𝑦𝑖|𝜆𝑖)
1−Pr(𝑌=𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖=0,𝜆𝑖)
                              (4.37) 
 
where Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝜆𝑖)  represents the standard Poisson regression model and Pr(𝑌 =
𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 = 0, 𝜆𝑖) = 𝑒
−𝜆𝑖 .  The conditional mean of ZTP model is: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0, 𝜆𝑖 ) =
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝜆𝑖 )
1−Pr(𝑦𝑖=0|𝜆𝑖)
                                (4.38) 
 
and the log-likelihood function of equation (4.37) is: 
 
𝐿 = ∑ [𝑦𝑖 ln 𝜆𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖 − ln 𝑦𝑖! − ln(1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑖)]𝑛𝑖=1                          (4.39) 
 
Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Model 
Poisson parameters are required to be homogeneous, but there will be over-dispersed of 
count data due to the unobserved heterogeneity.  Thus, the ZINB model is a better choice.  
The probability given by the ZTNB model is (Section 4.4.3 shows the expression for the 
NB model): 
 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛼) =
Pr(𝑌=𝑦𝑖|𝜆𝑖)
1−Pr(𝑌=𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖=0,𝜆𝑖,𝛼)
,                            (4.40) 
 
where the numerator is the NB distribution in Section 4.4.3 and the denominator 
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 = 0, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛼) = (1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖)
−𝛼−1.  The conditional mean of yi is: 
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𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛼) =
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝜆𝑖,𝛼)
1−Pr(𝑦𝑖=0|𝜆𝑖,𝛼)
,                                    (4.41) 
 
and the log-likelihood of equation (4.41) is (Cruyff and van der Heijden, 2008):16 
𝐿 = ∑{∑ln(𝑗 + 𝛼−1) − ln 𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑗=0
! − (𝑦𝑖! + 𝛼
−1) ln(1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖) + 𝑦𝑖 ln 𝛼𝜆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− ln[1 − (1 + 𝛼𝜆𝑖)
−𝛼−1]} . 
 
Overall, zero-truncated models exclude zero observations from the sample based on 
truncated distribution, and standard Poisson or NB count data model is used for all positive 
observations. This means that these models are not based on a two-stage regression 
process.  For the estimated parameters, all explanatory variables in this thesis are classified 
into the ‘country variables’ (host characteristics) and ‘source variables’ (previous number 
of projects from global regions), which is discussed in Chapter 5. Count data models in 
this chapter consider the same number of country variables and different source variables 
to explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  The two-stage models consider these variables 
in two stages, where the hurdle models require that variables in two stages must be the 
same, but zero-inflated models allows the different variables in two stages.  Details are 
discussed in Chapter 8. Appendix Table 4.1 is formed to compare all above count data 
models in Appendix B. 
 
4.5. The Choice of Explanatory Variables 
 
According to Carlton (1983), the multinational firm decides where to locate its capital 
by considering the factors that affect its profits in different locations.  In general, 
decisions on the location choice not only depend on the characteristics of host country, 
but also on that of the investing firm (Rasciute, 2008).  Hence, the main purpose of this 
section is to explore what factors should be considered in the regression equation for the 
FDI location choice.  
                                                            
16  If yi is an integer then ∑ ln(𝑗 + 𝛼−1)
𝑦𝑖
𝑗=0 = ln Γ(𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼
−1) − ln Γ(𝛼−1) , where Γ is the gamma 
distribution (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, p. 71).   
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4.5.1. Specification of the Profit Function 
 
In the choice of location, the profits 𝜋 that are expected to be earned by firm 𝑖 in industry 
𝑠 in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡 must be greater than that in each other country at that time, 
denoted by 𝑜  (since the choice is made at the same time then 𝑡  is ignored in this 
expression): 
 
Pr (𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 > 𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑜). 
 
Profits can be expressed as the after-tax difference between the production revenue and 
costs, where the tax rate is 𝑡𝑐, but also minus other costs ℎ𝑐 that arise from the political, 
institutional and macroeconomic environment of the host country: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐)(𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑐) − ℎ𝑐,                               (4.42) 
 
where 𝑇𝑅 and 𝑇𝐶 are the total revenue and costs.    According to Helpman et al., (2004), 
these profits can be expressed as follows, where in addition to 𝑡 and ℎ, profits depend on 
the distance between the source and host country (𝑑𝑐𝑒), the return on capital in the host 
country (𝑟𝑐), the market size of host country (𝑀𝑐) and the wage per hour in the host country 
(𝑤𝑠𝑐), while the other terms are parameters (see Appendix 4.4 in Appendix A): 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐) (𝑀𝑐 (
𝑑𝑐𝑒(𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢 )1−𝛼−𝛽
𝜑𝛾𝑖
)
1−𝛿
(1 −
𝜑
𝑑𝑐𝑒
) − (𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑠 )𝛼𝑟𝑐
𝛽
𝑓𝑐) − ℎ𝑐.      (4.43) 
 
All symbols and details of expression for the profit function are fully discussed in 
Appendix 4.4 of appendix A.  Defever (2012) explains that greater distance increases the 
transport costs of inputs that need to be shipped between firms in the source and host 
countries.  It means that there is a negative relationship between distance and location 
choice.  Distance can also influence the way in which the investor manages, develops 
and supervises its investments.  However, the effect of distance depends on whether FDI 
is in production or services, so that it is smaller for services.  There is also a negative 
relationship between the level of profits and wages, while profits increase with the extent 
of availability of the high-skilled labour force in host countries.  The wage variable is 
included in the empirical work to consider its effect. If it has the significant negative 
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effect, it means that the dominant effect is that a higher level of wage causes higher level 
of costs in a location and deters FDI. If the effect is positive, higher skill labour attracts 
FDI.  Also, an education variable is included to measure the level of labour skills.  The 
wage rate is an important factor and a negative relationship is expected with profits.  
These factors can be summarised as: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑐 , 𝑑𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑐 , 𝑀𝑐 , ℎ𝑐 , 𝑤𝑠𝑐).                                    (4.44) 
 
Furthermore, 𝑡𝑐 , 𝑑𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑐 , 𝑀𝑐 , ℎ𝑐 and 𝑤𝑠𝑐 have effects on the location choice at the country 
level, but they may differ across firms due to differences in productivity 𝛾 and the output 
shares 𝛼 and 𝛽 (in equation 4.43).  In this sense, when FDI is located in a particular 
country, it does not mean that the advantages of this country are the same for all investing 
firms.  This is because FDI goes to different industries, while firms have different 
productivities.  In addition to the above, agglomeration economies is another factor in 
the FDI location choice.  Defever (2012) indicates that externalities (e.g. information 
spillovers) can stimulate firms to cluster in some areas.  There are usually two forms of 
agglomeration: the first one relates to firms that belong to the same industry and the 
second one relates to firms that share the same function or activity (Duranton and Puga, 
2005).   
Overall, the location choice of FDI projects is determined by the factors which 
could maximize the profit, and these factors are also assumed to have a linear form in 
the profit function.  Therefore, the profit function (𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐) in equation (4.44) can be written 
with an error term as: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝛽
′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 ,                                            (4.45) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 is a vector of location characteristics (i.e. country variables), such as market 
size, wage rate and tax rate etc.  𝛽′ is a vector of coefficients and 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 is an error term.  
 A limitation is that project characteristics, such as the project type and source are 
allowed to vary through multinomial logit model, but only the characteristics of host 
countries are considered as the explanatory variables in the regression analysis.  
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4.5.2. The Regression Model for Discrete Choice 
 
As discussed at beginning of this section, choosing country 𝑐 must maximize profits 
among each of all other locations 𝑜 (i.e. 𝑜 ≠ 𝑐 and 𝑜 = 1, 2, … , 𝑂), where 𝑂 represents 
the EU-25 countries in this thesis.  Hence, the probability of choosing country 𝑐 can be 
expressed as:  
 
P𝑖𝑠𝑐 ≡ Pr[𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 > 𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑜] = Pr[𝛽
′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐 > 𝛽
′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑜 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑜] = Pr[𝛽
′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽
′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑜 >
𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑜 − 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐] = Pr[𝛽
′(𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑜) > 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑜 − 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐].                       (4.46) 
 
According to the discussion in section 4.3, McFadden (1974) shows that the probability 
function of firm 𝑖 choosing industry 𝑠 and country 𝑐 can be expressed as: 
 
P𝑖𝑠𝑐 =
exp(𝛽′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐)
∑ exp(𝛽′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑜)
𝑂
𝑜=1
 ∀ 𝑜 ≠ 𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜 = 1,2,… , 𝑂                      (4.47) 
 
Based on equation (4.47) to explore the probability of location in each of the EU-25 
countries, the values for the coefficients on the location characteristics 𝐴  can be 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function, which is globally concave in 
parameters 𝛽′ (McFadden, 1974).  This means that the probability function here aims to 
get the likelihood function that is used to estimate the coefficients. 
In the profit function (4.45), 𝛽′𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐  is the deterministic part, by which the 
location characteristics 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 linearly influence the probability of investment. In this sense, 
the dependent variable in logit analysis is the location in one of the EU-25 countries, 
which means that when FDI is located in a given country the dependent variable is unity, 
but otherwise it is zero. Explanatory variables are the location characteristics 𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑐 relate 
to the host country 𝑐  and include demand, labour costs, education, trade and policy 
variables etc.  The measurement of these variables is discussed in Chapter 5.  In addition 
to these host country characteristics, investments from different sources at time 𝑡 − 1 are 
treated as another one kind of the explanatory variables. Therefore, the regression 
equation can be shown as the follow: 
 
Pr(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 1) = 𝜷𝑨𝒊𝒄𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀,                                  (4.48) 
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where 𝑨𝒊𝒄𝒕−𝟏 is a vector of host country characteristics (i.e. explanatory variables), 𝜷 are 
the corresponding coefficients, and 𝜀 is an error term. 
 
4.5.3. The Regression Model for Count Data 
 
Models for count data analysis discussed in the above sections are based on the number 
of FDI project counts rather than the probability of location.  The same host country 
characteristics in equation (4.48) are considered, but the dependent variable is measured 
by the number of FDI projects in each of the EU-25 countries, instead of the dummy in 
equation (4.48).  The linear regression equation for count data analysis is: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜷𝑨𝒊𝒄𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀,                                                   (4.49) 
 
where the dependent variable 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡 is measured by the number of projects from the 
source country 𝑖 in host country 𝑐 at time t.  𝑨𝒊𝒄𝒕−𝟏 and 𝜷 have the same definition to 
that in equation (4.48), and 𝜀 is an error term.  For count data analysis, OLS estimation 
is used, but as the count data is approximately log-normal the dependent variable in 
equation (4.49) is logged, so that it is in a log-linear form.  Each country receives FDI in 
each year, but where we focus on FDI from particular sources there may be zeros in the 
data (i.e. no investment is received from individual BRICS countries in a particular year), 
in which case a single project is added to each count, so that logarithms can be taken. 
The count data and logit analysis are based on the same dataset, but the format of 
the data differs.  For logit analysis in Stata, the dataset is structured at the project level, 
which means that the data on all country variables for the EU-25 countries in each year 
are treated as an observation, which corresponds to the location choice of a specific 
project in an EU-25 country in a given year.  For example, if there are three projects 
located in the same EU-25 country in one year, the data on all country variables of the 
25 EU countries in this year will be repeated three times.  There are 35,105 projects in 
the EU-25 countries (see Chapter 5), and since in each case we observe 24 countries in 
which a project did not locate, there are 877,425 observations, i.e. 35,105 x 25.  For the 
count data analysis, the data are organised by the number of projects from each BRICS 
country in each EU-25 country in each year.  This means there are 350 observations, i.e. 
14 x 25, where 14 is the number of study years. 
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4.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has outlined the main models that will be used to examine the location of 
FDI.  These models are of two main types: the first encompasses the choices facing 
foreign direct investors when choosing a suitable location across a range of possible 
alternatives; the second focuses on the count-based nature of numbers of projects in a 
given location.  To examine the choice-based nature of the FDI decision the logit 
specification is identified as the most appropriate framework.  The Multinomial Logit 
incorporates the characteristics of individual foreign investors when making their location 
decision and the Conditional Logit model captures the attributes of the alternative 
locations, which can also be extended to include firm-specific attributes. 
To model the numbers of FDI projects in a location the appropriate framework 
should capture both the discrete nature of FDI location as well as the often skewed nature 
of the distribution of foreign investors across a range of locations.  Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions of log-linear models can capture the latter feature, but it cannot take into 
account the discrete nature of the FDI project data.  However, the log-linear model is a 
good approximation to the Poisson model if the mean project count is high.  In the OLS 
framework, the log-linear regression model is used.  Thus, the actual number of projects 
is added by one to include the zero observations (Head et al., 2010).  The Poisson 
framework is a count data model that can capture the discrete nature of FDI location.  
However the Poisson model is not without limitations as it imposes the restriction that the 
conditional mean and variance of the count distribution are equal to each other, but which 
is unlikely to occur given the skewed and over-dispersed nature of the FDI data.  
Alternatives to the Poisson are the Negative Binomial and the excess zero Hurdle, Zero-
Inflated and Zero-Truncated models, where the ZINB model is appropriate if the over-
dispersion arises from the excess counts of zeros in the data.  Testing procedures can be 
employed to determine the specification that best fits the data.17 
  
                                                            
17 Voung test is used to select the model between the standard Poisson and ZIP models.  The likelihood-
ration test is used to select the model between the Poisson and NB models or between ZIP and ZINB models. 
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Chapter 5. Data and Variables Used in Econometric Analysis 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the location choice of FDI projects in the EU-25 countries over 
the period from 1997 to 2010, focusing on the location of outward FDI from the BRICS 
countries.  It uses data from the European Investment Monitor (EIM), which tracks FDI 
in the EU.  The purpose of this chapter is to describe the nature of these data and the other 
variables that form the independent (explanatory) variables in our analysis.  The EIM 
database contains information on over 35,000 foreign investment projects, arising both 
from outside the European Union and from within the EU in the form of cross-border FDI.  
Currently, the EU is the largest destination region in the world for FDI inflows, accounting 
for nearly half of the global FDI flows, and it is also a significant trading partner of many 
countries (Milelli et al. 2010). This chapter analyses this investment in terms of its main 
characteristics, and makes a distinction between the EU countries that were Member 
States throughout the study period and those that joined in 2004 and 2007, and have seen 
strong increases in FDI. 
Overall, the chapter is divided into six sections as follows.  Section 5.2 describes 
the EIM database, including the nature of the FDI projects that are covered by this 
database. The characteristics of the FDI projects are examined in Section 5.3 according to 
a range of factors including time, the destination and source country, the industry and 
function of the project and the project size.  Section 5.4 analyses the EIM data in greater 
detail by cross-tabulating various characteristics such as the temporal pattern of FDI by 
source, industry and function.  The explanatory variables are discussed in Section 5.5 
including the definition, data and measurement of each variable.  Finally, Section 5.6 
concludes. 
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5.2. The EIM Database 
 
The source of information on FDI used in this thesis is the European Investment Monitor 
(EIM) database, which gives project-based details of FDI inflows into EU countries on an 
annual basis for each year between 1997 and 2010.  The data cover the 27 countries that 
were members of the EU in 2010, but we exclude Cyprus and Malta (the ‘EU-25’).18 The 
EIM is a commercial database, which is the leader in providing online information and 
inward investment tracking across Europe.  The data are supplied by Ernst and Young 
(2012) which compile the data, and claim to monitor 28,000 sources to identify FDI 
announcements and contact 70% of firms to validate the data.19  The EIM is project-based 
and it captures ‘productive’ investment only, classifying this into three types: ‘new’ or 
‘greenfield’ start-up investment; ‘co-location’, where a FDI project is located at or close 
to an existing activity owned by the same company but in a different function; and 
‘expansion’, which increases the capacity of an existing facility in the same function.  It 
does not include mergers and acquisitions, although joint ventures may be included where 
the investment satisfies the above definition.  It does not include license agreements and 
portfolio investment, nor certain activities such as retail, hotel, leisure facilities, fixed 
infrastructure and extraction facilities.20  
 The EIM database gives information on 35,105 FDI projects in the EU-25 
countries over the study period.  It has found application in other empirical work 
investigating FDI in the EU (e.g. Alegría, 2006; Defever, 2006 and Rabellotti et. al, 2008).  
It is believed to be a reliable data source, and it covers the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.  My analysis distinguishes between the 
incumbent fifteen EU countries (i.e. the members prior to 2004 and referred to as the ‘EU-
15’) and the 10 Central and Eastern European Countries (‘CEEC-10’).  The EU-15 
comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  The CEEC-10 are 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.  The latter have seen an increase in FDI, but the EU-15 still 
receives the vast majority of FDI projects in the EU. 
 
                                                            
18 These two countries are small island economies, which have received little FDI. FDI is known for these 
countries from 2004 only, but consists of only 50 projects in total, of which four come from the BRICS. 
19 Source: http://www.eyeim.com/index.htm last accessed on 15th April 2016. 
20 Source: European Investment Monitor, User Guide, 2008 
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5.2.1. The Nature of the FDI Projects 
 
The EIM database provides information on FDI projects in the EU countries from 1997 
to 2010.  Table 5.1 summarises the number of FDI projects in EU-25 countries by type 
(i.e. new, co-location and expansion) and by sub-period over the whole study period.  
Table 5.1 shows that most FDI is in the form of new investments.  For the whole study 
period there are 23,325 projects in this form, which accounts for 66.4% of all projects in 
the EU-25 countries. The shares of other two types of investment are 6.7% (2,358 projects) 
for co-locations and 26.8% (9,422 projects) for expansions.  Hence, new investment is the 
most common type of FDI project, followed by the expansions and then by co-location 
investment.   
 
Table 5.1: Number of FDI Projects in the EU-25 by Type and Sub-period 
Investment type 1997-00 2001-05 2006-10 Total 
New 
5,020 
(57.6%) 
7,346 
(69.2%) 
10,959 
(69.4%) 
23,325 
(66.5%) 
Co-location 
1,056 
(12.1%) 
551 
(5.2%) 
751 
(4.8%) 
2,358 
(6.7%) 
Expansion 
2,640 
(30.3%) 
2,712 
(25.6%) 
4,070 
(25.8%) 
9,422 
(26.8%) 
Total 
8,716 
(100%) 
10,609 
(100%) 
15,780 
(100%) 
35,105 
(100%) 
Note: See text for an explanation of these investment types.   
Source: EIM Database. 
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It can be seen from Table 5.1 that in any sub-period, FDI in the form of new investments 
is always more than half of all projects in the EU-25 countries.  The highest share is 69.4%, 
which is after the CEEC-10 joined the EU.  In absolute terms, the numbers of projects in 
the form of new investments and expansions nearly double over time, but the projects in 
the form of co-location decrease sharply over the same period.  New investment projects 
increase to nearly 70% of all projects over the study period, while the share of co-location 
projects is always accounts for the smallest share, and decreases sharply to 4.8% at the 
last sub-period.  The share of expansions also decreases slightly over time.  
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5.3. The Characteristics of FDI 
 
The information on FDI projects given by the EIM database includes the date that the 
project was announced, the host and source countries, the industry characteristics of the 
project and its function (e.g. production, service, R&D or headquarters, etc.).  Based on 
this information, this section describes the characteristics of FDI in the EU-25, as 
summarised in Table 5.2.  The EIM database gives the name of the company that 
implements the FDI project.  It also gives the calendar year, financial year, week and day 
when the project was announced.  Furthermore, it provides data on the employment size 
and investment scale of the project, and detailed information about the location of the FDI 
project, including the host country, region and city.  The employment size shown as the 
number of new jobs created measures the scale of FDI projects which is similar to the 
gross FDI value.  The host region is classified by the Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics (NUTS), which is a hierarchical geographical unit for sub-dividing the 
territory used by the European Commission.  There are four categories, from NUTS-0 to 
NUTS-3 areas, where NUTS-0 is the country level and NUTS-3 represents small areas. 
 
  
 1
0
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Table 5.2: The FDI Project Characteristics in the EIM Database 
Project Characteristics Description Additional Comments 
Date 
Year Calendar year when FDI project was announced From 1997 to 2010. 
Week Calendar week when FDI project was announced There are 52 weeks in each calendar year. 
Financial Year Financial year when FDI Project was announced The financial year runs from 1 April to 31 March. 
Announcement Date Day, month and year when FDI project was announced 
The announcement date is from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 
2010. 
Implementation  Date Date when FDI project was first implemented This is known for only 22,076 of 35,105 (63%) FDI projects. 
Name of 
Company 
Company Name Name of company implementing FDI project - 
Parent Company Name Name of parent company Several parent company names are listed for joint ventures. 
Location 
NUTS-3 region Name of NUTS-3 region in which FDI project locates - 
NUTS-1 region Name of NUTS-1 region in which FDI project locates - 
NUTS-0 region Name of the country - 
Source 
Country of Origin 
Name of country or countries from where project 
originates 
Some multiple parent companies originate from different countries, 
in which case all source countries are listed.*  
Global Region of Origin 
Name of region or regions from which the project 
originates 
Some multiple parent companies originate from different global 
regions, in which case all source regions are listed. 
Size 
Employment Number of new jobs created This is known for only 21,612 of 35,105 (62%) FDI projects. 
Investment Value Value of the project measured in US dollars This is known for only 10,738 of 35,105 (31%) FDI projects. 
Industrial 
Activity 
Activity 
Industry classification of projects at 3-digit level by 
using the NACE industrial classification system 
NACE is the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community. It is a standard classification system for 
European industry and is represented by a 6 digit code. 
Sector Name The name of sector at 2-digit NACE level - 
Industry Group 
The classification of industry in terms of Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system 
Industry groups include agriculture, construction, education & 
health, energy, finance & business services, manufacturing, 
recreation, retail & hospitality and transport & communications. 
Function 
Activity  Description of the project activity  - 
Function 
Function of the project including contact centre, 
education & training, headquarters, logistics, 
manufacturing, research & development, sales & 
marketing, shared services centre and testing & servicing 
- 
Type Project Type New, co-location and expansion investment. - 
Notes: FDI in the EU-25.  * The number of projects from single source country and joint source countries is compared in Table 5.3. 
12 
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The purpose of the NUTS areas is to provide a single and coherent territorial breakdown 
for EU regional statistics.  Table 5.2 shows that the EIM gives the location at the NUTS-
0, NUTS-1 and NUTS-3 levels.21   According to Eurostat (2012), the EU area and its 27 
Member States are classified by the 2006 version of NUTS into 97 regions at the NUTS-
1 level, 271 at NUTS-2 and 1,303 regions at the NUTS-3 level.    
The industry is classified by the NACE code. The information on the industry to 
which a FDI project belongs contains the sector name, industry group, activity and project 
type, comprising new, expansion and co-location investments.  There are nine industries 
at the 2-digit level in the database, comprising agriculture, construction, education and 
health, energy, finance and business services, manufacturing, recreation, retail and 
hospitality, and transport and communications.  For the EU-25, there are 20,351 projects 
in manufacturing, which accounts for 58% of all projects in the dataset. The EIM database 
includes the functions of the FDI project, which comprises contact centre, education and 
training, headquarters, internet data centre (IDC), logistics, manufacturing, research and 
development (R&D), sales and marketing, shared services centre and testing and servicing.  
These offer extra information on the nature of FDI and they differ from the industry, as 
whereas the industry relates to the nature of the plant the function relates more directly to 
the nature of the project.  For example, a plant may be in manufacturing, but a re-
investment may be for the purpose of introducing a head office or a sales and marketing 
function at the plant or it may just be production. 
The size of investment is given by the EIM database, in terms of the number of 
gross jobs associated with the project that are referred to as ‘new jobs’.  The size of the 
investment is also measured by the value of the investment. However, Table 5.2 shows 
that these data are not available for all projects. The new jobs data are available for 62% 
of projects, while the value of the investment is known for only 31%.  They are both 
known for 46% of projects. 
In the case of the source, the EIM database includes information on the name of 
the parent company and the source country, region and city of this parent.  All of these 
excluding the city are defined in table 5.2.  The database not only collects information on 
FDI projects that are owned by parent company or companies in a given country, but it 
                                                            
21 NUTS-3 areas are districts or cities with population thresholds limited from 150,000 to 800,000 people.  
NUTS-2 areas are states or provinces with population from 800,000 to 3 million and are the basic regions 
for the application of regional policies. NUTS-1 areas are major socio-economic regions, such as groups of 
states or provinces of a country, for which the maximum population size is 7 million. NUTS-0 are individual 
countries (Eurostat, 2007). 
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also collects data for joint venture projects owned by companies in different countries.  
Table 5.3 shows the number of FDI projects in each of these categories, where there may 
be more than one investor from the same source country.  There are no projects owned by 
companies in more than three countries.  It reveals that virtually all FDI projects are owned 
by investors from a single source country, with 33,794 out of 35,105 projects in this 
category (96.3%).  There are 1,136 projects originating from two source countries (3.2%), 
and just 175 (0.5%) projects from three source countries. 
 
Table 5.3: FDI Projects in the EU-25 by the Number of Source Countries 
Number of Source Countries Number of FDI Projects 
One 33,794 (96.3%) 
Two 1,136 (3.2%) 
Three 175 (0.5%) 
Total 35,105 (100%) 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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These data are now used to describe the nature of FDI in the EU-25.  As I indicated above, 
the EU-25 is distinguished between the EU-15 and CEEC-10, as the latter were not 
members of the European Union throughout the period.  I begin by looking at the host 
country.  
 
5.3.1. FDI by Destination Country 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of FDI projects in each EU-25 country over the whole study 
period from 1997 to 2010.  It shows that FDI is concentrated in a relatively small number 
of countries. The top three destination countries are the UK (8,343 projects; 23.8% of EU-
25 total), France (6,022 projects; 17.2%) and Germany (3,491 projects; 9.9%).  These 
three countries received more than half (50.9%) of all FDI projects in the EU-25 countries. 
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Figure 5.1: Number of FDI Projects in the EU-25 Countries 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
7 
 
It also can be seen from Figure 5.1 that there are fewer investments in the CEEC-10 
countries. The total number of projects in these countries is just 6,880 (19.6% of the EU-
25 total) over the study period, which is similar to the number of projects in France alone.  
This is because they are smaller and less-advanced economies.  In fact, FDI can be very 
small in some CEEC countries, so that, for example, Slovenia has just 118 projects over 
the whole period, although this is still more than either Greece or Luxembourg.  However, 
some CEEC-10 countries, such as Poland (1,613 projects), Hungary (1,413 projects) and 
the Czech Republic (1,152 projects) have a large number of FDI projects, similar to that 
of the Netherlands (1,242 projects).  This is probably because some CEEC countries are 
emerging as alternative destinations for FDI due to their fast growth and their ability to 
assemble products and deliver the products and services to neighbouring countries (Milelli 
et al, 2010).   
This pattern is consistent with the pattern reported by the World Investment Report 
of UNCTAD (2011).  This report shows that there are more than 40 billion US dollars of 
FDI in France, Germany and the UK respectively in 2010, which exceeds that of most 
other EU-15 countries.22  It also reports that the amount of FDI in most CEEC-10 countries 
                                                            
22 UNCTAD (2011), see Annex Table I.1. 
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is between 1 and 9 billion US dollars.   The main host countries are the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland.23  The reasons for FDI location are discussed in Chapter 2, and it 
indicates the larger market size of the host economy. 
Table 5.4 summarises the main characteristics of FDI projects in the EU-25 host 
countries over whole study period.  This table comprises the number of projects and the 
new jobs associated with each project, the percentage of projects in the manufacturing 
sector, the average value of investment in millions of US dollars (current prices) and the 
main function of the project.  It disaggregates the information by EU-15 and CEEC-10 
country.  Table 5.4 shows that most projects in the EU-25 countries are located in the 
manufacturing sector, and the main function of these projects is production.  It can be seen 
that the average investment value created by the projects is $44.9 million (current prices) 
and that on average there are 65.6 new jobs associated with each project in the EU-25.  As 
noted above, the EU-15 countries are the main destinations for FDI. There are 28,225 
projects in these countries, which accounts for 80.4% of the total in the EU-25 countries. 
The CEEC-10 received just 6,880 projects.  
  
                                                            
23 UNCTAD (2011), see Table A, page 69. 
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Table 5.4: FDI Characteristics by Destination Country in EU-25, 1997 to 2010 
Host Country 
Number of 
Projects 
Mean 
Jobs per 
Project 
Mean 
Investment 
(USD, mill., 
current 
prices) 
Projects in 
Manufacturing 
(%) 
Project Function 
Austria 696 51.4 39.4 62.5% Sales & Marketing 
Belgium 1,812 40.0 43.7 60.2% Production 
Denmark 568 25.6 58.3 40.8% Sales & Marketing 
Finland 251 14.0 22.3 60.0% Sales & Marketing 
France 6,022 39.2 25.4 62.7% Production 
Germany 3,491 42.4 66.5 54.4% Sales & Marketing 
Greece 100 31.4 54.0 55.0% Sales & Marketing 
Ireland 1,270 115.2 81.6 49.2% Production 
Italy 812 40.8 127.1 47.7% Sales & Marketing 
Luxembourg 90 13.8 20.8 33.3% Sales & Marketing 
Netherlands 1,242 39.8 79.5 50.0% Sales & Marketing 
Portugal 422 99.6 45.0 67.8% Production 
Spain 2,124 49.2 45.3 58.1% Production 
Sweden 982 28.2 56.0 45.5% Sales & Marketing 
UK 8,343 59.3 46.6 48.4% Sales & Marketing 
EU-15 28,225 50.0 46.4 54.2% 
Sales & 
Marketing 
Bulgaria 470 94.0 33.2 66.8% Production 
Czech Republic 1,152 182.1 55.0 78.0% Production 
Estonia 234 55.0 20.4 67.9% Production 
Hungary 1,413 116.7 33.4 78.5% Production 
Latvia 181 25.8 19.8 51.9% Sales & Marketing 
Lithuania 239 47.2 17.2 57.3% Production 
Poland 1,613 137.5 50.2 74.1% Production 
Romania 931 113.5 35.2 68.2% Production 
Slovakia 529 203.6 46.6 82.4% Production 
Slovenia 118 77.2 37.7 75.4% Production 
CEEC-10 6,880 129.6 41.4 73.6% Production 
EU-25 35,105 65.6 44.9 58.0% Production 
Notes: Number of jobs and investment scales is for known cases only.  Main function is the mode. 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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The third column of Table 5.4 shows that on average each project in the CEEC-10 is 
associated with nearly 130 new jobs, whereas each project in EU-15 is associated with 
only 50 jobs.  This is probably because of the cheaper labour in the CEEC-10 countries, 
enabling larger project scales, and because of its greater emphasis on manufacturing FDI.  
Besides, it can be seen that the mean number of jobs created in each CEEC-10 country is 
almost always more than that in each EU-15 country.  For example, there are 182.1 and 
137.5 jobs associated with each project on average in the Czech Republic and Poland 
respectively, but in the EU-15 countries the largest number of mean jobs per project is 
115.2 in Ireland.  The smallest mean number of jobs created in any CEEC-10 country (i.e. 
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25.8 in Latvia) is also larger than the corresponding number for the EU-15 (i.e. 13.8 in 
Luxembourg). 
The fourth column shows that the average investment value is similar between the EU-15 
and CEEC-10 countries, at $46.4 and $41.4 million respectively.  Italy has the largest 
mean investment scale ($127.1 million) in the EU-15 countries, while the Czech Republic 
has the largest investment scale ($55.0 million) in the CEEC-10 countries. 
By industry, the fifth column shows that manufacturing is the most common 
destination industry for FDI projects in the EU-25 (58.0%), and that this is the main 
receiving industry for more than half of the EU countries.  It also can be seen from Table 
5.4 that the share of manufacturing is higher for most CEEC-10 countries compared to the 
EU-15 countries.  The possible reason is that the economies of the EU-15 countries are 
more advanced than those of the CEEC-10 countries, so the development of the 
manufacturing sector in the EU-15 countries is earlier and more advanced than in the 
CEEC-10 countries.  In this sense, most projects in CEEC-10 are invested in the 
manufacturing sector, but other sectors in EU-15 receive more projects than 
manufacturing.  The last column shows that the main function of projects in the EU-15 is 
sales and marketing, while the main function of most CEEC-10 countries is production. 
 
5.3.2. The Temporal Pattern of FDI 
 
This section discusses the pattern of FDI in the EU-25 over the study period.  Figure 5.2 
shows the changes in the number of projects over time in the EU-25 as a whole and 
disaggregates this by EU-15 and CEEC-10. The number of projects in each EU-15 and 
CEEC-10 country is graphed in Appendix Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (the numbers are given in 
Table 5.5 below). 
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Figure 5.2: FDI Flows for the Number of Projects in the EU-25 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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Figure 5.2 shows that the number of FDI projects in the EU-25 was about 2,400 in 1997, 
but that it had decreased by 2003, standing at about 1,700 in this year.  However, from 
2003 to 2008 the number of projects in the EU-25 increased strongly, reaching a peak of 
nearly 3,300 in the year 2008, and remaining high thereafter.  The year 2004 is coincident 
with the accession of eight of the new Member States, but Figure 5.2 shows that the growth 
in FDI is largely driven by FDI location in the EU-15.  In fact, over the period as a whole 
the EU-15 account for about 80% of total EU-25, but this does decrease, especially 
between 1999 and 2004, from 86.5% in 1999 to reach a minimum of 72.9% in 2004.  
UNCTAD (2000, 2003, 2005 and 2011) shows a similar trend of FDI inflows to EU 
measured in value terms, although UNCTAD (2011) shows a stronger fluctuations of FDI 
inflows compared the number of projects after 2005, as the FDI inflows increase to $851 
billion in 2007 and then drop sharply to $305 billion in 2010.  Table 5.5 below shows the 
number of FDI projects in each EU-25 country over the study period. 
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Table 5.5: Number of FDI Projects in the EU-25 by Country and Year, 1997 to 2010 
Host country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total % change* 
Austria 23 84 66 61 53 44 32 35 59 56 45 64 41 33 696 -20.2 
Belgium 100 132 109 111 88 73 77 136 179 185 175 142 146 159 1,812 31.1 
Bulgaria 13 10 11 16 19 29 29 64 32 68 63 60 27 29 470 241.2 
Czech Republic 57 56 53 73 82 96 91 112 116 114 83 87 61 71 1,152 31.9 
Denmark 17 33 29 29 27 32 44 70 55 60 59 53 34 26 568 43.0 
Estonia 10 10 13 18 21 17 16 35 23 15 7 14 13 22 234 48.5 
Finland 12 14 11 14 31 12 9 19 9 15 25 42 15 23 251 116.2 
France 426 271 392 353 265 254 313 490 538 565 541 523 529 562 6,022 48.2 
Germany 190 197 196 170 171 153 110 163 182 286 305 390 418 560 3,491 134.6 
Greece 1 7 4 4 4 5 5 7 8 12 11 13 11 8 100 166.7 
Hungary 116 114 88 76 85 100 85 139 115 108 135 100 64 88 1,413 -20.8 
Ireland 169 112 115 113 61 51 46 76 67 74 80 108 84 114 1,270 -22.7 
Italy 43 36 45 60 52 29 23 33 49 74 69 96 100 103 812 141.1 
Latvia 18 9 5 5 10 12 8 18 16 22 16 24 10 8 181 31.3 
Lithuania 19 10 4 10 17 20 6 12 29 24 28 19 10 31 239 81.8 
Luxembourg 8 4 3 1 5 2 4 8 8 10 13 5 8 11 90 60.0 
Netherlands 85 84 87 105 67 61 58 56 82 95 123 116 108 115 1,242 32.4 
Poland 142 116 67 85 50 60 46 148 180 152 146 176 102 143 1,613 29.5 
Portugal 13 35 19 12 25 32 37 37 29 38 37 39 42 27 422 61.2 
Romania 18 22 18 15 39 50 20 91 86 140 150 145 75 62 931 386.2 
Slovakia 14 18 14 19 19 25 24 83 70 46 58 48 33 58 529 202.2 
Slovenia 4 6 2 4 2 1 1 10 9 9 19 17 16 18 118 325.0 
Spain 76 90 139 148 141 122 119 121 147 212 256 211 173 169 2,124 81.3 
Sweden 29 28 40 44 90 71 74 97 95 113 81 85 58 77 982 126.8 
UK 818 639 508 574 370 369 453 563 559 685 713 686 678 728 8,343 6.5 
EU-25 2,421 2,137 2,038 2,120 1,794 1,720 1,730 2,623 2,742 3,178 3,238 3,263 2,856 3,245 35,105 42.0 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
Note: * Percentage change between 2008-10 and 1997-99. 
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Figure 5.2 shows different patterns in the number of projects in the EU-15 and CEEC-10 
as a whole over time, although in both of these FDI grows at similar rates, i.e. between 
1997 and 2010 the number of projects grows by 35% for the EU-15 and by 29% for the 
CEEC-10.  In the case of the EU-15 after a decrease in the number of projects during the 
first six years, FDI increases sharply to the end of the period.  There were few projects in 
the CEEC-10 prior to 2003, while the number of projects increases dramatically from 
2004. After the accession of the other CEEC countries in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania), 
there is a sharp decrease as the number of FDI projects falling from 700 to about 500 in 
the year 2010.  The fall coincides with the Global Financial Crisis, but it is not apparent 
for the EU-15, suggesting that FDI in the CEECs spiked at membership and fell-back 
afterwards. 
Table 5.5 along with Appendix Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reveals that the EU-15 exhibit 
different trends over time.  Some countries, such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
experience a more-or-less continuous increase in FDI, but others are more stable.  The 
number of projects in the UK fluctuates over time, stabilising at about 700 projects per 
annum towards the end of the period. For most CEEC-10 countries, the number of projects 
increases strongly over time.  The changes in the number of projects of each EU-15 and 
CEEC-10 country over the study period are shown in Appendix Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
5.3.3. FDI by Source Country 
 
Investments from different source countries may have different location preferences (see 
Basile et al., 2008). This section explores the FDI in the EU-25 from different global 
source regions over the study period.  These global regions are Europe,24 America, Asia, 
Oceania and Africa. Table 5.6 shows the number and share of FDI projects from each 
global region in the EU-25.  If jointly-owned projects arise from parent companies from 
the same global region this is not problematic, but if they arise from parents in different 
global regions (see Table 5.3, which is on an individual country basis) then the project is 
attributed to the first country, which is considered to be the primary source, although there 
are a relatively small numbers of these.  Appendix Table 5.1 summarises the number of 
projects from the BRICS and compares it to that of the non-BRICS. 
  
                                                            
24 Here, Europe includes Russia, but in Chapter 6 Europe excludes Russia as it is included in the BRICS. 
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Table 5.6: Number of FDI Projects from Each Global Region 
Host Europe America Asia Oceania Africa Total 
EU-15 
13,246 
(73.0%) 
10,877 
(90.2%) 
3,622 
(83.5%) 
387 
(94.6%) 
127 
(92.0%) 
28,259 
(80.5%) 
CEEC-10 
4,909 
(27.0%) 
1,186 
(9.8%) 
718 
(16.5%) 
22 
(5.4%) 
11 
(5.0%) 
6,846 
(19.5%) 
EU-25 
18,155 
(100%) 
12,063 
(100%) 
4,340 
(100%) 
409 
(100%) 
138 
(100%) 
35,105 
(100%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for the primary source only. 
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Table 5.6 shows that the main source regions are Europe (18,155 projects; 51.7% of all 
projects over 1997-2010) and America (12,063 projects; 34.4%), followed by Asia (4,340 
projects; 12.4%). The total number of projects from these two main source regions is 
30,218, which is 86.1% of all FDI projects over the period.  The number of projects from 
America is about three times the number of projects from Asia, which in turn is less than 
a quarter of European investments in the EU-25 over the study period.  The table shows 
that the EU-15 share of EU-25 FDI projects is more than 70% for each global region.  The 
sum of projects from all regions in the EU-15 relative to the EU-25 is 80.5% and the 
largest share is for Oceania at 94.6%. 
Asia is not a main source region for FDI in the EU-25 during the whole period.  
There are only 4,340 projects from Asia, which accounts for just 12.4% of the projects 
received from all global regions.  FDI from these countries has evident regional 
preferences. For example, FDI from China and India mainly flows to developing and 
emerging markets in Asia rather than go into the European markets (Havlik et al., 2009).  
The number of FDI projects from Oceania (409 projects) and Africa (138 projects) is low, 
representing just 1.2% and 0.4% of all projects in the EU-25 respectively.  These patterns 
reflect a number of factors, including different levels of international economic 
development and proximity to Europe.  UNCTAD (2011) indicates briefly that the FDI 
flows to developed economies maintained their position at pre-crisis levels, but that 
Europe experienced a sharp decline in 2010.  It further shows that developing and 
emerging economies have been the new drivers for FDI outflows.  In 2010, FDI outflows 
from East, South and South-East Asia start to rise considerably from 2005, and increased 
by 20% in 2010, which is mainly due to China, Hong Kong, India and South Korea.  The 
US is the main contributor to the FDI outflows from the Americas.  Outward FDI from 
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Latin America and the Caribbean is attributed to Brazil and Mexico.   
By country, Appendix Table 5.1 shows that the main host countries for FDI 
projects are France, Germany and the UK, where the US is the most important investor in 
the EU countries.  The EIM database also shows that the number of projects from the US 
is 10,987, which accounts for 31.3% of all projects in the EU-25.  Another major source 
is Canada (788 projects).  Japan and Australia (2,001 and 339 projects) are the main 
investors from Asia and Oceania. In addition to the three main EU source countries (i.e. 
France, Germany and the UK), Switzerland (1,135 projects) is the main investor from 
within Europe. South Africa is the largest investor from Africa (95 projects), but there are 
few of projects from this global region.   
The following two tables focus on cross-border investment within the EU-25 over 
the study period.  Table 5.7 shows the number of FDI projects from the EU-25 in each 
EU-15 country and Table 5.8 in each CEEC-10 country.  In total, 16,181 projects arise 
from within the EU-25 (46% of all projects, whereas Table 5.6 shows that 18,155 projects 
arise from Europe as a whole, which is 52%).  The EU-15 is the main investor from within 
the EU-25, where 15,745 projects come from the EU-15 and the other 436 projects from 
the CEEC-10.   
By the source, these two tables show that France, Germany and the UK are three 
main EU source countries for cross-border investment in the EU-25, accounting for more 
than half of all projects from EU-25 countries.  It means that the larger host economies 
are also the main source of FDI in the EU-25. There are a considerable number of 
investments from Netherlands and Sweden, where the former is concentrated in the EU-
15 with 82.2% of all projects from this source.  It can be seen that projects from most EU-
15 or CEEC-10 countries are located in the corresponding region where these countries 
are located, but this excludes Austria, Greece and Poland, where the former two countries 
invest more projects in the CEEC-10 than in the EU-15, whereas most projects from 
Poland are located in the EU-15. 
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Table 5.7: Number of Projects in the EU-25: Originating from EU-15 Countries 
Host Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy 
Luxem
-bourg 
Nether
-lands 
Portugal Spain Sweden UK EU15 
Austria 10 1 8 13 22 277 0 2 38 5 25 0 4 15 23 443 
Belgium 12 21 16 13 187 168 3 7 46 18 155 3 11 54 136 850 
Denmark 3 7 5 11 31 78 1 1 9 3 23 0 3 42 54 271 
Finland 2 3 15 3 10 29 0 1 3 1 6 0 1 43 23 140 
France 58 283 80 61 131 976 6 42 279 30 263 12 211 176 542 3,150 
Germany 89 39 57 46 192 62 2 22 73 15 168 3 31 89 272 1,160 
Greece 0 0 1 2 4 15 6 0 6 0 5 0 2 0 7 48 
Ireland 5 9 6 3 35 86 0 5 19 2 22 1 4 6 177 380 
Italy 13 11 5 15 72 119 3 6 14 4 42 1 18 26 82 431 
Luxembourg 2 7 1 2 9 1 0 0 3 0 6 0 1 0 7 39 
Netherlands 10 38 15 28 42 89 0 8 8 3 18 3 9 40 97 408 
Portugal 1 9 2 3 58 83 0 4 18 0 8 2 80 10 22 300 
Spain 8 40 26 12 308 310 1 20 79 8 69 31 11 60 184 1,167 
Sweden 14 4 60 64 48 129 1 8 7 1 37 0 1 11 88 473 
UK 49 78 116 62 465 607 7 187 116 15 229 17 87 185 26 2,246 
EU15 276 550 413 338 1,614 3,029 30 313 718 105 1,076 73 474 757 1,740 11,506 
Bulgaria 34 15 6 4 28 71 37 2 35 2 13 1 12 12 20 292 
Czech 
Republic 
56 30 18 8 51 285 0 11 29 5 29 1 22 30 84 659 
Estonia 4 1 12 64 4 18 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 46 12 164 
Hungary 150 15 21 41 74 330 5 5 36 6 53 3 15 46 64 864 
Latvia 1 4 7 14 6 27 1 2 0 0 7 0 0 22 6 97 
Lithuania 4 1 6 16 11 31 1 4 7 1 6 0 2 19 15 124 
Poland 43 34 37 43 114 295 5 13 77 14 62 11 41 93 114 996 
Romania 76 18 9 11 99 192 34 2 35 7 42 6 26 30 48 635 
Slovakia 46 13 18 9 38 114 0 3 24 4 19 1 9 12 18 328 
Slovenia 23 0 4 0 8 28 2 1 6 1 0 0 3 0 4 80 
CEEC 10 437 131 138 210 433 1,391 85 43 249 40 233 23 131 310 385 4,239 
EU-25 713 681 551 548 2,047 4,420 115 356 967 145 1,309 96 605 1,067 2,125 15,745 
Notes: The period 1997-2010 as a whole.  Projects with investors from two or more source countries are included and shown for the primary source only. 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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Table 5.8: Number of Projects in the EU-25: Originating from CEEC-10 Countries 
Host Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia CEEC-10 
Austria 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 7 
Belgium 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 10 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 5 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 10 
France 0 5 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 5 20 
Germany 1 6 1 2 8 1 19 1 0 1 40 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Italy 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 9 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Spain 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 9 
Sweden 0 1 1 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 8 
UK 3 6 2 2 3 9 6 1 0 0 32 
EU15 6 24 10 7 18 12 46 11 4 17 155 
Bulgaria 14 7 1 5 3 1 0 2 1 4 38 
Czech 
Republic 
0 3 0 4 1 1 10 0 3 2 24 
Estonia 0 0 6 0 8 3 0 0 0 0 17 
Hungary 0 6 0 5 1 0 3 4 1 2 22 
Latvia 0 0 25 0 2 10 1 0 1 0 39 
Lithuania 0 0 21 2 11 5 3 0 0 0 42 
Poland 1 7 1 5 0 2 4 0 1 3 24 
Romania 3 4 3 14 0 0 11 7 2 4 48 
Slovakia 0 14 0 4 0 0 3 0 2 1 24 
Slovenia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
CEEC-10 18 42 57 40 26 22 35 13 12 16 281 
EU-25 24 66 67 47 44 34 81 24 16 33 436 
Notes: The period 1997-2010 as a whole.  Projects with investors from two or more source countries are included and shown for the primary source only. 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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There are 11,661 projects from both the EU-15 and CEEC-10 in the EU-15, whereas the 
number of projects in the CEEC-10 is just 4,520.  The three main host countries are France, 
Germany and the UK.  As shown in Appendix Table 5.1, the main host country for FDI 
as a whole are the UK (8,343 projects), France (6,022 projects) and Germany (3,491 
projects).  However, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show that the main hosts for investment from the 
EU-25 are France (3,170 projects) followed by the UK (2,278 projects).  This means that 
more projects in the UK come from outside of the EU-25, whereas more than half of the 
projects in France are from the EU-25.  Further, while there are 1,613 projects in the 
Netherlands from all sources, there are only 412 projects from the EU-25.  Overall, Europe 
is the main source region among all FDI sources, and the EU-15 countries are the main 
investors.  France, Germany and the UK are the main source and host countries. FDI 
projects from the EU-15 and CEEC-10 show different location patterns.  FDI from 
America occupies a large share of investment.  Finally, the number of projects from Asia, 
Africa and Oceania are relatively small since their low level of economy. 
 
5.3.4. FDI by Industry 
 
Table 5.9 shows the number of FDI projects in each EU-25 country by industry according 
to the classification used in the EIM database.  The table disaggregates the information 
between the EU-15 and the CEEC-10. In the EU-25 as a whole, it can be seen that the 
modal industry of the projects is manufacturing, with 20,351 projects (58.0% of projects 
over the period), followed by finance and business services, with 10,497 projects (29.9%).  
FDI in these two industries accounts for 87.9% of all projects in the EU-25. Otherwise, 
there are 2,647 (7.5%) and 717 (2.1%) projects in transport and communications and in 
retail and hospitality respectively. The total number of projects in other industries is just 
893, so that these account for only 2.5% of all projects.  Globally, the value and share of 
FDI in manufacturing has increased over time, and it occupies almost half of global FDI 
inflows (UNCTAD, 2011). 
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Table 5.9: Number of FDI Projects by Industry in the EU-25 
Host Agriculture Manufacturing Energy Construction 
Retail & 
Hospitality 
Transport & 
Communications 
Finance & Business 
Services 
Education & 
Health 
Recreation Total 
Austria 0 435 8 8 21 72 151 0 1 696 
Belgium 3 1,091 19 5 43 234 404 4 9 1,812 
Denmark 0 232 5 4 18 51 256 1 1 568 
Finland 0 128 2 1 5 27 88 0 0 251 
France 13 3,776 52 34 132 420 1,564 9 22 6,022 
Germany 2 1,900 29 20 88 292 1,112 14 34 3,491 
Greece 0 55 1 2 4 8 30 0 0 100 
Ireland 0 625 3 0 20 65 546 7 4 1,270 
Italy 2 387 13 2 12 95 294 2 5 812 
Luxembourg 0 30 1 0 2 6 51 0 0 90 
Netherlands 3 621 22 1 16 150 422 1 6 1,242 
Portugal 3 286 3 4 4 39 81 2 0 422 
Spain 2 1,235 20 6 48 184 607 6 16 2,124 
Sweden 1 447 6 14 33 74 398 4 5 982 
UK 12 4,036 117 37 150 467 3,429 36 59 8,343 
EU-15 41 (0.1%) 15,284 (54.2%) 301 (1.1%) 138 (0.5%) 596 (2.1%) 2,184 (7.7%) 9,433 (33.4%) 86 (0.3%) 162 (0.6%) 
28,225 
(100%) 
Bulgaria 6 314 7 2 10 37 94 0 0 470 
Czech 
Republic 
1 899 9 6 10 53 172 0 2 1,152 
Estonia 0 159 1 2 12 20 40 0 0 234 
Hungary 4 1,109 12 10 17 86 168 6 1 1,413 
Latvia 0 94 1 3 9 20 53 0 1 181 
Lithuania 1 137 6 4 9 26 56 0 0 239 
Poland 1 1,195 11 8 25 117 247 7 2 1,613 
Romania 4 635 9 9 20 61 170 19 4 931 
Slovakia 0 436 2 3 8 31 49 0 0 529 
Slovenia 0 89 1 0 1 12 15 0 0 118 
CEEC-10 17 (0.2%) 5,067 (73.6%) 59 (0.9%) 47 (0.7%) 121 (1.8%) 463 (6.7%) 1,064 (15.5%) 32 (0.5%) 10 (0.1%) 
6,880 
(100%) 
EU-25 58 (0.2%) 20,351 (58.0%) 360 (1.0%) 185 (0.5%) 717 (2.1%) 2,647 (7.5%) 10,497 (29.9%) 118 (0.3%) 172 (0.5%) 
35,105 
(100%) 
Note: For the period 1997-2010 as a whole.   
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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Table 5.9 also shows that most projects in each industry are focused on the EU-15, but 
different industries show different degrees of concentration.  Of the nine industries, 
agriculture is the smallest, but over 70% on this FDI in the EU-25 still goes to the EU-15 
countries.  In the case of manufacturing, around 55% of FDI in the EU-15 is  in this 
industry, whereas for the CEEC-10 it is much higher at around 75%  This may reflect 
different levels of economic development, but also the different labour skills and costs in 
these countries.  Service FDI is much more important for the EU-15, and its share of 
projects in finance and business services is 33.4%, whereas for the CEEC-10 it is just 
15.5%.  Transport and communications is another important industry for FDI, and about 
as equally important for the EU-15 and CEEC-10. 
Manufacturing is the most common industry for FDI in the EU-15 countries, 
although the share differs by country.  Thus, there are 4,036 projects in manufacturing in 
the UK, which makes up 48.4% of all projects in this country, but for Belgium the share 
is over 60% (1,091 projects). Further, Denmark and Luxembourg on the other hand 
receive more FDI in finance and business services than in manufacturing, which accounts 
for 45.1% and 56.7% of all projects in these two countries respectively.  In the CEEC-10 
countries, there is a similar situation to the EU-15 countries, with manufacturing receiving 
the most projects, but its share is much higher than that of the EU-15 countries.  The shares 
of projects in manufacturing of most EU-15 countries are around 50%, but these shares 
for most CEEC-10 countries are more than 70%. An exception is Latvia, which has a 
smaller share of projects in manufacturing, at just 51.9% of all projects. 
 
5.3.5. Functional Activity of FDI 
 
As well as locating in different industries, FDI projects have different functional activities. 
The EIM database identifies ten different kinds of function, and these are shown for the 
EU-25 in Table 5.10, which disaggregates FDI for the EU-15 and CEEC-10 countries.  
According to Defever (2006), who analyses the EIM data by functional activity for non-
EU FDI in the EU over 1997-2002, headquarters includes management, administration 
and accounting activities.  R&D includes fundamental scientific research, but also that 
related to the production process.  Production includes all activities relevant to physical 
production of a commodity.  Defever notes that the logistics function relates to the 
transport of a commodity, which could be internal or external to the firm.  Sales and 
marketing refers to the wholesale trade and representative offices for the business.  Table 
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5.10 shows that the main functions of FDI across the EU-25 are production (12,184 
projects, 34.7%) and sales and marketing (12,125 projects, 34.5%). The corresponding 
number and share of projects for logistics, headquarters and R&D are 2,752 (7.8%), 2,715 
(7.7%), 2,638 (7.5%) respectively. The total number of projects for the other five functions 
is 2,691, which just accounts for 7.7% of all projects. 
 
Table 5.10: Number of FDI Projects by Function in the EU-25, 1997 to 2010 
Function EU-15 CEEC-10 EU-25 
Contact Centre 948 3.4% 127 1.8% 1,075 3.1% 
Education & Training 205 0.7% 29 0.4% 234 0.7% 
Headquarters 2,632 9.3% 83 1.2% 2,715 7.7% 
IDC 220 0.8% 17 0.2% 237 0.7% 
Logistics 2,242 7.9% 510 7.4% 2,752 7.8% 
Production 8,032 28.5% 4,152 60.4% 12,184 34.7% 
Research & Development 2,334 8.3% 304 4.5% 2,638 7.5% 
Sales & Marketing 10,738 38.0% 1,387 20.2% 12,125 34.5% 
Shared Services Centre 248 0.9% 125 1.8% 373 1.1% 
Testing & Servicing 626 2.2% 146 2.1% 772 2.2% 
Total 28,225 100% 6,880 100% 35,105 100% 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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Table 5.10 shows that the CEEC-10 countries have more projects in production (60.4%) 
than in sales and marketing (20.2%), whereas the opposite is the case for the EU-15 (i.e. 
28.5% and 38.0% respectively).  In addition to these two main functions, it can be seen 
from Table 5.10 that the shares of projects in the other eight functions for the EU-15 and 
CEEC-10 are small and similar to each other, but except for the headquarters function.  
There are 2,632 projects in headquarters, which accounts for 9.3% of all projects in the 
EU-15, but the share for the CEEC-10 is 1.2%.  Of these other eight activities, the most 
attractive function for the CEEC-10 is logistics, which receives 510 projects (7.4%).  
Interestingly, R&D receives a considerable number of projects in both the EU-15 (2,334 
projects, 8.3%) and in the CEEC-10 (304 projects, 4.5%). 
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5.3.6. The Job Size of the FDI Projects 
 
The jobs data are known for 62% of projects.25  Table 5.11 shows the number of jobs per 
project in the EU-25 countries, again disaggregating this for the EU-15 and CEEC-10 
countries.  It also compares the number of jobs per project of each EU-25 country to the 
average of the EU-25. The first two columns are taken from Table 5.4 for the purpose of 
comparison, and Table 5.11 focuses on different points.  
 
Table 5.11: Job Size of FDI Projects in the EU-25, 1997 to 2010 
Host Number of Projects Jobs per Project Jobs relative to EU-25 average 
Austria 696 51.4 -22% 
Belgium 1,812 40.0 -39% 
Denmark 568 25.6 -61% 
Finland 251 14.0 -79% 
France 6,022 39.2 -40% 
Germany 3,491 42.4 -35% 
Greece 100 31.4 -52% 
Ireland 1,270 115.2 76% 
Italy 812 40.8 -38% 
Luxembourg 90 13.8 -79% 
Netherlands 1,242 39.8 -39% 
Portugal 422 99.6 52% 
Spain 2,124 49.2 -25% 
Sweden 982 28.2 -57% 
UK 8,343 59.3 -10% 
EU-15 28,225 50.0 -24% 
Bulgaria 470 94.0 43% 
Czech 
Republic 
1,152 182.1 178% 
Estonia 234 55.0 -16% 
Hungary 1,413 116.7 78% 
Latvia 181 25.8 -61% 
Lithuania 239 47.2 -28% 
Poland 1,613 137.5 110% 
Romania 931 113.5 73% 
Slovakia 529 203.6 210% 
Slovenia 118 77.2 18% 
CEEC 10 6,880 129.6 98% 
EU-25 35,105 65.6 0.0% 
Notes: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for the primary source only. 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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There are on average 65.6 jobs associated with each project in the EU-25, which is 50 jobs 
for the EU-15, but 129.6 jobs for the CEEC-10.  Table 5.11 shows that the number of jobs 
per project for the EU-15 is lower than the EU-25 average by 24% (i.e. 1 - 50.0/65.6), but 
                                                            
25 The investment scale is not considered as it known for only 31% of projects (see Table 5.2). 
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that for the CEEC-10 it is higher by nearly double, at 98%.  By host country, the jobs per 
project are lower than the average for most EU-15 countries, but except for in Ireland and 
Portugal, where they exceed the EU-25 average by 76% and 52% respectively.  However, 
for most CEEC-10 countries jobs per project are higher than the EU-25 average, except 
for the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  The largest number of jobs per 
project occurs in Slovakia (i.e. about 204 jobs per project), which is higher than the EU-
25 average by 210%.  It is of interest to see that the CEEC-10 countries that receive more 
projects generally have more jobs per project, although there is no such relationship for 
the EU-15 countries.  The table shows that three main host countries of France, Germany 
and UK have smaller projects on average than the EU-25. 
 
5.4. Multivariate Analysis of FDI Characteristics 
 
The above analysis considers the number of FDI projects by a single characteristic in each 
case, such as the host country, industry and the function of the project.  In order to provide 
a deeper analysis, this section examines FDI projects by several characteristics together.  
This is done in three ways, comprising source and time, by industry and time, and by 
function and industry. The first two of these reveal FDI trends over time, while the last 
one shows the extent to which the functions are correlated with different industries. 
 
5.4.1. FDI by Source and Time 
 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the trend in FDI projects for the five main global source regions 
for each year over 1997 to 2010. Figure 5.3 is for America, Asia and the EU-15, which 
have similar levels of outward FDI, and Figure 5.4 is for the CEEC-10 and Oceania. 
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Figure 5.3: The Number of FDI Projects by Source over Time (1) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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The two major source regions for cross-border FDI within the EU-25 are the EU-15 itself 
and America (also see Tables 5.6 and 5.7).  In general, EU-15 and America have a similar 
trend to that of the EU-25 as a whole over time, which shows a decline in the number of 
projects before 2003 (see Figure 5.2). Figure 5.3 shows that the numbers of projects 
reaches a peak in 2006 (1,036 projects) for America and in 2007 (1,543 projects) for EU-
15. It is also worth noting that FDI projects from America are greater than those from the 
EU-15 between 1999 and 2001. Otherwise, EU-15 always occupies the top position 
among all FDI source regions.  
It also can be seen that FDI projects from Asia show a different pattern from that 
of America and the EU-15. There is a decrease in the number of projects before 2001, and 
then the number increases until the end of the period with a slight decrease in 2007 and 
2009.  At the start of the study period, there are few projects from Asia (320 projects), but 
there are nearly 500 projects from Asia by the end of the period. The increasing investment 
in the EU can be seen as the first step of internationalisation for the Asian countries 
(Holtbrügge and Kreppel 2012). 
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Figure 5.4: The Number of FDI Projects by Source over Time (2) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
10 
 
The CEEC-10 and Oceania are not the main source regions for cross-border FDI projects 
in the EU-25 (Tables 5.6 and 5.8).  Over the whole period, there are only 843 projects in 
total from these two regions, which just makes up 2.4% of all projects in the EU-25. Figure 
5.4 shows that FDI from these two regions shows a similar trend. The number of 
investment projects increases sharply from 2005 to 2006 and then decreases considerably 
in 2008 and 2009. There are just 54 and 50 projects from the CEEC-10 and Oceania 
respectively at the end of the study period. 
 
5.4.2. FDI by Industry and Time 
 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 compare the trends of FDI by industry characteristics in the EU-25 
over time.  These are presented as two figures, with different scale on the vertical axis (see 
Table 5.9).  Most industries experience an increasing trend, although of course different 
industry characteristics are associated with different numbers of projects. 
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Figure 5.5: The Number of FDI Projects by Industry and Time (1) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
11 
 
Figure 5.5 shows that prior to the year 2000, most industries show an increasing trend in 
the number of projects, but with the exception of manufacturing, which decreases sharply 
from about 1,800 to 1,000 projects.  After that, the number of projects increases to 1,600 
and then remains relatively stable. FDI in manufacturing, and finance and business 
services have similar trends after 2003: both show an increase from around 2003 to 2006, 
followed by a decrease from the years 2006 and 2007 respectively.  At the end of the 
period, the number of projects in manufacturing, and finance and business services is 
1,682 and 1,119 respectively.  It can be seen that number of projects in transport and 
communications, and retail and hospitality is roughly constant. 
Figure 5.6 shows that the number of projects in the other five industries is much 
smaller than the numbers shown in Figure 5.5.  The number of projects in all five 
industries is less than 100 per annum, but it still varies.  It can be seen that projects in 
construction, education and health, recreation and agriculture increase more or less 
uniformly over time.  By comparison, the number of energy projects increases faster over 
the period, although it suffers a significant drop in 2009. 
  
Manufacturing
Retail & 
Hospitality
Transport & 
Communications
Finance & 
Business Services
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
124 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The Number of FDI Projects by Industry and Time (2) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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5.4.3. FDI by Function and Industry 
 
This section examines the nature of FDI projects by function and industry in the EU-25 to 
see whether some functions are associated with particular industries (i.e. how functions 
vary by industry).  Table 5.12 shows the number of projects in each function by all nine 
industries for the EU-25, and Table 5.13 disaggregates the EU-25 into EU-15 and CEEC-
10. 
Table 5.12 shows that the three main functions of FDI projects are production 
(12,184 projects), sales and marketing (12,125 projects) and logistics (2,752 projects).  By 
industry, in addition to the manufacturing and finance and business services, the most 
common industry is transport and communications (2,647 projects).  It can be seen that 
the main function of FDI differs by industry.  Not surprisingly, production is the main 
function of FDI by manufacturing (i.e. 11,866 projects for this function by manufacturing 
account for 58.3% of all projects by this industry), and projects for sales and marketing 
and R&D also occupy the large shares of all projects by manufacturing.  The similar 
situation can be found in the industry of finance and business services. The share of 
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projects for the function sales and marketing (7,172 projects) is 68.3% of all projects by 
finance and business services. This is because there is a correlation between one specific 
function and industrial characteristics. For example, finance and business services belong 
to the tertiary industry, which focus on functions like sales and marketing. 
Table 5.13 shows that different industries’ FDI prefers different functions in the 
EU-15 and CEEC-10.  The main functions of FDI are production, and sales and marketing 
by industries manufacturing and finance and business services respectively in both the 
EU-15 and CEEC-10.  However, because of the different levels of economic development, 
there are some differences in the share of projects used for the main function to all projects 
in the EU-15 and CEEC-10. There are 7,789 projects for production by manufacturing for 
the EU-15, which account for 51.0% of all projects by this industry, but this share for the 
CEEC-10 is 80.5%.  Furthermore, there is no obvious difference in the share of projects 
for sales and marketing by finance and business services for the EU-15 and CEEC-10 
(shares are 68.3% and 68.8%). 
 Table 5.13 shows that most headquarters FDI projects are located in the 
manufacturing, and finance and business services in both the EU-15 and CEEC-10.  The 
total number of projects in these two industries is 86.6% and 83.1% of all projects in the 
EU-15 and CEEC-10.  The number of headquarters projects for the EU-15 (2,632 projects) 
accounts for 96.9% of all projects in the EU-25, so that there are only very few such 
projects in the CEEC-10 (83).  However, the headquarters projects are more likely to be 
in manufacturing for the CEEC-10 (50.6%) compared to the EU-15 (41.2%).  This is likely 
to be partly due to the lagging but rapid development of the economy of the CEEC-10. 
  
 1
2
6
 
 
 
 
Table 5.12: Number of FDI Projects by Function and Industry in the EU-25, 1997 to 2010 
Function: 
Contact 
Centre 
Education 
& 
Training 
Head-
quarters 
IDC Logistics Production R&D 
Sales & 
Marketing 
Shared 
Services 
Centre 
Testing 
& 
Servicing 
All 
Functions 
Agriculture 0 0 3 0 3 36 4 12 0 0 58 
Manufacturing 220 105 1,127 46 1,247 11,866 1,712 3,469 163 396 20,351 
Energy 10 2 42 0 14 95 22 161 5 9 360 
Construction 0 0 19 0 12 65 1 85 0 3 185 
Retail & 
Hospitality 
56 2 80 1 287 6 1 259 8 17 717 
Transport & 
Comm. 
190 13 185 85 1,143 37 79 822 29 64 2,647 
Finance & Bus Svs. 588 82 1,222 105 44 63 813 7,172 168 240 10,497 
Education & Health 5 29 8 0 0 1 2 35 0 38 118 
Recreation 6 1 29 0 2 15 4 110 0 5 172 
All industries 1,075 234 2,715 237 2,752 12,184 2,638 12,125 373 772 35,105 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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Table 5.13: Number of FDI Projects by Function and Industry in the EU-15 and CEEC-10, 1997 to 2010 
Function: 
Contact 
Centre 
Education 
& Training 
Head-
quarters 
IDC Logistics Production R&D 
Sales & 
Marketing 
Shared 
Services 
Centre 
Testing & 
Servicing 
Total 
Agriculture 0 0 3 0 2 23 3 10 0 0 41 
Manufacturing 197 88 1,085 42 1,032 7,789 1,542 3,073 111 325 15,284 
Energy 9 1 41 0 13 72 21 135 2 7 301 
Construction 0 0 18 0 9 41 1 66 0 3 138 
Retail & Hospitality 49 2 75 1 228 4 1 219 5 12 596 
Transport & Comm. 175 11 178 76 917 30 67 662 16 52 2184 
Finance & Bus Svs. 507 78 1,195 101 39 58 694 6,440 114 207 9,433 
Education & Health 5 24 8 0 0 1 2 30 0 16 86 
Recreation 6 1 29 0 2 14 3 103 0 4 162 
EU-15 
948 205 2,632 220 2,242 8,032 2,334 10,738 248 626 28,225 
88.2% 87.6% 96.9% 92.8% 81.5% 65.9% 88.5% 88.6% 66.5% 81.1% 80.4% 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 1 13 1 2 0 0 17 
Manufacturing 23 17 42 4 215 4,077 170 396 52 71 5,067 
Energy 1 1 1 0 1 23 1 26 3 2 59 
Construction 0 0 1 0 3 24 0 19 0 0 47 
Retail & Hospitality 7 0 5 0 59 2 0 40 3 5 121 
Transport & Comm. 15 2 7 9 226 7 12 160 13 12 463 
Finance & Bus. Svs 81 4 27 4 5 5 119 732 54 33 1,064 
Education & Health 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 22 32 
Recreation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 0 1 10 
CEEC-10 
127 29 83 17 510 4,152 304 1,387 125 146 6,880 
11.8% 12.4% 3.1% 7.2% 18.5% 34.1% 11.5% 11.4% 33.5% 18.9% 19.6% 
EU-25 
1,075 
100% 
234 
100% 
2,715 
100% 
237 
100% 
2,752 
100% 
12,184 
100% 
2,638 
100% 
12,125 
100% 
373 
100% 
772 
100% 
35,105 
100% 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the EIM Database. 
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5.5. The Explanatory Variables 
 
This section describes the data that are collected on the explanatory variables for inclusion 
in the regression analysis below.  The main source of these data is Eurostat, which is the 
leader in providing high-quality statistics at the European level.  Its main task is to supply 
economic and other statistics for countries and regions of the European Union, including 
the economy, finance, population and social conditions, so that there is good coverage.26  
As part of the fifth enlargement in 2004 and 2007, some Member States joined the 
European Union after the start of the study period in 1997, but the data for these countries 
are collected from the beginning of the study period. 
The explanatory variables comprise country control variables and lagged FDI 
terms.  I begin this section by describing the nature of the country-level variables for which 
the data are collected.  These are organised into six groups including the demand, labour 
market, cost, education, trade and policy terms.  The rationale for these variables as 
location factors is provided in the literature review in Chapter 2, so that here I focus on 
the data collection only.  The information provided below includes the definition of each 
variable, its coverage and some discussion of the appropriate measurement.  Since not all 
data are available from Eurostat, steps were also taken to acquire data from other sources 
and this is also discussed.  Correlation matrices are included that show that these 
explanatory variables are not strongly correlated with each other. 
 
5.5.1. Data Collection and Description of the Explanatory Variables 
 
In order to select the variables that might affect FDI location, it is necessary to distinguish 
the FDI type and in particular whether it is market-seeking or not (Asiedu, 2002).  The 
former is promoted by domestic demand factors, such as the scale of markets and the level 
of income of host country, but the latter includes factors that accelerate the growth of the 
host country, by affecting things such as productivity.  The six variable groups have 
twenty-one variables in total, all of which have been used in previous work.  The data on 
all explanatory variables are in real terms using an EU country deflator, and are in Euros 
at 2005 prices.   
                                                            
26 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview last accessed on 15th April 2016. 
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Table 5.14 summarises the variables and presents descriptive statistics, including the mean, 
standard deviation and minimum and maximum values.  It also gives the sign of each 
variable according to its expected effect on FDI location at the country level.  The sources 
of some variables that are not collected from Eurostat are given in the note to the table.  
The table includes a dummy variable for the missing cases on the wage rate, where data 
are not available from Eurostat or elsewhere.  I now describe the six groups in turn.  At 
the end of the description of each of these, there is a table giving a summary of the 
variables in the group.  As we see the data on each variable are generally available for all 
countries, although for a given country it may be missing for some years.  For these cases 
it is interpolated assuming that the data change linearly over time across the missing years. 
 
Table 5.14: Summary Statistics for the Country Variables 
Explanatory Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Expected 
Sign 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:   
Demand Variables:   
Real GDP (€ Million) 424.7 618.0 6.1 2,400 + 
Real GDP per capita (€) 20.3 13.9 1.9 70.4 + 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 2.8 4.1 -17.7 11.7 + 
Population density (n / 𝑘𝑚2) 129.5 102.6 16.8 489.7 +/- 
External market demand (€ Million /D*d) 37.1 15.8 14.5 83.9 - 
Labour Market Variables:      
Unemployment rate (%) 8.3 3.8 1.8 22.1 +/- 
Real wage rate (€) 14.0 11.9 0 36.1 +/- 
Real wage rate (dummy) 0.2 0.4 0 1 - 
Cost Variables:      
Corporate income tax rate (%) 28.3 8.3 10.0 56.8 - 
Motorway density (km/1000 km2) 17.1 19.1 0 78 + 
Political risk index (0 to 100) 81.4 6.9 65 96.5 +/- 
Education Variables:      
Higher education rate (%) 21.2 8.0 2.3 42.6 + 
Secondary education rate (%) 50.7 15.4 10.8 80.2 + 
Trade Variables:      
Openness to trade (%) 78.5 34.4 27.1 186.3 +/- 
Real exchange rate (2005=100) 98.4 10.2 53.8 134.3 - 
Real exchange rate volatility (2005=100) 8.7 66.8 0.02 1090.3 - 
Policy terms:      
EU structural funds (€ Million) 1.3 1.9 0 9.8 +/- 
Eurozone country (dummy) 0.4 0.5 0 1 + 
EU Commitment (dummy) 0.9 0.3 0 1 + 
EU Membership (dummy) 0.8 0.4 0 1 + 
EU Post-membership (dummy) 1.5 0.8 0 2 + 
Notes: Summary statistics calculated across projects.  “+ / -” = expected positive / negative effect on FDI.  
Data on all explanatory variables are collected based on one lagged year from 1996 to 2009. 
Source: All data from Eurostat, except: wage rate: International Labour Comparisons, US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics; corporate income tax rate: OECD; higher and secondary education: World Bank; EU Structural 
Funds: DG for Regional Policy; political risk: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services; 
and openness to trade: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
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Demand Variables 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the sum of gross value generated by all resident 
producer units in an economy, plus product taxes but excluding subsidies on products that 
are not included in the value of output during the reference period.27  GDP is often treated 
as a proxy for the economic output of a whole country or region, whether this output 
belongs to the resident or non-resident population.  The Euro is used as the monetary unit 
for GDP for each country, which is obtained using the nominal exchange rate to convert 
national currencies into the Euro at the 2005 exchange rates.  The official Euro fixed 
conversion rate is used for Eurozone countries to convert the national currencies to Euros, 
including the years prior to the formal introduction of the Euro.  The source of these 
exchange rates is the ECU-activities website.28  Normally, the larger economies attract 
more FDI, so a positive effect of GDP is expected.  However, it cannot be confirmed 
whether the higher level of GDP or the larger population are the reason of attractive for 
FDI.  Hence, country fixed-effects instead of GDP are used to capture the characteristics 
of host countries. 
In addition to the level of output, real GDP per capita is included as a proxy for 
the benefits that the citizens receive on average from the increased output in their countries.  
It can be treated as an indicator for the wealth and standard of living of the population in 
a country or region.  In order to facilitate the comparison, GDP per capita is also measured 
in Euros at constant market prices of 2005.  This variable is expected to have a positive 
effect, which means that economies with richer citizens attract more FDI inflows.  Tsai 
(1994) suggests a positive relationship between these two variables, but Jaspersen et al. 
(2000) hold the opposite view by using the inverse of income per capita to measure the 
return on capital.  
The real GDP annual growth rate is included in the regression analysis as it is an 
indicator for the position that an economy is in (e.g. recession, recovery or prosperity).  
The GDP growth rate can reflect the development of an economy, for which Procher (2009, 
2011) indicates that real GDP per capita is a proxy for the relative purchasing power of 
the host market, and real GDP growth rate is an indicator of the sustainability and 
prospects of the host economy.  Some studies find that the growth rate of GDP is a more 
important determinant for FDI location, which is why it is normally used as a proxy for 
                                                            
27 Source: https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm Last accessed: 18th January 2016. 
28 Source: http://www.ecu-activities.be/ last accessed: 15th April 2016. 
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the attractiveness of the host market.  Asiedu (2002) finds that a higher growth rate of 
GDP can promote FDI inflows to the host country.  There may be a non-linear relationship 
between the GDP growth rate and FDI inflows.  This is because the less-developed 
economies are normally associated with a lower level of GDP per capita, but they may 
have rapid economic growth.  In this thesis, the GDP growth rate is calculated based on 
GDP in the current and preceding year that are measured in national currency to remove 
the fluctuations in the growth rate from changes in the exchange rate, rather than the own 
fluctuations of economic growth. 
Population is the total number of permanent residents in a country regardless of 
whether they are citizens or have legal status, although it excludes refugees who reside in 
the country temporarily.29  By contrast, the number of persons who leave their country of 
origin temporarily is counted in the total population.  The population density is included, 
which is defined as the total population divided by the land area measured in squared 
kilometres.  It shows the number of residents per land area, and it is a more accurate 
indicator of the extent of urbanisation than total population, which in any case is likely to 
be correlated with GDP.  The population density employed in the regression analysis is 
used to explore the extent of urbanization and concentration of consumer demand, which 
are indicators for the potential of the host market.  A greater density of population refers 
a larger consumer market, which could attract more market-seeking FDI, so that a positive 
sign is expected.  However, it may be negative from the perspective of congestion because 
it could cause more pressure on the transport infrastructure, increase the cost of land and 
exacerbate competition.  Therefore, the effect of population density in the regression 
analysis depends on the relative strength of two factors: urbanisation and congestion. 
Because of the Single Market, it is important to consider market access across the 
EU-25 countries. Alegria (2006) notes that firms investing in the EU consider the demand 
from the economies that make up the Single Market, as well as demand in the domestic 
market, while real GDP and GDP per capita are used to capture the internal (domestic) 
market demand.  The external market demand is the sum of GDP across all EU-25 
countries, weighted by the inverse radius (𝑑) of host country 𝑗 and multiplied by the 
inverse distance between the capital cities (𝐷), so that for country 𝑗 it is: 
 
                                                            
29 Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country= 
last accessed: 15th April 2016. 
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𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 = ∑(
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝑑𝑗
) ×
1
𝐷𝑖𝑗
25
𝑖=1
,     𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
 
where GDP is in millions of Euros at constant prices (2005 exchange rate) and: 
 
𝑑𝑗 = √
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗
𝜋
, 
 
is the radius of a circle that has the same land area as country 𝑗 (measured in squared 
kilometres), as used by Leamer (1997).  Amiti and Javorcik (2008) argue that that the land 
area captures the economic size of a country, while distance captures trade costs.  If 
external market demand is smaller for a country, it means FDI prefers to be located close 
to this market, so a negative sign is expected. In this sense, if western EU countries are 
treated as the core of European market, the negative estimation means that FDI prefer to 
be located in the markets that close to this core. 
 
Table 5.15: Summary of Demand Variables 
Demand Variables Summary Source 
Real GDP 
Country level total GDP at constant prices 
(based on 2005 exchange rates).  The currency 
unit is millions of Euro. 
Eurostat 
Real GDP per capita 
Country level real GDP per capita at constant 
prices based on 2005 exchange rates.  The 
currency unit is Euro. 
Eurostat 
Real GDP growth 
rate 
The calculation for the growth rate uses total 
GDP in the current and preceding year 
measured in national currency.  It is expressed 
in percentages. 
Eurostat 
Population Density 
The data for this variables is calculated as the 
total number of persons multiplied the inverse 
of land area in squared kilometres. 
Eurostat 
External Market 
Demand 
This variable is measured by the equation 
shown in the text above. 
Author’s own calculation 
based on Eurostat (data 
on GDP and land area) 
and AA Route Planner 
(data on distance) 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Labour Market Variables 
Unemployment is an important indicator for the development of economy and society, 
which indicates the availability of labour.  There is an argument about its effect on the 
FDI location.  Disdier and Mayer (2004) find that there is a positive effect of the 
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unemployment rate on inward FDI, which they treat as a proxy for the availability of 
workforce.  However, it can be detrimental to FDI if it is a signal of a rigid labour market 
or a poor quality workforce.  It may signal that an area is relatively depressed and so 
unattractive to FDI.  Eurostat is the source of data on unemployment, which captures 
anyone aged 15-74 who: does not have a job, but has been looking for a job actively during 
the last four weeks and can start work within the next two weeks; or has already found a 
job that starts within the next three months.  The unemployment rate is defined by Eurostat 
as the percentage of unemployed persons in the labour force, where the labour force is 
defined by the International Labour Office (ILO) as the total number of employed and 
unemployed persons.30  The long-term unemployment rate may be a better indicator if the 
purpose is to reflect the depressed nature of an economy, but it is not considered in this 
thesis.31 
Non-market seeking FDI may be motivated by low factor costs since higher wages 
imply lower profits.  Chapter 2 suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
labour costs and FDI, with Bevan and Estrin (2000) finding evidence for this when 
analysing FDI flows between EU countries and some transition economies.  However, 
some resource-seeking FDI is mainly looking for high-skilled labour force, which means 
that this FDI prefers to be in locations with a higher wage rate (i.e. in which case a positive 
effect is expected).  The real wage rate is defined as the hourly compensation in 
manufacturing expressed at constant Euro prices because most FDI projects from the EIM 
database are located in manufacturing.  This is the main reason for using the wage rate in 
manufacturing as a measure of the labour cost of a whole country, although the wage rate 
is different across industries.  The data source is the International Labor Comparisons 
(ILC) database of US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which provides a common 
conceptual framework for establishing the labour costs in different countries.  The wage 
is measured in US dollars, so the nominal bilateral exchange rate between the US dollar 
and the Euro is used to convert the data. There are missing data for Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovenia, so a separate wage rate dummy term is 
generated for these countries to pick these up.  The dummy variable equals unity if the 
data on the wage rate is missing for the above countries in each study year, but otherwise 
it is zero. 
                                                            
30 Unemployed persons only consider the persons aged 15-74 that satisfies the definition, but employed 
persons take all persons with work aged 15 years and over into account. 
31 The definition of long term unemployment rate is related to the number of persons, who are not 
employed for one year or longer and expressed as a ratio of the total number of unemployed persons. 
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Table 5.16: Summary of Labour Market Variables 
Labour Market Variables Summary  Source 
Unemployment Rate 
The ratio of the number of unemployed 
persons to the total number of employed 
and unemployed persons.  Unemployed 
persons are persons without work aged 15-
74, while employed persons include 
persons with work aged 15 years and over. 
Eurostat 
Real Wage Rate 
The hourly payment in manufacturing 
expressed at constant prices in Euro (Price 
index: 2005=100). 
International Labor 
Comparisons (ILC) 
database of US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), Eurostat for the 
exchange rate between 
US dollar and Euro 
Real Wage Rate (Dummy) 
Wage data are missing: Dummy = 1; 
otherwise, Dummy = 0 for each country 
with missing data in each year. 
Author’s construction 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Cost Variables 
In this group, the corporate income tax rate is an important variable that is considered by 
the multinational firms.  This is because it can affect their level of after-tax net profit 
directly.  Further, this rate can influence the preference of firms between locations with 
higher and lower level of tax.  The source for the corporate income tax rate is the OECD.32  
According to Procher (2011), the corporate tax rate is important as it helps to determine 
the after-tax level of economic rent in a location, so a negative effect is expected.  Lipsey 
(1999) finds that there is no significant effect of the tax rate on FDI on the location choice 
of the US affiliates in Asian countries, but Gastanaga et al. (1998) and Wei (2000) both 
find that FDI inflows increase with a fall in the tax rate.  This is consistent with the 
Conditional Logit model that is based on profit maximisation (Chapter 4), and a negative 
sign is expected on this term. 
The productivity of FDI could be improved by good physical transport 
infrastructure, leading to greater FDI.  A good measure of infrastructure should reflect 
both the availability and reliability of infrastructure (Asiedu, 2002).  For this purpose, the 
‘motorway density’ is used, which is calculated as the ratio of motorway length 
(kilometres) to the total land area (1000 km2), for which the data are available from the 
Eurostat.  Motorway density is a good indicator of transport infrastructure as it can attract 
                                                            
32 Data Source is: http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial last accessed: 
15th April 2016. 
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resource-seeking FDI by reducing the transport costs.  By contrast, a poor road network 
leads to a decrease in the efficiency and profits of investing firms.  In this sense, a positive 
sign is expected for this variable.  Another reason for selecting ‘motorway density’ as the 
indicator is because the road transport for passengers and freight is the main method of 
transport for most EU countries.  It is more complete than other possible proxies such as 
the railway network or navigable waterways (Eurostat, 2011). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Jadhav (2012) shows that there are political 
determinants for FDI location, such as political stability, government efficiency, 
regulatory quality and the control of corruption.  This thesis captures the effect of a 
comprehensive political risk of the host country using a composite risk index.  These data 
are produced by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk 
Services Group.33  The ICRG seeks to establish an early warning system of country risk 
by providing ratings of political, economic and financial risks for 140 developed, 
emerging and frontier markets.  The index that aims to capture the effect of political 
stability on the location choice of FDI is a composite of twelve risk indicators, ranging 
from 0 to 100, where 100 means no political risk.34  The investing firms are treated as the 
risk-averse as the lower political risk represents the higher level of stability and 
predictability in the political and economic environment of a host country, so that a 
positive effect on FDI location is expected, although previous work is not conclusive. 
Schneider and Frey (1985) find that country risk impacts FDI negatively, but Hausmann 
and Fernandez-Arias (2000) find that there is no significant relationship between these, 
and small differences in risk may be attractive to FDI as it signals a weak regulatory 
regime. 
  
                                                            
33 Data Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg last accessed: 25th April 
2016. 
34 The political risk composite index includes: Government Stability (12), Socioeconomic Conditions (12), 
Investment Profile (12), Internal Conflict (12), External Conflict (12), Corruption (6), Military in Politics 
(6), Religious Tensions (6), Law and Order (6), Ethnic Tensions (6), Democratic Accountability (6) and 
Bureaucracy Quality (4).  The number in parentheses is the weight for each indicator, adding to 100. 
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Table 5.17: Summary for Cost Variables 
Cost Variables Summary Source 
Corporate income 
tax rate 
Adjusted decretory rate of corporate income tax, 
measured in percentages (%). 
OECD 
Motorway density  
The ratio of the total motorway length (KM) in a 
country to the total land area (1000 KM2). 
Eurostat 
Political risk index 
A composite weighted index for a country including 12 
indicators.  This index ranges from 0 to 100 (highest 
level of risk = 0, lowest = 100). 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide of PRS 
Group 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Education Variables 
In general, the skills of the labour force are attractive to FDI flows to the host country.  
However, different investing firms are interested in locations where the skills of the labour 
force differ (i.e. unskilled, moderate- or high-skilled labour).  In order to consider this 
heterogeneity, two variables are included, for ‘higher education rate’ (tertiary education 
rate) and ‘secondary education rate’.  These capture the effect of high-skills and moderate-
skills on the FDI location. 
The rate of educational attainment refers to the number of persons in a given age 
group who complete a given education level, expressed as a ratio to the total number of 
persons in this age group. Education programmes are classified by the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which has three versions of categories 
of education level, known as ISCED 1976, 1997 and 2011.  ISCED 2011 has nine 
education levels, rather than the seven levels in ISCED 1997, as it disaggregates the lowest 
and tertiary pre-doctorate levels of education (see Appendix Table 5.2).35  The highest 
education level is calculated for the educational attainment rate to avoid the repeated 
calculation.  The higher (or secondary) education rate is measured as a ratio of the number 
of persons aged 25-64 who complete the higher (or secondary) education to total number 
of persons aged 25-64.  The data on these are collected from the World Bank, and positive 
effects are expected according to the discussion in Chapter 2.  For example, there is a 
significant positive effect of the skilled labour force on the location choice of foreign 
subsidiaries in the US (Friedman et al. 1996). 
                                                            
35 Education levels 3-6 (secondary and higher education) in ISCED 1997 are the same as levels 3-8 in ISCED 
2011.  Therefore, higher education attainment means completing the education of ISCED (2007) levels 5-
6, i.e. ISCED (2011) levels 5-8.  Secondary education attainment covers ISCED (2007, 2011) levels 3-4.   
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Table 5.18: Summary for Education Variables 
Education Variables Summary Source 
Higher education rate 
The ratio of the number of persons aged 25-64 
who complete higher education to the total 
number of persons aged 25-64. 
World Bank 
Secondary education 
rate 
The ratio of the number of persons aged 25-64 
who complete secondary education to the total 
number of persons aged 25-64. 
World Bank 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Trade Variables 
The openness to trade, real exchange rate and its volatility are included in this group.  The 
openness to trade is used to examine the importance of trade liberalisation on FDI location.   
It is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, and is used to capture 
the level of exports from the domestic producers to foreign markets and the level of 
imports of the domestic market from foreign suppliers.  There is an ambiguous sign on 
this variable as the effect may vary according to whether FDI is market-seeking or export-
oriented (Jadhav, 2012).  According to Asiedu (2002), if FDI is market-seeking, openness 
will have a negative effect on FDI, but if FDI is export-oriented it should be positive as it 
signals lower trade protection and transaction costs.  From the perspective of relationship 
between the trade and FDI, if they are complements FDI will locate in countries with the 
more open economy, but conversely substitutes.  The data on this variable are collected 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics, and given the importance of the Single 
Market a positive effect is expected on this variable. 
The real exchange rate and its volatility are included as they may affect the location 
choice of production facilities, especially for risk-averse investors (Goldberg and Kolstad, 
1995).  The variables have significant effects on production costs as they capture either 
an appreciation or depreciation of the domestic currency, and so affect the level of profits 
of FDI.  In this sense, they could reflect the stability and strength of the domestic currency 
in the international market and their effect on FDI location choice.  The real exchange rate 
is measured by the real effective exchange rate (REER) index, calculated for a basket of 
currencies composed of 36 major trading countries, reflecting the competitiveness of each 
country.36  The REER index can be deflated using unit labour costs, but the consumer 
                                                            
36 The 36 trading countries in the basket include 27 EU countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. 
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price index is used as wage rate is already included as a separate variable.  An increase in 
the index therefore indicates a decrease in the competitiveness of a host country as its 
domestic currency is appreciated.  It means that there may be less FDI located in this 
country, so that a negative sign is expected. 
The exchange rate volatility is measured by the absolute change in the REER index 
over the previous year.  Currently, there are few studies focusing on the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on FDI location, but I assume that investors are risk-inverse and expect that 
this variable has a negative effect.  This is because more fluctuations of the exchange rate 
mean that the economy of a country is less stable and hence predictable. 
 
Table 5.19: Summary for Trade Variables 
Trade Variables Summary Source 
Openness to trade 
The ratio of the sum of exports and imports to 
GDP (%). 
IMF 
Real exchange 
rate 
REER index (36 trading countries, reference year 
2005=100). 
Eurostat 
Real exchange 
rate volatility 
The absolute change in the REER index year on 
year: |REERt – REERt-1|. 
Author’s 
construction 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Policy terms 
The policy terms comprise EU Structural Funds, Eurozone membership, and terms for the 
membership of the CEECs, comprising the European Council commitment to accession, 
EU membership itself and the post-EU membership period.  These are each expected to 
have a positive effect on FDI location, except for the Structural Funds which have an 
ambiguous effect.   
First of all, certain EU policies play an important role in attracting FDI flows to 
the EU.  According to Basile et al. (2008), there is no overall policy to attract FDI to the 
EU, but the EU Structural Funds might serve this purpose as they support economic 
development and infrastructure provision in the regions of the EU Member States.  They 
aim to encourage economic and social development and to narrow the development gap 
between EU countries, so less-developed countries are more likely to obtain these Funds.  
However, the sign on this term is ambiguous as these Funds may just indicate the more 
depressed areas of the EU.  The data are collected from the Directorate-General for 
Regional Policy, European Commission and expressed in millions of European Currency 
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Units (ECUs) over 1979-98 and millions of Euro over 1999-2009.  Again, the reference 
year is 2005 (=100). 
Second, the single currency could further reduce transaction costs and help 
stimulate the development of a Single Market.  This is because the costs of conversion 
between different national currencies are removed.  It means that the Euro within the EU 
could promote FDI inflows to the EU more efficiently compared with national currencies, 
so that a positive sign is expected.  In order to control for its effect on FDI location, a 
Eurozone country dummy is added that is equal to unity if the country is an official 
Member State of the Eurozone, and zero otherwise.  Most EU-15 countries have been 
members of the Eurozone since January 1999, but Greece joined in January 2001 and 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK still use their own national currencies.  Half of the CEEC-
10 countries use the Euro i.e. Estonia (January 2011), Latvia (January 2014), Lithuania 
(January 2015), Slovakia (January 2009) and Slovenia (January 2007). 
Third, the enlargement of the EU stimulates the development of the Single Market, 
which removes trade barriers and reduces transaction costs, so it is expected to have a 
positive effect on FDI location.  Three dummy variables are included: EU announcement, 
EU membership and EU post-membership.  The dummy for EU membership captures the 
effect of greater access to the Single Market through lower trade costs, as a motive for 
FDI location. It takes a value of unity for each membership year, but otherwise zero.  Each 
EU-15 country joined the EU by the beginning of the study period so that the EU 
membership term for these is captured by the country fixed effects.  The CEEC-10 
countries joined during the study period and the EU announcement dummy is included 
for the date of the European Council commitment to EU accession, which captures the 
commitment to political and economic liberalization.  It differs across the CEECs, and it 
is measured like the EU membership term (i.e. it is unity from this date).  The other 
dummy (EU post-membership) is included for up to two years after membership to 
measure the lagged effect of EU membership on FDI location, and that might fall-off.   
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Table 5.20: Summary of Policy Terms 
Policy Terms Summary Source 
EU structural 
funds 
An EU policy for the amount of structural funds in 
each EU country.  It is expressed in millions of Euro 
at constant prices (reference year: 2005=100). 
Directorate-General 
for Regional Policy, 
European 
Commission 
Eurozone 
country 
Dummy variable that equals one, when FDI location 
uses the Euro, zero otherwise. 
Author’s construction 
EU 
Commitment 
Dummy variable that equals one from the date of the 
European Council commitment to accession, zero 
otherwise. 
Author’s construction 
EU 
Membership 
Dummy variable that equals one for each year of 
membership, zero otherwise. 
Author’s construction 
EU Post-
membership 
A combination of two dummies: ‘EU post-
membership + 1’ equals one if the date is one year 
after accession.  ‘EU post-membership + 2’ equals 
one, if the date is two years after accession. 
Author’s construction 
Note: Data period, 1996-2009. 
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Lagged FDI Terms 
The explanatory variables shown above capture the effect of the host country 
characteristics on FDI location.  In addition, other variables measured by the number of 
projects in the preceding year from different global regions or countries (i.e. lagged FDI 
projects) capture the effect of previous FDI from different sources on current FDI location.  
These variables should indicate whether the location of projects follows that of previous 
FDI, in particular whether there is ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS FDI.  The data 
on these are also taken from the EIM database and they are measured by the number of 
projects in the same location either from the same source region or country or from 
different source regions or countries. 
Depending on the level of analysis, the source region or country can be measured 
in several different ways.  They include projects from all over the world (All Sources), 
from four global regions (Europe, North America, the BRICS and Other) and from five 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).  Thus, if the regression 
is for the full sample and all terms above are included, this could show whether FDI as a 
whole tends to ‘follow’ previous FDI from the regions or countries measured by the above 
terms to particular host countries.  Similar, if sub-samples of FDI from different global 
regions or countries are considered, this could show whether FDI from this region or 
country follows previous FDI from the regions or countries measured by the above terms.  
For example, if the sample includes the projects from North America only to the EU-25 
and all above lagged FDI terms are included, the results could show whether the North 
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American FDI follows FDI from All Sources, North America or other global regions or 
countries. 
Another set of source variables focuses on the number of projects from the same 
source region or country to each EU-25 country.  In particular, when a specific project 
comes from any country to an EU-25 country, the variable ‘Same Global Region’ is 
measured by the total number of projects from the global source region that includes this 
source country (i.e. same source region) in the preceding year to this EU country.  For 
example, if a specific project comes from the US to the UK in 2005, this variable will be 
measured by the total number of projects from North America in the UK in 2004.  Even 
though the full sample is used, this variable could still explore whether FDI from the North 
America follows the location of previous FDI from this region. 
Finally, in relation to the BRICS, the lagged FDI project term is measured either 
for the ‘Same BRICS Country’ or ‘BRICS’.  Further, as the lagged FDI effect from the 
same and other BRICS countries may differ for any given project (e.g. Chinese FDI may 
‘follow’ other Chinese FDI, but not follow or even ‘avoid’ Indian FDI), a variable is also 
included for ‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS Country’. This is measured using the 
number of projects in the same host country in the preceding year.  The ‘Same BRICS 
Country’ is measured by the total number of projects in the respective EU-25 country in 
the preceding year from the same BRICS country when a specific project comes from any 
BRICS country.  The ‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS country’ is the difference in the 
number of projects between the ‘BRICS’ and ‘Same BRICS Country’.  These two 
variables are used together to show whether the BRICS FDI follows the location of 
previous FDI from the same BRICS country and whether also avoids the location of FDI 
from the other four BRICS. 
As a further point, the ‘Same BRICS Country’ captures the average effect across 
the BRICS countries.  To examine the individual BRICS effects I also consider 
multiplying this by a dummy variable for each BRICS country to disaggregate its effect 
and to examine which countries’ follows their own previous FDI.37  These disaggregated 
terms are ‘Same Brazil’, ‘Same Russia’, ‘Same India’, ‘Same China’ and ‘Same South 
Africa’.  On the same basis, ‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS Country’ is disaggregated 
into five variables ‘BRICS, excluding Brazil’, ‘BRICS, excluding Russia’, ‘BRICS, 
excluding India’, ‘BRICS, excluding China’ and ‘BRICS, excluding South Africa’ to 
                                                            
37 For example, ‘Same BRICS Country’ is multiplied by a dummy variable for Brazil, which links the 
previous and current Brazilian investments only. 
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examine if FDI from individual BRICS countries follows or avoids the location where 
each other BRICS country invests.   
 
5.5.2. Correlation of the Explanatory Variables 
 
It is important to check that the explanatory variables are not strongly correlated, as this 
implies that some variables can be replaced by others in the regression analysis, so that 
the estimates are poorly determined. There are several correlation coefficients, but the 
most common is the Pearson Product-moment correlation coefficient.  It captures both the 
strength and direction of a relationship between two variables, and can be used even if one 
variable is not a linear function of the other.  The Pearson correlation is defined only when 
the standard deviations of two variables are not equal to zero.  Its absolute value cannot 
exceed unity, which means that when the correlation is +1, there is a perfect and positive 
relationship between the two variables and when it is -1, there is a perfect and negative 
relationship.  A zero means that two variables are uncorrelated, while values between -1 
and +1 indicate the different extent of linear relationship between variables.  Values closer 
to either -1 or +1 indicate a stronger correlation. 
Table 5.21 shows the correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables 
considered pairwise across all countries and years.  It shows a positive relationship 
between most of the variables, except for real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and 
secondary education rate.  A coefficient of 0.7 may indicate a high degree of correlation, 
but Table 5.21 shows that the coefficients are almost always less than this.  The exceptions 
are the correlation coefficients between political risk and real GDP per capita (0.76) and 
between motorway and population density (0.85).  Further, some of the EU membership 
variables have high correlations, and this should be borne in mind for the analysis in the 
following chapters. 
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Table 5.21: Correlation Coefficients for the Explanatory Variables 
Correlation 
Real 
GDP 
Real 
GDP per 
capita 
Real GDP 
growth 
rate 
Population 
density 
Market 
distance 
Unemploy
ment rate 
Corporate 
income 
tax 
Real GDP 1.00       
Real GDP per 
capita 
0.27 1.00      
Real GDP 
growth rate 
-0.19 -0.13 1.00     
Population 
density 
0.37 0.34 -0.13 1.00    
Market distance 0.08 0.46 -0.06 0.61 1.00   
Unemployment 
rate 
0.01 -0.49 -0.03 -0.28 -0.27 1.00  
Corporate 
income tax rate 
0.47 0.28 -0.09 0.37 0.11 0.04 1.00 
Higher 
education rate 
0.07 0.37 -0.14 0.05 0.19 -0.14 -0.17 
Secondary 
education rate 
-0.22 -0.40 0.10 -0.17 0.18 0.12 -0.35 
Real wage rate 0.55 0.58 -0.24 0.40 0.25 -0.24 0.40 
Real wage rate 
(dummy) 
-0.36 -0.20 0.12 -0.22 -0.13 -0.01 -0.31 
Motorway 
density 
0.23 0.58 -0.16 0.85 0.66 -0.37 0.38 
Political risk 0.11 0.76 -0.04 0.27 0.31 -0.51 0.27 
EU structural 
funds 
0.58 0.04 -0.10 0.07 -0.28 0.19 0.36 
Real exchange 
rate 
0.08 0.15 -0.20 0.00 0.12 -0.16 -0.34 
Openness to 
trade 
-0.44 -0.15 0.19 0.20 0.53 -0.08 -0.31 
Real exchange 
rate volatility 
-0.06 -0.13 -0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.10 0.11 
Euro 
membership 
0.30 0.52 -0.16 0.29 0.20 -0.22 0.26 
EU membership 0.28 0.50 -0.13 0.19 0.20 -0.31 0.01 
EU 
commitment 
0.23 0.41 -0.06 0.15 0.16 -0.22 -0.09 
EU post-
membership 
0.33 0.58 -0.21 0.23 0.21 -0.35 0.12 
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Table 5.21 (continued) 
Correlation 
Higher 
education 
rate 
Secondary 
education 
rate 
Real 
wage 
rate 
Real 
wage rate 
(dummy) 
Motorway 
density 
Political 
risk 
EU 
structural 
funds 
Higher 
education rate 
1.00       
Secondary 
education rate 
-0.23 1.00      
Real wage rate 0.38 -0.32 1.00     
Real wage rate 
(dummy) 
-0.11 0.20 -0.66 1.00    
Motorway 
density 
0.18 -0.32 0.39 -0.07 1.00   
Political risk 0.20 -0.28 0.54 -0.38 0.43 1.00  
EU structural 
funds 
-0.10 -0.49 0.23 -0.35 0.05 -0.03 1.00 
Real exchange 
rate 
0.23 0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.11 
Openness to 
trade 
0.12 0.37 -0.18 0.10 0.22 -0.08 -0.50 
Real exchange 
rate volatility 
-0.11 0.03 -0.11 0.15 -0.08 -0.14 -0.06 
Euro 
membership 
0.15 -0.47 0.45 -0.26 0.49 0.41 0.35 
EU 
membership 
0.27 -0.32 0.49 -0.34 0.31 0.42 0.32 
EU 
commitment 
0.22 -0.24 0.40 -0.24 0.25 0.33 0.26 
EU post-
membership 
0.30 -0.42 0.58 -0.40 0.36 0.48 0.37 
 
 
Table 5.21 (continued) 
Correlation 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
Openness 
to trade 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
volatility 
Euro 
member-
ship 
EU 
member-
ship 
EU 
commit-
ment 
EU post-
member-
ship 
Real 
exchange rate 
1.00       
Openness to 
trade 
0.01 1.00      
Real 
exchange rate 
volatility 
-0.32 0.07 1.00     
Euro 
membership 
0.13 -0.12 -0.09 1.00    
EU 
membership 
0.60 -0.09 -0.20 0.41 1.00   
EU 
commitment 
0.62 -0.05 -0.24 0.33 0.81 1.00  
EU post-
membership 
0.55 -0.15 -0.18 0.48 0.88 0.71 1.00 
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5.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter discusses the characteristics of the data on FDI projects based on the EIM 
database.  It also focuses on describing other data that are collected on the explanatory 
variables for inclusion in the regression analysis.  In this chapter, there is a distinction 
between the EU countries that were members throughout the whole study period (EU-15) 
and those that joined more recently (CEEC-10). 
According to the information supplied by the EIM database, there are several 
features of FDI in the EU-25.  First, the EU-15 is the main host region over the whole 
study period, and the main host countries are France, Germany and the UK.  Projects in 
the EU-15 show an increase over time but with some variation.  Second, FDI in the CEEC-
10 only increases sharply from 2004 to 2008, following the EU enlargement to include 
the CEECs. There is almost no increase in the number of the projects in the CEEC-10 over 
the whole period.  Third, turning to the FDI sources, Europe is the main source region of 
FDI projects, and the EU-15 countries are the main investors. France, Germany and the 
UK are the top three source countries within the EU.  The projects from America have the 
second largest share of projects from all global regions because of the large amount of 
investments from the US. In addition to these, Japan, Switzerland and Canada are also 
main source countries for FDI projects in the EU-25.  However, the total number of 
projects from Asia, Africa and Oceania is small.  Finally, the most common industry 
characteristic of FDI projects both in the EU-15 and CEEC-10 is manufacturing, but there 
is a difference in the share of projects by manufacturing to all projects.  In the EU-15, the 
number of projects in manufacturing accounts for half of all projects, but this share for the 
CEEC-10 is 74%.  There is also a difference in the main function of FDI projects for these 
two regions.  For most EU-15 countries, the main function of FDI projects is sales and 
marketing, but for the CEEC-10 countries most FDI projects are in production. 
The details of all explanatory variables used in Chapters 7 and 8 are also discussed, 
where these variables are classified into the country and source variables.  The country 
variables capture the characteristics of the host countries and examine their effects on FDI 
location in the EU-25.  There are 21 country variables considered in this chapter and all 
of them are aggregated into six groups including the demand, labour market, cost, 
education, trade and EU terms.  The data source for most of these variables is Eurostat, 
and their definition, special data source, expected sign of coefficients and measurement 
are described one by one in this chapter.  The data on some other variables that are not 
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collected from Eurostat are also given in the description for each variable and summarised 
in the note to Table 5.14.  Another set of explanatory variables is represented by the source 
variables that are constructed by me and measured by the number of projects from 
different sources in the preceding year in the EU-25 countries or measured by the number 
of projects that match the projects from the same source region or country, especially for 
the BRICS countries.  The purpose of the source variables is to explore whether the 
location of FDI from the world or specific regions follows the location of previous FDI 
from the considered source regions.  For BRICS, the matched source variables could 
examine whether the BRICS FDI follows the location of FDI from the same source 
country and whether also avoid the location of FDI from other four BRICS countries. 
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Chapter 6. The Nature of BRICS Investment 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Outward FDI from the BRICS countries has increased substantially and it is an important 
factor in global development.  Indeed, BRICS countries are expected to be the largest 
economic group by gross GDP by the middle of this century (Ranjan and Agrawal, 2011).  
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the importance of BRICS FDI in the EU-
25 countries, which are defined in Chapter 5.  It does this by examining the differences in 
FDI between the BRICS and non-BRICS countries, and across BRICS countries.  The 
chapter uses the EIM database that was described in Chapter 5 to examine the investment 
trends from 1997 to 2010, and in particular the location pattern of FDI projects from the 
BRICS countries in the EU-25.  It discusses the features of BRICS FDI, including the 
employment size associated with the BRICS projects and the characteristics of these 
projects, such as industry group, functional activity and investment type. 
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.2 compares the BRICS and non-
BRICS investment by host region and over time.  The analysis is disaggregated between 
the EU-15 (i.e. the ‘West’) and the CEEC-10 (the ‘East’).  As I have shown most 
investment overall tends to go to the former, while FDI in the CEEC-10 tends to be later 
in the study period, reflecting the entry of these countries into the EU.  The characteristics 
of BRICS investment are then discussed in Section 6.3, which includes the host country, 
industry group, functional activity and project type.  The scale of FDI is examined using 
the employment size.  Section 6.4 explores the investment by each BRICS country again 
focusing on the project characteristics.  Finally, as the pattern of FDI suggests that FDI 
from BRICS has different location choice, Section 6.5 explores whether there is 
persistence in the country location choice of BRICS FDI over time using statistical tests.  
Conclusions are shown in Section 6.6. 
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6.2. BRICS and Non-BRICS Investment 
 
In order to explore the BRICS investment, it is necessary to first compare it with non-
BRICS FDI in the EU-25 countries.  The first sub-section compares the number of projects 
from the BRICS and non-BRICS in the EU-25, and the second sub-section examines 
changes over time. 
 
6.2.1. BRICS and Non-BRICS Investment in the EU 
 
In order to explore the FDI in the EU, a distinction is made between the EU-15 and CEEC-
10.  Table 6.1 shows the number and share of projects from the BRICS and non-BRICS 
regions located in these two groups of countries. 
 
Table 6.1: BRICS and Non-BRICS FDI in EU-25 
Host BRICS FDI Non-BRICS FDI Total FDI 
EU-15 
1,281 
(90.5%) 
26,944 
(80.0%) 
28,255 
(80.4%) 
CEEC-10 
134 
(9.5%) 
6,746 
(20.0%) 
6,880 
(19.6%) 
EU-25 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
33,690 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Note: All years, 1997-2010. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Overall, it can be seen from Table 6.1 that the number of BRICS investments in the EU-
25 is much smaller than non-BRICS investment.  There are 1,415 projects from BRICS, 
and they account for just 4.0% of all projects in the EU-25.  This is partly because there 
are only five countries in the BRICS group.  Other likely reasons are that BRICS countries 
are still in the initial phase of international expansion, which means that their investment 
is relatively small (Havlik et al., 2009).  Overall, Table 6.1 shows that most projects are 
located in the EU-15 (28,255 out of 35,105 projects, 80.4%), and this pattern is similar for 
the BRICS and non-BRICS.  However, the table shows that BRICS FDI is more 
concentrated in the EU-15 (90.5%) compared to non-BRICS (80.0%).  In fact there are 
relatively few projects from BRICS in the CEEC-10 (i.e. just 134 projects, 9.5%). 
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6.2.2. BRICS and Non-BRICS Investment over Time 
 
It is also of interest to explore the trends of FDI over time.  Table 6.2 shows the change in 
the number of FDI projects from the BRICS and non-BRICS regions in three sub-periods, 
covering the beginning, middle and end of the study period, i.e. 1997-2000, 2001-05 and 
2006-10. 
 
Table 6.2: BRICS and non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 over Time 
Source 1997-2000 2001-05 2006-10 Total 
BRICS 
84 
(1.0%) 
356 
(3.4%) 
975 
(6.2%) 
1,415 
(4.0%) 
Non-BRICS 
8,632 
(99.0%) 
10,253 
(96.6%) 
14,805 
(93.8%) 
33,690 
(96.0%) 
All 
8,716 
(100.0%) 
10,609 
(100.0%) 
15,780 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Note: All years, 1997-2010. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Table 6.2 shows that overall the number of investments increases continually over the 
study period.  There are about 8,700 projects in 1997-2000, which nearly doubles over 
2006-10, at around 15,800 projects.  For the BRICS, the increase in FDI is even more 
dramatic. There are 975 projects from the BRICS over 2006-10, which is nearly a twelve-
fold increase on the number of projects in the first sub-period, from 1997 to 2000, of 84 
projects.  For non-BRICS countries, the number of projects in the absolute term increases 
from 8,632 to 14,805 from 1997-2000 to 2006-10.  However, given the strong growth in 
BRICS FDI, in relative terms BRICS investments increase from 1.0% to 6.2% of projects 
over the period.  
Table 6.3 divides the non-BRICS countries into the main global regions of Europe, 
North America and ‘Other’ (i.e. rest of the world), in order to compare the investment 
trends from these regions.38  The global regions of Europe, North America and Other 
exclude the BRICS countries.  The table shows the number of projects from each of these 
over time. 
  
                                                            
38 The main investors for each of these three global regions are: France, Germany and the UK for Europe, 
the US for North America and Australia, Japan and South Korea for the Other countries. 
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Table 6.3:  BRICS and non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Source over Time 
Source 1997-2000 2001-05 2006-10 Total 
BRICS 
84 
(1.0%) 
356 
(3.4%) 
975 
(6.2%) 
1,415 
(4.0%) 
Europe 
3,987 
(45.7%) 
5,564 
(52.4%) 
8,439 
(53.5%) 
17,990 
(51.3%) 
North 
America 
3,710 
(42.6%) 
3,496 
(33.0%) 
4,569 
(28.9%) 
11,775 
(33.5%) 
Other 
935 
(10.7%) 
1,193 
(11.2%) 
1,797 
(11.4%) 
3,925 
(11.2%) 
All 
8,716 
(100.0%) 
10,609 
(100.0%) 
15,780 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Note: Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS countries. 
Source: EIM database. 
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It can be seen from Table 6.3 that most FDI in the EU-25 arises from Europe (17,990 
projects, 51.3%) and North America (11,775 projects, 33.5%). European FDI accounts for 
half of all foreign investment in the EU-25.  Of course, this is not surprising given of the 
short distance and the integration of these economies through the Single Market.  The 
number of FDI projects from the Other countries is small both in absolute and relative 
terms, i.e. 3,925 projects, which is 11.2% of total projects in the EU-25. 
Over time, Table 6.3 shows that the number of FDI projects from each global 
region increases over the study period and that the largest increase is from Europe.  This 
is likely to be due to increased economic integration over this time, including the accession 
of the CEEC-10 countries, which makes cross-border investment within the EU much 
easier.  It also can be seen that while investment from North America increases in absolute 
terms, it takes a smaller share of total FDI, falling from 42.6% to 28.9% over time. 
 
6.3. The Characteristics of BRICS and Non-BRICS Investment 
 
The above section compares the temporal patterns of BRICS and non-BRICS investment.  
In order to explore the location choice of investment in the EU-25, this section discusses 
the characteristics of BRICS and non-BRICS FDI.  The non-BRICS countries are again 
divided into the global regions of Europe, North America and Other (i.e. rest of the world).  
The following sub-sections discuss the investment by host country, industry group, 
functional activity and project type.  It also considers the employment size of the projects. 
 
151 
 
6.3.1. BRICS Investment by Destination Country 
 
The previous section found that the EU-15 is the main destination of BRICS and non-
BRICS investment.  In order to explore this further, Table 6.4 shows the number of FDI 
projects from the BRICS and other three global sources for each of the EU-25 countries,39 
again distinguishing this by the EU-15 and CEEC-10 countries.  Table 6.4 below shows 
that there are strong differences in the share of projects in the EU-15 from each of the four 
source global regions, although the EU-15 is still overwhelmingly the main destination 
for FDI from each source region.  European investment in the EU-15 is much smaller in 
relative terms than that of other three global regions, and most projects received by the 
CEEC-10 countries come from within Europe (4,888 projects which is 71% of all projects 
in the CEEC-10). 
Within the EU-15 countries, the main destination country is the UK (8,343 projects, 
23.8% of all projects in the EU-25), followed by France (6,022 projects, 17.2%) and 
Germany (3,491 projects, 9.9%).  Together these countries account for about 50% of all 
FDI projects in the EU-25.  For the BRICS countries, a similar pattern emerges, although 
investment is even more concentrated in the UK (40% of all projects from BRICS), and 
the UK, France and Germany receive 68.5% of BRICS FDI.  However, European FDI is 
more focused on France (3,526 projects) than on the UK (2,553 projects) and it has a less 
concentrated pattern across the EU-25 countries, as some other EU-25 countries, including 
Belgium, Ireland and Spain, receive a considerable amount of European FDI. 
With regards to the CEEC-10 countries, Table 6.4 shows that the Czech Republic 
(1,152 projects), Hungary (1,413) and Poland (1,613) receive most projects, and FDI in 
these three countries is more than that of some economies in the EU-15, such as Ireland 
and the Netherlands.  However, in general, for the BRICS countries, most investment is 
in the EU-15.  This is probably because the CEEC-10 countries have a lower level of 
economic development and possibly lower openness to investment than the EU-15 
countries. 
  
                                                            
39 Cyprus and Malta are always excluded as FDI data are not available for these for all years. 
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Table 6.4: BRICS and non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Source and Country 
Host BRICS Europe 
North 
America 
Other Total 
Austria 10 512 119 55 696 
Belgium 74 908 592 238 1,812 
Denmark 21 311 177 59 568 
Finland 7 171 57 16 251 
France 139 3,526 1,904 453 6,022 
Germany 264 1,517 1,301 409 3,491 
Greece 3 60 30 7 100 
Ireland 11 411 758 90 1,270 
Italy 32 483 235 62 812 
Luxembourg 1 43 38 8 90 
Netherlands 52 448 576 166 1,242 
Portugal 11 307 63 41 422 
Spain 50 1,281 560 233 2,124 
Sweden 40 571 292 79 982 
UK 566 2,553 3,925 1,299 8,343 
EU-15 
1,281 
(90.5%) 
13,102 
(72.8%) 
10,627 
(90.3%) 
3,215 
(81.9%) 
28,225 
(80.4%) 
Bulgaria 13 380 58 19 470 
Czech 
Republic 
22 727 226 177 1,152 
Estonia 7 201 23 3 234 
Hungary 23 952 273 165 1,413 
Latvia 9 149 16 7 181 
Lithuania 12 189 25 13 239 
Poland 20 1,092 317 184 1,613 
Romania 21 735 114 61 931 
Slovakia 6 369 79 75 529 
Slovenia 1 94 17 6 118 
CEEC-10 
134 
(9.5%) 
4,888 
(27.2%) 
1,148 
(9.7%) 
710 
(18.1%) 
6,880 
(19.6%) 
EU-25 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
17,990 
(100.0%) 
11,775 
(100.0%) 
3,925 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Notes: All years, 1997-2010.  Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS countries. 
Source: EIM database. 
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6.3.2. BRICS Investment by Industry 
 
The EIM database categorizes FDI according to nine industry groups.  Table 6.5 shows 
the number and share of FDI projects from the global regions by industry characteristics 
over the study period.  Based on the total number of projects by all nine industries, Table 
6.5 shows that manufacturing, and finance and business services are the two main 
industrial characteristics of FDI projects. There are 20,351 projects (58.0% of projects) 
and 10,497 projects (29.9%) by manufacturing, and finance and business services 
respectively, followed by transport and communications with 2,647 projects (7.6%).  The 
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total number of projects by the other six industries is just 1,610 projects, which is 4.6% of 
all projects. 
By source region, it can be seen that the tendency of investment by manufacturing, 
and finance and business services is also the common characteristic of all four global 
source regions, but BRICS and North America are less focused on manufacturing and 
more concentrated in finance and business services compared to European and Other FDI.  
In particular, the main destination industry of more than half of BRICS investment (738 
projects, 52.1%) is manufacturing, followed by finance and business services.  The total 
number of projects by these two industries occupies 88.8% of all projects from BRICS.  
The most common industry characteristic of projects from North America is 
manufacturing, but there is no significant gap between the investment by manufacturing 
(5,854 projects, 49.7%), and finance and business services (4,918 projects, 41.7%). 
 
Table 6.5: BRICS and Non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Industry 
Industry BRICS Europe 
North 
America 
Other Total 
Agriculture 
1 
(0.0%) 
36 
(0.2%) 
14 
(0.1%) 
7 
(0.2%) 
58 
(0.2%) 
Manufacturing 
738 
(52.1%) 
10,928 
(60.7%) 
5,854 
(49.7%) 
2,831 
(72.1%) 
20,351 
(58.0%) 
Energy 
31 
(2.2%) 
231 
(1.3%) 
80 
(0.7%) 
18 
(0.5%) 
360 
(1.0%) 
Construction 
7 
(0.5%) 
149 
(0.8%) 
19 
(0.2%) 
10 
(0.3%) 
185 
(0.5%) 
Retail and  
Hospitality 
33 
(2.3%) 
468 
(2.6%) 
179 
(1.5%) 
37 
(0.9%) 
717 
(2.0%) 
Transport and 
Communications 
73 
(5.2%) 
1,693 
(9.4%) 
608 
(5.2%) 
273 
(7.0%) 
2,647 
(7.6%) 
Finance and 
Business Services 
519 
(36.7%) 
4,344 
(24.1%) 
4,918 
(41.7%) 
716 
(18.2%) 
10,497 
(29.9%) 
Education and 
Health 
8 
(0.6%) 
64 
(0.4%) 
33 
(0.3%) 
13 
(0.3%) 
118 
(0.3%) 
Recreation 
5 
(0.4%) 
77 
(0.5%) 
70 
(0.6%) 
20 
(0.5%) 
172 
(0.5%) 
Total 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
17,990 
(100.0%) 
11,775 
(100.0%) 
3,925 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Notes: All years, 1997-2010.  Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS countries. 
Source: EIM database. 
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6.3.3. Functional Activity of BRICS Investment 
 
The function of FDI, as discussed in Chapter 5, include whether a project is mainly 
concerned with headquarters, production, sales and marketing, education and training, 
R&D and so on.  The function differs from the industry, as a plant may be in 
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manufacturing but the FDI project may add some other function, such as a headquarters, 
logistics, energy or R&D.  These functions are shown in Table 6.6 and are defined by 
Ernst & Young in constructing the EIM database.  Table 6.6 shows the number of projects 
both in absolute and relative terms from the BRICS and the three global source regions 
over the study period. 
 
Table 6.6: BRICS and Non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Function 
Function BRICS Europe 
North 
America 
Other Total 
Contact Centre 
36 
(2.5%) 
472 
(2.6%) 
516 
(4.4%) 
51 
(1.3%) 
1,075 
(3.1%) 
Education and 
Training 
9 
(0.6%) 
87 
(0.5%) 
114 
(1.0%) 
24 
(0.6%) 
234 
(0.7%) 
Headquarters 
179 
(12.7%) 
744 
(4.1%) 
1,388 
(11.8%) 
404 
(10.3%) 
2,715 
(7.7%) 
IDC 
2 
(0.2%) 
104 
(0.6%) 
116 
(1.0%) 
15 
(0.4%) 
237 
(0.7%) 
Logistics 
66 
(4.7%) 
1,837 
(10.2%) 
561 
(4.7%) 
288 
(7.3%) 
2,752 
(7.8%) 
Production 
245 
(17.3%) 
7,512 
(41.8%) 
2,983 
(25.3%) 
1,444 
(36.8%) 
12,184 
(34.7%) 
Research & 
Development 
102 
(7.2%) 
1,014 
(5.6%) 
1,213 
(10.3%) 
309 
(7.9%) 
2,638 
(7.5%) 
Sales and 
Marketing 
749 
(52.9%) 
5,662 
(31.5%) 
4,427 
(37.6%) 
1,287 
(32.8%) 
12,125 
(34.5%) 
Shared Services 
Centre 
6 
(0.4%) 
155 
(0.9%) 
177 
(1.5%) 
35 
(0.9%) 
373 
(1.1%) 
Testing and 
Servicing 
21 
(1.5%) 
403 
(2.2%) 
280 
(2.4%) 
68 
(1.7%) 
772 
(2.2%) 
Total 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
17,990 
(100.0%) 
11,775 
(100.0%) 
3,925 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Notes: All years, 1997-2010.  Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS 
countries. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Table 6.6 shows that most projects are in production (12,184 projects, 34.7% of all 
projects) and sales and marketing (12,125 projects, 34.5%).  Headquarters, logistics and 
research & development (R&D) also attract considerable investment, where the share of 
projects in each of the three functions to all projects is close to 8% in each case.  By source 
region, most projects from the three global regions and the BRICS are also in production 
and sales and marketing, but BRICS and North America are more focused on the latter, 
and Europe and Other on the former.  It can be seen that BRICS investment in sales and 
marketing represents more than half of all its investment, and European FDI in production 
is close to 42% of its investment, so it is evident that FDI from these two regions shows a 
considerable concentration by function compared to the FDI from the other two source 
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regions.  There is a large number of projects in headquarters from the global source regions, 
except for Europe, for which it is only 4.1% (i.e. 744 projects). 
The temporal pattern of BRICS investment by function is explored in Table 6.7.  
It shows that the number of projects in all ten functions increases over time, but at different 
rates.  BRICS FDI in sales and marketing receives the most investment, and Table 6.7 
shows it increases considerably over the study period.  The largest growth rate is in R&D, 
where the number of projects in the last sub-period increases by a 37-fold of the number 
in the first sub-period, but the starting point is just 2 projects.  Projects in headquarters 
have also shown a sharp increase over time (8.9-fold compared to the number in the first 
sub-period), which exceeds the growth of manufacturing, which is the main function (4.0-
fold compared the number in the first sub-period).  
 
Table 6.7: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Function and Time 
Function 1997-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 
Change from 1997-
2000 to 2006-10 
Contact Centre 0 11 25 25 
Education and 
Training 
1 3 5 4 
Headquarters 10 70 99 89 
IDC 0 1 1 1 
Logistics 6 19 41 35 
Production 31 60 154 123 
Research & 
Development 
2 24 76 74 
Sales and 
Marketing 
34 163 552 518 
Shared Services 
Centre 
0 1 5 5 
Testing and 
Servicing 
0 4 17 17 
Total 84 356 975 891 
Note: All years, 1997-2010.  This table shows the number of projects. 
Source: EIM database. 
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6.3.4. BRICS Investment by Project Type 
 
FDI projects are classified into three categories: start-up, co-location and expansion 
(Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5).  This sub-section compares the different types of FDI from 
the BRICS and the other three global source regions. Table 6.8 presents the number and 
share of projects in all three types of investment from each of these sources over the study 
period.  The main FDI type from all sources is the start-up investment (the last column), 
for which there are 23,325 projects in total, i.e. 66.4% of all projects in the EU-25.  It is 
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followed by expansion FDI (9,422 projects, 26.8%) and then by co-locations (2,358 
projects, 6.7%). 
 
Table 6.8: BRICS and Non-BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Project Type 
Project Type BRICS Europe 
North 
America 
Other Total 
Start-up 
1,163 
(82.1%) 
11,646 
(64.7%) 
7,950 
(67.5%) 
2,566 
(65.4%) 
23,325 
(66.4%) 
Co-location 
32 
(2.3%) 
1,216 
(6.8%) 
793 
(6.7%) 
317 
(8.1%) 
2,358 
(6.7%) 
Expansion 
220 
(15.6%) 
5,128 
(28.5%) 
3,032 
(25.8%) 
1,042 
(26.5%) 
9,422 
(26.9%) 
Total 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
17,990 
(100.0%) 
11,775 
(100.0%) 
3,925 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Note: All years, 1997-2010.  Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS countries. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Of course, given their relative small level of FDI, there are not so many start-up projects 
in absolute terms from the BRICS (1,163 projects), but the table shows the highest 
concentration of start-up FDI in the EU-25 (82.1%) compared to the other three global 
source regions.  It also can be seen that there is a considerable number of start-up projects 
in absolute terms arising from North America, Europe and Other, where each share is 
above 60% of the respective investment.  Europe is the leader of start-up investment 
among all four sources, as it generates 11,646 projects in the EU 25 (49.9% of all start-up 
projects in the EU-25). 
 
6.3.5. BRICS Investment by Employment Size 
 
The effect of FDI on the economic development of a host country depend on its scale 
(Kok and Ersoy, 2009).  This section compares the size of the projects, as measured by 
the number of gross jobs.  While the investment scale is included in the EIM data, Table 
5.2 shows that this is known for only 31% of projects, whereas the number of jobs is 
known for 62% of projects.  Table 6.9 shows the number of gross jobs associated with 
each project from the BRICS and from the main global regions.  It also shows the number 
of jobs per project between each of these four sources relative to that of all sources. 
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Table 6.9: BRICS and Non-BRICS FDI by Gross Job Size in EU-25 
Source 
Number 
of 
projects 
Number of gross jobs per project Mean job 
size relative 
to all sources  All Manufacturing 
Finance and 
Business Services 
BRICS 1,415 38.8 47.4 33.7 59.2% 
Europe 17,990 62.5 78.9 27.1 95.4% 
North 
America 
11,775 65.9 89.1 38.1 100.6% 
Other 3,925 88.9 110.5 33.6 135.7% 
Total 35,105 65.5 85.1 33.0 100.0% 
Notes: All years, 1997-2010.  Europe, North America and Other exclude the BRICS countries.  
Final column for BRICS calculated as 38.8 / 65.5 = 59.2%, and so on. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Table 6.9 shows that there are 65.5 jobs created associated with each project in the EU-
25.  In fact, the mean number of jobs associated with the projects is similar for North 
America (65.9 jobs) and Europe (62.5 jobs), but much lower for the BRICS, at only 38.8 
jobs per project (40.8% lower than the average).  The number of jobs created by Other is 
the largest, at 88.9 jobs per project, which is higher than the average by 35.7%.  Overall, 
this shows that on average the FDI projects from the BRICS are much smaller in scale. 
The second and third columns of Table 6.9 show that Europe and North America 
are the two largest source regions of FDI projects, but they do not create the largest number 
of jobs per project.  To explore this, the fourth and fifth columns disaggregate the number 
of jobs per project by manufacturing, and finance and business services.  This shows that 
the number of jobs per project by manufacturing is larger for each source compared with 
finance and business services.  Second, it also can be seen that the source region with a 
larger number of jobs by manufacturing normally has a larger number of jobs per project 
in total.  It means that the number of jobs per project by manufacturing from a particular 
source region could decide the total number of jobs per project from this region.  For 
example, North America has a smaller number of jobs by manufacturing compared to the 
Other, and therefore it also has a smaller number of jobs in total, even though it has a 
larger number of jobs by finance and business services.  The BRICS have the smallest 
number of jobs per project overall (38.8 jobs), and Table 6.9 shows that this arises 
primarily because it has relatively small manufacturing projects. 
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6.4. Investment by Each BRICS Country 
 
According to Milelli et al. (2010), the EU is an increasingly important destination of 
BRICS investment, particularly for FDI from India and China. This section explores the 
FDI location pattern in the EU-25 for individual BRICS countries.  This pattern is 
analysed over time, but also by host region, industry group, functional activity and 
investment type. 
 
6.4.1. Investment of BRICS Countries over Time 
 
Table 6.10 shows the number and share of projects in the EU-25 from each BRICS country 
over time, focusing on three sub-periods.  Consistent with Milelli et al. (2010), it shows 
that the majority (76.7%) of all projects from BRICS in the EU-25 are from China and 
India.  It can also be seen that all BRICS countries have experienced an increasing trend 
over time, but at different rates.  In fact, at the beginning of the study period, the two main 
contributors of FDI are India (32.1% of BRICS projects) and South Africa (34.5%), 
although in absolute terms the number of projects is small (27 and 19 projects 
respectively).  In the second sub-period, 2001-05 the number of projects from China and 
India increase substantially.  Over the three sub-periods, China’s FDI experiences the 
largest increase from 16 to 406 projects, so that in the last sub-period it accounts for 41.6% 
of all BRICS projects.  Investment from India also increases strongly over time, although 
less strongly in relative terms, reflecting the overall growth in FDI from the BRICS.  The 
other three countries increase their projects in absolute terms much more slowly than 
China and India, while in relative terms the BRICS share of projects from Russia and 
South Africa decrease sharply, from 11.9% to 9.9% and from 34.5% to 3.9% respectively. 
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Table 6.10: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 over Time 
Source 1997-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 Total 
Brazil 
2 
(2.4%) 
19 
(5.3%) 
49 
(5.1%) 
70 
(4.9%) 
Russia 
10 
(11.9%) 
58 
(16.3%) 
97 
(9.9%) 
165 
(11.7%) 
India 
27 
(32.1%) 
130 
(36.5%) 
385 
(39.5%) 
542 
(38.3%) 
China 
16 
(19.1%) 
121 
(34.0%) 
406 
(41.6%) 
543 
(38.4%) 
South Africa 
29 
(34.5%) 
28 
(7.9%) 
38 
(3.9%) 
95 
(6.7%) 
BRICS 
84 
(100.0%) 
356 
(100.0%) 
975 
(100.0%) 
1415 
(100.0%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for the primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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6.4.2. Investment of BRICS Countries by Host Region and Country 
 
This sub-section explores the location choice of BRICS FDI in the West (EU-15) 
compared to the East (CEEC-10) of Europe.  Table 6.11 shows the number and share of 
FDI projects from each BRICS country.  Section 6.3.1 showed that the EU-15 receives 
about 90% of all projects from the BRICS, which is more than the other three global 
source regions.  Table 6.11 shows that the share of FDI projects from each BRICS country 
is broadly the same, except for Russia, where nearly a third of its FDI is in the CEEC-10.  
This no doubt reflects its historical ties and proximity to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Table 6.11: BRICS FDI in the EU-15 and CEEC-10 
Host All FDI Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
BRICS 
EU-15 
28,225 
(80.4%) 
65 
(92.9%) 
111 
(67.3%) 
508 
(93.7%) 
511 
(94.1%) 
86 
(90.5%) 
1,281 
(90.5%) 
CEEC-10 
6,880 
(19.6%) 
5 
(7.1%) 
54 
(32.7%) 
34 
(6.3%) 
32 
(5.9%) 
9 
(9.5%) 
134 
(9.5%) 
EU-25 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
70 
(100.0%) 
165 
(100.0%) 
542 
(100.0%) 
543 
(100.0%) 
95 
(100.0%) 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for the primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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The number of FDI projects from each BRICS country in each EU-25 country is given in 
Appendix Table 6.1. This shows that the main host countries for the investment of all 
BRICS and non-BRICS countries are much the same, i.e. France, Germany and UK.  Of 
the BRICS, Russia again stands out, as its main destination is Germany (33 projects) and 
there are relatively few investments in the UK (26 projects), although the number of 
projects is small.  With regards to the CEEC-10 countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland receive most projects from non-BRICS countries, while Romania (21 projects) 
is also a main host country for FDI from each BRICS country, with the exception of South 
Africa. 
 
6.4.3. Investment of BRICS Countries by Industry 
 
According to Table 6.5, the investment of the BRICS has similar industry characteristics 
to those of the three main global regions.  To explore this issue, this sub-section discusses 
the FDI of the five BRICS countries by industry, and then explores this for manufacturing 
by destination country.  Table 6.12 gives the number and share of projects from each 
BRICS country by industry over the study period.  It shows that manufacturing is the main 
activity for four BRICS countries, but that for India the most important industry is finance 
and business services (327 projects, 60.3% of projects from India).  China is more focused 
on manufacturing (385 projects, 70.9%) than other BRICS.  Russian investment is more 
evenly split between manufacturing, and finance and business services (43.6% and 37.6% 
of projects). 
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Table 6.12: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Industry 
Industry Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
BRICS 
Agriculture 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.1%) 
Construction 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.2%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
4 
(0.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
7 
(0.5%) 
Education and 
Health 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(0.7%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
8 
(0.6%) 
Energy 
3 
(4.3%) 
17 
(10.3%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
9 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
31 
(2.2%) 
Finance and 
Business Services 
16 
(22.9%) 
62 
(37.6%) 
327 
(60.3%) 
82 
(15.1%) 
32 
(33.7%) 
519 
(36.6%) 
Manufacturing 
46 
(65.7%) 
72 
(43.6%) 
185 
(34.1%) 
385 
(70.9%) 
50 
(52.6%) 
738 
(52.1%) 
Recreation 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
4 
(0.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(0.4%) 
Retail and 
Hospitality 
1 
(1.4%) 
3 
(1.8%) 
6 
(1.1%) 
21 
(3.9%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
33 
(2.3%) 
Transport and 
Communications 
4 
(5.7%) 
9 
(5.5%) 
16 
(3.0%) 
35 
(6.4%) 
9 
(9.5%) 
73 
(5.2%) 
Total 
70 
(100.0%) 
165 
(100.0%) 
542 
(100.0%) 
543 
(100.0%) 
95 
(100.0%) 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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The above analysis shows that manufacturing is the most common industry of FDI 
projects from all sources and the BRICS. BRICS manufacturing FDI location is now 
explored in greater detail.   As subsequently it is necessary to group manufacturing with 
construction and energy in the mixed logit analysis, these are considered together.   Table 
6.12 shows that there are only small numbers of projects in these other two industries.   
Table 6.13 shows the number of projects in ‘manufacturing’ over the study period 
for each of the EU-25 countries from the BRICS as a whole, the five BRICS countries 
individually and all sources. It shows that China is the most important investor for the 
manufacturing projects among all five BRICS countries over the study period (398 
projects), accounting for more than half of all projects from the BRICS countries. (i.e. 
51.3%).  It can also be seen that China (92.5% of projects from China) and India (91.5%) 
are more focused on the EU-15 compared to Russia (50.6%), Brazil (89.8%) and South 
Africa (86.0%).    
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Table 6.13: BRICS Manufacturing FDI in the EU-25 by Country 
Host BRICS Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
All FDI 
Austria 7 1 2 2 1 1 451 
Belgium 50 5 3 13 25 4 1,118 
Denmark 10 0 1 3 6 0 241 
Finland 2 0 1 0 1 0 131 
France 85 8 7 12 51 7 3,874 
Germany 167 3 11 31 117 5 1,951 
Greece 1 0 0 0 1 0 58 
Ireland 5 0 1 3 1 0 628 
Italy 27 1 3 3 20 0 404 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
Netherlands 28 2 3 7 14 2 647 
Portugal 6 5 0 1 0 0 296 
Spain 36 13 5 5 13 0 1,263 
Sweden 21 0 1 4 16 0 468 
UK 228 6 8 88 102 24 4,202 
EU-15 
673 
(86.7%) 
44 
(89.8%) 
46 
(50.6%) 
172 
(91.5%) 
368 
(92.5%) 
43 
(86.0%) 
15,763 
(75.2%) 
Bulgaria 13 0 7 1 4 1 329 
Czech 
Republic 
15 0 4 4 4 3 915 
Estonia 5 0 5 0 0 0 162 
Hungary 16 0 3 1 11 1 1,135 
Latvia 6 0 6 0 0 0 98 
Lithuania 11 0 11 0 0 0 148 
Poland 14 0 2 5 5 2 1,215 
Romania 16 1 6 4 5 0 657 
Slovakia 6 4 0 1 1 0 441 
Slovenia 1 0 1 0 0 0 90 
CEEC-10 
103 
(13.3%) 
5 
(10.2%) 
45 
(49.4%) 
16 
(8.5%) 
30 
(7.5%) 
7 
(14.0%) 
5,190 
(24.8%) 
EU-25 
776 
(100.0%) 
49 
(100.0%) 
91 
(100.0%) 
188 
(100.0%) 
398 
(100.0%) 
50 
(100.0%) 
20,953 
(100.0%) 
Notes: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for primary source only.  
Manufacturing includes a small number of projects in construction and energy. 
Source: EIM database. 
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By host country, Table 6.13 shows that the main host countries for FDI from Russia, India, 
China and South Africa are much the same as the host countries for the BRICS as whole.  
However, Spain replaces Germany as one of the main host countries for FDI from Brazil 
as Spain receives the largest number of projects (13 projects, 26.5%) from this country, 
because of their common language and heritage.  For China, Germany (117 projects) is 
the main host country, with a number of projects exceeding that of France and the UK, a 
pattern that is different from the BRICS group as a whole.  The investment of India and 
South Africa shows considerable concentration, with nearly half of their investment in 
one country, the UK. 
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6.4.4. Investment of BRICS Countries by Function 
 
Table 6.6 showed that most projects from the BRICS are in the production function and 
in sales and marketing.  Therefore, it is of interest to explore whether the main functions 
of each BRICS country’s investment are the same to those of the BRICS group.  Table 
6.14 shows the number of projects from each BRICS country in the ten functions over the 
study period.  Table 6.14 shows that the main functions of each BRICS country’s FDI are 
production, and sales and marketing, although there are differences in the number and 
share of projects.  Most projects from China (324 projects, 59.7%), India (270 projects, 
49.8%) and Russia (105 projects, 63.6%) are in sales and marketing, which is similar to 
the BRICS as a whole, but Brazil (30 projects, 42.9%) and South Africa (32 projects, 
33.7%) have greater focus on production.  This may be because Brazil and South Africa 
have less developed economies than the other three countries, so they are more interested 
in production as the main function of their investment.  Russian FDI shows the greatest 
concentration of the five BRICS countries, with 63.6% of all projects in sales and 
marketing. 
 
Table 6.14: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Function 
Function Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
BRICS 
Contact Centre 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.6%) 
26 
(4.8%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
8 
(8.4%) 
36 
(2.5%) 
Education & 
Training 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
7 
(1.3%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
9 
(0.6%) 
Headquarters 
6 
(8.6%) 
5 
(3.0%) 
89 
(16.4%) 
66 
(12.1%) 
13 
(13.7%) 
179 
(12.7%) 
IDC 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.1%) 
Logistics 
5 
(7.1%) 
7 
(4.3%) 
15 
(2.8%) 
25 
(4.6%) 
14 
(14.7%) 
66 
(4.7%) 
Production 
30 
(42.9%) 
41 
(24.9%) 
72 
(13.3%) 
70 
(12.9%) 
32 
(33.7%) 
245 
(17.3%) 
Research & 
Development 
2 
(2.9%) 
4 
(2.4%) 
49 
(9.0%) 
44 
(8.1%) 
3 
(3.2%) 
102 
(7.3%) 
Sales & 
Marketing 
26 
(37.1%) 
105 
(63.6%) 
270 
(49.7%) 
324 
(59.6%) 
24 
(25.2%) 
749 
(52.9%) 
Shared Services 
Centre 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(0.4%) 
Testing & 
Servicing 
1 
(1.4%) 
2 
(1.2%) 
9 
(1.7%) 
8 
(1.5%) 
1 
(1.1%) 
21 
(1.5%) 
Total 
70 
(100.0%) 
165 
(100.0%) 
542 
(100.0%) 
543 
(100.0%) 
95 
(100.0%) 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
Notes: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for primary source only.  
IDC = Internet Data Centre 
Source: EIM database. 
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The rest of this section explores the investment of BRICS countries in headquarters and 
R&D.  There are several reasons for selecting these two functions.  First, in addition to 
the two main functions, headquarters (179 projects, 12.7%) and R&D (102 projects, 7.2%) 
also receive a considerable number of projects from the BRICS.  Second, as seen in Table 
6.7, FDI in R&D has the largest growth rate among all functions, and the growth rate of 
headquarters is also larger than that of the main function, i.e. production.  Finally, the most 
important reason is that these projects in headquarters and R&D are of interest as they 
imply high-value projects using high-skilled labour, and they may be more embedded in 
the host country due to substantial sunk costs.  Table 6.15 combines the number of projects 
in headquarters and R&D for the EU-25 countries from all sources, the BRICS group and 
each of the five BRICS countries. 
 
Table 6.15: BRICS FDI in EU-25 Countries for Headquarters and R&D 
Host BRICS Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
All FDI 
Austria 2 1 0 0 1 0 141 
Belgium 4 1 0 2 1 0 212 
Denmark 10 0 1 4 5 0 179 
Finland 3 0 0 2 1 0 35 
France 22 0 1 6 15 0 735 
Germany 36 2 2 13 18 1 462 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Ireland 4 0 1 1 1 1 365 
Italy 5 0 0 0 5 0 104 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Netherlands 9 0 0 1 6 2 225 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Spain 6 1 2 0 3 0 339 
Sweden 13 0 0 4 9 0 184 
UK 155 3 1 98 41 12 1,934 
EU-15 
269 
(95.7%) 
8 
(100.0%) 
8 
(88.9%) 
131 
(94.9%) 
106 
(96.4%) 
16 
(100.0%) 
4,966 
(92.8%) 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Czech 
Republic 
2 0 0 2 0 0 85 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Hungary 6 0 0 2 4 0 91 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Lithuania 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 
Poland 2 0 1 1 0 0 85 
Romania 1 0 0 1 0 0 60 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
CEEC-10 
12 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(11.1%) 
7 
(5.1%) 
4 
(3.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
387 
(7.2%) 
EU-25 
281 
(100.0%) 
8 
(100.0%) 
9 
(100.0%) 
138 
(100.0%) 
110 
(100.0%) 
16 
(100.0%) 
5,353 
(100.0%) 
Notes: Number of projects and shares in parentheses.  Projects with investors from two or more 
countries are shown for primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Table 6.15 shows that there are 281 projects in headquarters and R&D invested by the 
BRICS, which represents 5.2% of all projects in these two functions.  Most of this BRICS 
investment is from India and China, which account for 88.3% of the total number of 
projects from these five countries.  Of the 281 projects, there are just 12 projects in these 
functions in the CEEC-10 countries, where India is the leader (7 projects, 58.3% to all 
BRICS projects in CEEC-10).  By host country, the investments from India and China in 
these two functions have the same main host countries as the BRICS group, i.e. France, 
Germany and the UK.  FDI from India shows a high concentration in the UK, with more 
than half (71%) of projects in these two functions.  There is no investment from Brazil 
and South Africa in France.  It also can be seen that Germany and Spain replace France 
and the UK as the two main host countries for investment in these two functions from 
Russia. 
 
6.4.5. Start-up Investment by BRICS Countries in the EU-25 
 
This sub-section investigates the distribution of BRICS countries’ investment by project 
type.  Table 6.16 shows the number and share of FDI projects for the three different types 
from each of the five BRICS countries over the study period. 
 
Table 6.16: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Project Type 
Project 
Type 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
BRICS 
Start-up 
50 
(71.4%) 
140 
(84.9%) 
433 
(79.9%) 
485 
(89.3%) 
55 
(57.9%) 
1163 
(82.2%) 
Co-location 
1 
(1.4%) 
4 
(2.4%) 
12 
(2.2%) 
11 
(2.0%) 
4 
(4.2%) 
32 
(2.3%) 
Expansion 
19 
(27.2%) 
21 
(12.7%) 
97 
(17.9%) 
47 
(8.7%) 
36 
(37.9%) 
220 
(15.5%) 
Total 
70 
(100.0%) 
165 
(100.0%) 
542 
(100.0%) 
543 
(100.0%) 
95 
(100.0%) 
1415 
(100.0%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Table 6.16 shows that most FDI projects are in the form of start-up for each BRICS 
country.  There is a considerable number of start-up projects both in absolute and relative 
terms from China (485 projects, 89.3%) and India (433 projects, 79.9%).  These are the 
leaders in start-up investment among the BRICS countries, with 918 projects in the EU-
25 (78.9% of all start-up projects from the BRICS).  The smallest share of start-up projects, 
from South Africa, is still over 50%, although there are not many projects from this 
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country.  The co-location projects occupy the smallest share of all projects from each 
BRICS country.  In fact, Table 6.16 shows that expansions account for a considerable 
amount of FDI from both South Africa (37.9%) and Brazil (27.1%), so that these invest 
at existing facilities.  
Because start-up investment is the main FDI type from the BRICS the remainder 
of this sub-section explores the location choice of start-up projects from BRICS countries.  
Table 6.17 shows the number of start-up projects from the five BRICS countries in the 
EU-25 countries over the study period. It reveals that the start-up investments of all 
BRICS countries are concentrated in the EU-15, where the share of projects in the EU-15 
to all projects in the EU-25 from each BRICS country is over 90% except for Russia 
(70.0%).  The start-up investment from Russia is more similar to the world investment 
than that of the other four BRICS countries. 
 
Table 6.17: BRICS FDI by the EU-25 Country for Start-up Projects 
Host BRICS Brazil Russia India China South Africa All FDI 
Austria 9 1 5 2 1 0 419 
Belgium 61 7 1 22 27 4 1,088 
Denmark 19 0 3 7 9 0 460 
Finland 6 0 1 4 1 0 182 
France 102 5 12 33 46 6 3,392 
Germany 244 2 32 58 145 7 2,585 
Greece 3 0 1 1 1 0 90 
Ireland 7 0 2 1 3 1 751 
Italy 26 1 4 4 17 0 629 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 0 0 73 
Netherlands 48 2 5 16 20 5 951 
Portugal 7 6 0 1 0 0 249 
Spain 38 9 5 7 13 4 1,404 
Sweden 33 0 2 12 19 0 758 
UK 450 13 25 237 152 23 5,595 
EU-15 
1,054 
(90.6%) 
47 
(94.0%) 
98 
(70.0%) 
405 
(93.5%) 
454 
(93.6%) 
50 
(90.9%) 
18,626 
(79.9%) 
Bulgaria 11 0 5 1 4 1 344 
Czech 
Republic 
18 0 6 5 4 3 773 
Estonia 7 0 7 0 0 0 152 
Hungary 19 0 3 4 12 0 839 
Latvia 9 0 8 0 0 1 162 
Lithuania 9 0 8 1 0 0 197 
Poland 16 0 2 9 5 0 1,117 
Romania 16 1 3 7 5 0 666 
Slovakia 4 2 0 1 1 0 370 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 
CEEC-10 
109 
(9.4%) 
3 
(6.0%) 
42 
(30.0%) 
28 
(6.5%) 
31 
(6.4%) 
5 
(9.1%) 
4,699 
(20.1%) 
EU-25 
1,163 
(100.0%) 
50 
(100.0%) 
140 
(100.0%) 
433 
(100.0%) 
485 
(100.0%) 
55 
(100.0%) 
23,325 
(100.0%) 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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By host country, the three main host countries for start-up projects from Brazil are 
Belgium (7 projects, 14.0%), Spain (9 projects, 18.0%) and the UK (13 projects, 26.0%).  
It also can be seen that more than half of the start-up FDI of India (237 projects, 54.7%) 
is concentrated in the UK, while Russia invests more in Germany (32 projects, 22.9%) 
than in the UK (25 projects, 17.9%).  With regards to the CEEC-10, start-up investment 
is relatively evenly split among these countries. 
 The preceding sub-sections discuss the location choice of FDI projects from the 
BRICS countries based on industry group (manufacturing), function (headquarters / R&D) 
and investment type (start-up).  Appendix Table 6.2 considers the number of start-up 
projects in the headquarters or R&D functions that are by the manufacturing industry.  
This is for the EU-25 countries over the study period.  It shows that there are only 100 
projects (7.1% to all BRICS projects) in this category and most are from China (60 
projects).  Hence, the number of projects that fulfil all these characteristics simultaneously 
is small, and most are focused on the EU-15 and in particular France, Germany and the 
UK. 
 
6.5. Persistence in FDI Country Location Choice 
 
BRICS FDI has increased sharply over the study period, and the analysis has shown that 
it tends to be concentrated in the ‘West’, i.e. the EU-15, and in certain countries, including 
France, Germany and the UK.  This section examines the extent to which FDI from each 
BRICS country follows previous FDI from the same source, by locating in the same EU-
25 countries.  A Chi-square test is used to examine whether this tendency to locate in the 
same countries over time is significant or not, and hence whether there is any persistence 
in the location choice of the BRICS investors across the EU-25 countries. 
According to Howell (2011), the Chi-square test was introduced by Karl Pearson 
in the early 1900s.  There are two types of the Chi-Square test.  The first one is a 
‘goodness-of-fit’ test that is used to compare observed data with the data that is expected 
to obtain.  In this test the null hypothesis indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the observed and expected data.  The second type of Chi-Square test that concerns 
independence is used to investigate whether observed data on two variables are 
independent of each other.  It is in the first sense that the Chi-square test is used here. 
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6.5.1. The Chi-Square (‘Goodness-of-Fit’) Test Statistic 
 
The Chi-square test statistic is calculated as follows, where 𝑂𝑖 is the observed value of 𝑖, 
𝐸𝑖  is the expected value of this observation and 𝑘 is the number of observations on 𝑖 
(Kazmier and Pohl, 1987): 
 
𝜒2 = ∑
(𝑂𝑖−𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 .                                                  (6.1) 
 
If there is the perfect conformity between the observed and expected values, the test 
statistic is zero.  When the difference between the observed and expected values becomes 
larger, the value of the test will increase, which means that this is a one-tail test, and the 
upper-tail of the test distribution is the region of rejection. When the value of 𝜒2 is equal 
to or greater than the critical value the null hypothesis (where there is no difference) will 
be rejected.  The critical value is determined by the degrees of freedom and required level 
of significance. 
The degrees of freedom 𝑑𝑓 have the following form, 𝑑𝑓 = 𝑘 − 𝑚 − 1, where 𝑘 
refers to the number of categories of the data over which 𝑖  is observed and 𝑚 is the 
number of parameters that are estimated based on the sample data.  In effect, one further 
degree of freedom is lost as these frequencies sum to unity.  The degrees of freedom 
represent the number of frequencies, which is decreased by the number of parameters of 
the sample data.  There are several requirements for the Chi-square test, as follows (Gasser, 
1975 and Marsh et al., 1988): 
 
(i)  A random sample. The data must be drawn randomly from a fixed population. 
(ii) A large sample size.  Otherwise the test statistic may be biased. 
(iii) Independence. The Chi-Square test cannot be used to investigate correlated data, 
so the data on all observations must be independent of each other. 
(iv) Quantitative data. The data used must be numerical, rather than percentages or 
ratios. 
 
The accuracy of the Chi-square test will decrease if the number of data observations 𝑂𝑖 
on any 𝑖 is small, although the definition of ‘small’ is arguable.   Kazmier and Pohl (1987) 
and Howell (2011) both argue that the number of observations on the expected value 
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should not be less than five.  Kazmier and Pohl (1987) further elaborate on this by 
suggesting that if the data do not satisfy this criterion, the adjacent data should be 
combined to satisfy the requirement.  However, Cochran (1952) argues that it is arbitrary 
to choose five as the criterion.  Another way to solve the problem is to increase the size 
of the whole sample, and therefore to increase the number of observations 𝑂𝑖 on any 𝑖, but 
this is not always possible, for example in this case, where the EIM database gives the 
population of FDI locations in the EU-25 countries. 
 
6.5.2. Test Design for the BRICS Investment 
 
As indicated before, the test explores whether FDI from each BRICS country follows its 
previous investment in terms of location.  To calculate the Chi-square test statistic, it is 
necessary to address two issues:  how to calculate the expected value of 𝑖 for any BRICS 
country and how to deal with observations on projects that are less than five. 
On the first of these, the expected value of 𝑖 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑡,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇𝑡,𝑗
𝑇𝑡−𝑛,𝑗
 𝑂𝑡−𝑛,𝑖,𝑗,                                              (6.2) 
 
where 𝐸 and 𝑂 are defined above but in terms of the number of FDI projects from BRICS 
country 𝑗 in the EU-25 country 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  𝑇 is the total number of FDI projects in the 
EU-25.  This equation shows that the expected number of projects 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is essentially 
based on the observed number of projects 𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 𝑛.  In the empirical work below 
we use 𝑛 = 1 or 𝑛 = 2, so that I examine persistence in FDI location over one or two 
years.  Of course, in calculating the expected value of 𝑖, a difficulty is that the total number 
of projects changes between time 𝑡 and time 𝑡 − 𝑛, so that 𝑇𝑡 / 𝑇𝑡−𝑛 in (6.2) adjusts the 
expected value for this.  
 On the second issue, we know that while BRICS FDI has grown strongly over time, 
the number of projects in earlier years can be small, and that when considered across the 
EU-25 the number of projects in any one country in any year can also be small.  Indeed, 
there is a large number of zeroes, and of course these mean that 𝜒2 in (6.1) cannot be 
calculated.  To address the issue of zeroes we add ‘1’ to the number of FDI projects in any 
country and year for each BRICS country.  This seems reasonable where the counts are 
reasonably high, and a reference is added in Section 4.6 where it is first mentioned to 
170 
 
support this.40  On the issue of the small number of observations in a year, one way to 
address this is to add the years together, so that we look at persistence in FDI location 
between sub-periods, which is what I consider below.  Countries are not grouped together 
as this reduces the meaningfulness of the test (i.e. the number of locations falls from 25 
to just 2). On the direction of bias, since smaller samples are likely to mean that 𝐸 is 
measured with less precision then this is likely to increase the test statistic and make the 
rejection of the null hypothesis more likely.41   
 
The hypotheses tested for the BRICS countries are: 
 
𝑯𝟎: There is no significant difference in BRICS FDI project location across the EU-25 
countries by year, i.e. current FDI follows the previous FDI location pattern. 
𝑯𝟏: Current investment does not follow the previous FDI location pattern. 
 
In this case, there are 25 EU countries and no parameter values, so that 𝑘 = 25, and 𝑚 =
0, and the degrees of freedom 𝑑𝑓 is 24.  The critical values are 33.20 at 10%, 36.42 at 5% 
and 42.98 at 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
6.5.3. An Example 
 
To illustrate the above issues, FDI from Brazil in the EU-25 in 2010 can be taken as an 
example, in which persistence is considered over a 1-year period.  Table 6.18 presents the 
observed and expected values for the number of FDI projects from Brazil in EU-25 
countries.  The second and third columns show the number of projects in 2010 and 2009.  
As a first point if expression (6.2) is used to calculate the expected values for 2010 based 
on 2009 then this generates the results in the fourth column, where now there are 14 
projects.  Table 6.18 shows that if the countries with a number of projects less than five 
are combined, there are two problems.  The first one is that there will be a large change in 
the degrees of freedom.  This is because the number of data categories will decrease from 
25 to 2, as shown in the second and fourth columns.  The second problem is that the zeroes 
in the third column mean expression (6.1) cannot be calculated. 
                                                            
40 Table 6.18 below shows that by this approach a near identical prediction is made of the expected value, 
so I do not think a serious error has been made. 
41 Denote 𝑦 = 𝐸, where 𝑦 >  0. Then (6.1) can be written as 𝜒2 = (𝑂/𝑦 − 𝑦)2.  Since 2/𝑦 <  0, 
greater errors in measuring 𝑦 will result in a lower test statistic, meaning that the null hypothesis is less 
likely to be rejected. 
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Therefore, in order to keep the same degrees of freedom and make all expected values 
exceed zero, the observed values on the number of projects in columns two and three are 
each increased by 1, giving the fifth and sixth columns in Table 6.18. Therefore, the total 
number of observed projects in these columns is now 39 and 33.  The expected values are 
calculated in the seventh column using (6.2), which for a value of unity in 2009 is 1.18 
once we adjust for the difference in the total number of projects between these years (e.g. 
consider Austria): 
 
𝐸2010,𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎,𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙 =
𝑂2009,𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎,𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙 ∗ 𝑇2010,𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙
𝑇2009,𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙
=
1 ∗ 39
33
= 1.1818 
 
Based on the fifth and seventh columns of Table 6.18 the test statistic is as follows, which 
suggests that the null hypothesis can be rejected in this case but at the 10% level only: 
 
𝜒2 = ∑
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
25
𝑖=1
= 34.5348 
 
  
 1
7
2
 
 
Table 6.18: Observed and Expected Number of FDI Projects from Brazil in EU-25, 2010 
Host Country Oi in 2010 Oi in 2009 Ei in 2010 Oi in 2010 + 1 Oi in 2009 + 1 Ei in 2010 + 1 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
6 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10.5 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
7 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
3.5455 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
1.1818 
8.2727 
Total 14 8 14 39 33 38.9996 
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6.5.4. Results for the Persistence of FDI Location 
 
The following tables give the values of goodness-of-fit test statistics for the FDI projects 
of each BRICS country in the EU-25 using 𝑛 = 1  and 𝑛 = 2  in expression (6.2) 
respectively. 
 
Table 6.19: Test Results for BRICS Countries by Year (𝒏 = 𝟏) 
Year Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
2010 34.53* 22.18 28.72 24.68 6.04 
2009 53.31*** 33.25* 22.06 30.42 31.94 
2008 11.21 25.65 19.03 73.50*** 9.06 
2007 4.73 10.19 23.95 32.25 16.07 
2006 3.67 26.15 11.04 24.39 5.95 
2005 4.39 10.09 13.54 18.95 3.12 
2004 19.23 8.67 18.33 11.81 2.33 
2003 1.50 8.52 9.13 6.86 3.93 
2002 2.54 8.27 67.90*** 38.28** 6.51 
2001 2.36 14.28 10.07 3.33 1.74 
2000 0.00 3.72 0.54 5.95 3.43 
1999 0.48 2.90 8.94 2.38 2.89 
1998 1.50 1.89 7.20 2.83 7.23 
Notes: Evaluation of (6.1) using (6.2) with 𝑛 = 1. *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% significance level. 
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Table 6.20: Test Results for BRICS Countries by Year (𝒏 = 𝟐) 
Year Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
2010 24.53 15.87 36.12* 35.33* 16.07 
2009 13.08 19.22 20.19 111.06*** 10.70 
2008 20.61 24.86 36.73** 41.76** 9.88 
2007 5.52 25.26 26.10 26.86 17.39 
2006 6.36 32.07 24.75 44.73*** 4.32 
2005 4.17 12.33 17.80 22.23 4.55 
2004 20.34 9.22 26.23 24.63 1.87 
2003 2.53 10.15 59.33*** 79.33*** 2.75 
2002 0.92 7.68 11.30 14.98 6.22 
2001 2.35 13.66 12.09 3.59 2.63 
2000 0.48 3.67 6.13 14.61 1.78 
1999 0.48 2.04 2.62 2.22 4.58 
Notes: Evaluation of (6.1) using (6.2) with 𝑛 = 2. *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% significance level.  
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Overall, Tables 6.19 and 6.20 suggest that the null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected, so 
that FDI from the BRICS tends to follow the same location across the EU-25 countries 
over time.  There are several exceptions to this.  First, if anything, there are more statistical 
differences in the FDI location pattern over a 2-year period, compared to a 1-year period.  
This is possibly because the longer lag allows FDI sufficient time to respond to earlier 
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FDI flows.  Second, Table 6.20 indicates that, so far as they exist, the different temporal 
location patterns exist for China and India only, and tend to be for the later years of the 
study period, when FDI from these countries was expanding the most.  It suggests that 
FDI from these countries has spread out to other EU locations as it has grown.  Contrary 
to this, the location choice of investment from Brazil, Russia and South Africa are 
relatively stable, although with a possible spreading out of Brazilian FDI in recent years.  
Of course, the results are subject to the problem of small numbers, which makes the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis more likely, although given this then it adds weight to 
the significance of the test statistics for China and India. 
In terms of the number of projects, the FDI from Brazil, Russia and South Africa 
is relatively small, so that some spreading out of this FDI to other countries cannot be 
ruled out.  However, as a further exercise the tests in Tables 6.19 and 6.20 were repeated 
by aggregating the FDI from each BRICS country by year, in order to increase the number 
of observations.  Therefore, the test results, which are calculated based on three sub-
periods (1997-2000, 2001-05 and 2006-10), are given in Table 6.21, where the first sub-
period is used to calculate the expected values for the second sub-period (and likewise the 
second for the third). 
 
Table 6.21: Test Results for BRICS Countries by Sub-Period 
Period Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
2006-2010 32.02 39.80** 81.63*** 377.66*** 7.62 
2001-2005 9.21 18.22 54.30*** 136.04*** 5.26 
Notes: Evaluation of (6.1) using (6.2) with three sub-periods. *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * 
= 10% significance level.  
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Table 6.21 indicates significant differences in FDI location across countries over the 
longer time spans in the case of China and India.  It implies that these BRICS countries 
have spread their investments to other EU-25 countries as they have grown over this 
longer time horizon.  However, it can be seen that FDI projects from Brazil and South 
Africa follow their previous FDI location across all 25 EU countries, while the later FDI 
projects from Russia also have the same location choice to their own previous investment.  
Broadly, these results are consistent with those shown in Tables 6.19 and 6.20.  Overall, 
for the BRICS countries that show the strongest growth in FDI over time it suggests that 
FDI projects tend to be located in other EU-25 countries over time, so that given the initial 
concentration of this investment in a few countries it suggests that it has become more 
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spread out.  In the case of Russia it suggests that its investment has followed a different 
pattern after the accession of the CEECs. 
 
6.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter compares the difference in the FDI projects between the BRICS and non-
BRICS regions, especially for Europe and North America.  Afterwards, it concentrates on 
describing the characteristics of FDI from the whole BRICS region and from each BRICS 
country, which gives a general understanding for the regression analysis about the effect 
of the characteristics of the host countries on FDI location.  Finally, this chapter examines 
the persistence in the BRICS FDI country location choice using the ‘Goodness-of-Fit’ test, 
which could be treated as a preliminary attempt for exploring whether there is ‘follow-
the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS FDI prior to the regression analysis. 
 With regards to the FDI of BRICS and non-BRICS (i.e. Europe, North America 
and the Other), there is a much smaller number of projects from BRICS as there are only 
five countries in this group and they are in the initial stage of international expansion. 
Most projects from both BRICS and non-BRICS prefer to enter the EU-15 countries, with 
Europe which is the main contributor in the non-BRICS region accounting for half of all 
projects in the EU-25.  In addition, the BRICS FDI increases dramatically over the study 
period (i.e. there is a twelve-fold increase in the number of projects from 1997-00 to 2006-
10), which is same as the individual countries.  This increase trend for non-BRICS is 
smoother, where the main contributor Europe increases from 3,987 to 8,439 projects and 
this number increases from 3,710 to 4,569 for North America.  The sharp increase for the 
Europe is due to the economic integration over this time, including the accession of the 
CEEC-10 countries. 
 Most characteristics of BRICS FDI are the same to those of the other three global 
regions.  The main host countries for all BRICS and individual BRICS countries are 
France, Germany and the UK.  In addition to this, Russia has a considerable number of 
projects that are located in the CEEC-10 because of cultural and political reasons.  For the 
industry choice, FDI from the four regions is interested in manufacturing, and finance and 
business services, but BRICS and North America are less focused on manufacturing and 
more concentrated on finance and business services compared to European and Other FDI.  
Within the BRICS, only India shows the same tendency as the BRICS, and the common 
characteristics of other BRICS countries is the manufacturing.  Turning to the functional 
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activity, most projects from these four regions are located in production, and sales and 
marketing, but BRICS (including Russia, India and China) and North America are more 
focused on the latter, and Europe and Other on the former.  The main type of FDI projects 
for the BRICS as a whole, all individual BRICS countries and the other three global 
regions is start-up investment.  There is the smallest number of start-up projects in 
absolute terms from the BRICS, but it shows the highest concentration of start-up FDI in 
the EU-25 (82.2%) compared to other three source regions, where the share is the highest 
for China at 89%.  Finally, BRICS FDI is also featured by the employment size.  For all 
FDI in the EU-25, there are 65.5 jobs created associated with each project.  The number 
for North America and Europe is similar to this, but much lower for the BRICS, at only 
38.8 jobs per project, where the number of jobs per project in manufacturing exceeds that 
in finance and business services.  All source regions with a larger number of jobs by 
manufacturing normally have a larger number of jobs per project in total. 
 The last section of this chapter examines the persistence in FDI country location 
choice using the ‘Goodness-of-Fit’ test.  The results show that FDI from all BRICS 
countries tends to follow the location of previous FDI from the same country over time.  
There are more statistical differences in the FDI location pattern over a 2-year period 
compared to a 1-year period, but the different temporal location patterns exist for China 
and India only, and tend to be concentrated in the later years of the study period.  By 
contrast, the location choice of FDI from Brazil, Russia and South Africa is relatively 
stable.  When the years are aggregated to increase the number of projects, there will be 
more considerable difference in the location choice of most countries’ FDI.  It suggests 
that BRICS FDI tends to disperse across the EU-25 countries along with their growth. 
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Chapter 7. The Logit Analysis 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the locational determinants of FDI in the EU-25 
countries from all source regions, especially for the BRICS, and in particular to examine 
how this FDI locates in relation to other BRICS investment, including that arising from 
the same BRICS country.  The chapter also considers how this BRICS investment locates 
according to its characteristics, including FDI that is in manufacturing, in the high-level 
functions of a headquarters or R&D, and by the investment mode according to a start-up 
or re-investment, where the former is sometimes known as ‘greenfield’ investment.  The 
main econometric technique that is used in this chapter is the Conditional Logit model, 
which was discussed in Chapter 4.  It enables FDI location to be considered according to 
host country characteristics, but I also use a Multinomial Logit model that allows the 
location determinants to vary according to the project characteristics.   
The results that are presented in this chapter not only reveal how the determinants 
of FDI location vary across different source regions and BRICS countries, but they offer 
insights on how investment locates in relation to earlier investment from the same or from 
other BRICS countries.  As discussed in Section 2.6, this ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour 
may be an intrinsic unobserved advantage of a country location that is not otherwise 
captured by the regressors.  In Chapter 6, I found that on the whole BRICS FDI tends to 
‘follow’ previous FDI from the same country, although over longer time spans I find that 
there is evidence that as it grows it changes location across countries, particularly in the 
case of China and India.  Overall, results from goodness-of-fit test keep consistent with 
the results of logit analysis in this chapter generally.  In the analysis of this chapter the 
full range of explanatory variables is included, as discussed in Chapter 5, including 
traditional location factors such as market size, education, unemployment and risk.  
Chapter 3 suggests that market and knowledge seeking are important determinants for 
BRICS FDI location.  These variables can be regarded as controls when exploring ‘follow-
the-leader’ behaviour.  Further, the logit analysis allow me to consider the possibility that 
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BRICS FDI does not ‘follow’ the location of FDI from other BRICS countries, so that in 
this sense the BRICS investment arising from different countries is not substitutable and 
is distinct in its nature. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Section 7.2 focuses on the effects of 
the country variables and FDI lagged terms on the location choice of FDI projects from 
all source regions as a whole.  Then, FDI location from each global source region is 
explored in Section 7.3, which also examines the issue of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour 
for these global regions.  Section 7.4, which refers to the location choice of BRICS FDI, 
concentrates on the issue of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour for each BRICS country, i.e. if 
there is a significant tendency for FDI from each BRICS country to follow their own 
previous FDI or that of other BRICS countries.  Section 7.5 investigates the country 
probability of BRICS FDI location in the EU-25 in terms of both the project characteristics 
and global source region (i.e. BRICS, Europe and North America).  Finally, conclusions 
are drawn in Section 7.6. 
 
7.2. FDI Location from All Global Source Regions 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore the overall effect of the different determinants on 
FDI location across the EU-25 countries from all sources over the period 1997-2010.  This 
means it is based on the full sample of investments across the 25 countries.  Since there 
are lagged FDI terms it means it is necessary to drop the observations for 1997, so that are 
a total of 32,684 (= 35,105 - 2,421) investments, which gives 817,100 (= 32,684 x 25) 
observations on location (i.e. whether to locate or not in a country).  The results from 
estimating equation (4.48) of Chapter 4 using the Conditional Logit model are presented 
in Table 7.1.   
Table 7.1 has lagged variables FDIit-1 that capture the number of FDI projects from 
different source global regions or countries in the same host country i in the previous year 
t-1. This is to explore the effect of previous investment on the location choice of global 
current investment (for example, variable ‘Europe’ is measured by the total number of 
projects from Europe in the EU-25 in the preceding year).  These FDIit-1 variables are 
classified under the heading ‘Source Variables’, and include four global regions (Europe, 
North America, BRICS and Other) and the five BRICS countries.  They are shown in 
Table 7.1, for which different columns consider the different source variables.  These are 
the key variables to assess which source region or country’s previous investment is 
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followed by the global investment.  It is the first step to explore whether investment in an 
EU-25 country follows the previous investment from the same source.  All estimations 
include country fixed-effects to control for differences in the country characteristics, 
which reduces the problem of omitted variable bias. 
 
Table 7.1: Location Choice for FDI from All Sources 
Dependent Variable: = 1 if project 
locates in country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All Sources 
I II III IV 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -3.46*** -4.43*** -4.56*** -1.79** 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−2) 2.15*** 2.09*** 1.90*** 2.14*** 
Population Density (x10−2) -1.57*** -1.11** -0.67* -1.22*** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) -0.61 -1.45* -1.55** -1.77** 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -2.23*** -1.60*** -1.61*** -1.93*** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−3) -2.98 -6.35 -15.61 9.53 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -7.37*** -6.95*** -6.59*** -6.20*** 
Cost Variables:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−2) -1.19*** -1.26*** -1.10*** -1.06*** 
Motorway Density (x10−2) 0.90 1.60*** 1.27** 0.38 
Political Risk (x10−3) -3.42 3.96 1.67 -5.76** 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education (x10−3) 0.38 2.33 2.22 -1.91 
Secondary Education (x10−3) 6.45** 1.41 2.36 6.49** 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 1.05 1.66 1.28 2.44** 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) -4.70** -1.71 -2.53 -5.35*** 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−3) -1.46*** -1.37** -1.47*** -1.63*** 
Policy Terms:     
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -3.13*** -2.42*** -2.00** -2.82*** 
Eurozone Country (x10−1) 1.11** 1.83*** 2.00*** 0.94* 
EU Commitment (x10−1) 3.08*** 3.44*** 3.65*** 2.54*** 
EU Membership (x10−1) 1.87*** 1.94*** 2.01*** 1.99*** 
EU Post-membership (x10−1) -2.71*** -2.68*** -2.63*** -2.46*** 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x 10
-3): 
All Sources 0.63*** - - - 
Europe - 0.77*** 0.80*** - 
North America - -0.09 -0.08 - 
BRICS  - 6.08*** - - 
Other - -0.04 -0.40 - 
Brazil - - -9.76 - 
Russia - - 9.28 - 
India - - 2.11 - 
China - - 9.06*** - 
South Africa - - 0.69 - 
Same Global Region - - - 2.82*** 
Number of Observations 817,100 817,100 817,100 817,100 
Number of Cases 32,684 32,684 32,684 32,684 
Log likelihood -85140.80 -85116.20 -85110.47 -84856.40 
Notes: Location choice of FDI projects in EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. Estimation is using 
Conditional Logit model.  Country fixed-effects included throughout.  10-2 means coefficients 
need to be multiplied by 10-2 and so on.  All variables are fully described in Section 5.5. * = 10%, 
** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Column I of Table 7.1 measures FDIit-1 as the total number of investments from all sources 
in the same host country in the preceding year.  Column II disaggregates this lagged FDI 
term according to four global regions to investigate the relative importance of these four 
regions, while column III further disaggregates the BRICS term into its constituent 
countries. Thus, column III identifies whether the number of FDI projects from each 
BRICS country determines FDI location in the same host country in the next year from 
all sources.  Finally, column IV is different in that includes a single variable, ‘Same Global 
Region’, which for each investment matches it to the total number of projects from the 
same global source region in the same host country in the previous year.  Overall, it is 
through the FDIit-1 terms that I assess if FDI in the host country ‘follows’ FDI in the 
previous year, whether from a particular source region or country (columns I to III) or the 
same global region (column IV). 
 
7.2.1. Country Variables 
 
First of all, regarding the country explanatory variables in Table 7.1, the majority of these 
are significant at the 1% level, in which case they generally each have the same sign in 
each column.  The estimates are plausible in terms of their sign and significance, and 
better estimates are found below when regressed for the BRICS only.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to discuss the nature of the estimates in Table 7.1. 
On the demand variables, the GDP term tends to be negative, but it is positive 
when country fixed effects are excluded.  This suggest larger countries tend to get more 
FDI on average, but at a decreasing rate with size, perhaps due to negative agglomeration 
effects.  The decision was taken to omit the GDP term altogether.  Conventionally, studies 
include only two of GDP, GDP per capita and population density in order to avoid 
multicollinearity.  The GDP growth rate has a positive and significant effect in each 
country, which is consistent with the previous studies that investors prefer to invest in 
those foreign markets with faster growth rate.  However, the real GDP per capita term 
does not attract more FDI inflows to the EU-25 countries, which is found in each column, 
and this suggests investors prefer locations with lower per capita incomes, which is 
perhaps due to their lower costs.  Generally, higher population density is associated with 
congestion and higher costs and the estimate on this term is also negative and significant.  
It implies that greater urbanisation makes these countries less attractive to FDI.  The 
estimates on external market demand show that FDI is interested in locating in markets 
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that are close to the core of the European market.  It is to do with access to larger markets 
as this term is distance weighted.  Since this covers the whole period it not just limited to 
the Single Market, which the new accession countries of the Central and East Europe 
joined in 2004 and 2007.  Association Agreements that were signed by these countries 
over 1991-95 that already eliminated most tariff barriers prior to their accession.   
 Turning to the labour market variables, a higher level of unemployment rate deters 
FDI inflows to a country, which may be partly because these countries have lower levels 
of economic development and poorer quality of labour force. However, while the wage 
rate term is generally negative, it is statistically insignificant.  Nevertheless, the dummy 
that is included for missing data on the wage rate is negative and strongly significant 
throughout.  On the cost variables, the corporate income tax has a negative and significant 
effect, so that FDI avoids countries with a higher tax rate.  The last two cost terms are the 
motorway density and political risk.  These are not always significant, but they suggest 
that better transport links encourage investment, possibly because it is easier to transport 
goods, while in column IV a negative and significant estimate suggests that investors may 
actually prefer more risk.  After inspection of the data on this variable, the risks are 
relatively low for the EU-25 and this term tends to capture locations to the South and East 
of Europe, where higher political risk is associated with higher profits and more 
opportunities.  In the literature, negative signs are often found across countries, although 
it can be positive where the serious risks are similar (e.g. internal and external conflict), 
so it captures differences in corruption and government inefficiency, which may actually 
be preferred by investors.42  A similar effect is found by Bevan and Estrin (2004), which 
suggests that investors have a preference for weak administrative control.  This may not 
only imply a higher level of corruption but a weak level of labour market regulation. 
Regarding the education variables, the positive and significant education variables 
mean that FDI seek a more skilled workforce.  In particular, secondary education has a 
positive and significant effect on FDI location in columns I and IV, but the effect of higher 
education is always insignificant.  Again, this supports the cost-based motive for FDI, as 
it suggests investors like a reasonably educated workforce, but not too educated as the 
wage rate is likely to be higher.  It possibly indicates that investors are interested in a 
labour force that has ‘middle skills’ rather than ‘higher skills’.  Turning to the trade 
variables, trade openness (i.e. a greater volume of trade relative to GDP) does not affect 
FDI in general, although there is a positive and significant effect in column IV (i.e. higher 
                                                            
42 The composition of risk index is fully described in ‘Cost Variables’ part of Section 5.5.1 of Chapter 5. 
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level of trade openness could get more FDI).  The exchange rate and its volatility have 
negative and significant effect in columns I and IV, and this indicates that there will be 
less FDI in a country where the domestic currency appreciates or is volatile.  These are 
because a higher exchange rate signals a decrease in national competitiveness of the 
foreign investors, while the more volatile is the exchange rate the more risky is a country 
for FDI (i.e. more volatility means higher risk and greater uncertainty,).  The depreciation 
of the currency of a country may have different effects based on the different perspectives.  
If the country is already exporting to a country and the exchange rate depreciates then this 
makes exports more costly and FDI more worthwhile.  The exit costs may be relevant to 
the location decision, but these will occur a long way in the future when the discounted 
value is smaller, while the exchange rate may in any event swing back over a long period. 
Several dummies are included for policy and political variables and each of these 
play an important role in attracting investment to the EU-25.  The negative effect of the 
EU Structural Funds demonstrates that the countries needing greater aid are less developed 
economically and socially, so that this has a negative effect on FDI location, which is like 
the unemployment term.  Membership of the Euro currency zone country is conducive to 
reduced transaction costs and may reduce exchange rate risks, so it attracts FDI.  Finally, 
dummies in respect of the CEECs for the commitment to EU enlargement by the European 
Council of Ministers and EU membership have a positive effect on FDI.  The first of these 
signals a commitment to economic liberalization, while the second may capture the non-
tariff barriers that are eliminated at entry.  However, the estimates for post-membership 
suggest FDI inflows into these countries subsequently fall back. 
 
7.2.2. Lagged FDI Terms 
 
As discussed earlier in the section, Table 7.1 measures the lagged number of FDI projects 
in the host country in several ways, so that the interpretation of this variable differs 
according to its measurement.  Column I shows that FDI prefers to locate in countries that 
have received significantly greater levels of investment in the previous year, no matter 
where this previous investment is from.  Column II shows that this is particularly strong 
for cross-border investment within Europe, but interestingly also for the BRICS countries, 
and this is explored further below.  However, there appears to be no strong ‘follow-the-
leader’ pattern for North American investment or for FDI from elsewhere in the world. 
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Column III disaggregates the BRICS term into its five separate countries, and suggests 
that China is the only source country in the BRICS for which investment follows FDI in 
the previous year.  This is consistent with Chapter 6 and it is explored further below.  
Finally, in column IV, the total investment from the same global source region as the 
investment in the preceding year is measured (for example, if a project comes to the UK 
from the USA in 2005 this variable measures the total number of projects in the UK from 
North America in 2004).  It comprises four global regions that are the same as those shown 
in column II.  The significant and positive sign on this term suggests strongly that 
investment from different global regions tends to follow that arising from the same source 
region, offering support for the ‘follow-the-leader’ hypothesis at a global regional level at 
least.  Finally, it is necessary to explore which column in Table 7.1 shows the most reliable 
results.  In this sense, the likelihood ratio test is used to compare these columns, for which 
results are shown in Table 7.2 below. 
 
Table 7.2: Likelihood Ratio Test for Comparing Columns in Table 7.1 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
I II 
Columns I & II in Table 7.1 Columns II & III in Table 7.1 
df (Number of Restrictions) 3 4 
𝜒2 49.20 11.46 
Critical Value 7.81 9.49 
Note: This test is based on the 5% significant level. 
54 
Table 7.2 shows that values of 𝜒2 in both Columns I and II are greater than the critical 
values at the 5% significant level.  It means that restrictions of Columns I and II in Table 
7.1 are rejected, which indicates that Column II in Table 7.1 is better than Column I, while 
Column III is also preferred compared with Column II. However, Column IV in Table 7.1 
cannot be compared with other columns as it has a different basis by including a new 
variable.  Therefore, estimates for coefficients in Columns III and IV in Table 7.1 can be 
considered comprehensively, and details of effects of all explanatory variables have been 
discussed in Section 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.  Overall, FDI from BRICS countries prefer to follow 
previous FDI from the same country (Column IV), and China is confirmed to keep 
consistent with this conclusion (Column III in Table 7.1).  
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7.3. FDI Location from Each Global Source Region 
 
Section 7.2 examines the effect of the determinants of FDI location regardless of where it 
arises, so that we might expect some degree of heterogeneity across these investors.  In 
order to examine the different effects of country variables on FDI location from different 
sources and to explore whether the FDI of each global region follows their own FDI or 
that of other global regions, this section considers the four global sources separately.  It 
enables the issue of ‘follow-the-leader’ investment to be explored for each of FDI arising 
from Europe, from North America, the BRICS and from the other source countries.  Table 
7.3 shows the results from estimating equation (4.48) in Chapter 4 for each of the four 
global regions.  These are basically a disaggregation of the regression results in column II 
of Table 7.1. 
 
7.3.1. Country Variables 
 
The results for the country explanatory variables in Table 7.3 can be reconciled with those 
in column II in Table 7.1.  In summary, they show that the GDP growth rate has a similar 
effect across the different global source regions, but that the per capita income term is 
negative for Europe and the Other countries only.  In the case of the BRICS it is 
insignificant, but the wage rate is now negative and significant.  In general, these labour 
market variables display a different pattern across the global source regions.  The tax rate 
is again an important factor, while motorway density is significant for FDI from North 
America only.  Of the education variables the high-skill term is positive and significant 
for North America and BRICS, while the results show that the BRICS are risk averse in 
terms of where they invest.  In the case of the exchange rate variable, the positive and 
significant coefficient for the BRICS means more BRICS FDI projects in a country where 
the domestic currency of this host country has appreciated.  Finally, the policy terms are 
much more important for cross-border investment within the EU-25. 
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Table 7.3: Location Choice for FDI from Different Global Source Regions 
Dependent Variable: =1 if the project 
locates in country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
Global Source Regions 
V 
(Europe) 
VI 
(N. America) 
VII 
(BRICS) 
VIII 
(Other) 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:  
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -4.87*** -2.22 -0.06 -8.16*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−2) 0.36 4.96*** 5.73** 3.03* 
Population Density (x10−2) -1.44*** -0.70 0.38 1.62 
External Market Demand (x10−2) -0.66 -1.91 -1.35 -2.74 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -2.00*** -0.79 2.31 -2.12 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) -1.62 -0.12 -13.31** 0.88 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -6.54*** -6.87*** -9.80** -4.29** 
Cost Variables:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−2) -1.10*** -1.12*** -1.59 -3.71*** 
Motorway Density (x10−2) 0.70 3.02*** 2.64 1.84 
Political Risk (x10−2) 0.18 0.44 5.90*** -0.21 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education (x10−2) -0.34 1.95** 8.61** -1.61 
Secondary Education (x10−2) 0.11 -0.07 3.63 0.24 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 2.96* -2.18 -1.44 -0.69 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−2) -0.52** -0.19 3.41*** 0.48 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−3) -1.99*** 0.16 -20.90 -1.15 
EU Terms:     
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -3.04*** -0.73 -4.83 0.22 
Eurozone Country (x10−1) 2.79*** -0.01 -1.02 3.21* 
EU Commitment (x10−1) 2.93*** 4.38*** -7.95* 3.08 
EU Membership (x10−1) 2.18*** 2.07* -1.02 -1.42 
EU Post-membership (x10−1) -2.94*** -1.66*** -3.01* -1.05 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x𝟏𝟎
−𝟑): 
Europe 1.03*** -0.19 2.73 2.28*** 
North America 0.46 -0.66 -1.49 0.03 
BRICS 6.57*** 5.03*** 3.24 10.47*** 
Other 0.29 1.16 -4.69 -0.76 
Number of Observations 421,600 270,925 34,700 89,875 
Number of Cases 16,864 10,837 1,388 3,595 
Log likelihood -46,455.29 -25,045.19 -2,923.41 -8,644.00 
Notes: Location choice for different number of projects from different sources in 25 countries over 1998 
to 2010. Estimation is using the Conditional Logit model.  Country fixed-effects are included throughout. 
10-2 means coefficients need to be multiplied by 10-2 and so on. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% 
significance level. 
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In order to explore whether there is the significant difference in coefficients when FDI 
from different sources are considered, the Chow test can be used to discuss this issue, 
where the null hypothesis is that coefficients of different models keep the same between 
different portions (i.e. different sources in this thesis).  The testing results are shown in 
Table 7.4 below.  
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Table 7.4: Chow Test for Comparing Coefficients in Table 7.3 
LR (Chow) Test 
I II III IV 
Full Sample 
Europe and 
BRICS 
Europe and 
North America 
North America 
and BRICS 
𝜒2 4096.62 945.52 3042.50 295.19 
Prob > 𝜒2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Column I compares the difference in coefficients of all four columns in Table 7.3 based on 
the full sample. Columns II to IV compare the difference in any two of four columns. 
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All positive values of 𝜒2 and significant probabilities in Columns I to IV of Table 7.4 
indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected regardless of considering all source regions 
together or considering any two of them.  This means that coefficients are not the same in 
columns of Table 7.3.  Thus, it is necessary to consider FDI projects from these global 
regions separately.  Therefore, the results for different source regions (i.e. columns in 
Table 7.3) are now briefly discussed in turn. 
 
Europe: Column V shows that the effect of most country variables on this FDI is 
consistent with that for all investments (column II, Table 7.1), reflecting its importance in 
the overall number of investments (i.e. 16,864 out of 32,684 investments).  The GDP 
growth rate, external market demand and motorway density are not significant factors, 
which is probably because most of this FDI in the EU-25 comes from the EU-25 itself and 
in particular the EU-15 (see Chapter 5).  However, the exchange rate and openness to trade 
are important, which is because some countries are not Eurozone members and the extent 
of openness of CEEC-10 countries is lower than that of EU-15 countries.  The other 
variables are similar to that of column II of Table 7.1 and so are discussed above. 
 
North America: This investment has special characteristics that reflects the highly-
developed and advanced technology of the US economy.  Column VI shows that 
investment from North America is not influenced by the population density and factors 
such as distance to the core European market (external market demand), nor the 
unemployment rate.  What is important is a high level of higher education.  Furthermore, 
because the US dollar is one of the most important world currencies, the effects of 
exchange rate volatility and Eurozone country on the location of North American FDI are 
insignificant.  The significant effect of motorway density shows that this FDI is attracted 
by better physical infrastructure. 
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BRICS: Overall, column VII of Table 7.3 shows that relatively few of the country variables 
are important for BRICS FDI location in the EU-25.  Fewer significant variables mean 
that BRICS FDI is only interested in part of all factors considered in the regression 
analysis. This may reflect its heterogeneity as the individual BRICS countries are quite 
different.  The main location factors are the GDP growth rate (a positive effect on FDI), 
wage rate (negative), political risk (positive), higher education (positive) and exchange 
rate (i.e. positive coefficient means more BRICS FDI in a country where the domestic 
currency has appreciated).  Other terms are largely insignificant.  This is broadly 
consistent with the literature, as in Chapter 3 I showed that market access and knowledge-
seeking motives are two of the main reasons for BRICS FDI.  The large estimated 
coefficients on the risk and exchange rate terms may indicate that there is correlation 
between these (possibly other terms), which is shown in Section 5.5.2 of Chapter 5 (the 
data chapter).  However, similar significant effects are found below for these, although 
smaller in magnitude.  Overall, these results suggest that FDI from the BRICS seeks low 
labour costs and a high-skilled workforce, but distance to the core European market within 
the EU and the transport road network are unimportant, as are the various political events 
such as EU membership.  It perhaps suggests that on the whole this investment is not 
market-seeking. 
 
Other: Investment from elsewhere has different characteristics, reflecting its 
heterogeneity, so that most of the country location factors are insignificant.  Column VIII 
shows that there are only four country variables that have significant effects on its location 
of FDI: GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, the income tax rate and exchange rate volatility. 
 
7.3.2. Lagged FDI Terms 
 
In terms of the lagged level of FDI from the different global source regions, Table 7.3 
shows that there is very little persistence in FDI location from the same source.  Of the 
four global regions only FDI from Europe follows foreign investment from the same 
global region in the previous year, but otherwise the terms are insignificant.  This suggests 
that investment tends to locate between different countries over the study period, and this 
includes the BRICS as a whole.  It possibly reflects FDI heterogeneity, even when 
disaggregated by the four global regions.  Again, the only real pattern to emerge from the 
FDIit-1 terms is that they suggest the BRICS investment is a good predictor of investment 
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from the other global source regions a year later.  The large estimates on this term possibly 
reflects the fact that BRICS investment is relatively small (i.e. 1,388 out of a total of 
32,684 investment projects).   
One interpretation of this result is that BRICS investment has been leading the 
trend of global investment, suggesting that it may be a ‘first-mover’.  Column VII of Table 
7.3 shows that the location of investment FDI from the Other source in the preceding year 
cannot predict BRICS investment significantly, so that it is consistent with the results in 
column II of Table 7.1, where the location decision of global investments is not 
significantly influenced by Other investment.  Column VIII again suggests that Other 
investment does not follow its own previous investment, which may be due to 
heterogeneity in this group, but that is predicted by BRICS investment.  These issues are 
now explored for individual BRICS countries. 
 
7.4. FDI Location of the BRICS 
 
Table 7.3 shows that the BRICS investment does not follow the previous investment of 
any global source region, including the BRICS as a whole.  This issue is now explored.  
Section 7.4.1 disaggregates the lagged BRICS FDI term into its five constituent countries 
to explore whether BRICS FDI as a whole follows the FDI of any individual BRICS 
country.  This also shows if BRICS FDI as a whole avoids the countries where the BRICS 
previously invested.  Further, to explore whether BRICS FDI follows FDI from the same 
BRICS country, Section 7.4.2 disaggregates each of the matched lagged FDI variables 
‘Same BRICS Country’ and ‘BRICS, excluding the Same Country’ for the individual 
BRICS countries (i.e. it matches FDI in Brazil at year 𝑡 with that in Brazil at year 𝑡 − 1, 
and so on for each BRICS country).  It is able to confirm which specific individual 
countries’ FDI ‘follows’ the location of its own previous FDI and ‘avoids’ the location of 
other BRICS.  Finally, Section 7.4.3 repeats the analysis of Section 7.4.2, but it estimates 
the matched terms for each individual BRICS country.   In this latter analysis, I also 
consider the lagged FDI terms for the previous FDI from the global regions. 
 
7.4.1. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour: All BRICS 
 
Table 7.5 regresses equation (4.48) in Chapter 4 for FDI originating from the BRICS as a 
whole, but including different measures of the lagged FDI term in each column.  Column 
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IX includes previous FDI from the whole BRICS, while column X disaggregates previous 
FDI into the five individual BRICS countries.  The last three columns in Table 7.5 give 
the results for the matched lagged FDI terms.  The likelihood ratio test can be used to 
select the better model between Columns IX and X as they have a same basis, but nearly 
all source variables are insignificant in these two columns, which cannot show any trend 
on ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour for BRICS FDI. This means that these two columns are 
not a good choice.  Thus, Columns XI and XII are introduced to further explore this issue, 
where Column XII has one more source variable which is significant and also reduces the 
restriction in Column XI. This indicates that Column XII is better than XI.  Finally, in 
order to avoid considering the effect of FDI from the same BRICS country repeatedly, 
variable ‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS Country’ is included in Column XIII instead of 
variable ‘BRICS’ in Column XII. Therefore, Column XIII is the best choice in Table 7.5.  
The sign and significance of the estimates on the country variables in Table 7.5 are like 
those previously found for the BRICS investment in column VII of Table 7.3, but 
sometimes much smaller in magnitude.  The EU enlargement term is now significant at 
the 5% level, but its negative sign suggests that the commitment to enlarge made the 
CEEC-10 countries less attractive to FDI.  This is possibly because investors can now 
source these markets from the EU-15, so that it reflects risk-averse behaviour of BRICS 
investors.  Otherwise the pattern of results is much the same as that found previously. 
 Turning to the lagged FDI variables, column IX of Table 7.5 considers the 
preceding year’s investments of the BRICS as the only source variable, but it is still 
insignificant.  By disaggregating the BRICS into the five countries, column X shows that 
BRICS FDI as a whole ‘follows’ the previous investment of South Africa only.  This is 
significant at the 10% level and it may reflect the fact that South African FDI in the EU-
25 is long-standing, not least the UK and other advanced economies, although it is the 
most recent member state of the BRICS (i.e. join in April 2011).43  Nevertheless, it is 
perhaps not wholly convincing to treat South Africa as the ‘leader’ of BRICS FDI as its 
total number of projects in the EU-25 is quite small. 
  
                                                            
43 Source: http://www.bricsforum.com/2011/04/21/bric-becomes-brics-south-africa-joins-at-sanya/ last 
accessed: 20th April 2016. 
190 
 
Table 7.5: ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour for All BRICS FDI 
Dependent Variable: =1 if the project 
locates in country i at time t. 
All BRICS 
IX X XI XII XIII 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
Demand Variables:      
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -4.35 -4.96 -11.72* -5.98 -5.98 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−2) 6.51** 6.88*** 7.65*** 6.77*** 6.77*** 
Population Density (x10−2) -0.27 -1.76 4.01* 0.43 0.43 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.84 4.04 -3.91 1.67 1.67 
Labour Market Variables:      
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) 0.83 0.01 3.94 1.12 1.12 
Real Wage Rate (x10−1) -1.71*** -1.49** -2.02*** -1.94*** -1.94*** 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -11.41*** -12.56*** -6.23* -11.21*** -11.21*** 
Cost Variables:      
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−2) -1.39 -1.68 0.22 -0.83 -0.83 
Motorway Density (x10−2) 1.74 1.04 1.36 1.46 1.46 
Political Risk (x10−2) 5.49*** 4.97** 7.17*** 5.55*** 5.55*** 
Education Variables:      
Higher Education (x10−2) 8.26** 8.51** 6.29* 7.96** 7.96** 
Secondary Education (x10−2) 2.87 2.61 -1.11 2.58 2.58 
Trade Variables:      
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -4.64 -7.05 1.28 -4.47 -4.47 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−2) 3.21** 3.37** 4.15*** 3.31** 3.31** 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−2) -2.06 -2.56 -2.25 -2.35 -2.35 
Policy Terms:      
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -9.06 -13.09** -6.59 -8.68 -8.68 
Eurozone Country (x10−1) -4.77 -6.21 -4.69 -4.76 -4.76 
EU Commitment (x10−1) -8.77** -8.69** -9.78** -9.15** -9.15** 
EU Membership (x10−1) -0.69 -1.51 0.16 -0.83 -0.83 
EU Post-membership (x10−1) -3.21* -3.14* -2.54 -3.07* -3.07* 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x𝟏𝟎
−𝟐): 
BRICS 0.05 - - -1.59*** - 
Brazil - -5.92 - - - 
Russia - -3.56 - - - 
India - 1.04 - - - 
China - -0.16 - - - 
South Africa - 7.57* - - - 
Same BRICS Country - - 3.26*** 3.76*** 2.17*** 
BRICS, excluding Same BRICS Country - - - - -1.59*** 
Number of Observations 34,700 34,700 34,700 34,700 34,700 
Number of Cases 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
Log likelihood -2,925.31 -2,920.91 -2,882.09 -2876.51 -2876.51 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects from the BRICS across 25 countries over 1998 to 2010. Estimation 
is using the Conditional Logit model.  Country fixed-effects are included throughout. 10-2 means coefficients 
need to be multiplied by 10-2 and so on. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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7.4.2. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour: Matched BRICS 
 
Column XI aims to determine whether BRICS investors follow the investment pattern of 
previous investors from the same source country, so that it matches the individual 
investment for each BRICS country to that all investment projects from the same BRICS 
country in the same host country in the previous year.  The final two columns consider 
whether BRICS investors locate where there is a high level of FDI from their own source 
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country and from the BRICS as a whole.  The latter term is measured in two ways, so that 
column XII includes all BRICS FDI including the same source country and column XIII 
includes all BRICS FDI excluding the same BRICS source country. In order to avoid 
considering the effect of FDI from the same BRICS country repeatedly, variable ‘BRICS, 
excluding Same BRICS Country’ is a better choice.  Table 7.5 is a re-estimation of the 
regression shown in column VII of Table 7.3, but including a breakdown of the lagged 
BRICS FDI and excluding the other global regions. 
Column XI shows a positive and significant effect for the BRICS term, which 
suggests a strong ‘follow-the-leader’ effect for the BRICS countries.  It is in contrast to 
the insignificant lagged BRICS FDI term in column VII of Table 7.3, suggesting that it is 
investment from the same BRICS country that matters, and not the investment from the 
BRICS as a whole.   
 Column XII of Table 7.5 also includes the term for total BRICS investment in the 
previous year, for which a negative and significant estimate is obtained.  These suggest 
that investment from the same BRICS country in the previous year increases FDI in the 
current year, but that from elsewhere in the BRICS actually leads to a lower level of FDI 
from that country, where each is significant at the 1% level.  This implies that FDI from 
the BRICS is not complementary.  The net own-country FDI location effect is given by 
the difference in the estimates in column XII, so that, for example, for China it is as 
follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 3.76(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) − 1.59(𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙 + 𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 + 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎),    (7.1) 
 
which gives: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 2.17(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎) − 1.59 (𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑙 + 𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎).          (7.2) 
 
Equation (7.1) will indicate whether the gross effect for China and the BRICS as a whole 
are each significantly different from zero, but it does not reveal whether the net own-
country FDI location effect for China is significantly different from zero in equation (7.2).  
To examine this, column XIII of Table 7.5 introduces a new variable ‘BRICS, excluding 
Same BRICS Country’, and this reveals that the net own-country FDI location effect is in 
fact significant at the 1% level.  Thus, Table 7.5 shows that BRICS FDI follows the 
investment from the same BRICS country, but that it avoids FDI from the other BRICS.  
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However, it does not confirm whether there is a leader country and how these inter-relate, 
so that this is now explored. 
 
7.4.3. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour: Individual BRICS 
 
This section investigates the relationship between the BRICS investment in further details 
to examine the extent of the relationship between BRICS FDI and whether it follows 
investment from any particular BRICS country.  It involves extending the estimation in 
column XII in Table 7.5 to examine how the estimated coefficients on the BRICS terms 
in this regression vary between the individual BRICS countries.  These results are given 
in Table 7.8.  I now briefly explain the nature of the lagged FDI terms, but before 
discussing the estimation results for these, I first discuss those for the country variables. 
First of all, for ease of comparison, column XIV of Table 7.8 replicates the results 
from column XIII of Table 7.5.  Column XV then disaggregates the ‘Same BRICS 
Country’ variable into the five individual BRICS countries to examine which of these 
countries FDI follows their own previous investment.  For example, the variable ‘Same 
Brazil’ in Table 7.8 is defined as the variable ‘Same BRICS Country’ multiplied by a 
dummy variable for Brazil, which links the previous and current Brazilian investments 
only and measures the effects of the previous Brazilian FDI only.  On the same basis, 
column XVI disaggregates the variable ‘BRICS excluding Same BRICS Country’ to 
determine whether in addition to following their own previous investments they avoid 
locations where other BRICS countries invest.  For completeness, the non-BRICS three 
global regions (Europe, North America and the Other region) are also added in column 
XVII to explore the effects of their previous FDI and the changes caused by them in the 
‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  There is no doubt that Table 7.8 must include all of these 
columns to explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour more and more deeply, but there should 
be a most preferred model among them.  In this sense, the likelihood ratio test is used 
again to select the best model among these columns, and testing results are shown in Table 
7.6 below. 
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Table 7.6: Likelihood Ratio Test for Comparing Columns in Table 7.8 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
I II III 
Columns XIV & XV 
in Table 7.8 
Columns XV & XVI 
in Table 7.8 
Columns XVI and 
XVII in Table 7.8 
df (Number of 
Restrictions) 
4 4 3 
𝜒2 13.12 16.12 4.96 
Critical Value 9.49 9.49 7.81 
Note: This test is based on the 5% significant level. 
58 
Columns I and II of Table 7.6 show that values of 𝜒2 are greater than the critical values 
at the 5% significant level.  It means that restrictions of Columns XIV and XV in Table 
7.8 are rejected, which indicates that Column XV in Table 7.8 is better than Column XIV, 
while Column XVI is also preferred compared with Column XV.  However, when three 
global source regions are considered in Column XVII, the testing result shows that 
restrictions of Column XVI cannot be rejected, which means that Column XVI is still 
better than XVII.  Therefore, variables ‘Same BRICS Country’ in Column XIV and 
‘BRICS excluding Same BRICS Country’ in Column XV should be disaggregated to 
explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS countries’ FDI, and Column XVI in 
Table 7.8 shows the most reliable results.   
According to this, details for marginal effects and signs and significance of 
coefficients are discussed in the following.  However, the Hausman test for the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption shows that when Estonia, 
Germany, Poland or Slovakia is dropped, there is not a significant change in the 
probability of location choice (i.e. Data meet the IIA assumption). When other countries 
are dropped by one at each time, the value of Chi2 is negative, which means that model 
fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test.  
Therefore, we cannot confirm whether or not the data meet the IIA assumption, which is 
a caveat of the regression analysis.  The testing results are shown in Appendix Table 7.1 
in Appendix B. 
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Table 7.7: Marginal Effects of ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour for Individual BRICS FDI 
Dependent Variable: =1 if the project 
locates in country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
BRICS 
XIV XV XVI XVII 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP per capita -1.16 -1.03 -0.97 0.05 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.16** 
Population Density  0.53 -0.37 -0.77 0.30 
External Market Demand  0.59 0.90 1.06 -0.33 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate  0.09 0.05 0.03 0.16 
Real Wage Rate  -2.60*** -2.50*** -2.50*** -1.93** 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -2.58*** -2.71*** -2.81*** -2.35** 
Cost Variables:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate  -0.23 -0.35 -0.40 -0.48 
Motorway Density  0.24 0.26 0.31 0.49 
Political Risk  4.34*** 4.47*** 4.53*** 4.94*** 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education  1.62** 1.63** 1.68** 1.74** 
Secondary Education  1.26 1.07 1.00 1.39 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade  -0.34 -0.38 -0.31 0.01 
Real Exchange Rate  3.13** 3.22*** 3.23*** 3.43*** 
Real Exchange rate volatility -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 
Policy Terms:     
EU Structural Funds -0.11 -0.13* -0.15** -0.09 
Eurozone Country -0.20 -0.2.5 -0.24 -0.07 
EU Commitment -0.77** -0.78** -0.76** -0.69* 
EU Membership -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 
EU Post-membership -0.46* -0.46* -0.48* -0.44* 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
BRICS Country, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 (x10
−2): 
Same BRICS Country 3.94*** - - - 
Same Brazil - 0.05 0.13 0.13 
Same Russia - -0.37 0.07 0.08 
Same India - 2.43*** 2.39*** 2.64*** 
Same China - 1.08** 0.70 0.91 
Same South Africa - 0.17* 0.08 0.09 
All other BRICS Countries excluding the 
Same Country, FDIit-1 (x10-2): 
    
Excluding same BRICS country -5.64*** -4.30** - - 
Excluding Brazil - - -0.54** -0.46** 
Excluding Russia - - -1.27*** -1.14*** 
Excluding India - - -1.05 -0.68 
Excluding China - - -0.91 -0.51 
Excluding South Africa - - 0.01 0.07 
Global Source, FDIit-1:     
Europe - - - 0.17* 
North America - - - -0.06 
Other - - - -0.05 
Number of Observations 34,700 34,700 34,700 34,700 
Number of Cases 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
Log likelihood -2876.51 -2869.95 -2861.89 -2859.41 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects from the BRICS in the EU-25 countries over 1998 to 2010. 
Estimation in this table is using the Conditional Logit model.  Country fixed-effects are included 
throughout. 10-2 means coefficients need to be multiplied by 10-2 and so on. Marginal effect is (1 − 𝑃𝑖)𝛽 
if xi is logged or (1 − 𝑃𝑖)𝛽𝑥𝑖 if xi is unlogged.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Table 7.8: ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour for Individual BRICS FDI 
Dependent Variable: =1 if the project 
locates in country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
BRICS 
XIV XV XVI XVII 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -5.98 -5.31 -4.98 0.24 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−2) 6.77*** 6.98*** 7.08*** 6.05** 
Population Density (x10−2) 0.43 -0.30 -0.62 0.24 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.67 2.54 2.98 -0.93 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) 1.12 0.62 0.36 1.98 
Real Wage Rate (x10−1) -1.94*** -1.86*** -1.86*** -1.44** 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -11.21*** -11.75*** -12.21*** -10.18** 
Cost Variables:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−2) -0.83 -1.27 -1.48 -1.76 
Motorway Density (x10−2) 1.46 1.58 1.88 2.99 
Political Risk (x10−2) 5.55*** 5.72*** 5.80*** 6.32*** 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education (x10−2) 7.96** 8.05** 8.28** 8.57** 
Secondary Education (x10−2) 2.58 2.20 2.05 2.85 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -4.47 -5.00 -4.16 0.14 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−2) 3.31** 3.41*** 3.42*** 3.63*** 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−2) -2.35 -2.43 -2.27 -2.33 
Policy Terms:     
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -8.68 -10.79* -12.01** -7.19 
Eurozone Country (x10−1) -4.76 -5.89 -5.71 -1.76 
EU Commitment (x10−1) -9.15** -9.28** -8.99** -8.14* 
EU Membership (x10−1) -0.83 -1.13 -1.13 -1.42 
EU Post-membership (x10−1) -3.07* -3.11* -3.22* -2.99* 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
BRICS Country, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 (x10
−2): 
Same BRICS Country 2.17*** - - - 
Same Brazil - 4.17 10.81 10.48 
Same Russia - -5.92 1.21 1.34 
Same India - 2.99*** 2.94*** 3.25*** 
Same China - 1.18** 0.77 1.00 
Same South Africa - 12.73* 5.65 6.75 
All other BRICS Countries excluding the 
Same Country, FDIit-1 (x10-2): 
    
Excluding same BRICS country -1.59*** -1.21** - - 
Excluding Brazil - - -2.09** -1.80** 
Excluding Russia - - -2.55*** -2.29*** 
Excluding India - - -0.85 -0.55 
Excluding China - - -0.68 -0.38 
Excluding South Africa - - 0.03 0.31 
Global Source, FDIit-1 (x10-3):     
Europe - - - 3.31* 
North America - - - -1.86 
Other - - - -4.85 
Number of Observations 34,700 34,700 34,700 34,700 
Number of Cases 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
Log likelihood -2876.51 -2869.95 -2861.89 -2859.41 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects from the BRICS in the EU-25 countries over 1998 to 2010. 
Estimation in this table is using the Conditional Logit model.  Country fixed-effects are included 
throughout. 10-2 means coefficients need to be multiplied by 10-2 and so on. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 
1% significance level. 
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The magnitude of marginal effects in Table 7.7 represents the percentage change in the 
probability of location choice from the percentage change in an explanatory variable when 
other things keep constant.  Marginal effects can be directly compared across models, and 
the signs and significance of coefficients are further discussed in terms of Table 7.8.  
 
Country Variables 
In general, all of the columns of Table 7.8 show similar results to those of Table 7.5 when 
the different source variables are considered.  These two tables show that the BRICS 
investment is interested in only some of the host country characteristics that are considered 
by the global investors, and the effects of these characteristics on BRICS FDI have a 
similar sign to those of the global FDI (in Table 7.1).  It can be seen that the individual 
BRICS are interested in one or two country variables in each of all variable groups, such 
as the GDP growth, lower wages, lower political risk and a depreciation of domestic 
currency.  These are consistent with the discussion in earlier sections, although the 
exchange rate has the opposite effect on BRICS investment compared to investors more 
generally. 
Table 7.8 suggests that a greater higher education rate is associated with a greater 
importance of the wage rate for BRICS investment.  Most EU terms could affect the 
location choice of BRICS investments significantly except for membership of the EU and 
the Euro.  This is because most BRICS investments are located in the UK, which is not a 
member of the Eurozone, while the UK has been a member of the EU throughout the study 
period.  It also can be seen that BRICS FDI is discouraged by the EU Structural Funds, 
which may indicate a weak investment environment and the risks of a more-depressed 
economy.  
 
Lagged FDI Terms 
Column XIV of Table 7.8, which is the same as column XIII in Table 7.5, shows that 
BRICS FDI follows the location choice of FDI from the same BRICS country in the 
preceding year, but avoids the location of previous FDI from the other BRICS countries.  
In order to identify which BRICS countries follow their own previous investment, column 
XV disaggregates the variable ‘Same BRICS Country’ into the five individual BRICS 
countries.  It reveals that India, China and South Africa are the countries that follow their 
own previous investment, but that it is insignificant for Brazil and Russia.  Again, column 
XV shows that the FDI of each BRICS avoids the location of the other BRICS countries 
when taken as a whole. 
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To identify which individual countries avoid the location of the other BRICS FDI, column 
XVI introduces five variables that disaggregate the variable ‘BRICS, excluding Same 
Country’ for each BRICS country (e.g. when the investor is Brazil, ‘BRICS excluding 
Brazil’ includes the previous FDI in the same country from Russia, India, China and South 
Africa). Column XVI shows which individual BRICS countries not only follow their own 
previous investment, but avoid the other BRICS countries.  India is now the country that 
follows its own investment, but it can be seen that each BRICS country avoids the location 
of the other four countries except for South Africa, although it is significant for Brazil and 
Russia only. Column XVII shows that there are no changes in the ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour across the five individual countries when the preceding year investments of the 
three global regions are also included.  It shows that when the full specification of the 
model is considered, Europe FDI has a strong effect on the location of BRICS FDI.   
Overall, Table 7.8 shows that there is no single BRICS country that simultaneously 
follows its own investment and avoids the FDI of the other four BRICS countries.  
Nevertheless, when taken as a whole the results suggest that India, China and South Africa 
follow their own investment, while Brazil and Russia avoid the location of other BRICS 
countries. 
 
7.5. The Project Characteristics and the Probability of FDI Location 
 
In considering whether BRICS FDI follows or avoids the location of previous BRICS FDI, 
the analysis has sought to hold the characteristics of the host country constant, but has 
largely ignored the project heterogeneity, except for the ultimate country of origin of the 
investment, including the BRICS.  In this section a Multinomial Logit framework is used 
that enables both the project and source country characteristics to be explored.  In 
particular, this section addresses a different question, as it examines the characteristics of 
the investors from different source countries and how this affects the location choice 
across the EU-25.  It enables the attractiveness of each host country to be examined, so 
that in very broad terms the results are related to the estimates for the country controls that 
are obtained above.   
Details of the Multinomial Logit approach are discussed in Chapter 4 and the 
variables are described in Chapter 5.  It shows that the number of project characteristics 
and classes that can be considered is limited, as it requires the construction of large 
datasets that requires considerable computing power.  For example, if FDI is considered 
198 
 
according to a single characteristic that has two classes then the size of the dataset doubles, 
from 32,684 to 65,368 observations, while if there are three characteristics each with two 
classes it increases eight-fold to 261,472 observations.  Further, if there are eight global 
regions (North America, Europe, five BRICS and Other sources) then there are already 
2,091,776 observations!  
The investment project characteristics that are considered in this section comprise 
the industry (manufacturing and other industries), the project function (headquarters / 
R&D and other functions) and the project investment mode (start-up or expansions and 
co-locations).  The reasons for selecting these are as follows.  First, in the case of 
manufacturing FDI, the motivations for undertaking investment may differ, leading to 
different location patterns.  In fact, the manufacturing sector receives more projects than 
any other sector, but the number of service projects is also substantial.  Table 5.9 in 
Chapter 5 shows that the share of projects in manufacturing is 54.2% for the EU-15 and 
73.6% for the CEEC-10.  Second, the function is of interest, as the location patterns may 
differ between these (Defever, 2012).   Investment in headquarters and R&D functions are 
of interest as they imply high-value projects using high-skilled labour, which may as a 
result be more embedded in the host country due to substantial sunk costs and provide 
greater benefits to economic development.  Section 6.4.4 shows that both these functions 
receive a large number of projects.  Finally, the location determinants may differ by the 
investment mode, leading to different FDI location patterns (Basile, 2004).  The main type 
of FDI project in the EU-25 countries is start-ups, so that these are considered separately 
from expansion and co-location investments, which are combined.   
The Multinomial Logit model is now used to explore FDI location in terms of the 
project characteristics and the source country or global region of the investment.  In so 
doing, it is important to understand the nature of the estimated coefficients, which are as 
log-odds ratios relative to the base case.  Throughout, the UK is the base-case country as 
it is the major recipient of FDI within the EU-25 (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5).  Thus, for 
example, the significant estimate of 0.62 obtained for manufacturing FDI for Austria in 
Table 7.9 means that the probability that an investment in Austria is in manufacturing is 
86% higher relative to the probability that an investment in the UK is in manufacturing, 
holding the other characteristics measured by the other regressors constant, i.e. 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.62) − 1 = 85.8%. 
Section 7.5.1 explores the country location of FDI allowing only the project 
characteristics to vary, i.e. industry, function and investment mode.  Section 7.5.2 explores 
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the country location of FDI by allowing only the BRICS countries as the source to vary, 
i.e. each BRICS country.  Finally, Section 7.5.3 allows both the project characteristics and 
the sources to vary.  The main results are presented in Tables 7.9 to 7.11 respectively.  
These focus on the estimates for the project characteristics and functions for each EU-25 
country, so that the estimates for the country variables for these three tables are presented 
in Appendix Table 7.2.  This shows broadly similar estimates are obtained for these, which 
are consistent with those reported above, so that they are not our main focus in this section. 
 
7.5.1. Project Characteristics 
 
Table 7.9 gives the results from allowing only the project characteristics to vary, reporting 
the estimated coefficients for each country for manufacturing, headquarters / R&D and 
start-ups only.  It also splits the locations according to whether they are part of the EU-15 
or CEEC-10.  Overall, it shows some strong differences between the EU-15 and CEEC-
10 countries.  In general, and relative to the UK in each case, an investment in CEEC-10 
is more likely to be in manufacturing compared to the EU-15, but less likely to be in 
headquarters / R&D, while investments in the CEEC-10 are more likely to be start-ups, 
reflecting their status as a new location for FDI following their accession to the European 
Union.  
For the manufacturing column, Table 7.9 shows that only Ireland and Luxembourg 
are less likely to receive FDI projects in the manufacturing sector compared with the UK.  
All other EU-15 countries are more likely to receive investment in manufacturing, except 
for the Scandinavian countries, where there is no significant effect.  It can be seen that all 
the CEEC-10 countries are more likely to receive the manufacturing projects than the UK.  
This is because of their different levels of economic development and economic structure. 
Within the EU-15, similarly developed countries such as France and Germany are also 
more likely to receive FDI in manufacturing, reflecting the highly developed service 
sector in the UK. 
  
200 
 
 
Table 7.9: FDI Location Choice for All Sources: Project Characteristics 
Model: Multinomial Logit Model 
Country Fixed Effects: Yes 
Investment Source Variable (𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏): All Source 
Host 
Case Variables 
 Manufacturing Headquarters / R&D  Start-up 
EU-15 
Austria 0.62*** -0.22** -0.16* 
Belgium 0.47*** -0.85*** -0.22*** 
Denmark -0.09 0.44*** 0.70*** 
Finland 0.19 -0.65*** 0.28* 
France 0.53*** -0.79*** -0.37*** 
Germany 0.45*** -0.68*** 0.41*** 
Greece 0.73*** -0.81*** 1.62*** 
Ireland -0.20*** 0.28*** -0.46*** 
Italy 0.20** -0.75*** 0.54*** 
Luxembourg -0.45* -0.10 0.69** 
Netherlands 0.24*** -0.31*** 0.54*** 
Portugal 0.91*** -1.84*** -0.17 
Spain 0.47*** -0.45*** 0.06 
Sweden 0.07 -0.30*** 0.46*** 
UK Base Alternative 
CEEC-10 
Bulgaria 1.17*** -1.70*** 0.53*** 
Czech Republic 1.50*** -1.38*** 0.33*** 
Estonia 0.88*** -2.63*** 0.09 
Hungary 1.42*** -1.51*** 0.01 
Latvia 0.59*** -2.84*** 1.48*** 
Lithuania 0.86*** -2.28*** 1.10*** 
Poland 1.27*** -1.65*** 0.39*** 
Romania 1.14*** -1.51*** 0.42*** 
Slovakia 1.82*** -2.23*** 0.52*** 
Slovenia 1.30*** -1.42*** 0.27 
Number of Observations 817,100 
Number of Cases 32,684 
Log Likelihood -83,303.11 
Notes: Location choice for 32,684 projects across the EU-25 countries over 1998 - 2010 estimating using 
the Multinomial Logit model.  Coefficients are log-odds ratios relative to the UK base case.  Country 
terms and Country fixed-effects are included, but not shown in the table. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% 
significance level.  
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In the case of the headquarters / R&D function, Table 7.9 reveals that compared with the 
UK, only Denmark and Ireland are more likely to receive investment in these functions 
across the EU-25 countries.  According to Chapter 5, projects with headquarters are 
decision centres that have accounting, management and administration activities.  R&D 
includes fundamental scientific research and those that have a strong relation to the 
production process.  It suggests that an economy with a more-advanced technology and 
larger production scale is more likely to attract this investment.  A start-up is defined as 
an investment by a firm in a new location.  Table 7.9 shows that there is a greater 
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probability of most EU-25 countries receiving this ‘greenfield’ investment, but this is 
because the UK has a greater tradition in receiving foreign investment, so that the UK is 
more likely to receive FDI as re-investment.  The other two main host countries show 
different patterns, as France is less likely to receive start-up investment than the UK, but 
Germany more so. 
 
7.5.2. The BRICS Countries 
 
The Multinomial Logit model was used to allow the source country to vary between the 
five BRICS countries and the global regions of Europe and North America.  The estimates 
allowing the coefficients to vary for each BRICS country are reported in Table 7.10, while 
Table 7.11 shows the estimates allowing both the project characteristics and sources to 
vary (i.e. the five BRICS countries, Europe and North America).  Again, the base for both 
these tables is the United Kingdom. 
Table 7.10 shows that there is a different pattern for the attractiveness of the EU-
15 and CEEC-10 host countries for FDI locations, but this might just reflect the 
differences in the project characteristics analysed in Table 7.9.  In the case of Brazilian 
investment, Table 7.10 shows that it is significantly more likely to go to Portugal and 
Spain, no doubt because of cultural similarities, but also to Luxembourg and Slovakia.  
However, it is no more likely to locate in any other EU-25 country compared with the UK.  
According to the literature review in Chapter 2, language and culture are important drivers 
of FDI, and of course, Portugal is the former colonial power in Brazil and they share a 
similar language.  Turning to Russia, it can be seen that this investment is more likely to 
go to Germany and Italy within the EU-15, but that it has a significant greater probability 
of locating in several of the CEEC-10 countries compared with the UK.  These include 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were formerly part of the Soviet Union, plus 
Bulgaria. 
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Table 7.10: FDI Location Choice for All Sources: Each BRICS Country 
Model: Multinomial Logit Model 
Country Fixed Effects: Yes 
Investment Source Variable (𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏): All Sources 
Host 
Case Variables 
 Brazil  Russia  India  China South Africa 
EU-15 
Austria -0.37 0.72 -2.70*** -2.80*** -1.32 
Belgium 0.54 -0.69 -1.02*** -0.24 -0.27 
Denmark -17.54 0.72 -1.09*** -0.38 -18.08 
Finland -17.55 0.86 -0.95* -1.74* -18.09 
France -0.45 -0.26 -1.74*** -0.85*** -1.49*** 
Germany -0.39 1.00*** -0.81*** 0.56*** -0.93** 
Greece -17.57 1.01 -1.50 -0.91 -18.10 
Ireland -17.51 -0.66 -2.71*** -2.09*** -1.11 
Italy -0.53 0.75* -2.45*** 0.08 -18.08 
Luxembourg 1.90* -16.93 -17.82 -17.56 -18.09 
Netherlands -0.15 0.23 -0.97*** -0.17 -0.22 
Portugal 2.29*** -16.92 -2.24*** -17.56 -18.09 
Spain 1.25*** -0.24 -2.60*** -1.12*** -1.05** 
Sweden -17.54 -0.51 -0.98*** 0.04 -18.07 
UK Base Alternative 
CEEC-10 
Bulgaria -17.53 1.38*** -3.15*** -1.16** -0.94 
Czech Republic -17.54 0.56 -1.94*** -1.90*** -0.42 
Estonia -17.56 2.19*** -17.81 -17.54 -18.09 
Hungary -17.52 -0.44 -2.22*** -0.85*** -18.07 
Latvia -17.55 2.53*** -17.81 -17.53 0.15 
Lithuania -17.56 2.66*** -2.28** -17.55 -18.10 
Poland -17.51 -0.58 -1.90*** -2.02*** -1.41* 
Romania -0.79 0.69 -1.75*** -1.61*** -18.09 
Slovakia 1.21** -16.92 -3.17*** -2.59*** -18.09 
Slovenia -17.56 0.85 -17.82 -17.57 -18.10 
Number of Observations 817,100 
Number of Cases 32,684 
Log Likelihood -84,657.61 
Notes: Location choice for 32,684 projects across the EU-25 countries over 1998 - 2010 estimating 
using the Multinomial Logit model.  Coefficients are log-odds ratios relative to the UK base case.  
Country terms and Country fixed-effects are included, but not shown in the table. * = 10%, ** = 5% 
and *** = 1% significance level. The interpretation for the coefficients is as a logs-odd ration. Thus, 
coefficients which equal to -17 for Brazil are the default. It means that these terms have no effect on 
the probability of location.  
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Table 7.10 also shows that there is a similar investment pattern between Chinese and 
Indian FDI.  Across all of the EU-25 countries, investments from these two countries are 
more likely to go to the UK than any other country, except for Chinese investment in 
Germany.  In the case of the CEEC-10, they are nearly always less likely to invest in the 
same countries, comprising Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. The only difference is that Indian investment is less likely to go to Lithuania.  
In the case of the EU-15, Indian and Chinese investment is less likely to locate in France 
compared to the UK, although Chinese investment is more likely to go to Germany.  
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Finally, Table 7.10 shows that the UK is the most attractive destination for FDI from South 
Africa, possibly due to language similarity and cultural heritage. Although most 
coefficients are negative, generally they are not significant, except for France, Germany, 
Spain and marginally Poland. 
 
7.5.3. Project Characteristics, BRICS Countries and Global Regions 
 
Table 7.11 allows the probability of location to vary both by sources (i.e. BRICS countries 
and two global regions) and by project characteristics.  It is encouraging that there are not 
many differences in the relative probabilities for the location choice of FDI projects 
compared to the two previous tables.  In particular, in the case of the project characteristics 
there are only a few differences in the estimates, with Austria and Sweden now no longer 
less likely to be a base for headquarters / R&D and Austria, Spain and Slovenia more 
likely to be a location for start-up FDI. 
Compared with the project characteristics, there are more changes in the 
probabilities for the BRICS countries.  Countries that are now more attractive to FDI once 
these other factors are controlled for include France and Sweden in the EU-15 and 
Bulgaria and Romania in the CEEC-10, which are the two 2007 entrants to the European 
Union.  Finally, Table 7.11 also presents the results for the global source regions of Europe 
and North America.   These show that North American investment prefers France and 
Germany to the UK, but the UK is a more favourable location for this investment 
compared to many of the CEEC-10 countries. On the other hand European investment is 
less likely to locate in the UK than in any other country.  
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Table 7.11: FDI Location Choice for All Sources: Project Characteristics and Source Countries / Regions 
Model: Multinomial Logit Model 
Country Fixed Effects: Yes 
Investment Source Variable (𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏): All Source 
Host 
Case Variables 
Project Characteristics BRICS Global Regions 
Manufacturing 
Headquarters / 
R&D 
Start-up Brazil  Russia India  China 
South 
Africa 
 North 
America 
 Europe 
EU-15 
Austria 0.58*** 0.10 -0.08 0.43 1.63*** -1.74** -2.04** -0.45 -0.20 1.66*** 
Belgium 0.44*** -0.72*** -0.19*** 0.67 -0.50 -0.66*** -0.04 -0.07 -0.13 0.61*** 
Denmark -0.13 0.64*** 0.75*** -15.86 1.09* -0.87** -0.10 -16.23 -0.11 0.98*** 
Finland 0.18 -0.38** 0.35** -15.89 1.66** -0.04 -0.93 -16.27 0.12 1.61*** 
France 0.53*** -0.62*** -0.31*** 0.31 0.59* -0.73*** -0.01 -0.65 0.50*** 1.36*** 
Germany 0.41*** -0.60*** 0.41*** -0.16 1.22*** -0.43*** 0.74*** -0.57 0.17** 0.61*** 
Greece 0.75*** -0.60* 1.69*** -15.92 1.72 -0.53 -0.35 -16.31 0.52 1.50*** 
Ireland -0.11 0.30*** -0.41*** -15.86 0.27 -1.89*** -1.19** -0.33 0.95*** 0.82*** 
Italy 0.17** -0.54*** 0.58*** 0.19 1.41*** -1.65*** 0.75*** -16.26 0.30* 1.36*** 
Luxembourg -0.46* 0.08 0.74** 2.29** -15.29 -16.01 -15.95 -16.27 0.05 0.88** 
Netherlands 0.25*** -0.27*** 0.56*** -0.05 0.30 -0.81*** -0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.29*** 
Portugal 0.85*** -1.54*** -0.10 2.76*** -15.30 -1.39* -15.97 -16.29 -0.52** 1.33*** 
Spain 0.43*** -0.24*** 0.12** 1.66*** 0.21 -2.03*** -0.73*** -0.55 -0.10 1.06*** 
Sweden 0.04 -0.11 0.50*** -15.87 0.07 -0.35 0.63** -16.25 0.18 1.26*** 
UK Base Alternative 
CEEC-10 
Bulgaria 1.15*** -1.33*** 0.61*** -15.91 2.73*** -1.44 0.06 0.68 0.32 2.34*** 
Czech Republic 1.44*** -1.15*** 0.40*** -15.89 0.66 -1.45*** -1.97*** -0.11 -0.58*** 0.79*** 
Estonia 0.86*** -2.19*** 0.16 -15.92 5.06*** -16.04 -15.98 -16.29 1.56** 3.88*** 
Hungary 1.37*** -1.26*** 0.07 -15.89 0.02 -1.38*** -0.51* -16.28 -0.29*** 1.17*** 
Latvia 0.57*** -2.38*** 1.55*** -15.91 3.93*** -16.03 -15.97 1.97* 0.22 2.56*** 
Lithuania 0.82*** -1.86*** 1.16*** -15.93 3.50*** -1.06 -15.98 -16.30 -0.30 1.91*** 
Poland 1.24*** -1.39*** 0.46*** -15.89 -0.15 -1.09*** -1.72*** -0.75 -0.21** 1.22*** 
Romania 1.12*** -1.15*** 0.50*** 0.12 1.67*** -0.43 -0.77 -16.29 -0.12 1.92*** 
Slovakia 1.76*** -1.95*** 0.60*** 1.34** -15.30 -2.49** -2.58** -16.32 -0.62*** 1.04*** 
Slovenia 1.29*** -1.07*** 0.37* -15.94 2.22** -16.06 -16.00 -16.30 0.36 2.30*** 
Number of Observations 817,100 
Number of Cases 32,684 
Log Likelihood -81,467.08 
Notes: Location choice for 32,684 projects across the EU-25 countries over 1998 - 2010 estimating using the Multinomial Logit model.  Coefficients are log-odds ratios relative to the UK base 
case.  Country terms and Country fixed-effects are included, but not shown in the table. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.   
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7.6. Conclusions  
 
This chapter explores three questions based on the Conditional Logit and Multinomial 
Logit models.  The first is about the effect of the country variables (i.e. characteristics of 
host countries) on the location choice of the foreign investors from different global source 
regions or countries.  Sections 7.2 and 7.3 use the Conditional Logit model to discuss this 
question based on all sources and four regions (i.e. Europe, North America, BRICS and 
the Other).  The second question is whether BRICS investment has a ‘follow-the-leader’ 
pattern across the EU-25 locations.  To this end, Section 7.4 explores the effects of 
locational determinants for the BRICS FDI using the same model.  Finally, the third 
question is how FDI from all sources actually locates across the individual EU-25 
countries allowing for differences in project characteristics and sources.  This is examined 
in Section 7.5 using a Multinomial Logit model, which looks at the relative attractiveness 
of countries. 
On the first question, the main conclusions are as follows.  First, while there are 
some changes in the effect of the country variables when different FDI lagged terms are 
considered, most of these have a significant effect on the location choice of FDI from all 
sources, including the demand variables, unemployment rate and EU terms, such as EU 
membership.  Second, different country variables are relevant for FDI locating in the EU-
25 from different global regions.  The location choice of European FDI is similar to that 
of FDI from all sources because most FDI in the EU-25 countries come from these 
countries.  However, EU membership is not so important for FDI from the other three 
global regions.  Third, BRICS FDI is attracted by only some of the country variables, 
including the economic growth rate, real wage rate and higher education level.   This 
differs to FDI from all sources, which may be because BRICS has a different level of 
economic development compared to Europe and North America. 
On the second issue, the chapter finds that FDI from all sources prefers locations 
that are associated with previous investment from Europe and the BRICS, where China is 
the leader for global FDI across all BRICS countries.  When FDI from different global 
regions is considered, each region has a different pattern with respect to previous 
investment. Locations with European FDI attract FDI from Europe and the rest of the 
world (i.e. the Other region).  However BRICS FDI as a whole is ‘followed’ by the 
investments of all global regions, excluding itself.  When the BRICS outward FDI is 
disaggregated by the individual BRICS countries I find that BRICS FDI ‘follows’ FDI 
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from the same BRICS country in the preceding year, but it ‘avoids’ the location of 
previous FDI from the other four BRICS countries as a whole.  When these results are 
disaggregated for individual BRICS countries, the signs on these effects are almost 
uniformly consistent with this, although not always significant. 
Finally, on the third question, when controls are included for project characteristics 
and sources, there are significantly different probabilities of FDI from each global region 
and the BRICS countries locating in each EU-25 countries compared with the base case, 
which is the UK.  In virtually all cases, investment projects are more likely to be located 
in the UK, which is the main location for FDI in the EU-25 countries.  With regards to the 
BRICS, some heterogeneity is again apparent.  Brazilian investment strongly avoids the 
CEECs, while this region is a strong attraction for Russian FDI owing to its historical ties.  
Likewise, Brazilian FDI is strongly attracted to Spain and Portugal, and Indian and South 
African FDI to the UK (although differences in the latter case are not significant), owing 
to historical and language ties.  Chinese FDI tends to favour locations in north-western 
Europe, mainly larger industrialized countries such as France, Germany and the UK. 
Overall, this chapter finds evidence for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS, 
and this suggests that there is distinctiveness in its investment behaviour.  Possible 
explanations for this behaviour are considered in Chapter 9, which concludes the thesis.  
Before this, count data models are used in Chapter 8 to further explore the location of 
individual BRICS countries.   The chapter examines whether consistent results can be 
obtained for the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in this chapter, as well as for the effects of 
the country variables. 
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Chapter 8. Count Data Analysis 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to explore the locational determinants of the FDI projects locating in 
the EU-25 countries and originating from the BRICS countries.  Again, it considers 
whether there is evidence of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour, whereby FDI from a BRICS 
country locates in the same country as earlier FDI originating either from the same or 
other BRICS countries, whether taken singly or as a whole.  This potentially provides 
evidence of linkages between investments and investigates whether the investment 
climate in some countries or certain project characteristics are more favourable to FDI 
arriving from certain BRICS.  This chapter also considers whether investment from one 
BRICS country locates away from other BRICS investment, suggesting that it reflects 
different location determinants.  For these purposes, this chapter uses models of count data 
analysis, i.e. data on the number of FDI projects that locate in a country in a particular 
year.  These models are different to the logit approach that was used in Chapter 7, but the 
results of these two chapters are subsequently compared. 
The basic econometric technique used in this chapter is a log-linear regression of 
the FDI project count data.  However, as there are many zero investments from the BRICS 
in some countries (and in the early years of the study period in particular), other count 
data models are used, such as the Negative Binomial (NB), Poisson, Hurdle, Zero-Inflated 
and Zero-Truncated models.  This chapter considers FDI from the BRICS countries only, 
whereas in Chapter 7 all investments were considered, regardless of the global source 
region from which they came.  In order to facilitate the comparison of the results with the 
estimates in Chapter 7, the explanatory variables of this chapter are basically the same as 
those that were used earlier.  The signs and significance of coefficients are discussed in 
details based on all above models, but marginal effects are only considered for the main 
results in Table 8.11 based on ZINB model as it is the most preferred model for my data, 
which is also discussed in this chapter. 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows.  Section 8.2 uses a log-linear model and OLS 
estimation to give the benchmark results.  According to Chapter 6, most BRICS FDI in 
the EU-25 countries is in manufacturing, so this chapter also investigates the location 
choice of BRICS FDI projects in this sector.44  To explore the issue of ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour in FDI location, a new variable is introduced for BRICS FDI arising from 
countries other than the BRICS country that is under consideration, which is similar to 
Chapter 7.  Section 8.3 uses the Poisson and NB models to investigate the locational 
determinants of BRICS FDI in the EU-25. 
To deal with the issue of zero investments, more advanced methods are used in 
Section 8.4 based on all BRICS FDI only.  First, this section considers the Hurdle and 
Zero-Inflated versions of the Poisson and NB models, estimated on the entire BRICS 
dataset.  These models analyse the location choice of FDI in two stages: in the first stage, 
factors are explored that determine FDI location in a particular country; and in a second 
stage, the effects of different locational determinants are explored.  These determinants 
are the same in both stages in the Hurdle model, but the Zero-Inflated model allows for 
differences in these between the two stages.  Second, Section 8.4 drops the zero 
investment observations from the data and uses the Zero-Truncated Poisson (ZTP) and 
NB (ZTNB) models to compare with the results based on the whole dataset.  Section 8.5 
uses the approaches of Section 8.4 to investigate the FDI location for individual BRICS 
countries, both for all and manufacturing FDI.  Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.6. 
 
8.2. Benchmark Results for BRICS FDI Location 
 
This section investigates the effect of the locational determinants of BRICS FDI in the 
EU-25 countries over the whole study period.  The FDI data are lagged, which means that 
for the years 1998 to 2010 there are 325 observations rather than 350 observations.  The 
dependent variable in this chapter is measured by the number of FDI projects from a 
BRICS country or countries in an EU-25 country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡).  This is different to 
the dummy variable that was used in the logit analysis in Chapter 7.  This dependent 
variable captures the number of projects from all BRICS countries going to country 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡.  The BRICS lagged FDI term (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) captures the number of projects in the same 
country 𝑖 but for the previous year 𝑡 − 1.  Of course, in considering the project counts one 
                                                            
44 For simplicity, according to the discussion of Chapter 5, the number of FDI projects in manufacturing is 
combined with the relatively small number of projects in the energy and construction sector. 
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difficulty is the large number of zero observations.  Table 8.1 shows the number of zero 
and non-zero observations for BRICS FDI projects in the EU-25 countries for 1997-2010 
as a whole, but also for the 325 observations used here. 
 
Table 8.1: Zero and Non-Zero BRICS FDI in EU-25 Countries 
BRICS 
Country 
All Observations (1997 - 2010) 325 Observations (1998 - 2010) 
Non-Zero 
(cases)  
Zero 
(cases) 
Non-Zero 
/ All (%) 
Non-Zero 
(cases)  
Zero 
(cases) 
Non-Zero 
/ All (%) 
Brazil 39 311 11.1% 38 287 11.7% 
Russia 98 252 28.0% 96 229 29.5% 
India 104 246 29.7% 102 223 31.4% 
China 107 243 30.6% 105 220 32.3% 
South Africa 50 300 14.3% 45 280 13.9% 
All BRICS 197 153 56.3% 189 136 58.2% 
Note: Number of years for which there are a non-zero and zero number of projects for each country. 
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The table reveals that the proportion of non-zero projects from each BRICS country over 
the whole period is less than 35%. China has the largest percentages of non-zero 
observations, at 32.3% when the shorter period 1998-2010 is considered.  The table 
suggests that the zero observations account for larger share than the non-zero observations 
(i.e. around two-thirds of observations on FDI counts are zeros), which can lead to 
problems in estimating the Poisson and NB models, as explained below.  
To address the problem of the zero observations, two-stage models are 
subsequently used (i.e. the Hurdle and Zero-Inflated models).  However, in order for these 
models to work, I find it is necessary to drop the country fixed-effects in the second stage 
of estimation.  This is possibly because these terms are not identified when included in 
both stages of the regression.  Therefore, to capture the effect of country fixed-effects (i.e. 
larger countries tend to get more FDI in each year) I include the real GDP to replace the 
country fixed-effects.  For consistency, the country fixed-effects are replaced by real GDP 
in all of the tables presented in the body of the text, while I consider the implication of 
this in the Appendix Tables.   
In addition to the country fixed-effects, I try to include time fixed-effects, although 
these appear to experience the same problem as the country fixed-effects in the count 
models.  As a consequence, in order to contain time fixed-effects as many as possible, all 
of them are generally included in the regressions, but some or all of them have to be 
dropped in the second stage of the regression.  To summarise, time fixed-effects are 
included in the OLS, Poisson and NB models, but other count data models exclude them 
to obtain results for certain BRICS countries.  In order to show that these fixed effects do 
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not impact too much on the estimates of the variables, I again include tables of results 
with or without these two kinds of fixed effects in the Appendices. 
This section uses OLS estimation of a log-linear model of FDI counts.  It is divided 
into three parts.  The first part provides the benchmark estimates on the location 
determinants.  The second part explores BRICS FDI in manufacturing only, and the third 
part introduces a new source variable to analyse the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  Like 
the lagged FDI term, all of the country variables are lagged one year. 
 
8.2.1. All BRICS Investment: Log-Linear Model 
 
A log-linear model and OLS estimation is used to give benchmark results on the effects 
of the locational determinants and the BRICS lagged FDI terms.  Since Table 8.1 shows 
that there are many zero investments by the BRICS in the EU-25, the dependent variable 
and BRICS lagged FDI terms are measured by the log of the original number of projects 
plus one, i.e. ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 1)  and ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 1)  respectively.  This transformation 
avoids the problem caused by the zero investments.  Notwithstanding the zeros, it reduces 
the variation in the absolute change of the number of FDI projects, so that it possibly 
weakens the significance of the results. 
Table 8.2 gives the results from the log-linear OLS regression with robust standard 
errors45.  Each regression has the same country variables, but whereas each of these 
includes the real GDP term and time fixed-effects, for the reason outlined above they do 
not include the country fixed-effects.  Columns I to VI show the results based on the 
different source variables.  Column I considers the effect of all BRICS investments in the 
preceding year in the same host country and columns II to VI consider the effects of 
previous investments from each BRICS country.  In order to examine the effects of the 
omitting the country fixed-effects, Appendix Table 8.1 gives the results that are based on 
the OLS estimation including all of the country and time fixed-effects, but excluding the 
real GDP term.  R2 in this table suggests that China and India provide much better fit to 
the model, which indicates that they should be estimated separately. However, there is a 
greater efficiency from estimating the five BRICS countries jointly. 
  
                                                            
45 The robust standard errors contribute to make standard deviation is insensitive to heteroscedasticity that 
could exist in the model. Thus, it is used here for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 8.2: BRICS FDI Location: Log-Linear Model (Each BRICS) 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 0.70*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.20* 0.44*** 0.15** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -1.24** -0.55 -0.71* -0.35 -0.18 -0.40 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 16.50 -2.65 15.70* -0.05 14.70* -1.47 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.25 -1.33** -0.58 2.03*** -0.36 1.71*** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.42*** 0.38 0.07 0.98** -0.01 0.93*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.80 0.28 -1.30* -0.75 0.72 -1.01** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 1.38** -0.09 0.29 0.08 1.13*** -0.33 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) 1.03 -0.61 1.14 1.07 0.40 0.65 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -4.81 -0.78 -6.16 -2.07 2.63 -4.74 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -7.55 6.90 3.37 -13.80*** 3.87 -12.30*** 
Political Risk (x10−3) 15.90** -1.05 4.78 10.60* 2.35 7.53** 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 5.09 -1.10 8.32** 7.30* -4.72 6.81** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -12.30*** -4.31* 3.85* -4.08 -4.85 -5.42*** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.84 -0.54 -0.77 -1.79 1.17 -1.00 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 1.59 -1.67 3.23 4.33 -6.27* 4.33* 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 7.45** -1.05 3.45 5.34* 0.35 2.86 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -1.32 1.68 2.64 0.34 -4.17** -0.63 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -33.30*** 6.42 4.85 -12.60 -19.70** 2.15 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -18.40 -5.50 11.80 -11.60 -8.99 -2.17 
EU Membership (x10−2) 3.10 -7.44 12.90 12.40 -21.80 6.56 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -14.70 -1.36 -18.60** -3.58 4.84 -4.73 
Source Variables, 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟏) 
(x10-2): 
      
All BRICS  38.70*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 12.54 5.22 20.30** 12.60 7.70 
Russia - -9.05 5.41 9.95 0.98 1.14 
India - 19.60*** 1.96 32.80*** 27.80*** 9.61** 
China - 1.67 10.30* 30.30*** 30.00*** 5.30 
South Africa - 6.62 18.90** 4.99 9.10 4.59 
Constant (x10-1) -9.75 6.36 -6.42 -12.62* 2.74 -7.24* 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.79 0.40 0.43 0.78 0.80 0.52 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice of FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. OLS estimation with robust standard 
errors. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Explanatory Variables 
In general, column I of Table 8.2 shows that there are not as many significant variables 
for all BRICS FDI compared to those for FDI from all sources in Table 7.1 of Chapter 7.  
However, most of the significant variables have the same sign as in Table 7.1 and some 
of them continue to be significant at the 1% level.  It gives us some confidence regarding 
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the results, and it means that the BRICS investors are interested only in some 
characteristics of the host countries. 
With regard to the demand variables, Table 8.2 shows that larger economies, as 
measured by GDP, attract significantly more BRICS FDI, but with the exception of 
Brazilian FDI.  This is supported by previous studies such as Janicki et al. (2004) and 
Jadhav (2010), who show that larger real output attracts more FDI.  The coefficient on 
GDP per capita has a negative sign across all five countries, but it is significant only for 
all BRICS and for Russia, which indicates that their investments prefer locations with 
lower per capita income.  The real GDP growth rate and population density are significant 
for several BRICS countries.  Thus, Russia and China are interested in locations with 
higher economic growth rate, while India and South Africa prefer locations with higher 
population density.  This is in contrast to Brazilian investment, which prefers the less-
populated countries.  A positive sign on external market demand means that FDI prefer 
locations close to the core of European market, as discussed in Chapter 7, but it is 
significant for India and South Africa only.  
Turning to the labour market variables in Table 8.2, the unemployment rate and 
real wage rate are significant for one or two countries only.  This may be because most 
BRICS FDI projects are located in France, Germany or the UK, which suggests that 
BRICS investors are interested in the size of the internal market at the expense of any 
other factors.  Regarding the cost factors, the BRICS prefer countries with lower company 
tax rate, although the effects are insignificant.  Chapter 7 finds that motorway density has 
a positive effect on location, although here it is strongly negative and significant for FDI 
from India and South Africa.  It is possible that this term captures other factors, such as 
congestion.  The positive and significant effect of risk in columns I, IV and VI indicates 
that investments from all BRICS, India and South Africa prefer locations with lower risks, 
even though the risks are comparatively low for all the EU-25 countries. 
The effects of the education variables on BRICS investment are different from 
those on other global investment.  Table 7.1 shows that higher education is always 
insignificant and secondary education is positive and significant when different source 
variables are included.  However, Table 8.2 shows that all BRICS and each individual 
country are not interested in secondary education, and that they may even avoid locations 
with better secondary education.  Nevertheless, Russia, India and South Africa prefer 
locations with better higher education rates, which indicates that they prefer locations 
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where the labour force has ‘higher skills’, rather than ‘middle skills’, which are required 
by investors from all sources (in Table 7.1).  
With regard to the trade variables, Table 8.2 shows that there are the unexpected 
signs for these variables, although it is generally for at most a single BRICS country, so 
that overall I can conclude that the BRICS are not as interested in these international trade 
factors as are the investors from all sources.  In particular, the exchange rate volatility 
should be negative, so that a more stable exchange rate attracts more FDI inflows, but it 
is significant for India only.  The openness to trade, which is insignificant for each BRICS 
country, should be positive, which indicates that a higher degree of openness prompts 
more FDI inflows.  While the effect of the exchange rate should be negative, so that a 
country is unattractive to FDI when the domestic currency appreciates, but it is positive 
and significant for South Africa.  
Several EU policy terms are considered in the analysis of BRICS investments in 
the EU-25.  Compared with Table 7.1, an obvious difference is that all five EU policy 
terms are significant for all investors in Table 7.1, but Table 8.2 shows that only Russia 
and China are interested in any of these, and indeed may be deterred (e.g. Chinese 
investment is repelled by the EU Structural Funds and Euro currency membership).  A 
possible reason for this, as discussed in Chapter 7, is that the Structural Funds contribute 
to less-developed areas and may signal a depressed economy.  Further, membership of the 
Euro is meant to reduce transaction costs and exchange rate risks, but the negative sign of 
this dummy variable may be due to the fact that most FDI from China is located outside 
the Eurozone and in the UK, so it captures other effects.  The negative and significant 
effect of the post-membership dummy on Russian FDI indicates that it decreases after EU 
accession.  Table 8.2 shows that the EU membership of the CEECs does not make these 
countries more attractive for BRICS FDI either in the run-up or afterwards. 
 
The Lagged FDI Term 
The lagged number of FDI projects is also used to explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour, 
like in Chapter 7.  Column I of Table 8.2 includes the preceding year’s investment from 
all BRICS as an explanatory variable, and it shows that BRICS investment ‘follows’ its 
own previous investment (i.e. the term is positive and significant at the 1% level), whereas 
in column IX of Table 7.5 it is insignificant.  In order to check the robustness of the result 
in column I of Table 8.2, and to further explore the ‘leader’ hypothesis for BRICS 
countries, the lagged investment of each individual country is introduced in columns II to 
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VI.  Each column shows a tendency to follow one or more countries’ investments.  India 
and China appear to play a role as ‘leaders’ for FDI from the BRICS countries.  Indian 
FDI is ‘followed’ by other Indian investment, but also by FDI from Brazil, China and 
South Africa in the following year.  Chinese FDI also shows significant inertia and is 
‘followed’ by Russian and Indian FDI.  Brazilian and South African FDI is ‘followed’ by 
FDI from one other BRICS country only (India and Russia respectively), while no BRICS 
investors seem to ‘follow’ Russian FDI.  
Appendix Table 8.1 explores the same issue, but with country fixed-effects instead 
of the real GDP term.  This table shows that there are no substantial changes in the results 
for the lagged FDI terms, except for South Africa where the own-country term is negative 
and significant.  This is perhaps a perverse result and it is considered further below.  
Overall, Table 8.2 shows that the BRICS countries prefer EU-25 country locations in 
which previous FDI from the BRICS has located.  At the individual BRICS country level, 
this is the case for China and India, and these can be regarded as BRICS ‘leaders’ as FDI 
from other BRICS countries tends to follow them.  The analysis shows some BRICS 
countries ‘avoid’ the EU-25 country locations of other BRICS countries, so that these 
investments are distinct. 
 
8.2.2. BRICS FDI Location: Log-Linear Model with a New Lagged FDI Term 
 
This section further explores the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of investors by measuring 
the number of FDI projects originating from the other BRICS countries using a single 
variable only, potentially reducing any collinearity between the lagged FDI terms in Table 
8.2.  This variable captures whether the FDI of each BRICS country follows or avoids the 
investments of the other BRICS countries.  It is included for each BRICS country, and for 
the BRICS as a whole, where in the former case the lagged variables count the number of 
projects originating from the same BRICS country and from the other four BRICS 
countries locating in the same country in the previous year.  Table 8.3 gives the regression 
results for the log-linear model using OLS. 
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Table 8.3: BRICS FDI Location: Log-Linear Model (All BRICS) 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 0.70*** 0.05 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.20*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -1.24** -0.50 -0.78** -0.44 -0.28 -0.43 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 16.50 -0.56 16.50* 3.60 17.20** 0.57 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.25 -0.85 -0.23 1.76** 0.26 1.82*** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.42*** 0.60* 0.32 1.07** 0.41 1.05*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.80 0.27 -1.44* -0.67 0.41 -1.05** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 1.38** -0.12 0.26 0.25 1.02** -0.31 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) 1.03 -0.45 1.35 1.08 0.67 0.72 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -4.81 0.26 -6.44 -1.75 2.27 -4.52 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -7.55 3.25 0.37 -12.40** -1.21 -13.30*** 
Political Risk (x10−3) 15.90** 1.17 7.00 11.03 5.85 8.53** 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 5.09 -1.09 9.43** 6.71* -2.79 6.96*** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -12.30*** -6.10** 1.69 -6.41* -7.49** -6.59*** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.84 -0.84 -0.87 -1.55 0.36 -1.18 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 1.59 -2.51 3.54 1.56 -6.65** 3.19 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 7.45** -0.26 3.83 5.41* 1.74 3.35* 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -1.32 1.21 2.01 -1.12 -4.32** -1.03 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -33.30*** 2.35 2.65 -16.10 -24.00*** -0.35 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -18.40 -9.24 11.50 -10.90 -12.10 -3.49 
EU Membership (x10−2) 3.10 -8.68 10.80 6.04 -19.80 5.70 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -14.70 0.71 -19.10** -4.33 4.52 -4.60 
Source Variables, ln (FDIit-1 + 1) (x10-2):       
All BRICS  38.70*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 20.70* - - - - 
Russia - - 9.85 - - - 
India - - - 51.60*** - - 
China - - - - 46.70*** - 
South Africa - - - - - 11.50 
BRICS, excluding the same country - 9.95*** 7.85 13.90** 11.40** 7.12** 
Constant (x10-1) -9.75 5.03 -7.87 -10.07 0.81 -7.01 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.79 0.35 0.41 0.75 0.78 0.51 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes:  Location choice of FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  OLS estimation with robust standard 
errors.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Compared with Table 8.2, there are few changes in the effects of the country variables.  
Table 8.3 shows that most BRICS countries are attracted by the economic size of the host 
country, external market demand and its education level, but they are not interested in EU 
policy terms.  Again, Chinese investment is repelled by the EU Structural Funds and 
Eurozone membership, while Russian investment falls significantly post-membership.  
The lagged FDI terms also show similar results to those in Table 8.2, as all individual 
BRICS countries follow their own previous investment significantly, but except for Russia 
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and South Africa.  However, Table 8.3 also shows that BRICS investors from each country 
are attracted by the previous investment from other BRICS countries.  This is similar to 
Table 8.2, where each country follows several or all other four individual countries’ FDI.  
This is not opposite to the results of Chapter 7 as Table 7.8 shows that most individual 
countries cannot avoid the location of other four countries significantly and it does not 
show which specific country is avoided by others.  Appendix Tables 8.2 and 8.3 also 
explore ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour with and without the fixed effects.  The results are 
similar to those in Table 8.3, but again except for South Africa in Appendix Table 8.2, 
whose investors do not prefer the location of previous South African FDI.  This is opposite 
to the results of Table 8.3 and main conclusion of Chapter 7, which shows that individual 
BRICS countries prefer to follow the location of their own previous FDI.  This further 
illustrates that it is reasonable to use GDP instead of country fixed effects.   
Overall, Tables 8.2 and 8.3 (and the two appendix tables) based on the OLS 
estimation find consistent results that each BRICS country prefers to follow its own 
previous FDI.  However, Table 8.2 suggests that they do not avoid all locations of FDI 
that arises from the other four BRICS countries, and Table 8.3 indicates that they even 
follow the location of FDI from other four countries when these are considered as a group.  
In this sense, F-test is used to compare the difference between the columns for the same 
BRICS country in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.  Testing results are shown in Table 8.4 below. 
 
Table 8.4: F-Test for Comparing Columns of Tables 8.2 and 8.3 
F-Test 
I II III IV V 
Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
V1 298 298 298 298 298 
V2 26 26 26 26 26 
F-test Value 0.96 0.40 1.56 1.15 0.24 
Critical Value 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 
Notes: The test is based on the 5% significant level. V1 = number of observations – number of regressors. 
V2 = number of regressors – 1. 
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Table 8.4 shows that F-test values for all BRICS countries are less than the critical values 
at the 5% significant level, which means there is not significant difference between the 
columns for the same BRICS country in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.  However, Table 8.3 
considering FDI from other four countries as a whole shows that nearly all BRICS 
countries not only follow its own previous investment, but also follow other four countries’ 
investment as a whole significantly, excluding Russia.  This means that Table 8.3 cannot 
show the difference in ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour among BRICS countries.  Therefore, 
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results in Table 8.2 are preferred and there is a greater efficiency from estimating the five 
BRICS countries jointly in this table. 
 
8.2.3. BRICS Manufacturing FDI Location: Log-Linear Model 
 
According to Chapter 6, most BRICS FDI projects are located in the manufacturing sector.  
For the whole BRICS, there are 184 zero observations to all 350 observations for the 
manufacturing FDI.  The number of zero observations for Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa is 318, 283, 285, 253 and 316 respectively.  This section repeats the analysis 
of Section 8.2.1, rather than Section 8.2.2 to examine whether the results for BRICS 
manufacturing FDI are similar to those found for all BRICS FDI.  This is because Table 
8.2 is more preferred than Table 8.3 as mentioned above.  Table 8.5 gives the results for 
BRICS manufacturing FDI based on OLS estimation of the log-linear model. 
For the country variables, Table 8.5 shows the results for manufacturing FDI are 
similar to those of Table 8.2.  First, the demand variables are the main country 
characteristics to attract FDI from the BRICS, where each individual country is interested 
in one or two variables in this group.  Second, all other groups of country variables do not 
have significant effects on all BRICS countries, which is similar to that of all FDI from 
the BRICS.  Third, all BRICS countries’ manufacturing FDI are still not interested in the 
rate of corporate income tax and the openness to trade (i.e. insignificant).  However, one 
difference between Tables 8.2 and 8.5 is that all BRICS manufacturing FDI is not affected 
by political risk, whereas it was attracted by this in Table 8.2.  Further, Russian and Indian 
manufacturing FDI is more sensitive to the EU policy terms, although this is not the case 
for Brazil and South Africa. 
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Table 8.5: BRICS Manufacturing FDI Location: Log-Linear Model 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 0.68*** 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.49*** 0.06 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -1.04** -0.64** -0.57* 0.38 -0.40 -0.31 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 28.67** -1.32 8.28 5.01 13.32 -2.23 
Population Density (x10−3) 0.68 -1.33** -0.30 1.85*** -0.30 1.02** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.30*** 0.45 0.08 0.24 0.37 0.68*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.37 0.42 -1.12* -0.40 0.63 -0.88** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 1.28** 0.13 0.23 -0.16 0.99*** -0.17 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) 0.75 -0.65 1.28 0.55 0.71 0.43 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -3.11 -1.74 -5.44 -1.66 2.90 -1.24 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -4.45 6.98* 2.12 -10.20** 0.30 -8.20*** 
Political Risk (x10−3) 6.97 -2.72 -0.87 4.55 5.07 3.69 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 0.36 -1.20 8.35** 3.93 -5.11 4.67** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -12.30*** -4.15** 2.10 -0.35 -6.86** -2.61* 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.17 -0.85 -0.03 -0.39 0.96 -0.97 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 2.04 -2.17 7.58** 2.84 -5.85* 2.88 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 5.52* -1.00 1.69 3.28 0.46 0.81 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -2.03 0.08 3.77** 1.96 -4.10* -0.13 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -28.90*** 5.46 6.35 -7.34 -18.50** 3.00 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -21.20 -8.27 15.04 -13.81* -12.10 2.77 
EU Membership (x10−2) -13.90 -1.99 4.07 12.20 -19.90 9.17 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -7.92 -1.27 -15.80** -3.71 5.45 -6.99 
Source Variables, ln (FDIit-1 + 1) (x10-2):       
All BRICS  30.23*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 7.84 -3.42 24.30* 4.87 4.50 
Russia - -9.89** -8.66 9.89 3.28 -4.10 
India - 16.60** 6.41 24.80*** 26.10*** 13.10*** 
China - 2.22 11.50** 28.50*** 30.60*** 2.57 
South Africa - 5.91 -0.43 9.04 12.04 6.55 
Constant (x10-1) -3.04 8.19* -5.50 -7.68 0.82 -4.22 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.72 0.35 0.28 0.65 0.75 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.26 0.18 0.61 0.72 0.32 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. OLS estimation with robust standard 
errors.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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For the lagged FDI terms, Indian and Chinese manufacturing investment follows their 
own lagged FDI significantly, but the lag is insignificant for Brazil, Russia and South 
Africa.  Each country does not avoid the location of the other four countries’ investments 
significantly, except for that Brazil avoids previous Russian investment.  It also can be 
seen that China and India being the ‘leaders’ among the five countries.  Appendix Table 
8.4 uses country fixed-effects instead of real GDP and gives similar results, except for 
Russia and India.  The former avoids locations with its own previous FDI and the latter 
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prefers to follow Chinese investments instead of its own.  Overall, regardless of how the 
previous BRICS investment is measured (Table 8.3) or whether attention is focused on 
manufacturing (Table 8.5), BRICS FDI appears to be attracted by the same locational 
determinants in the EU-25 and there is evidence of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  The 
results from the OLS estimation are broadly consistent with Chapter 7 as it does not show 
which specific country is avoided by others. 
 
8.3. BRICS FDI Location: the Poisson and Negative Binomial Models 
 
It is well-known that OLS is more suitable for continuous dependent variables, whereas 
the Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) models are generally used for dependent 
variables that are measured using discrete count data.  In this section these other count 
data approaches are used to repeat the analysis and compare the results with those of the 
log-linear OLS estimation.  In the previous section, the dependent variable is measured 
by the log of the number of projects plus one, but here the actual number of projects is 
used as the dependent variable. The signs and significance of coefficients are discussed in 
following sections, but the marginal effects which can be estimated at the means of 
regressors and compared directly between models are estimated for the main results in 
Table 8.11.  
 
8.3.1. Results for the Poisson Model 
 
This sub-section presents the results of the Poisson model, comparing these with those 
from the OLS estimation of the log-linear model.  The Poisson model is set out in Section 
4.4.2 and it is estimated using Stata.  Both the explanatory variables and fixed effects are 
the same as above, but the difference is that the count of FDI projects is now measured by 
the actual number of projects, so that there is no need to add one project to 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1, and this is the case in following sections.  Table 8.6 gives the results for BRICS 
FDI location using the Poisson model. 
It shows that similar results are obtained for the country variables compared to 
those obtained above from the OLS estimation.46  Market demand, the labour market 
variables and education are still the most significant characteristics of the host countries.  
                                                            
46 In order to make the Poisson regression feasible for Brazil, it is necessary to exclude the time fixed effects 
for the years 1997 to 2000, but there are few investments from Brazil for these early years.   
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However, the wage rate becomes significant for more BRICS countries compared with 
the OLS estimation.  It means that these countries prefer locations with a higher wage rate, 
which may just reflect a greater level of higher education with a more-skilled workforce.  
Notably, all of the BRICS, except Brazil, are now attracted by at least one of the EU policy 
terms, so the Poisson regression suggests they play a more important role in attracting 
BRICS FDI, although the EU enlargement terms are again insignificant in each case. 
 
Table 8.6: BRICS FDI Location: Poisson Model 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.60*** 1.26 0.98*** 1.23*** 1.98*** 1.38** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.47*** -4.72 -5.95 -13.64*** -12.61*** -5.31 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 49.30** -67.50 61.80 18.40 113.62** -83.60 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.13 -4.57 -1.45 5.10** -4.03* 8.98 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.25*** 6.10** 0.88 3.61*** 0.72 7.84*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.33 7.74 -8.39** -2.05 -1.05 -17.70* 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 5.41*** -7.60 8.00** 13.20*** 13.40*** -1.91 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -0.66 -17.17 3.80 0.31 -9.31* -6.61 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -23.60** 39.60 -66.00** -31.10 -37.60 -48.40 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 0.01 45.40 11.60 -21.70 37.40** -64.40* 
Political Risk (x10−3) 48.30*** 8.51 -30.60 59.30** 52.10** 33.70 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 11.50 -25.60 66.60*** 25.60 -33.80* 83.20** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -35.30*** -66.60** 42.80*** -20.40** -41.80*** -30.90* 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -0.71 -1.32 -6.62 -12.20*** 1.18 -3.99 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) -2.83 47.40 17.40 -14.20 -33.20* 33.03 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 5.76 13.10 -797.93** 60.10 -313.32 24.50 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -2.94 14.40 25.60** -8.16 -16.04* 22.20 
Eurozone Country -1.09*** 1.63 0.07 -1.25*** -1.77*** 0.77 
EU Commitment -0.19 -17.67 0.25 0.04 14.26 0.01 
EU Membership (x10−2) 19.20 1498.23 -27.70 195.90* -77.60 127.80 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -32.90** -155.50 -62.90** -29.60 13.10 -136.10** 
Source Variables, FDIit-1 (x 10-2):       
All BRICS  0.30 - - - - - 
Brazil - -6.72 -9.30 2.05 -7.89 0.65 
Russia - -39.50*** -13.60* -3.36 -1.52 -23.99* 
India - 11.20*** -0.85 0.70 0.74 -1.39 
China - 5.74 0.44 -0.18 -0.51 4.68* 
South Africa - 7.94 39.60*** 6.04 14.50** 1.54 
Constant (x10-1) -0.40 -64.84 -6.12 -35.51 -96.24 -80.77 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Log likelihood -485.90 -89.18 -216.56 -256.93 -263.50 -114.91 
Pseudo R2 0.80 0.57 0.37 0.79 0.77 0.49 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  Time fixed-effects for Brazil are from 
2001 to 2010.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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For the lagged FDI terms, the results are markedly different for the Poisson model, and 
two features stand out in Table 8.5.  First, it can be seen that no country follows its own 
previous investment significantly, and indeed Russian investors are put off by previous 
Russian FDI.  Second, China and India lose their ‘leadership’ role in most cases.  In order 
to confirm whether there are changes caused by the fixed effects, Appendix Table 8.5 
performs the regressions without any fixed effects (i.e. excluding both country and time 
fixed-effects), but it gives similar results to Table 8.6, particularly regarding the effect of 
the lagged dependent variables.  Overall, the log-linear functional form appears to give a 
much better fit to the data compared to the Poisson distribution.  This is because the FDI 
data contain a large number of zeros, so it is not distributed as a Poisson.  This means that 
the Poisson is not a particular good model for detecting ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of 
BRICS FDI in the context of early stage FDI. 
Pseudo R2 is used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of some logistic and count data 
models as R2 does not exist.  This is because estimates for these models are not calculated 
based on minimizing the variance, which means that the OLS approach to goodness-of-fit 
cannot apply.  Pseudo R2 can be used to evaluate multiple models and predict the outcome 
on the same dataset, but they cannot be compared across datasets.  In this sense, pseudo 
R2 reported in tables but without explanation only aims to make tables more complete. 
 
8.3.2. Results for the Negative Binomial Model 
 
This sub-section uses the Negative Binomial model instead, which is discussed in Section 
4.4.3.  It is a more general model than the Poisson model as it enables us to examine from 
a statistical point of view whether the Poisson model is suitable, for which the over-
dispersion parameter reported by the NB model is used.  The Poisson model imposes the 
restriction that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean, but if there is 
over-dispersion in the FDI count data (i.e. conditional variance is greater than the 
conditional mean) then the NB model should be used, as it allows for these to differ.  
However, if the over-dispersion parameter is insignificant, so that the variance equals the 
mean then there is no loss from using the Poisson model as it gives the same results as 
that of the NB model. 
Table 8.7 shows that the NB results for all of the BRICS are similar to those of 
Table 8.6.  The over-dispersion parameter is significant at the 10% level for all BRICS 
and it suggests that the Poisson model is inappropriate (i.e. the count data are over-
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dispersed). However, the results for most individual BRICS countries indicate that the 
count data are not over-dispersed, so that there is no difference between using the Poisson 
and NB models.  In fact, the results in Table 8.7 for the individual BRICS are identical to 
those reported in Table 8.6.  The exception to this is China, because the time fixed-effects 
from 1997-2000 are dropped for China in Table 8.7, and the results are different to that of 
Table 8.6.  The over-dispersion parameter for China is also insignificant.  Appendix Table 
8.6 repeats the NB regressions without either country or time fixed-effects.  Data over-
dispersion exists for India and China, but similar results are found for both the country 
variables and lagged FDI terms for each individual BRICS country.  Overall, the NB 
model seems to give the same results as those that were obtained from the Poisson model 
since the same reason that BRICS FDI data have a large number of zeros.  Thus, it is not 
an improvement.  
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Table 8.7: BRICS FDI Location: Negative Binomial Model 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.52*** 1.26 0.98*** 1.23*** 2.02*** 1.38** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.68*** -4.72 -5.95 -13.60*** -12.20*** -5.31 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 42.10* -67.50 61.80 18.40 96.80** -83.60 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.14 -4.57 -1.45 5.10** -3.08 8.98 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.27*** 6.10** 0.88 3.61*** 0.95 7.84*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.32 7.74 -8.39** -2.05 -1.24 -17.70* 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 5.97*** -7.60 8.00** 13.20*** 12.40*** -1.91 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -0.96 -17.17 3.80 0.31 -8.87* -6.61 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -25.10** 39.60 -66.00** -31.10 -45.30* -48.40 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 0.54 45.40 11.60 -21.70 28.80* -64.40* 
Political Risk (x10−3) 43.80*** 8.50 -30.60 59.30** 60.60*** 33.70 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 10.50 -25.60 66.60*** 25.60 -22.80 83.20** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -34.30*** -66.60** 42.80*** -20.40** -39.10*** -30.90* 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.84 -1.32 -6.62 -12.20*** 1.71 -3.99 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 3.16 47.40 17.40 -14.20 -35.30* 33.03 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 4.91 13.10 -797.92** 60.10 -501.63 24.50 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -3.01 14.40 25.60** -8.16 -13.90* 22.20 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -108.50*** 163.30 6.86 -124.60*** -158.10*** 76.80 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -20.40 -1739.40 25.30 4.03 1427.72 1.47 
EU Membership (x10−2) 15.40 1470.22 -27.70 195.90* -89.30 127.80 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -34.20** -155.50 -62.90** -29.60 16.10 -136.10** 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  0.53 - - - - - 
Brazil - -6.72 -9.30 2.05 -6.57 0.65 
Russia - -39.50*** -13.60* -3.36 -2.73 -23.99* 
India - 11.20*** -0.85 0.70 0.79 -1.39 
China - 5.74 0.44 -0.18 -0.79 4.68* 
South Africa - 7.94 39.60*** 6.04 11.70** 1.54 
Constant (x10-1) -2.35 -64.84 -6.12 -35.51 -143.8 -80.77 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Log likelihood -484.66 -89.18 -216.56 -256.93 -266.06 -114.91 
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.46 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.38 
Over-dispersion Parameter (χ2) 2.47* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. Time fixed-effects for Brazil and China 
are from 2001 to 2010. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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8.4. Methods for Handling Zero FDI Project Counts 
 
So far, it has been found that the log-linear estimation gives results that are broadly 
consistent with those found in Chapter 7, but that the Poisson and NB models are less 
likely to show the consistent results.  This is possibly because of the large number of zeros 
in the count data.  To further investigate the effect of the lagged FDI terms on BRICS FDI 
location, this section introduces more advanced methods to analyse the BRICS FDI 
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location.  These are based on the discrete count data approaches that allow for the large 
number of zeros present in the FDI data.  Table 8.1 shows that half the countries and years 
receive no BRICS FDI.   
Initially, Hurdle and Zero-Inflated models are used, which are based on a two-
stage approach (see Sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5), but subsequently the zeros are removed 
using the Zero-Truncated Poisson and NB models (Section 4.4.6).  Like in previous 
sections, the country fixed-effects are replaced by real GDP, while time fixed-effects are 
dropped from this section.  This is due to the limited degrees-of-freedom for BRICS 
outward FDI, which means that in some cases the regressions do not otherwise yield 
results at all (as discussed in Section 8.2).   
 
8.4.1. Results for the Two-Stage Models 
 
Table 8.8 gives the results for the locational determinants of BRICS FDI based on the 
Hurdle and Zero-Inflated models.  As discussed in Chapter 4, in both cases, in the first 
stage a logit analysis is used to find what factors decide the location within a country and 
year (i.e. 1 = yes and 0 = no), and in the second stage the Poisson or NB model is used to 
explore the determinants of BRICS FDI location.  In the case of the Hurdle model, the 
regression variables must be the same in the first and second stages, but in the Zero-
Inflated model these variables can differ between stages.   After running many regressions 
for individual BRICS countries, I found that this model works when including real GDP 
only in the first stage but all the country variables in the second stage and without country 
or time fixed-effects.  This means that the economic size of a host country is used to decide 
whether the BRICS FDI will be located in a country, and then the host country 
characteristics determine where FDI goes in the second stage. 
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Table 8.8: All BRICS FDI Location: Hurdle and Zero-Inflated Models 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
Hurdle Models Zero-Inflated Models 
Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
I II III IV 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:     
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.62*** 1.40*** 1.63*** 1.45*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -5.43*** -8.94*** -4.85*** -6.92*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 10.50 31.50 -4.09 -2.69 
Population Density (x10−3) -0.22 -1.95 0.15 -1.38 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.49*** 1.03 2.05*** 2.22*** 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -4.70* -5.67* -5.14** -5.83** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 4.50** 10.18*** 3.36** 5.96*** 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -5.52** -6.51* -4.98** -4.85* 
Cost Factors:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -69.30*** -85.80*** -66.20*** -74.30*** 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 5.72 19.80 3.30 15.80 
Political Risk (x10−3) -17.30 -22.90 -11.80 -5.51 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education (x10−3) 62.00*** 27.20 66.30*** 46.50*** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -19.30*** -25.90*** -13.20*** -14.40** 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 4.61* 1.87 2.76 -1.36 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) -0.70 12.80 5.28 17.30* 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -69.60 101.80 -62.50 -25.50 
Policy Terms:     
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 4.30 2.22 4.47 4.81 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -64.70*** -77.80*** -58.20*** -63.50*** 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 49.70 21.10 65.10* 42.10 
EU Membership (x10−2) 25.10 18.90 13.96 25.80 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -1.16 -9.78 -21.50 -37.60** 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏  (x10
-2):      
All BRICS 0.77*** 2.22*** 0.64** 1.84*** 
Constant (x10-1) 23.42 37.33* 11.40 8.16 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 
Log likelihood -529.97 -498.70 -552.57 -520.33 
Vuong Test (z-value) N/A N/A 2.08** N/A 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  All country and time 
fixed-effects excluded throughout.  Results for the first stage of these models not shown.  For Zero-
Inflated model the first stage includes real GDP only. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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For the country variables, Table 8.8 shows similar results to those of Table 8.2.  Real GDP, 
GDP per capita, nearly all labour market and education variables, the corporate income 
tax rate and Eurozone membership are significant in each regression.  It suggests that these 
factors attract BRICS FDI to a host country regardless of what method is used for the 
analysis.  For the lagged FDI, the regressions show that there is a significant tendency for 
BRICS investment as a whole to follow previous BRICS investment, consistent with the 
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results in Table 8.2.  Column III shows a significant value of the Vuong test, which 
indicates that the Zero-Inflated Poisson is more suitable than the simple Poisson model 
for analysing BRICS investment location.47 
 
8.4.2. Results for the Zero-Truncated Models 
 
The Zero-Truncated model drops the zero investments from the regression.  The presence 
of a large number of zero cases can lead to over-dispersion in the data, and this invalidates 
the assumptions of the Poisson model.  Further, it may be that the factors that determine 
whether a country receives FDI differ to the country characteristics that determine whether 
a country that gets FDI attracts a large or small positive number of projects, so that the 
location factors are different.  An easy way to deal with this is to drop the zero 
observations and focus on the second of these.  In this case, the coefficients on the country 
variables do not measure any effect on whether a country receives FDI or not in any 
particular year.  Like Table 8.8, Table 8.9 shows the effects of the same country variables 
on BRICS FDI location based on the Zero-Truncated models.  It also compares these 
results with those for the simple Poisson and NB models, but where these are regressed 
for positive (and unadjusted) FDI counts only.  Table 8.9 shows that there are 189 
observations for each model instead of the 325 observations in the previous tables.  All 
country and time fixed-effects are excluded from these regressions. 
For the country variables, the results of Table 8.9 are consistent with those from 
the Poisson and NB models based on the whole dataset (Tables 8.6 and 8.7).  For the 
lagged FDI terms, the table also shows that the results are similar to these earlier Poisson 
and NB results.  An obvious difference is that BRICS FDI is more attracted by labour 
market variables based on the Zero-Truncated models than those based on the simple 
Poisson and NB models.  In this sense, Table 8.9 gives us an important finding that the 
results based only on the positive counts of the investment projects from the BRICS as a 
whole give similar results to those in Table 8.8 (that uses different methods) and Tables 
8.6 and 8.7 (that use the whole dataset).  It suggests that inferences about the BRICS FDI 
location can be based on regressions including the zero investments rather than just the 
positive investment counts only. 
  
                                                            
47 The Vuong test is used to investigate whether there is a significant difference between the standard 
Poisson and ZIP models.  It is not available for the other models in Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.9: All BRICS FDI Location: Zero-Truncated Models 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
Poisson 
Model 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 
Zero-Truncated Models 
Poisson Negative Binomial 
I II III IV 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:     
Demand Variables:     
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.37*** 1.11*** 1.62*** 1.40*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -2.99** -4.11** -5.43*** -8.94*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10-3) 3.30 13.50 10.50 31.47 
Population Density (x10−3) -0.06 -1.07 -0.22 -1.95 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.86*** 1.64*** 1.49*** 1.03 
Labour Market Variables:     
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -2.72 -2.39 -4.70* -5.67* 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 2.06 4.29** 4.50** 10.18*** 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -2.62 -2.32 -5.52** -6.51* 
Cost Factors:     
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10-3) -54.20*** -53.90*** -69.30*** -85.80*** 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 3.40 10.26 5.72 19.79 
Political Risk (x10-3) -1.90 0.30 -17.30 -22.90 
Education Variables:     
Higher Education (x10-3) 41.20*** 18.10 62.00*** 27.20 
Secondary Education (x10-3) -14.90*** -17.20*** -19.30*** -25.90*** 
Trade Variables:     
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 2.87 1.12 4.61* 1.87 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) -0.17 10.50 -0.70 12.84 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10-4) -110.80 -45.60 -69.60 101.80 
Policy Terms:     
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 3.54 2.35 4.30 2.22 
Eurozone Country (x10-2) -47.70*** -46.90*** -64.70*** -77.80*** 
EU Commitment (x10-2) 20.70 -5.10 49.70 21.05 
EU Membership (x10-2) -5.10 -5.30 25.10 18.88 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -6.34 -10.33 -1.16 -9.78 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):      
All BRICS 1.24*** 2.51*** 0.77*** 2.22*** 
Constant (x10-1) 15.40 13.80 23.40 37.33* 
Number of Observations 189 189 189 189 
Log likelihood -429.23 -401.11 -390.03 -358.75 
Pseudo R2 0.74 0.30 0.76 0.26 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. Poisson and NB models 
include positive FDI project counts only for comparison. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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8.5. Results for Individual BRICS Countries 
 
The OLS estimations in Section 8.2 give consistent results to those of Chapter 7, whereas 
the results based on the Poisson and NB models in Section 8.3 are not consistent.  The 
previous section considers some more-advanced methods for count data analysis.  This 
section aims to use these methods to explore the location choice of investments for each 
BRICS country, and to compare these with those for the OLS estimation.  Similar to 
Section 8.2, this section also examines the effects of all the country variables and the 
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lagged FDI terms.  The first two sub-sections consider different ways of accounting for 
the lagged FDI terms as used in Section 8.2, while the third sub-section repeats the 
analysis for manufacturing FDI only.   
As pointed out in Section 8.4, the regressions based on the Hurdle and Zero-
Truncated models in Tables 8.8 and 8.9 cannot be run for Brazil, even if all the country 
and time fixed-effects are excluded.  This is owing to the large number of zero FDI cases 
for this country (see Table 8.1).  In this section, the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
(ZINB) model is used to explore FDI location for individual BRICS.  It is preferred to the 
Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, as the NB model is more suitable than the Poisson 
model if the data are over-dispersed, while in the Zero-Inflated models regressed above 
the first stages are based on identical specifications for the Poisson and NB models.  Hence, 
the ZINB model is used to examine FDI location for the individual BRICS countries, and 
results are compared with that of log-linear model.  This is because BRICS FDI data 
contain a large number of zeros, so that it is not distributed as a Poisson or NB, and the 
second stage of ZINB model is based on the NB distribution. Therefore, ZINB model may 
also cannot give an improvement for exploring ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS 
FDI. 
 
8.5.1. BRICS FDI Location: The ZINB Model 
 
Table 8.10 shows the marginal effects of variables which are expressed as the Incidence 
Rate Ratios (IRRs) in count data models.  IRRs is the ratio of x to y, where x is the number 
of projects when a variable is considered, and y represents the number of projects when it 
is not considered. Thus, if IRRs equals one, there is no difference in the number of projects 
in a location.  If the estimates of coefficients are negative, then IRRs will be less than one, 
and conversely.  As mentioned, marginal effects can be compared directly across models.  
Table 8.11 gives the signs and significance of coefficients for BRICS FDI location in the 
EU-25 based on the ZINB model.  Column I reproduces the result for all BRICS FDI in 
column IV of Table 8.8, while columns II to VI estimate the location effect for each 
individual BRICS country in turn.   
Regarding the country variables, Table 8.11 shows consistent results with those 
found above.  Like column I, which focuses on the investment of all BRICS, it shows that 
GDP, the labour market and education variables are significant.  The results in columns II 
to VI show that GDP and education are attractive for FDI location in the individual BRICS, 
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but that the different labour market terms have different effects.  The GDP per capita and 
the corporate income tax rate are significant for many BRICS, but the population density 
is always insignificant and the trade terms are largely insignificant.  The other country 
variables and EU terms are significant for one or two BRICS only.  Overall, Table 8.11 
shows that broadly consistent estimates are found across the individual BRICS 
countries.48 
For the lagged FDI terms, the results in Table 8.11 are also broadly similar to those 
for the Poisson and NB models in Tables 8.6 and 8.7, with many of these terms are 
insignificant.  There is no clear ‘leading-country’ for other BRICS countries’ investments, 
but equally there is no BRICS country that seems to be avoided by the other BRICS 
countries.  There is also no tendency for investors to follow their own country’s 
investment, except for the case of the Russian investors, but who seem to avoid the country 
location of previous Russian FDI, albeit at the 10% significance level.  Overall, many 
variables are insignificant in Table 8.11, which suggests that very few variables are 
important factors for each of the BRICS investment. 
 
  
                                                            
48 Chow test is also used here to confirm that coefficients in last five columns are not the same. Thus, the 
five BRICS countries should be considered separately.  It is same to the results of Chow test for Table 7.3. 
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Table 8.10: Marginal Effects for BRICS FDI Location: Zero-Inflated NB Model (Each BRICS) 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP 1.00*** 1.00 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Real GDP per capita 1.00*** 1.00 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00 
Real GDP Growth Rate 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.06** 0.99 0.95 
Population Density 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 
External Market Demand 1.02*** 1.06** 1.01 1.03** 0.99 1.05* 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate 0.94** 1.01 0.90** 0.96 0.93 0.87 
Real Wage Rate 1.06*** 0.93 1.10** 1.06* 1.07 0.87* 
Real Wage Rate Dummy 0.62* 0.09 1.60 1.38 0.41 0.38 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate 0.93*** 0.96 0.92*** 0.95** 0.92*** 1.02 
Motorway Density 1.02 1.09* 1.01 0.99 1.03 0.95 
Political Risk 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.94** 1.06 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education 1.05*** 0.96 1.07*** 1.15*** 1.11*** 1.15** 
Secondary Education 0.99** 0.93*** 1.04*** 1.01 0.99 0.96** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01** 1.01 
Real Exchange Rate 1.02* 1.06* 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 
Real Exchange rate volatility 1.00 1.05 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds 1.00 1.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Eurozone Country 0.53*** 6.52 1.21 0.44*** 0.36*** 1.76 
EU Commitment 1.52 0.00 1.59 0.94 0.40 0.37 
EU Membership 1.29 0.36 0.86 5.64 0.86 1.81 
EU Post-membership 0.69** 0.08** 0.49*** 0.86 0.94 0.39 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
All BRICS  1.02*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 0.89 0.97 1.04 1.00 0.88 
Russia - 0.86 0.89* 1.04 0.97 0.95 
India - 1.12*** 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 
China - 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
South Africa - 1.35** 1.31*** 1.00 0.96 1.05 
Constant 2.26 1.02 0.50 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Non-zero Observations 189 38 96 102 105 45 
Log likelihood -520.33 -104.65 -227.19 -267.82 -293.54 -119.85 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  The first stage of this model includes 
the real GDP only and the results for this stage are not shown in this table.  Dependent variable and BRICS terms measured 
by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Table 8.11: BRICS FDI Location: Zero-Inflated NB Model (Each BRICS) 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.45*** 1.39 1.07*** 1.52*** 2.38*** 2.23*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.92*** -3.26 -8.71** -9.08*** -8.46** -4.53 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) -2.69 -99.10 2.93 62.40** -10.30 -52.50 
Population Density (x10−3) -1.38 -10.70 -1.89 3.45 -2.63 6.26 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.22*** 6.25** 1.26 2.55** -1.27 4.44* 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -5.83** 0.88 -10.90** -3.69 -7.66 -14.30 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 5.96*** -6.72 9.27** 6.27* 7.07 -13.90* 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -4.85* -23.74 4.69 3.26 -8.80 -9.57 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -74.30*** -39.50 -86.50*** -53.98** -83.30*** 17.30 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 15.80 84.40* 10.30 -13.50 26.80 -51.70 
Political Risk (x10−3) -5.51 -9.40 -17.90 -18.60 -66.10** 59.03 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 46.50*** -39.30 70.60*** 137.66*** 102.00*** 142.84** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -14.40** -77.30*** 34.80*** 8.47 -9.44 -37.10** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.36 2.75 -5.17 -3.48 12.20** 14.10 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 17.30* 55.50* 12.70 10.30 8.40 23.80 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -25.50 479.25 -454.87 -12.90 -109.14 5.87 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 4.81 15.70 22.80** -3.86 -11.20 -6.29 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -63.50*** 187.50 19.20 -82.20*** -102.10*** 56.30 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 42.10 -1532.21 46.10 -6.33 1520.73 -98.40 
EU Membership (x10−2) 25.80 1509.32 -14.98 173.02 -14.50 59.10 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -37.60** -254.50** -70.50*** -15.20 -5.74 -94.20 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  1.84*** - - - - - 
Brazil - -11.60 -3.50 3.47 -0.16 -13.30 
Russia - -15.60 -11.70* 4.19 -3.20 -5.44 
India - 11.20*** -0.18 0.83 0.15 -2.12 
China - 1.06 0.41 -0.25 0.64 1.40 
South Africa - 30.10** 27.40*** 0.24 -4.40 4.45 
Constant (x10-1) 8.16 0.19 -6.96 -35.28 -98.09 -81.57 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Non-zero Observations 189 38 96 102 105 45 
Log likelihood -520.33 -104.65 -227.19 -267.82 -293.54 -119.85 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  The first stage of this model includes 
the real GDP only and the results for this stage are not shown in this table.49  Column I in this table is same to the column 
IV in Table 8.8.  Dependent variable and BRICS terms measured by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% 
and *** = 1% significance level. 
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Undoubtedly, the smaller samples do not help as they are likely to produce larger standard 
errors.  As such, the issue of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour is further explored in Table 
8.12, which replaces the lagged investment of each individual BRICS in Table 8.11 with 
                                                            
49 The ZINB model allows different variables to be considered in the two stages.  The rationale for choosing 
GDP is that different variables were tried, but when only the GDP term is included in the first stage, the 
regression can be run and shows the results.  
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a single variable that is for the lag of FDI for all BRICS countries but excluding the FDI 
of the own country.  
 
Table 8.12: BRICS FDI Location: Zero-Inflated NB Model (All BRICS) 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.45*** 1.25 1.22*** 1.56*** 2.33*** 2.06*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.92*** 0.70 -6.07* -8.81** -8.20** -5.49 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) -2.69 -63.40 2.00 61.30** -9.55 -45.70 
Population Density (x10−3) -1.38 -6.99 1.13 3.68 -2.72 5.40 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.22*** 6.10** 1.42 2.64** -1.38 4.64* 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -5.83** -0.30 -9.58** -3.76 -7.82 -12.95 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 5.96*** -8.55 6.82** 5.84 6.95 -11.40* 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -4.85* -29.72** 4.64 3.63 -9.35 -7.62 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -74.30*** -32.70 -68.50*** -52.30** -81.20*** 4.62 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 15.80 62.30 -6.12 -15.50 27.40 -45.30 
Political Risk (x10−3) -5.51 -65.60 -21.10 -20.96 -71.30** 83.20* 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 46.50*** -19.80 74.20*** 142.41*** 102.21*** 115.49** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -14.40** -94.10*** 25.05** 9.52 -8.05 -35.90** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.36 2.52 -5.26 -3.35 12.20** 11.90 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 17.30* 54.60 16.80 9.46 6.17 28.20 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -25.50 1362.99** -289.35 -67.40 -74.20 27.95 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 4.81 10.30 20.40** -3.26 -11.70 -5.13 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -63.50*** 81.70 -1.10 -81.30*** -99.40*** 55.50 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 42.10 -1409.72 55.40 -6.25 1680.70 -91.20 
EU Membership (x10−2) 25.80 1447.44 -1.98 171.50 -14.30 67.80 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -37.60** -209.40** -71.80*** -15.03 -5.14 -101.40 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  1.84*** - - - - - 
Brazil - -1.22 - - - - 
Russia - - -9.55 - - - 
India - - - 0.54 - - 
China - - - - 0.73 - 
South Africa - - - - - 3.01 
BRICS, excluding the same country - 4.05** 0.25 0.26 -0.27 -0.30 
Constant (x10-1) 8.16 39.74 -14.65 -34.65 -108.80 -99.52* 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Non-zero Observations 189 38 96 102 105 45 
Log likelihood -520.33 -109.37 -231.03 -268.21 -293.78 -120.76 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  The first stage of this model includes 
the real GDP only and the results for this stage are not shown in this table.  Dependent variable and BRICS terms are 
measured by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significant level. 
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Table 8.12 gives similar results for the country variables to those of Tables 8.3 and 8.11, 
with GDP, labour market and education variables significant both for all BRICS 
investments and for at least some of the individual countries.  On the lagged FDI term, 
column I of Table 8.12 shows that there is a tendency for BRICS investment to follow 
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previous BRICS investment in aggregate at the 1% significance level.  However, in all 
other columns, the lagged FDI terms are insignificant, except for Brazil, which seems to 
follow the investment of the other BRICS countries significantly.  Overall, the results for 
the lagged FDI terms may be weak as most of them are insignificant, so that it does not 
offer support for the results in Section 8.2. 
 
8.5.2. BRICS Manufacturing FDI Location: The ZINB Model 
 
As service and manufacturing FDI may locate differently, then to allow for the 
heterogeneity this section focuses on manufacturing investment only.  According to 
Chapter 6, most BRICS FDI is in the manufacturing sector.  Broadly, this section repeats 
the analysis of Table 8.11 using the ZINB model, but for manufacturing FDI only.  The 
results are given in Table 8.13.  In general, China has the most non-zero observations, but 
there are still many zeros.  For South Africa, there is nearly not any point in the estimating 
models. 
 For the country variables, Table 8.13 shows that broadly similar results are 
obtained to those of Table 8.11, with the exception of the GDP per capita and secondary 
education terms.  Table 8.11 shows that GDP per capita has significant effects on FDI 
from Russia, India and China, but in Table 8.13 it is significant for Russia only.  In the 
case of education, Table 8.11 shows that Brazil, Russia and South Africa are attracted by 
secondary education, which is in addition to a significant effect for higher education in 
most BRICS.  However, in the case of manufacturing FDI, Table 8.13 shows that 
secondary education is quite unimportant (there is a significant, but negative effect for 
Brazil), while higher education is important for Russia, India and China only.  It suggests 
that manufacturing FDI from the BRICS is more attracted by higher education compared 
to all BRICS’ FDI, so that ‘higher’ skills rather than ‘moderate’ skills seem to be more 
important for manufacturing FDI. 
For lagged FDI terms, Table 8.13 shows that aggregate BRICS manufacturing FDI 
seems to follow its own past investment, but at the individual BRICS country level this is 
the case for South African manufacturing investment only.  For the other countries, this is 
insignificant, but except for Russia, where there is a negative effect.  Regarding 
investment from other BRICS countries there is a mixed pattern, with Russia FDI seeming 
to ‘avoid’ Brazilian FDI, while the South African FDI has the opposite effect.  Overall, I 
am of the view that the results are not consistent with Chapter 7 as there is a large number 
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of zeros in BRICS FDI data, so it is not distributed as a NB model.  They do not offer 
strong support for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in BRICS manufacturing FDI location at 
the EU-25 country level. 
 
Table 8.13: BRICS Manufacturing FDI Location: Zero-Inflated NB Model 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕  in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.53*** 0.94 0.82** 1.49*** 2.24*** 0.03 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.45*** -9.76 -9.84* 0.56 -6.73 -11.50 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 11.50 -141.68* 45.20 73.60 -10.70 -24.10 
Population Density (x10−3) -1.20 -9.66 -0.94 3.68 -1.57 18.10** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.62** 11.20*** 1.79 1.67 -1.59 11.04*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -4.78* -7.27 -10.90** 2.54 -9.23* -9.64 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 6.10** -4.42 10.10** 1.71 5.74 11.00 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -6.24* -28.15* 5.07 5.54 -15.95* 17.38 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -76.80*** -72.04 -85.04** -56.50 -72.20** 13.50 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 17.70 80.50 10.70 -8.55 10.20 -120.23* 
Political Risk (x10−3) -41.20** -102.96 -47.60 -38.10 -92.70*** 53.70 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 49.10*** 0.36 72.20*** 91.70** 100.06*** -31.80 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -13.20* -52.80* 19.50 5.45 -7.12 0.17 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 1.22 -21.20 -3.81 5.97 15.50*** -20.96 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 22.70** 18.40 36.70* 30.80 30.80 -3.47 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -6.64 3.97 -688.80 519.66 34.05 -81.83 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 4.73 31.60** 30.30** 6.14 -13.40 12.40 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -62.30*** 284.70* -4.82 -90.70** -65.10* 94.60 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 39.50 -1444.45 41.10 306.10 1607.25 -12.60 
EU Membership (x10−2) 12.50 1514.04 -64.10 1642.86 -69.60 208.20 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -44.30** -288.98** -66.10** -33.80 -16.10 -162.70 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  2.47** - - - - - 
Brazil - 11.80 -7.71 21.40 -5.26 8.95 
Russia - -90.50*** -35.20** 21.50 -6.22 -36.60 
India - 34.50*** 2.78 -1.19 -2.31 2.01 
China - -1.63 0.18 1.50 1.28 6.32 
South Africa - 67.90** 7.96 -8.00 -8.39 37.10** 
Constant (x10-1) 26.50 104.14 -2.91 -237.46 -104.59 -86.95 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Non-zero Observations 159 31 66 63 96 30 
Log likelihood -428.41 -80.60 -168.26 -171.08 -264.83 -75.32 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  The first stage of this model includes 
the real GDP only and the results for this stage are not shown in this table.  Dependent variable and BRICS terms are 
measured by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significant level. 
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8.5.3. Omitting the Early Years 
 
Finally, as another way of dealing with the zero cases, I exclude the first seven years of 
the study period, during which the zeros are much more prevalent, so that I focus on the 
years 2004-10.  I rerun the regressions for each of the NB and ZINB models, but 
measuring the lagged BRICS FDI terms in two different ways, as in Tables 8.11 and 8.12, 
i.e. for each individual BRICS and for all BRICS countries but excluding the FDI of the 
own country.  Of course, the drawback is that the smaller number of observations further 
reduces the degrees of freedom, and in the case of Brazil it was not possible to get 
estimates at all and for South Africa it was not possible to run the NB model. The results 
for the estimates on the lagged FDI terms for the other BRICS countries are reported in 
Table 8.14.  They show consistent patterns to previous two tables, but overall few of the 
terms are significant, which suggests that there is no advantage to using the smaller sample. 
 
Table 8.14: Results for Lagged BRICS FDI Terms: 2004-10 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2): Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
Negative Binomial:      
Brazil - - - - - 
Russia - -16.29** - - - 
India - - -0.11 - - 
China - - - -0.92 - 
South Africa - - - - - 
BRICS, excluding same country - 1.53 0.84 1.20 - 
      
Brazil - -1.54 1.26 -1.77 - 
Russia - -15.78** 1.36 -3.45 - 
India - 0.79 0.59 1.32 - 
China - 1.50 0.15 -0.84 - 
South Africa - 26.13** 10.32 18.46* - 
ZINB:      
Brazil - - - - - 
Russia - -13.06* - - - 
India - - -0.23 - - 
China - - - -0.91 - 
South Africa - - - - -2.12 
BRICS, excluding same country - 1.23 0.41 0.36 0.26 
      
Brazil - -0.63 -6.00 -5.84 -27.85 
Russia - -14.20* -0.63 -2.57 2.95 
India - 0.67 -0.17 0.66 -4.40 
China - 1.23 0.32 -0.64 5.03* 
South Africa - 23.92* 11.64** 15.01* -1.50 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Models regressed for 2004-10 and coefficients on lagged BRICS FDI terms shown only.  No 
convergence for Brazil using both the NB and ZINB models and for South Africa using NB model.  For each 
country, there are four regressions in total based on the two models.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% 
significant level. 
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8.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter uses a log-linear model and different count data models to analyse the BRICS 
FDI location in the EU-25 countries.  The purpose is to further investigate the potential 
for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour among the BRICS countries.  The same country 
variables are considered as in Chapter 7, which facilitates a comparison, but with different 
lagged FDI terms to capture the own-country and cross-country effects to see whether FDI 
location ‘follows’ FDI from the same BRICS country in the next period, while ‘avoiding’ 
the FDI from other BRICS countries.  These are explored for all FDI and manufacturing 
FDI.  The count data models include the Poisson and Negative Binomial models, where 
the latter allows for over-dispersion in the count data, and more advanced models that 
allow for the large number of zero observations in the FDI count data.  These are the 
Hurdle, Zero-Inflated and Zero-Truncated methods. 
 The count data models produce results, while in general they offer some but not 
overwhelming support for the results obtained in Chapter 7.  In terms of the country 
variables, this chapter shows that FDI from each BRICS country is generally attracted by 
some location factors, and especially the GDP of the host country, the labour market and 
the education terms.  These are significant in many of the analyses, but the other country 
variables are either generally insignificant or affect FDI location for one or several BRICS 
countries only, such as the population density in the log-linear model.  This may be 
compared with Chapter 7 where we find that the BRICS investors are interested in the 
countries with better economic growth rates and higher education, but also lower wage 
rates and political risks, in addition to some EU policy terms (Table 7.5).  These kinds of 
variable are significant for some BRICS countries in this chapter, so that there is some 
support, but it is not overwhelming. 
 Of course, my interest is in the lagged FDI terms.  Using the logit model in Chapter 
7, I find evidence of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour, but this applies only to FDI from the 
same BRICS country.  That is, there is a tendency for each BRICS country’s FDI to follow 
the FDI from the same BRICS country in the preceding year, but to avoid the location of 
FDI from the other BRICS countries.  In this chapter, for the benchmark log-linear model, 
I find that the FDI of a BRICS country follows the previous FDI from the same country, 
but it is not significant for all countries.  Indeed, most of the analyses in this chapter reveal 
that there is an insignificant tendency for BRICS countries to either follow or avoid the 
investment of other BRICS countries, although in this respect we do find some strong 
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results that China and India may be ‘leaders’ across all of the BRICS countries, confirming 
the earlier findings.   
In this latter respect the results of this chapter are consistent with those found 
before in this thesis, but overall they are not especially strong.  The generally weak results 
found for the count data models may reflect the presence of a very large number of zeros, 
especially in the early years of the study period and the much smaller number of 
observations that are brought to bear in the count data analysis.  A further difficulty is that 
for these regressions to converge, I had to omit the country fixed effects, although in 
general through the inclusion of the country GDP I do not believe that this accounts for 
the weaker results.   While methods were used to try to deal with the issue of zeros, these 
seem to be only partially successful. Also, when I focus on the latter half of the study 
period there are limited degrees of freedom and the results are not particularly strong either.  
As such, I believe that the better results are probably obtained using the log-linear model 
in this chapter, in which the zero observations are dealt with by adding one project to each 
FDI count.  As BRICS FDI takes off, particularly from China, future research may be able 
to better deal with this issue, as there are likely to be fewer zeros in the data and more 
observations on the counts.  In this thesis I focus on the early stage of BRICS investment. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis studies the location choice of BRICS outward FDI in the twenty five EU (EU-
25) countries over the period from 1997 to 2010.  The reason to select the BRICS as the 
main source is because the BRICS countries are rapidly-industrializing economies with 
low levels of per capita income but very large populations.  They comprise Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa, and they are expected to be the largest economic group by 
the middle of this century (Ranjan and Agrawal, 2011), and hence potentially a major 
source of outward FDI.  This thesis focuses on the EU as a host for the early-stage 
investment from the BRICS, as recently it has been a major host for the global FDI inflows.  
The thesis not only considers the fifteen EU Member State countries in the West as 
locations for the early-stage investment from the BRICS, but also the ten Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.  The large 
Western European countries are the dominant FDI recipients, but the CEECs are a 
relatively low-cost destination (Milelli et al., 2010). 
There is considerable interest in the literature on FDI inflows to the developing 
and emerging economies, but BRICS outward FDI is relatively neglected, so that the focus 
in this thesis on the BRICS fills an important gap.  There are three main contributions of 
the thesis.  First, it analyses the nature of BRICS FDI in the EU-25 according to its 
characteristics.  Second, it explores the locational determinants of the BRICS FDI in the 
EU-25 countries relative to FDI originating from other major global regions (Europe, 
North America and elsewhere).  Third, logit and count data analysis are used to examine 
the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour, whereby the investment from each BRICS country is 
similar in its country location choice to its own earlier investment in the preceding year 
and earlier sub-periods.  It examines if there is a ‘leader’ country among the five BRICS 
countries and also whether the BRICS tend to ‘avoid’ each other in their location, so that 
there is distinctiveness across the five countries.  In addition, the thesis reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on FDI location. 
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9.1. The Main Findings 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the European Investment Monitor (EIM) database that is the 
basis for the empirical analysis of this study gives information on project-based FDI 
inflows into the EU countries for each year over the period from 1997 to 2010.  It classifies 
projects into three types (‘new’, ‘co-location’ and ‘expansion’ investments).  It excludes 
mergers and acquisitions, license agreements and portfolio investments.  It does include 
some joint ventures that satisfy the above definition.  Overall, there are 35,105 projects in 
the EIM that relate to the EU-25 countries.  The analysis distinguishes between the EU-
15 and CEEC-10.  The main findings of this thesis arise from the analysis of this database. 
 
9.1.1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
The descriptive statistical analysis describes BRICS FDI in the EU-25 countries.  It reveals 
the characteristics of BRICS FDI projects and gives an overview of the spatial distribution 
of these projects both across the EU and over time.  It compares BRICS and non-BRICS 
investment in the EU-25.  It analyses the projects by its characteristics, such as the industry 
group and functional activity.  The characteristics of the investments for each BRICS 
country are explored to investigate the main investors among these five countries and their 
choice based on different indicators. 
The analysis of the BRICS investment shows that the main type of project is the 
start-up or ‘greenfield’ investment.  This is the same as for the other major global source 
regions, but values of BRICS investment (i.e. measured by the number of gross jobs 
associated with each project) is much smaller in scale compared with the non-BRICS.  
The BRICS is by no means a significant investor in the EU-25 countries as a whole, as 
the EIM identifies just 1,415 investment projects (4.0% of the total number of projects) 
from BRICS in the EU-25.  However, BRICS investment experiences a nearly twelve-
fold increase over the study period, from 84 projects in 1997-2000 to 975 in 2006-10.   
This descriptive statistical analysis of the BRICS investment reveals further 
interesting results.  First, the EU-15 is the major location for the BRICS investment over 
the whole study period, of which the UK, Germany and France receive more than half of 
these projects.  Among the CEEC-10 countries, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania and 
Poland are the main host countries.  Second, investment in manufacturing is a common 
characteristic of both BRICS FDI and that arising from elsewhere.  However, there are 
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the different functional activities for BRICS investment, especially when compared with 
the cross-border investment that arises from within the Europe Union.  The BRICS 
countries focus on sales and marketing, whereas the more-mature investment from Europe 
prefers production activity, so that this latter investment may serve as an ‘export-platform’ 
for the wider European Union market.  Third, individual BRICS countries have different 
industry characteristics and functional activities, which may arise from the differences in 
the economic development of BRICS countries.  BRICS countries (apart from India) have 
the same main industry sector as the whole BRICS (i.e. manufacturing), whereas early 
studies find that it is mainly aimed at acquiring natural resources (see Hirt and Orr, 2006).  
Turning to the project function, most projects from China, India and Russia are in sales 
and marketing, which is similar to that of the BRICS group. 
Fourth, Chapter 2 shows that locations with more rapid economic growth or larger 
economic size attract more FDI inflows.  It means that there should be more FDI inflows 
to EU-15 countries, compared to the CEEC-10 countries.  As mentioned above, the UK, 
Germany and France are the main three host countries as they have the greatest economic 
size.  Other Western countries receive a smaller number of projects as they have a smaller 
economic size, including Finland, Greece and Luxembourg.  Generally, the CEEC-10 
countries should receive a smaller number of projects because of their smaller economic 
size.  However, the FDI located in some CEEC-10 countries exceeds that of some EU-15 
countries.  For example, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland attract more FDI because 
of their rapid economic growth.  Overall, the BRICS chooses similar locations across the 
EU-15 and CEEC-10 countries as the major global source regions, and China and India 
account for main investors across all of the BRICS countries, at around three-quarters of 
all investments. 
 
9.1.2. Locational Determinants 
 
This thesis explores the effect of host country characteristics on the location choice of 
BRICS FDI in the EU-25, comparing these to the location choice of other global FDI in 
these countries.  I use a Conditional Logit model to examine the location choice of all FDI 
across the 25 countries, and also for FDI in manufacturing only. In general, this logit 
model does not take into account the project and source characteristics.  To allow for 
differences in these characteristics, I also use a Multinomial Logit model to allow project 
characteristics including industry sector, function and investment type to vary.  This 
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model also allows the sources including the global source region (Europe, and North 
America) and each of the five BRICS countries to vary.  For each host country it calculates 
the probability of location in each of EU-25 countries, which is relative to the base case 
of the UK.  I begin with the host country characteristics in Chapter 6, and then turn to the 
Conditional and Multinomial Logit in Chapter 7.  Subsequently, ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour in BRICS FDI location in the EU-25 is explored based on the ‘Goodness of Fit’ 
test in Chapter 6 and the lagged source variables that are used in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Effects of Host Country Characteristics 
One of the contributions of this thesis is to explore the determinants of FDI location from 
different sources in the EU-25, and in particular the special determinants for FDI location 
from the BRICS.  In the logit models each location choice is made across twenty-five 
countries, so that in total there are 817,100 observations (i.e. to either locate or not locate 
in a country).  This discussion focuses on inward FDI to the EU-25 as a whole, as well as 
that originating from the four different global regions, i.e. the BRICS, Europe, North 
America and Other, where ‘Other’ excludes FDI from the BRICS.  I highlight certain 
differences in the host country variables for the BRICS when taken as a whole in this 
section.  I consider the host country characteristics according to the main location factors 
identified in the literature review, which in this thesis are classified as the demand, labour 
market, cost, education, trade and policy variables. 
I find that nearly all of the demand and policy variables have a significant effect 
on FDI location from the different global source regions.  This is in line with other studies 
such as Holtbrugge and Kreppel (2012).   A higher real GDP per capita does not attract 
cross-border FDI from within Europe, which is in contradiction to other studies such as 
Shamsuddin (1994) and Janicki et al. (2004).  It may reflect that this investment is made 
as an ‘export-platform’ for the EU-25 market, so that investors prefer locations with lower 
per capita incomes as it signals lower costs.  This interpretation is supported by the 
external market demand term, which is significant for the global FDI, although 
insignificant for the FDI from each global source region.  This is the same for the effect 
of population density on North America, BRICS and the Other, which captures more 
dense markets. 
With regard to the labour market variables, a higher unemployment rate 
discourages FDI inflows, which may be because these countries have weaker economic 
development and a poorer quality of the labour force.  The wage rate, which is a measure 
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of labour costs, has an expected negative effect, which is supported by Coughlin et al. 
(1991) and Bevan and Estrin (2000).  Its effect is insignificant for investments from the 
global regions and is only significant for BRICS investment when the previous FDI of 
these four source regions is taken into account.   Regarding the cost variables, FDI from 
the different global regions avoids countries with higher tax rates and less dense motorway 
networks, as it is more difficult to transport goods.  The negative and significant 
coefficient on political risk suggests that investors prefer risk, but these risks are relatively 
low for the EU-25.  In this sense, there are the positive coefficients of political risk for 
FDI from all four global regions.  Bevan and Estrin (2004) find that investors prefer 
locations with weak administrative control, as it implies a weaker level of regulation and 
lower political risk. 
 Turning to education variables, secondary education has a positive and significant 
effect on the location of FDI from all sources as a whole, but the effect of higher education 
is always insignificant.  This supports the cost-based motive for FDI as it suggests that 
investors prefer a reasonably educated workforce, but not too educated as the wage rate is 
likely to be higher.  However, there is no significant effect of secondary education on the 
FDI from all four global source regions, and North America and BRICS prefer those 
countries with ‘higher skills’ labour force.  Regarding the trade variables, trade openness 
does not affect global FDI in general because EU-25 considered as a whole has been more 
open than many other regions or countries.  Within the EU-25, there is a difference in the 
openness of different countries and most FDI from Europe comes from the EU-25.  Hence, 
European FDI is interested in trade openness.  The negative and significant effects of the 
exchange rate and its volatility on the global and European FDI means that there is less 
FDI in a country where the domestic currency appreciates or is volatile.  BRICS FDI is 
attracted by countries with a depreciation of the domestic currency.   
With regards to the EU policy terms, most variables in this group have the 
expected effects on the BRICS, except for the EU Structural Funds and EU post-
membership terms.  The negative effect for the former may be because countries receiving 
European aid are less-developed economically and socially, so that it works in the same 
way as the unemployment term.  EU membership has a positive effect on FDI location, 
which may capture the lower border costs, such as a reduction in waiting times and border 
checks.  These are non-tariff barriers, whereas the tariff barriers for the CEEC-10 were 
eliminated by the Association Agreements with these countries that were signed in the 
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1990s.  The negative coefficient on the post-membership term suggests that FDI in these 
countries later fell back, so that there was a surge at membership.  
Overall, the effect of most country variables on European FDI is consistent with 
that for FDI from all sources as a whole, reflecting the high share of European FDI in the 
total number of FDI projects.  The GDP growth rate, external market demand and 
motorway density are not significant for European investment.  North American 
investment is not influenced by the population density, external market demand and the 
unemployment rate, but higher education has a significant effect that reflects its highly-
developed economy and advanced technology.  Finally, relatively few of the country 
variables are important for BRICS FDI location in the EU-25.  The main location factors 
are the GDP growth rate, wage rate, political risk, higher education and exchange rate, 
which indicates that the BRICS seek countries with lower labour costs and a high-skilled 
labour force.  It is consistent with the literature that shows that market access and 
knowledge-seeking motives are two of the main reasons for BRICS FDI location.  BRICS 
FDI is also not interested in the EU policy terms as most of their projects are located in 
three West European countries only (i.e. France, Germany and the UK), partly reflecting 
their economic size.  For the Other region (i.e. elsewhere), there are the different 
characteristics of FDI because of its heterogeneity, so that most of the locational 
determinants are insignificant for FDI from this source. 
 
Probability of FDI Location: the Project Characteristics and Sources 
Studies of the locational determinants tend to consider the characteristics of the host 
country, but the heterogeneity of the projects is often ignored, except for the ultimate 
country of origin.  Hence, this thesis explores the probability of FDI location in each of 
the EU-25 countries by allowing project characteristics to vary, as well as the investment 
sources, i.e. the five BRICS countries, Europe and North America.  The Multinomial Logit 
framework enables both the project characteristics and sources to be considered.  It 
expresses the estimates as log-odds ratios relative to the base case, where this is the UK, 
owing to its status as the main host country for FDI within the EU-25.   
First, when the BRICS source countries are allowed to vary only, there is a mixed 
pattern between the EU-15 and CEEC-10 countries.  Compared to the UK, Brazilian FDI 
is more likely to invest in Spain and Portugal, as these have similar cultures, but it also 
prefers Luxembourg and Slovakia.  The literature review in Chapter 2 has shown that 
language and culture are important determinants for FDI location.  In case of Portugal, it 
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was the former colonial power in Brazil and they share a similar language.  Regarding to 
Russia, there is a greater probability for its FDI to locate in Germany and Italy within the 
EU-15, but its FDI is more likely to invest in several CEEC-10 countries compared to the 
UK.  This is because these CEEC-10 countries were formerly part of the Soviet Union.  
Chinese and Indian FDI show a similar investment pattern to each other.  Across all of the 
EU-25 countries, investments from these two countries are more likely to go to the UK 
than to most other countries.  In the case of CEEC-10, they are nearly always less likely 
to invest in the same countries.  For the EU-15, there is a smaller probability of FDI from 
both China and India to locate in France compared to the UK, but Chinese FDI is more 
likely to go to Germany.  In case of South Africa, the UK is also the most attractive 
destination for FDI, possibly due to language similarity and cultural heritage, but South 
African investment is significantly less likely to choose the other major hosts of France 
and Germany.  
Second, when the project characteristics are allowed to vary only, I find strong 
differences between the EU-15 and CEEC-10 countries.  Relative to the UK in each case, 
an investment in the CEEC-10 is more likely to be in manufacturing compared to the EU-
15, but headquarters / R&D less so.  Indeed, there are two countries among the EU-15 (i.e. 
Ireland and Luxembourg) that are less likely to receive FDI projects in manufacturing, 
while Scandinavian countries do not show a significant tendency to do so.  For the 
headquarters / R&D functions, only Denmark and Ireland among the EU-25 are more 
likely to get investments in these functions compared to the UK.  This is because these 
two functions refer to the decision centre, fundamental scientific research and the 
production process, which means that only economies with a more-advanced technology 
and larger scale of production are more likely to attract this kind of investment.  
Meanwhile, there is a greater probability for investments in the CEEC-10 countries to be 
start-ups, reflecting their status as a new location for FDI following their accession to the 
EU.  This is also the case for most EU-15 countries as there is a greater tradition for FDI 
in the UK, so that it is more likely to receive its FDI as a re-investment. 
Finally, when both the project characteristics and sources vary, there are not too 
many changes in the probabilities for the FDI location choice in case of the project 
characteristics.  However, turning to the sources, there are considerable differences in the 
probabilities for the BRICS countries.  By considering global regions of North America 
and Europe, an investment in the UK is less likely to come from Europe, while there is a 
greater probability for investments in France and Germany from North America. 
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Compared to the CEEC-10, the UK is a more favourable location for investments from 
North America. 
 
9.1.3. ‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour of BRICS FDI 
 
To examine ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in FDI location, whereby FDI from the same 
source tends to locate in the same countries over time, the thesis first uses a ‘Goodness-
of-Fit’ test to investigate this for each BRICS country.  This is carried out over a period 
of 1-year, 2-years and different sub-periods.  Subsequently, lagged FDI terms are 
introduced in the regression analyses using both the logit models and count data 
estimations to explore if earlier FDI from the same country or different countries or global 
regions has a significant effect on the location choice of current BRICS FDI.  The signs 
and significance of these estimates could indicate that BRICS FDI ‘follows’ or ‘avoids’ 
previous FDI location.  Within the BRICS, if BRICS FDI ‘avoids’ that of other BRICS 
countries then it suggests distinctiveness in this investment between the BRICS, while if 
it ‘follows’ its own investment then there could be a number of possible interpretations. 
 
Persistence in the Location Choice: ‘Goodness-of-Fit’ Test 
A further contribution of this thesis is to use a ‘goodness-of-fit’ test to explore if there is 
persistence in the location choice of the BRICS investors across the EU-25 countries.  This 
test compares the observed location pattern with that which is expected based on earlier 
FDI location, where the null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between 
these.  One issue is that the number of BRICS projects in earlier years can be small, 
especially for the number in any one country in any year.  For these cases Kazmier and 
Pohl (1987) argue that when the data are less than 5, adjacent data should be combined.  
However, I choose not to combine these cases as the criterion for doing so is arbitrary 
(Cochran, 1952) and it reduces the meaningfulness of the test if countries are combined.  
In these cases, small samples mean that the expected value is measured with less precision, 
so the direction of bias is towards increasing the test statistic and increasing the probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis.  A second issue is the large number of zero projects from 
several BRICS countries in a host country in a year, which makes it impossible to calculate 
the test statistic for the ‘goodness-of-fit’ as the values for both the observed and expected 
data are zero.  Hence, the number of projects from each BRICS country is increased by 
adding one project in each country and each year to solve the issue of zeroes. 
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Different time intervals are considered, as a longer lag gives the investor sufficient time 
to respond to earlier FDI flows.  In this thesis, a 1-year and 2-year period are considered, 
as well as several sub-periods (i.e. 1997-2000, 2001-05 and 2006-10), where the sub-
periods help address the two issues above.  First of all, I find that in most years the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, so that FDI from each BRICS country tends to ‘follow’ its 
own previous location pattern across the EU-25 countries over a 1-year and 2-year period.  
Second, there are more statistical differences in the location pattern over a 2-year period 
compared to a 1-year period.  In particular, there are obvious differences for China and 
India based on the 2-year period, and these differences in the location patterns tend to 
occur for the later years of the study period, suggesting that FDI from China and India has 
spread out to other EU locations as it has grown.  By contrast, the location patterns of FDI 
from the other three BRICS countries are relatively stable, although results based on the 
1-year period show a possible spreading out of Brazilian FDI in recent years.   
It is necessary to emphasize that there is a significant tendency for all BRICS 
countries to follow the location of their own previous FDI in most years, but the above 
results are subject to the problem of small numbers of projects, which potentially increases 
the probability of acceptance of the null hypothesis.  The analysis based on the three sub-
periods to aggregate the numbers shows that China and India spread their FDI to other 
EU-25 countries in each of the latter two sub-periods when more FDI takes place, while 
Brazil and South Africa still follow the location choice of their previous FDI.  Russian 
FDI has the same location to its previous FDI in 2001-05, but spreads to other EU-25 
countries over 2006-10, which is after the CEEC-10 countries joined the EU.  Overall, the 
‘Goodness-of-Fit’ test suggests that the FDI by the BRICS countries tends to ‘follow’ their 
own previous investment in its location choice across the EU-25 countries, but that as it 
has grown in the case of China and India it has spread out.  Russian FDI may also have 
spread out but that may reflect its weakening economic ties with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe.  
 
‘Follow-the-Leader’ Behaviour: Lagged FDI Terms as the Explanatory Variables 
The final contribution of this thesis is to examine ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in BRICS 
FDI location using lagged FDI terms as the explanatory variables in the logit and count 
data analyses.  It enables me to investigate whether the investments of individual BRICS 
countries ‘follow’ the previous investment of the same BRICS country, but also whether 
they ‘avoid’ or ‘follow’ the investments of other countries, with the aim of identifying a 
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possible  ‘leader’ among the five BRICS countries.  The descriptive statistical analysis 
suggests that there is ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour for some of the BRICS countries, but 
such simple analysis does not include controls for other country characteristics. 
The analysis proceeds in several stages.  First, the lagged BRICS FDI term, which 
is measured by the total number of projects locating in the same country in the preceding 
year, is disaggregated into five individual countries to explore whether BRICS FDI as a 
whole follows the FDI of any individual BRICS country.  This disaggregation also shows 
whether BRICS FDI as a whole differs from the previous investment of individual BRICS 
countries.  Second, to determine whether each BRICS country follows the investment 
pattern of previous investors from the same BRICS country and avoids (or follows) the 
investment of the other four BRICS countries, two new variables are introduced.  These 
are: ‘Same BRICS Country’ and ‘BRICS, excluding same BRICS country’, where the 
former matches the individual FDI project from each BRICS country to all FDI projects 
from the same BRICS country in the same host country in the preceding year, and the 
latter is measured by all BRICS FDI projects in the preceding year, excluding those from 
the same BRICS country.  Third, each of these two matched lagged FDI variables is 
further disaggregated for the five BRICS countries to examine whether there is ‘follow-
the-leader’ behaviour for each individual country and whether they ‘avoid’ or ‘follow’ 
other BRICS countries. 
Regarding the logit model, in relation to the first analysis, when the lagged BRICS 
FDI term is disaggregated into five individual countries, I find that BRICS FDI as a whole 
‘follows’ the previous investment of South Africa only.  This is significant at the 10% 
level and it may reflect the fact that South African FDI in the EU-25 is long-standing, not 
least to the UK and other advanced economies, although it is the most recent member state 
of the BRICS.  Nevertheless, it is perhaps not wholly convincing to treat South Africa as 
the ‘leader’ of BRICS FDI as its total number of projects in the EU-25 is quite small.   It 
is to address this issue that the matched variable ‘Same BRICS Country’ is introduced in 
the second analysis.  The positive and significant estimate on this term suggests ‘follow-
the-leader’ behaviour, so that across the BRICS there is a tendency for FDI from a given 
BRICS country to follow its own previous FDI.  When the variable ‘BRICS, excluding 
Same BRICS Country’ is included, ‘Same BRICS Country’ is still significant, while the 
estimate for the new variable is negative and significant at the 1% level.  Thus, across the 
BRICS countries, BRICS FDI ‘follows’ previous FDI from the same country, but it 
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‘avoids’ the previous investment from the other four BRICS countries when considered 
together.   
In the third analysis, these two variables are further disaggregated to examine 
which individual countries have the strong ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  For 
completeness, the lagged FDI terms for the three global source regions (Europe, North 
America and elsewhere) are included to explore the effect of their previous FDI and the 
changes caused by them in the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  There are three main 
findings for the individual BRICS countries.  First of all, when only the variable ‘Same 
BRICS Country’ is disaggregated into five same BRICS countries, I find that India, China 
and South Africa ‘follow’ their own previous investment significantly.  Second, when 
‘BRICS, excluding Same BRICS Country’ is also disaggregated, each BRICS country 
‘avoids’ the location of the other four countries except for South Africa (this is consistent 
with the above finding regarding the role of South African investment as a ‘leader’).  
However, this term is significant for Brazil and Russia only, while only India follows its 
own previous investments significantly.  Third, when the preceding year investments of 
the three global regions are included, the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of all five 
individual BRICS countries is still apparent.   
Furthermore, the ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of BRICS investment is also 
considered in the count data analysis of the number of FDI projects that locate in each 
country in a particular year.  It is based on the FDI from the BRICS only, for which the 
basic technique is a log-linear regression, while other count data models are used for the 
problem on zero observations.  All of the explanatory variables in the logit analysis are 
considered in the count data analysis to facilitate the comparison.  The OLS regression of 
the log-linear regression model is used to provide the benchmark results with different 
lagged FDI terms.  This is followed by the Poisson and Negative Binomial models, which 
are more suitable for discrete observations, and subsequently by more-advanced methods 
to deal with the issue of extra zero observations. 
For the country variables, the benchmark estimations show that there are not as 
many significant variables for all BRICS FDI as those for FDI from all sources based on 
the logit analysis.  However, most of the significant variables have the same sign as for 
global FDI (i.e. from all sources) and some of them continue to be significant at 1% level.  
It means that the BRICS investors are attracted by much the same characteristics of the 
host countries.  The lagged FDI terms for the five BRICS countries give the following 
main results.  First, there is a tendency for each BRICS to ‘follow’ the investment of one 
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or more BRICS countries.  Second, India and China are the ‘leaders’ in ‘attracting’ FDI 
from all BRICS countries, where Indian FDI ‘attracts’ FDI from Brazil, China and South 
Africa in the following year and China plays a role in ‘attracting’ Russian and Indian FDI 
to a country in addition to ‘attracting’ their own following FDI.  Third, there is no 
significant tendency for all BRICS countries to ‘avoid’ the previous FDI of other countries, 
although Brazil appears to ‘avoid’ the location of Russian FDI.  This appears to contradict 
the analysis of the logit analysis, but the result obtained in logit analysis was for the 
BRICS countries as a whole and not for individual BRICS.  When the number of FDI 
projects originating from the other four BRICS countries is measured as a whole using a 
single variable, FDI from one BRICS country still cannot avoid location of FDI from other 
four countries as a whole.  Finally, the analysis shows that there are similar results for 
manufacturing FDI when modelled as count data to that of all FDI. 
The results for the Poisson and Negative Binomial models are not as convincing 
as those of the OLS estimation because FDI data have too many zeros, so it is not 
distributed as a Poisson or NB.  Furthermore, these two models show that no BRICS 
country ‘follows’ its own previous investment significantly and indeed Russian investors 
are put off by previous Russian FDI, which is opposite to the results of above benchmark 
and previous logit analysis.  When dealing with zero project counts, the Zero-Truncated 
models give similar results to the standard Poisson and Negative Binomial models based 
on BRICS FDI as a whole, suggesting that the inclusion of the zero investments is not 
problematic.  For two-stage models, the Hurdle model cannot be run for Brazil, even if all 
the Country and Time fixed-effects are excluded because of the large number of zero 
project counts for this country, which reduces degrees-of-freedom drastically.  The Zero-
Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) model is preferred to the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) 
model, but even so this also produces weak results as most regressors are insignificant, 
and this is the same for manufacturing FDI.  It means that these results cannot provide 
strong support or otherwise for ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour.  This may be due to the 
large number of zeros, and possibly the explosive growth in FDI from China and India in 
particular, so the logit analysis is preferred, which has many more observations. 
 
9.2. Implications 
 
With increased globalization, international relations between countries in the form of trade 
and investment have become much stronger.  Compared with trade, FDI may be a more 
effective channel to promote the diffusion of technology, knowledge and other skills 
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across international boundaries (Driffield and Taylor, 2000), thereby creating job 
opportunities and greater productivity and economic growth in the host countries 
(Driffield et al., 2002).  More narrowly, as stated by Cave (1971), the entry of foreign 
firms into a domestic market increases competition which may create more active rivalry 
and improve the performance of local firms.  Thus, FDI can have many positive effects 
on the host country economy. 
Europe is the main source of FDI in the EU-25.  This reflects the short distance 
and the integration of these economies through the European Single Market.  Indeed, the 
study period of this thesis covers the fifth enlargement of the European Union, which 
occurred in two stages in 2004 and 2007, and this was undoubtedly a further spur to inward 
FDI, particularly in the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  Thus, the number of 
projects originating from Europe increases from 3,987 over 1997-2000 to 8,439 over 
2006-10.  FDI from North America has also increased in absolute terms, although it has 
taken a smaller share of total FDI than that of Europe, while the number of BRICS projects 
has increased substantially from 84 to 975 projects, but its share of all FDI projects in the 
EU-25 is small, increasing from 1.0% to 6.2% between the periods.   A finding of the 
thesis is that there is a drift of investment to the CEECs, especially within Europe, 
suggesting that these countries are an ‘export-platform’ for the enlarged Single Market.  
This has implications for trade imbalances in the EU, while the recent introduction of 
border controls resulting from the 2015-16 ‘migrant crisis’ may in future reduce 
investment flows to the CEECs and hence FDI within the European Union. 
One difference in the BRICS FDI compared to that from Europe or North America 
is the sharp growth in BRICS FDI in the EU-25 over the study period.  By the end of the 
period the BRICS countries are an important generator of inward FDI, with the share of 
BRICS FDI reaching 11% of total inward FDI projects in 2010.  This high growth rate 
and increasing share of global FDI flows reflects the rapid economic development of the 
BRICS economies.  These are predicted to have an increasingly greater role in future 
global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2010) and Ranjan and Agrawal (2011) believes that the 
BRICS will be the largest economic group by the middle of this century.  It not only makes 
this investment increasingly of interest to the EU countries to aid their own development, 
but a challenge for policymakers in the BRICS countries is to promote this investment as 
a source of economic development.  This is because there are ‘reverse spillovers’, whereby 
foreign firms can acquire advanced technology in the host countries.  Driffield and Love 
(2002) find that the growth in the domestic sectors is limited in relatively R&D-intensive 
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sectors and that the effect of any ‘reverse spillover’ will be greater for those industries 
where the spatial concentration is greater. 
The thesis finds distinctiveness in the FDI originating from the BRICS compared 
to the other major global regions of Europe and North America.  In addition, in terms of 
attracting the investment it finds that BRICS investment as a whole is interested in 
different characteristics of a host country compared to the other global investors.  These 
partly reflect its different nature: it is more likely to be in production and in the 
manufacturing sector, but also different motives.  The factors that are important for BRICS 
FDI location are a higher GDP growth rate, a greater higher education rate, a stronger 
exchange rate, a greater political risk and a lower wage rate.  Economic growth and higher 
education suggest that market access and knowledge-seeking are important motives for 
BRICS investors. While a weaker currency is important for European FDI for the purpose 
of an ‘export-platform’, as it makes the investment and subsequent exports cheaper, the 
opposite is the case for the BRICS.  It is probably because currency appreciation reflects 
a stable economic environment and lower risk.  The political risk estimate suggests that 
BRICS investors probably like a weaker regulatory environment, while the wage rate term 
also suggests that the BRICS investors seek location with a lower level of labour costs.  
The location choice of FDI is a trade-off between ‘dispersion’ factors and 
agglomeration determinants.  If the latter plays the major role, the ‘follower’ will choose 
the same location for more profits.  In general, the reasons for the ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour include the superior information, larger size and better profitability of the 
‘leader’ and characteristics of a location that are interested by different investors (e.g. 
similar language and culture).  In addition, seeking for the raw materials and advanced 
technology, support of the government and greater market potential are main motives for 
BRICS FDI to follow their previous investment.  The results for ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour indicate that when the investments of the rest four BRICS countries are 
considered together, each BRICS country prefers to ‘follow’ the previous investment from 
the same BRICS country, but ‘avoid’ the investment of the other BRICS.  At the level of 
the individual BRICS, China and India appear to be the ‘leaders’ in the investment 
location among all BRICS countries and their FDI grows stronger than other countries, 
while there is some evidence that South African investment may perform a similar role 
owing to the more long-standing nature of its investment.  Therefore, there is distinctive 
purpose and location choice of BRICS FDI, which suggests that BRICS countries should 
be considered separately, while China and India have rapid growth in FDI projects and 
252 
 
similar number in the EU-25 over the study period.  They also become increasingly similar 
in the location choice during the dispersion periods. In this sense, these two countries 
could be considered together and are comparable to each other to some extent. 
 
9.3. Future Work 
 
This thesis uses cross-sectional data to explore the locational determinants for the BRICS 
FDI in the EU-25 from 1997 to 2010 covering enlargements in 2004 and 2007 of the 
European Union.  It also examines ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour of the BRICS FDI, 
whether they follow their own previous investments and also avoid or follow locations of 
other BRICS countries’ investments.  According to Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012), most 
previous research in international business concentrated on the motives, directions and 
forms of outward FDI from developed countries.  However, more recently, there has been 
a change in the patterns of FDI, with more companies from emerging markets investing 
abroad.  Therefore, the thesis fills this gap, where there is few research on the outward 
FDI from emerging or developing economies.  However, there are still limitations to my 
research, which could give suggestion for future research. 
First of all, this thesis explores the determinants for FDI location choice in the EU-
25.  It considers the characteristics of the host country only, whereas future research could 
concentrate on the characteristics of the host and source countries, and deepen the research 
by focusing on the industry level.  This is because outward FDI from the BRICS countries 
mainly depends on two factors: the strategic position of an industry in the source country 
and competitive pressures in the home market.  In addition, there are firm-level factors 
that focus on projects has tended to ignore, such as the specific resources owned by the 
domestic firms.  It may explain why firms become leaders in their home markets and then 
compete in foreign markets.  The difficulty with analysing firm-level factors is that it 
would require greater data on the firm-level characteristics, while an industry-level 
analysis may be limited by the number of observations on investments in the case of the 
BRICS, although this problem may ease over time as BRICS investment continues to 
grow.  Of course, effects of financial crisis should be considered in the regression analysis. 
Second, the thesis finds evidence of ‘follow-the-leader’ behaviour in BRICS 
investment.  Future research could explore the exact source of this behaviour through the 
collection of other data, and explore whether it is agglomeration economies that underlie 
this or some other factor.  I also find distinctiveness in FDI location from different BRICS 
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countries, with FDI tending to ‘avoid’ the country location of the other BRICS.  It raises 
the issue of whether the BRICS form a cohesive unit and if they are worth studying as a 
single group of countries or not.  Further, the future global importance of the BRICS may 
be called into question, with serious recessions in some of these countries (i.e. Brazil and 
Russia) and others facing economic uncertainties (China and South Africa), although 
India looks set to grow strongly in future. 
Third, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is a limitation 
for the Conditional Logit model as it assumes that all of the alternatives are independent 
of each other.  This may be implausible for some of the location alternatives (i.e. the EU-
15 and the CEEC-10), which may be close substitutes, but nesting techniques (e.g. Nest 
Logit Model that relaxes this restriction) for such a large dataset has precluded me from 
considering this issue in this thesis.  Likewise, the Poisson and Negative Binomial models 
give weak results for the BRICS investment in the EU-25, so that they cannot be used to 
offer a strong support or opposition to the results of the logit analysis.  This weakness may 
arise from the large number of zero counts on projects (i.e. countries receiving no BRICS 
investment in a given year), especially in the early years of the study period.  More 
advanced models for count data are used to deal with the large number of zeros but the 
results are still weak.  Good results are obtained for the log-linear model using OLS 
estimation, but this may be more suitable for continuous rather than discrete data.  Future 
research could study this topic using count data models, but for which the zero 
observations are likely to be less important as BRICS FDI grows. 
Finally, the EIM database classifies the FDI projects into three types: new, 
expansion and co-location investment.  The different types of projects may be interested 
in different host country characteristics, and may be a dimension to ‘follow-the-leader’ 
behaviour.  For example, an expansion is an investment at an existing location of a foreign 
firm, which means that it is more likely to ‘follow’ previous investment by the same 
multinational enterprise, as well as less likely to be attracted by some host country 
characteristics as a new investment.  While the number of expansion and co-location 
projects is small for the BRICS, it is a dimension has not been considered in this thesis, 
but it is seems likely to be more important to future research, again as BRICS investment 
grows and becomes more important over time. 
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Appendix 4.1: Estimation of Binary Choice Models 
 
The estimation of binary choice models is usually derived from the method of maximum 
likelihood.  As indicated by Greene (2002), each choice can be considered as a single 
draw from the Bernoulli distribution that is subject to the binomial distribution.  If the 
models have independent observations with the probability of success 𝐹(𝑋′𝛽), the joint 
probability is: 
 
Pr(𝑌1 = 𝑦1, 𝑌2 = 𝑦2, … , 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛|𝑋) = ∏ [1 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖′𝛽)]𝑦𝑖=0 ∏ 𝐹(𝑋𝑖′𝛽)𝑦𝑖=1 .   (A.4.1) 
 
where 𝑋 represents [𝑋𝑖].  When a sample has 𝑛 observations, the likelihood function is: 
 
𝐿(𝛽) = ∏ [𝐹(𝑋𝑖′𝛽)]
𝑦𝑖[1 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖′𝛽)]
1−𝑦𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1                        (A.4.2) 
 
Hensher et al., (2005) note that if there are very small values, then multiplication will 
lead to even smaller values so that the log of the likelihood function is adopted to replace 
the original likelihood function.  Thus, equation (A.4.2) is written as: 
 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ {𝑦𝑖 ln 𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) ln[1 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖′𝛽)]}
𝑛
𝑖=1               (A.4.3) 
 
The maximum likelihood estimation gives the values of 𝛽.  The first derivative of 𝛽 
equals zero: 
 
𝜕 ln𝐿
𝜕𝛽
= ∑ [
𝑦𝑖𝑓𝑖
𝐹𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑦𝑖)
−𝑓𝑖
1−𝐹𝑖
]𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0                          (A.4.4) 
 
where 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑑𝐹𝑖/𝑑(𝑋𝑖′𝛽) , is the density function.  Different forms for 𝐹𝑖  result in 
different empirical models.  In order to get the likelihood function for the logit model, 
equations (4.5) and (4.9) are substituted into (A.4.4) giving: 
 
    
𝜕 ln𝐿
𝜕𝛽
= ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − Λ𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖 = 0                                  (A.4.5) 
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Appendix 4.2: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
 
If in the Multinomial Logit or Conditional Logit models, the odds ratio (𝑃𝑗/𝑃𝑘 ) for 
alternatives 𝑗 and 𝑘 is irrelevant to other alternatives it is known as the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  This is convenient for parameter estimation, and it is based 
on assumption of independent and homoscedastic disturbances.  
Both the Multinomial Logit and Conditional Logit models are subject to the IIA 
assumption, and this can lead to a problem with the estimation.  A famous example relates 
to transport economics (see Rasciute, 2008), as discussed in Section 4.3.2, but here we 
consider it in the context of FDI location.  The UK and Poland are assumed to be the only 
two location choices (the two largest host countries of FDI in the West and East 
respectively) for a project in the EU-25.  Suppose there are the same probabilities for these 
choices, i.e. Pr(𝑢𝑘) = Pr(𝑝𝑜) = 1/2, so that the ratio of probabilities equals one, i.e. 
Pr(𝑢𝑘)/ Pr(𝑝𝑜) = 1.  Further, suppose Hungary (hun) is introduced as a new location for 
the project in the East only, and that there is the same probability of location in Hungary, 
so Pr(ℎ𝑢𝑛)/ Pr(𝑝𝑜) = 1. 
When there are three location choices, IIA supposes that the probabilities of 
choosing any one of the three locations is still the same, so that Pr(𝑢𝑘) =
Pr(𝑝𝑜) = Pr(ℎ𝑢𝑛) = 1/3.  However, the probability of choosing the UK should be the 
same as before the introduction of the third alternative, as Hungary is an alternative for 
Poland only.  In particular, the probability of choosing Hungary should account for half 
of the original probability of choosing Poland and equal to 1/4.  By introducing Hungary 
there is a change in the ratio of the probability of choosing the UK to that of choosing 
Poland, i.e. Pr(𝑢𝑘)/ Pr(𝑝𝑜) =
1/2
1/4
= 2, so that IIA breaks down. Hence, the logit models 
underestimate the probability of choosing the UK, while they overestimate the 
probability of choosing Poland or Hungary.  
 A test is proposed to examine this assumption, where the principle is that if a 
subset of all choices is independent of the remaining choices, the estimation parameters 
will not be changed systematically when the subset is excluded from the estimation.  
However, if the omitted choices are relevant, the parameter estimation will change 
dramatically.  This is the basis for the Hausman specification test, which is as follows: 
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𝜒2 = (?̂?𝑠 − ?̂?𝑓)
′
[?̂?𝑠 − ?̂?𝑓]
−1
(?̂?𝑠 − ?̂?𝑓), 
 
where 𝑠 is the estimator for the restricted subset of choices, 𝑓 is the estimator for the 
full set, and  ?̂?𝑠  and ?̂?𝑓  represent the corresponding estimates of the asymptotic 
covariance matrices.  This statistic is subject to the Chi-squared distribution. 
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Appendix 4.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
Given the linear regression model: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜺𝒊                                               (A.4.6) 
 
Greene (2002) indicates that the likelihood function for a sample with 𝑛 disturbances that 
are independent to each other and that have the normal distribution is: 
 
𝐿 = (2𝜋𝜎2)−𝑛/2𝑒−𝜀
′𝜀/(2𝜎2). 
 
Because 𝜺𝒊 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷, the likelihood function for the 𝑛 observations is: 
 
𝐿 = (2𝜋𝜎2)−𝑛/2𝑒
−1
2𝜎2
(𝑦−𝑿𝜷)′(𝑦−𝑿𝜷)
. 
 
When logs are taken, the log-likelihood function for the classical regression model arises: 
 
ln 𝐿 = −
𝑛
2
ln 2𝜋 −
𝑛
2
ln 𝜎2 −
(𝒚 − 𝑿𝜷)′(𝒚 − 𝑿𝜷)
2𝜎2
. 
 
The necessary conditions for maximizing the above function are: 
 
[
 
 
 
𝜕 ln 𝐿
𝜕𝛽
𝜕 ln 𝐿
𝜕𝜎2 ]
 
 
 
= [
𝑿′(𝒚 − 𝑿𝜷)
𝜎2
−𝑛
2𝜎2
+
(𝒚 − 𝑿𝜷)′(𝒚 − 𝑿𝜷)
2𝜎4
] = [
𝟎
0
]. 
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Appendix 4.4: The Profit Function 
 
As discussed in Section 4.5, the location choice is decided to maximize profits, so that, 
 
Pr(𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 > 𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑜),                                             (A.4.7) 
 
where 𝑖, 𝑠 and 𝑐 are for firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑠 and host country c respectively, and 𝑜 denotes 
all other locations.  It is necessary to explore the expression for the profit function, which 
is the difference between revenue and cost.  This exploration starts with the revenue 
function.   
 
Total Revenue 
According to Helpman (2006), the demand for the product of firm 𝑖 in the host country 𝑐 
is: 
 
𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 𝑀𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐
−𝛿 ,                                             (A.4.8) 
 
where  𝑞𝑖𝑐 is the product quantity of firm 𝑖 in host country 𝑐, 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐 is the product price,  𝑀𝑐 
is a measure for the level of demand in the host country 𝑐, and 𝛿 is the demand elasticity, 
which always equals 1/(1 − 𝜑), where 𝜑 is the mark-up.  It is assumed that demand 
elasticity is constant and that 𝑀𝑐 is exogenous.  Therefore, the total revenue (𝑇𝑅), which 
equals the price level times the quantity of products, can be expressed as: 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝑀𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐
−𝛿 = 𝑀𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐
1−𝛿 .                  (A.4.9) 
 
In order to achieve the maximum profits, it is necessary to maximize the total revenue, 
which means that the maximum price level should be found.  Let 𝛾𝑖 be the productivity of 
firm 𝑖, where 𝛾𝑖 varies between zero and one.  The variable cost, which increases with 
each unit of output shown by Rasciute (2008) is 𝑏/𝛾𝑖 , where 𝑏 represents the cost of 
resources.  Therefore, the price that maximizes the profits for firm 𝑖 can be expressed as 
𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑏/𝜑𝛾𝑖. 
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Total Costs 
In addition to maximizing the revenue, it also needs to confirm the minimum total costs.  
It is assumed that production is carried out by using three main factors: unskilled and 
skilled labour, and capital (Defever, 2012). Denote 𝑓𝑐  as a measure for the fixed 
production costs of the host country 𝑐 that is relevant to the cost of resources 𝑏, so that the 
fixed costs are 𝑏𝑓𝑐, which are the same for all firms, but the variable costs 𝑏/𝛾𝑖 changes 
with the firm productivity.  This is because the fixed costs (e.g. the costs of establishing 
factories or facilities) are less able to vary substantially with firm productivity (Bernard et 
al., 2007). 
Skilled labour and capital are assumed to be relevant to fixed costs (i.e. they are 
used for R&D and for setting up factories and facilities), whereas the unskilled labour 
corresponds to the variable costs.  Based on cost minimization using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the expression for the minimum total cost can be derived as: 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑠 )𝛼(𝑟𝑐)
𝛽𝑓𝑐 +
(𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢 )1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛾𝑖
𝑞𝑖𝑐 ,                           (A.4.10) 
 
where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the shares of skilled labour and capital to the total costs respectively, 
𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑠  is  
the wage rate per hour of skilled labour in industry 𝑠  and country 𝑐 , and 𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢  is for 
unskilled labour, while 𝑟𝑐 is the return from capital in country 𝑐.  The first term on the 
right-hand side of equation (A.4.10) represents the fixed costs for a firm entering foreign 
country 𝑐, which relates to developing distribution networks and generating marketing 
strategies, in addition to establishing factories or facilities as mentioned above. 
 
The Specification for the Profit Function 
In the labour market, equilibrium means that labour supply should equal to the labour 
demand.  The former is assumed to be exogenous and expressed as ?̅?.  The labour force is 
classified into skilled (𝐿𝑠) and unskilled labour (𝐿𝑢).  At the same time, the price for 
maximizing the profits (𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑏/𝜑𝛾𝑖) can be expressed as a mark-up over the marginal 
cost: 
 
𝑃𝑖(𝛾) =
𝑑𝑐𝑒(𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢 )1−𝛼−𝛽
𝜑𝛾𝑖
,                                        (A.4.11) 
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where 𝑑𝑐𝑒  is the transport cost between the source country 𝑒  and host country 𝑐 .  
Samuelson (1954) finds that only 1/𝑑𝑐𝑒 of goods can arrive in the host country when these 
goods are transported from source country 𝑒 to the host 𝑐.  Thus, when other things are 
maintained constant, more distant locations have a smaller role in profits. 
The after-tax profit in country 𝑐 is specified as the after-tax difference between 
total revenue and costs, and minus some other costs arising from environment of the host 
country: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐)(𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑐) − ℎ𝑐 ,                             (A.4.12) 
 
where 𝑡𝑐 is the tax rate and ℎ𝑐 are the costs arising from the political, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors in the host country 𝑐.  As shown in equation (A.4.9), the total 
revenue comes from selling a quantity of products (𝑞𝑖𝑐).  Equation (A.4.10) reveals the 
total costs caused by producing these products. Substituting them in the above equation 
gives: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐) (𝑀𝑐𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑐
1−𝛿 − (𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑠 )𝛼𝑟𝑐
𝛽
𝑓𝑐 −
(𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢 )1−𝛼−𝛽
𝛾𝑖
𝑞𝑖𝑐) − ℎ𝑐 .         (A.4.13) 
 
Further, substituting equations (A.4.11) and (A.4.8) for 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑐 and 𝑞𝑖𝑐 leads to: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐) (𝑀𝑐 (
𝑑𝑐𝑒(𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑢 )1−𝛼−𝛽
𝜑𝛾𝑖
)
1−𝛿
(1 −
𝜑
𝑑𝑐𝑒
) − (𝑤𝑠𝑐
𝑠 )𝛼𝑟𝑐
𝛽
𝑓𝑐) − ℎ𝑐   (A.4.14) 
 
According to this, when the price level is given, the attributes of the profit function (𝜋𝑖𝑠𝑐) 
that determine FDI location are the tax rate in the host country (𝑡𝑐), the distance between 
the source and host country (𝑑𝑐𝑒), the return on capital in the host country (𝑟𝑐), the market 
size of host country (𝑀𝑐), the wage rate in the host country (𝑤𝑠𝑐) and other costs (ℎ𝑐). 
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Appendix Table 4.1: Summary for Count Data Models 
Model 
First Stage 
(Zero filter) 
Second Stage 
Marginal 
effects 
Treatment of zeros Comments 
Basic Count 
Data  
No first stage 
Standard Poisson or NB 
count data model for all 
observations including zeros. 
No Included, no distinction. 
Basic model. Dispersion 
determines distribution choice. 
NB for over-dispersion. 
Hurdle 
Binary choice model for 
zero or non-zero 
(positive) observations - 
logit. 
Zero truncated Poisson or 
NB for all non-zero 
(positive) observations. 
No 
Zeros included in estimation, 
but filtered out statistically with 
impact corrected for at stage 2. 
Different process for non-zero 
observations allowed for. Second 
stage is model of non-zero 
observations only. 
Zero inflated 
Binary choice model for 
zeros and observations 
from range including 
zero (i.e. part of zeros 
and all positive 
observations) - logit. 
Standard Poisson or NB 
count data model for all 
possible observations. 
No 
Zeros included in estimation, 
but only extra zeros filtered out 
statistically. Modelled as either 
from zero only process or more 
general all value process. 
Two processes for all 
observations: Stage one is model 
of extra zero observations. Stage 
two is model of all possible 
observations from Poisson or NB. 
Zero truncated No first stage 
Standard Poisson or NB 
count data model for all non-
zero (positive) observations. 
No 
Zero observations excluded 
from sample with model based 
on truncated distribution. 
Count data models based on zero-
truncated Poisson or NB 
distributions i.e. distributions for 
non-zero observations only. 
Note: coefficients do not represent marginal effects in non-linear regression models, but they have the same significant level and directions of the sign. Marginal 
effects that can be evaluated at the means of the regressors are estimated for BRICS countries based on the ZINB model in Chapter 8. 
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Appendix Table 5.1: BRICS Investment in the EU-25, 1997 to 2010 
Host China India Russia 
South 
Africa 
Brazil BRICS 
Non-
BRICS 
Total 
Austria 1 2 5 1 1 10 686 696 
Belgium 31 26 3 7 7 74 1,738 1,812 
Denmark 9 8 4 0 0 21 547 568 
Finland 1 4 2 0 0 7 244 251 
France 61 45 16 9 8 139 5,883 6,022 
Germany 151 66 33 9 5 264 3,227 3,491 
Greece 1 1 1 0 0 3 97 100 
Ireland 3 3 2 3 0 11 1,259 1,270 
Italy 21 4 6 0 1 32 780 812 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 1 89 90 
Netherlands 22 18 5 5 2 52 1,190 1,242 
Portugal 0 2 0 0 9 11 411 422 
Spain 17 7 6 4 16 50 2,074 2,124 
Sweden 23 15 2 0 0 40 942 982 
United 
Kingdom 
170 307 26 48 15 566 7,777 8,343 
EU-15 
511 
94.1% 
508 
93.7% 
111 
67.3% 
86 
90.5% 
65 
92.9% 
1,281 
90.5% 
26,944 
80.0% 
28,225 
80.4% 
Bulgaria 4 1 7 1 0 13 457 470 
Czech 
Republic 
4 7 7 4 0 22 1130 1,152 
Estonia 0 0 7 0 0 7 227 234 
Hungary 13 6 3 1 0 23 1390 1,413 
Latvia 0 0 8 1 0 9 172 181 
Lithuania 0 1 11 0 0 12 227 239 
Poland 5 10 3 2 0 20 1593 1,613 
Romania 5 8 7 0 1 21 910 931 
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 4 6 523 529 
Slovenia 0 0 1 0 0 1 117 118 
CEEC-10 
32 
5.9% 
34 
6.3% 
54 
32.7% 
9 
9.5% 
5 
7.1% 
134 
9.5% 
6,746 
20.0% 
6880 
19.6% 
EU-25 
543 
100% 
542 
100% 
165 
100% 
95 
100% 
70 
100% 
1,415 
100% 
33,690 
100% 
35,105 
100% 
Note: Projects with investors from two or more source countries are shown for the primary source only. 
Source: EIM Database. 
79 
  
 2
8
2
 
 
Appendix Table 5.2: Summary for Education levels of ISCED 2011 
Level ISCED 2011 Description ISCED 1997 
0 
Early childhood educational 
development 
Promotes early development of preparation for participating in school and 
society (0-3 year old children). 
- 
0 Pre-primary education 
Has the same purpose to above, but for children from 3 years old to the 
start of primary education. 
Level 0: Pre-primary education 
1 Primary education 
Help students have fundamental skills (reading and writing) and form a 
good foundation for learning. 
Level 1: Primary education or first stage of basic education 
2 Lower secondary education 
(First stage) The purpose is to build on primary education with a more 
subject-oriented curriculum. 
Level 2: Lower secondary education or second stage of basic 
education 
3 Upper secondary education 
(Second stage) The purpose is to prepare for tertiary education and 
develop skills relevant to employment. 
Level 3: Upper secondary education 
4 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education 
Develop learning experiences to build on secondary education and in 
preparation for the entry to the labour market or tertiary education. 
Level 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
5 Short-cycle tertiary education 
Provide short first tertiary programmes with practically-based and 
occupationally-specific characteristics to prepare for entry to labour 
market and supply a pathway to other tertiary programmes. 
Level 5B: First stage of tertiary education: shorter, practical and 
occupational programmes for professional qualifications. 
6 Bachelor or equivalent 
Provide programmes to obtain intermediate academic and professional 
knowledge, skills and competencies for a first tertiary degree or 
equivalent qualifications. 
Level 5A: First stage of tertiary education: large and theoretical 
programmes for getting more advanced research programmes and 
professions with higher skills requirements. 
7 Master or equivalent 
Provide programmes to obtain advanced academic and professional 
knowledge, skills and competencies for a second tertiary degree or 
equivalent qualifications. 
Level 5A: The same to above 
8 Doctoral or equivalent 
Provide programmes to get an advanced research qualification when a 
thesis which meets the requirement for publication based on original 
research is produced.  It aims to achieve independent research and 
contribute to current knowledge. 
Level 6: Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an 
advanced research qualification). 
Source: The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
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Appendix Table 6.1: BRICS FDI in the EU-25 by Country 
Host Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
BRICS 
Non-
BRICS 
Total 
Austria 1 5 2 1 1 10 686 696 
Belgium 7 3 26 31 7 74 1,738 1,812 
Denmark 0 4 8 9 0 21 547 568 
Finland 0 2 4 1 0 7 244 251 
France 8 16 45 61 9 139 5,883 6,022 
Germany 5 33 66 151 9 264 3,227 3,491 
Greece 0 1 1 1 0 3 97 100 
Ireland 0 2 3 3 3 11 1,259 1,270 
Italy 1 6 4 21 0 32 780 812 
Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 0 1 89 90 
Netherlands 2 5 18 22 5 52 1,190 1,242 
Portugal 9 0 2 0 0 11 411 422 
Spain 16 6 7 17 4 50 2,074 2,124 
Sweden 0 2 15 23 0 40 942 982 
UK 15 26 307 170 48 566 7,777 8,343 
EU-15 
65 
(92.9%) 
111 
(67.3%) 
508 
(93.7%) 
511 
(94.1%) 
86 
(90.5%) 
1,281 
(90.5%) 
26,944 
(80.0%) 
28,225 
(80.4%) 
Bulgaria 0 7 1 4 1 13 457 470 
Czech 
Republic 
0 7 7 4 4 22 1130 1,152 
Estonia 0 7 0 0 0 7 227 234 
Hungary 0 3 6 13 1 23 1390 1,413 
Latvia 0 8 0 0 1 9 172 181 
Lithuania 0 11 1 0 0 12 227 239 
Poland 0 3 10 5 2 20 1593 1,613 
Romania 1 7 8 5 0 21 910 931 
Slovakia 4 0 1 1 0 6 523 529 
Slovenia 0 1 0 0 0 1 117 118 
CEEC-10 
5 
(7.1%) 
54 
(32.7%) 
34 
(6.3%) 
32 
(5.9%) 
9 
(9.5%) 
134 
(9.5%) 
6,746 
(20.0%) 
6,880 
(19.6%) 
EU-25 
70 
(100.0%) 
165 
(100.0%) 
542 
(100.0%) 
543 
(100.0%) 
95 
(100.0%) 
1,415 
(100.0%) 
33,690 
(100.0%) 
35,105 
(100.0%) 
Notes: Number of projects in all years, 1997 to 2010. Projects with investors from two or more countries are shown for 
the primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Appendix Table 6.2: Start-up Manufacturing FDI for Headquarters / R&D 
Host BRICS Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
All FDI 
Austria 2 1 0 0 1 0 41 
Belgium 2 1 0 0 1 0 77 
Denmark 5 0 0 1 4 0 63 
Finland 1 0 0 0 1 0 17 
France 9 0 0 1 8 0 232 
Germany 19 0 0 4 14 1 207 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Ireland 1 0 0 0 1 0 88 
Italy 3 0 0 0 3 0 45 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Netherlands 5 0 0 1 3 1 82 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Spain 3 1 2 0 0 0 125 
Sweden 4 0 0 1 3 0 62 
UK 43 1 0 21 19 2 543 
EU-15 
97 
(97.0%) 
4 
(100.0%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
29 
(96.7%) 
58 
(96.7%) 
4 
(100.0%) 
1,606 
(93.4%) 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Czech 
Republic 
1 0 0 1 0 0 25 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 2 0 0 0 2 0 29 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CEEC-10 
3 
(3.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
2 
(3.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
113 
(6.6%) 
EU-25 
100 
(100.0%) 
4 
(100.0%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
30 
(100.0%) 
60 
(100.0%) 
4 
(100.0%) 
1,719 
(100.0%) 
Notes: Number of FDI projects for years, 1997 to 2010. Projects with investors from two or more source countries are 
shown for the primary source only. 
Source: EIM database. 
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Appendix Table 7.1: Hausman Test for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption 
Dropped Country Value of Chi2 Prob > Chi2 Comments 
Austria -4.39 N/A 
When this country is dropped, the negative 
value of Chi2 means that model fitted on these 
data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions 
of the Hausman test. No conclusion can be 
made. 
Belgium -7.61 N/A Same to the above. 
Bulgaria -3.22 N/A Same to the above. 
Czech Republic -2.11 N/A Same to the above. 
Denmark -0.87 N/A Same to the above. 
Estonia 1.01 1.0000 
The positive value of Chi2 and insignificant 
Prob > Chi2 indicate that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. It means that there is not a 
significant difference in probability of location 
choice when Estonia as one location choice is 
included or not (i.e. Data meet IIA 
assumption). 
Finland -3.27 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
France -3.08 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Germany 2.57 1.0000 Same to the case above of Estonia. 
Greece -0.28 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Hungary -4.39 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Ireland -2.37 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Italy -0.02 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Latvia -0.37 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Lithuania -1.65 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Luxembourg -3.50 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Netherlands -1.87 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Poland 10.60 0.9999 Same to the case above of Estonia. 
Portugal -4.56 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Romania -3.73 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Slovakia 3.11 1.0000 Same to the case above of Estonia. 
Slovenia -2.71 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Spain -4.55 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Sweden -4.55 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
UK -158.86 N/A Same to the case above of Austria. 
Notes: The null hypothesis: There is not the systematic difference in coefficients. Hausman test is for the 
main results in Column XIV of Table 7.8. All country fixed-effects are considered when each of EU-25 
countries is dropped, excluding the UK as country fixed-effects are dropped to get the regression results. 
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Appendix Table 7.2: FDI Location Choice for All Sources: Country Variables 
Dependent Variable: = 1 if project 
locates in country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All Sources with Different Case Variables 
Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 7.11 
Project 
Characteristics 
BRICS 
Countries 
Both, Europe and 
North America 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏: 
Demand Variables:    
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -4.42*** -3.71*** -3.86*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−2) 2.13*** 2.09*** 2.02*** 
Population Density (x10−2) -1.91*** -1.57*** -1.77*** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 0.43 -0.46 0.96 
Labour Market Variables:    
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -2.31*** -2.31*** -2.31*** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−3) -5.72 -3.71 -0.44 
Real Wage Rate Dummy -8.86*** -7.31*** -9.92*** 
Cost Variables:    
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−2) -1.15*** -1.18*** -1.29*** 
Motorway Density (x10−2) 1.28** 1.12** 1.39** 
Political Risk (x10−3) -3.32 -2.17 -3.67 
Education Variables:    
Higher Education (x10−3) 2.43 0.62 3.07 
Secondary Education (x10−3) 7.46*** 5.49* 6.92** 
Trade Variables:    
Openness to Trade (x10−3) 0.93 0.60 -0.34 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) -5.18*** -4.24** -5.44*** 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−3) -1.51*** -1.45*** -1.48*** 
Policy Terms:    
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -3.67*** -3.14*** -3.39*** 
Eurozone Country (x10−1) 1.48*** 1.20** 1.43*** 
EU Commitment (x10−1) 3.00*** 3.35*** 3.01*** 
EU Membership (x10−1) 2.53*** 1.94*** 2.37*** 
EU Post-membership (x10−1) -2.61*** -2.69*** -2.48*** 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x 10
-3): 
All Sources 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.628*** 
Number of Observations 817,100 817,100 817,100 
Number of Cases 32,684 32,684 32,684 
Log likelihood -83,303.11 -84,657.61 -81,467.08 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Notes: The table shows the estimates on the country variables and lagged FDI term corresponding to the 
results reported in Tables 7.9 to 7.11 respectively.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significant level. 
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Appendix Table 8.1: BRICS FDI Location Choice:  
Log-Linear Model with Country and Time Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -10.50*** -4.06** -3.83** -4.06** -4.36** -1.32 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 15.50 -9.00 16.90 8.69 11.10 -13.20** 
Population Density (x10−3) -2.48 11.10 -17.90 -12.20 6.78 -0.26 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 5.75* 1.12 2.45 7.20** 3.71 2.56 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.04 -1.59* -0.66 0.06 0.10 -2.00** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) -2.96 -4.37** -2.94 -0.58 0.15 -1.81 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -33.15*** -28.53*** -4.66 -6.67 -13.58 -4.63 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -3.83 1.32 -17.70** 1.37 0.02 -6.15 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -12.80 -0.28 11.70 -16.40 -22.50* 6.76 
Political Risk (x10−3) 11.10 -6.61 20.70** -7.99 4.29 5.72 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 19.60* -0.59 6.86 13.50* 2.27 4.14 
Secondary Education (x10−3) 5.59 2.96 -1.45 12.90* 0.77 -0.19 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -3.96 -2.33 -4.57 -8.36** -0.48 2.93 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 0.26 -0.48 2.93 0.10 -8.54** 1.54 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 8.91** 0.33 10.60*** 5.46* 1.37 -0.79 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -4.52 -1.71 5.34 2.77 -11.20*** -5.17** 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -11.40 5.04 -0.32 -8.35 -10.40 0.75 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -32.10 -4.08 -0.05 -23.50* -4.78 -1.70 
EU Membership (x10−2) 0.32 -11.80 10.30 17.30 -28.50* 2.98 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -17.80* -1.76 -23.20*** -4.06 8.74 -9.11* 
Source Variables, 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟏) (x 10
-2):       
All BRICS  25.20*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 0.46 7.60 14.10 12.70 1.77 
Russia - -10.40* -4.48 11.20* 2.40 1.26 
India - 17.90*** 5.23 16.10* 31.20*** 1.27 
China - 1.90 14.70** 28.00*** 22.80*** 3.05 
South Africa - 2.81 24.30** -8.90 12.20 -18.90** 
Constant (x10-1) 17.59 22.02** 9.30 8.56 3.34 -2.18 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.81 0.46 0.50 0.81 0.81 0.64 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010.  OLS estimation with robust standard 
errors.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be compared with Table 8.2. 
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Appendix Table 8.2: BRICS FDI Location Choice: 
Log-Linear Model with New Source Variable and Country and Time Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -10.50*** -4.23*** -5.04*** -5.46*** -6.06*** -1.48 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 15.50 -6.30 15.90 10.50 15.40 -12.97** 
Population Density (x10−3) -2.48 6.63 -18.70 -18.30 -2.55 -1.14 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 5.75* 3.05 4.46* 10.10*** 7.66*** 3.02 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.04 -1.67* -1.07 -0.61 -0.40 -2.09** 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) -2.96 -4.79** -3.49 -0.69 -1.31 -1.90 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -33.15*** -27.89*** -8.65 -8.51 -17.58 -4.86 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -3.83 4.16 -16.70** 0.79 1.39 -6.07 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -12.80 -2.10 9.61 -18.90 -25.60** 6.33 
Political Risk (x10−3) 11.13 -11.07 19.60** -12.60 -1.07 5.14 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 19.60* -0.90 8.26 14.10* 5.18 4.17 
Secondary Education (x10−3) 5.59 3.94 0.83 17.10** 5.62 0.25 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -3.96 -3.64 -4.72 -9.84** -4.42 2.70 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 0.26 -2.33 1.72 -4.80 -10.80** 1.05 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 8.91** 0.40 9.98*** 5.90* 2.97 -0.75 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -4.52 -1.90 3.36 0.08 -10.70*** -5.46** 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -11.40 3.47 -2.02 -9.82 -12.60 0.62 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -32.10 -8.07 -1.25 -21.70* -11.70 -1.85 
EU Membership (x10−2) 0.32 -12.50 6.93 11.10 -25.50* 2.43 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -17.80* -0.45 -24.60*** -5.44 6.32 -9.31* 
Source Variables, 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟏) (x 10
-2):       
All BRICS  25.20*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 4.11 - - - - 
Russia - - 1.43 - - - 
India - - - 30.70*** - - 
China - - - - 36.50*** - 
South Africa - - - - - -17.50** 
BRICS, excluding same country - 7.16** 9.30 12.01* 9.83* 2.46 
Constant (x10-1) 17.59 26.30** 11.41 17.29 14.47 -1.20 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.81 0.43 0.47 0.79 0.80 0.64 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes:  Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. OLS estimation with the robust standard 
errors.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be compared with Table 8.3. 
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Appendix Table 8.3: BRICS FDI Location Choice: 
Log-Linear Model with New Source Variable and No Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 0.63*** 0.04 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.22*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -1.32** -0.52 -0.69* -0.53 -0.35 -0.46 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) -0.08 -2.14 0.55 2.89 -1.46 1.38 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.00 -0.93 -0.18 1.67** 0.04 1.92*** 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 1.69*** 0.69** 0.29 1.16*** 0.64 1.00*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -2.35** -0.07 -1.38* -0.97 -0.72 -0.80* 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 0.81 -0.20 0.14 0.11 0.52 -0.24 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) 0.45 -0.61 1.32 0.98 0.18 0.93* 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -19.08 *** -3.22 -8.19* -6.47 -8.99* -1.88 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -6.40 3.85 -0.13 -11.54** -0.15 -14.05*** 
Political Risk (x10−3) 6.97 -1.29 4.92 8.72 -1.02 11.30*** 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 16.56*** 1.36 10.25*** 10.21*** 5.74* 5.40** 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -6.74** -5.09** 1.75 -4.47 -3.02 -7.43*** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -2.79* -1.21 -0.54 -2.09 -0.65 -0.90 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 3.55 -2.21 3.04 0.84 -3.06 2.46 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 7.36** 0.74 1.88 5.42** 2.55 2.14 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 1.63 1.94 1.77 -0.35 -1.40 -1.63 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -9.82 6.09* 3.93 -9.93 -6.21 -2.44 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 0.31 -6.76 11.30 -6.84 4.11 -4.56 
EU Membership (x10−2) 29.44* 4.31 7.52 17.80 2.57 1.65 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -24.80*** -4.28 -16.10** -6.64 -4.32 -3.76 
Source Variables, 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟏) (x 10
-2):       
All BRICS  46.63*** - - - - - 
Brazil - 21.24* - - - - 
Russia - - 10.47 - - - 
India - - - 53.46*** - - 
China - - - - 60.08*** - 
South Africa - - - - - 9.84 
BRICS, excluding same country - 11.13*** 7.70 16.30*** 13.42** 5.62* 
Constant (x10-1) -0.77 7.32 -5.09 -6.75 5.85 -8.86** 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.76 0.30 0.38 0.74 0.75 0.48 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. OLS estimation with robust standard 
errors. * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be compared with Table 8.3. 
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Appendix Table 8.4: BRICS Manufacturing FDI Location Choice: 
Log-Linear Model with Country and Time Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝟏) in 
country 𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -10.30*** -3.63** -2.70 -1.43 -6.21*** -0.58 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) 28.10** -7.48 9.92 11.70 10.50 -6.29 
Population Density (x10−3) 1.77 12.10 -1.99 -4.11 -4.60 -2.90 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 5.37* 0.96 -0.90 4.14 6.42** 0.80 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -0.03 -1.25 -0.96 0.11 0.05 -0.93 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) -4.24 -3.99** -1.06 -3.28 0.11 -1.45 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -37.76*** -25.71*** -8.63 -12.29 -11.23 -2.28 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -2.19 0.08 -9.64* -0.21 -1.22 -1.10 
Motorway Density (x10−3) -13.60 -1.38 6.76 -16.90 -16.60 4.82 
Political Risk (x10−3) 2.15 -7.24 7.72 -11.90 5.75 2.08 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 20.10* -0.67 10.90* 9.61 7.06 2.91 
Secondary Education (x10−3) 9.05 -0.13 6.07 14.40** 3.99 2.75 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -3.20 -1.49 -1.86 -7.27** -0.98 1.60 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 2.89 -0.06 9.07** 0.19 -9.54** 1.62 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) 7.56* 0.21 5.92** 4.30 1.65 -1.85 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) -6.61 -3.58 4.66 3.73 -10.02** -0.47 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -10.30 2.84 0.06 -3.51 -7.42 9.06* 
EU Commitment (x10−2) -32.30* -6.70 8.51 -17.70** -11.50 0.87 
EU Membership (x10−2) -19.40 -6.34 2.70 12.90 -26.70* 5.75 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -9.15 -1.40 -16.80** -1.45 6.38 -10.10** 
Source Variables, 𝒍𝒏(𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝟏) (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  18.60** - - - - - 
Brazil - -3.22 -6.14 17.01 2.80 1.46 
Russia - -12.20** -16.10** 11.20 3.80 -2.97 
India - 14.10** 9.15 8.46 28.10*** 6.83 
China - 2.33 14.50** 29.90*** 21.50** 0.19 
South Africa - 4.32 2.45 -3.15 7.78 -9.23 
Constant (x10-1) 20.32 20.15** 0.51 12.75 6.50 0.30 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
R2 0.75 0.42 0.34 0.70 0.77 0.49 
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. OLS estimation robust standard errors. 
* = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be compared with Table 8.5. 
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Appendix Table 8.5: BRICS FDI Location Choice: 
Poisson Model without Country and Time Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.52*** 1.71* 1.04*** 1.09*** 2.08*** 1.37*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -4.97*** -4.85 -8.08** -6.12** -6.11** -5.79 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) -3.17 -91.80 4.78 35.20 -3.71 -39.60 
Population Density (x10−3) 0.59 -8.55 -1.42 7.60*** -3.97** 8.70* 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.76*** 7.38*** 1.37 4.43*** 1.27 6.38*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -3.94** 2.94 -10.30** -4.45 -4.44 -11.60 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 4.96*** -8.59 8.85** 10.10*** 8.85*** -1.90 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -2.46 -24.63* 4.60 0.61 -10.10** -4.15 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -72.50*** -29.90 -79.80*** -65.60*** -108.38*** -17.60 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 3.31 74.90* 8.72 -42.50*** 33.10** -60.50* 
Political Risk (x10−3) -5.29 -3.17 -19.70 -21.60 -22.40 72.90* 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 57.60*** -28.20 72.20*** 100.62*** 48.03*** 54.04 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -13.60*** -77.20*** 35.30*** 17.50* -15.01* -33.20** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -1.04 0.57 -6.58 -9.49** 5.82 -1.23 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 1.35 67.70** 13.60 -9.21 -2.71 18.50 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -26.70 18.30 -419.44 -11.60 -153.81 15.80 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 9.12*** 21.10* 22.80** 12.10* 2.83 9.76 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -59.50*** 204.30* 20.60 -62.30** -93.10*** 58.30 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 61.30* -1667.89 49.30 57.40 1430.99 -27.95 
EU Membership (x10−2) 52.40* 1640.13 -9.04 220.50** 7.39 75.40 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -42.10*** -258.30** -72.02*** -37.40 -21.20 -90.90 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  0.74*** - - - - - 
Brazil - -10.90 -3.43 0.52 0.46 -2.36 
Russia - -25.70** -12.04* -0.24 -3.09 -9.24 
India - 12.10*** -0.36 -0.45 0.95 -0.38 
China - 1.46 0.68 0.45 0.20 1.88 
South Africa - 31.50** 26.50*** 3.07 4.26 6.06 
Constant (x10-1) 8.48 -28.50 -10.94 -31.70 -110.10 -90.71** 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Log likelihood -565.80 -104.78 -227.65 -290.42 -336.57 -123.34 
Pseudo R2 0.76 0.50 0.33 0.76 0.71 0.46 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. Dependent variable and BRICS terms 
are measured by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be 
compared with Table 8.6. 
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Appendix Table 8.6: BRICS FDI Location Choice: 
Negative Binomial Model without Country and Time Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 in country 
𝒊 at time 𝒕. 
All 
BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
I II III IV V VI 
Country Variables, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏:       
Demand Variables:       
Real GDP (x10-6) 1.29*** 1.71* 1.04*** 0.98*** 1.97*** 1.37*** 
Real GDP per capita (x10−5) -6.99*** -4.85 -8.08** -9.62*** -10.70*** -5.79 
Real GDP Growth Rate (x10−3) -1.31 -91.80 4.78 41.80 3.13 -39.60 
Population Density (x10−3) -0.89 -8.55 -1.42 5.26* -3.04 8.70* 
External Market Demand (x10−2) 2.72*** 7.38*** 1.37 3.69*** 0.62 6.38*** 
Labour Market Variables:       
Unemployment Rate (x10−2) -4.91** 2.94 -10.30** -2.83 -4.77 -11.60 
Real Wage Rate (x10−2) 7.45*** -8.59 8.85** 13.60*** 15.90*** -1.90 
Real Wage Rate Dummy (x10-1) -3.31 -24.63* 4.60 -2.25 -9.25* -4.15 
Cost Factors:       
Corporate Income Tax Rate (x10−3) -79.20*** -29.90 -79.80*** -85.98*** -135.69*** -17.60 
Motorway Density (x10−3) 13.60 74.90* 8.72 -22.90 33.80* -60.50* 
Political Risk (x10−3) 1.22 -3.17 -19.70 -3.60 -33.80 72.80* 
Education Variables:       
Higher Education (x10−3) 36.70*** -28.20 72.20*** 66.10*** 36.70* 54.05 
Secondary Education (x10−3) -14.40** -77.20*** 35.30*** 3.35 -12.50 -33.20** 
Trade Variables:       
Openness to Trade (x10−3) -4.25 0.57 -6.58 -10.60** 2.65 -1.23 
Real Exchange Rate (x10−3) 14.50 67.70** 13.60 10.10 -7.23 18.50 
Real Exchange rate volatility (x10−4) -18.70 18.30 -419.45 31.30 -18.80 15.70 
Policy Terms:       
EU Structural Funds (x10−5) 8.79* 21.10* 22.80** 9.21 4.87 9.75 
Eurozone Country (x10−2) -60.50*** 204.30* 20.60 -78.40*** -114.03*** 58.30 
EU Commitment (x10−2) 43.70 -1464.13 49.20 14.40 1500.94 -27.96 
EU Membership (x10−2) 46.10 1436.36 -9.04 214.60** -5.40 75.40 
EU Post-membership (x10−2) -49.90*** -258.30** -72.02*** -41.40 -19.20 -90.90 
Source Variables, 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (x10
-2):       
All BRICS  2.10*** - - - - - 
Brazil - -10.90 -3.43 12.50 7.39 -2.35 
Russia - -25.70** -12.04* 5.76 -7.27 -9.24 
India - 12.10*** -0.36 2.19 1.54 -0.38 
China - 1.46 0.68 -0.32 0.91 1.88 
South Africa - 31.50** 26.50*** -1.16 -2.00 6.06 
Constant (x10-1) 4.90 -28.50 -10.94 -34.97 -92.06 -90.71** 
Number of Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Log likelihood -524.40 -104.78 -227.65 -284.48 -307.70 -123.34 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.33 
Over-dispersion Parameter (2) 82.80*** 0.00 0.00 11.88*** 57.74*** 0.00 
Time fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Country fixed-effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Location choice for FDI projects across EU-25 countries over 1998-2010. Dependent variable and BRICS terms 
are measured by the original number of projects.  * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1% significance level.  This can be 
compared with Table 8.7. 
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Appendix Figure 5.1: FDI Projects in the EU-15, 1997-2010 
 
Source: EIM Database. 
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Appendix Figure 5.2: FDI Projects in the CEEC-10, 1997-2010 
 
Source: EIM Database. 
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Appendix Figure 5.3: FDI Projects in Each EU-15 Country, 1997-2010 
 
Source: EIM Database. 
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Appendix Figure 5.4: FDI Projects in Each CEEC-10 Country, 1997-2010 
 
Source: EIM Database. 
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